ORDER
A.K. Srivastava, J.
1. This application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC has been moved by Bluechip Construction Co. Ltd. the plaintiff. in suit No. 2415/96 with a request that defendant No. 1 MCD, be restrained from sealing the front portion of the basement of the plaintiff situated at G-13, M.B. Road, Saket New Delhi till the disposal of the suit. This application came up for the first time on September 30, 1996 and K. Ramamoorthy, J. while issuing notice to the defendants passed an ex parte order to the effect that there shall be an injuction restraining defendant No. 1 (MCD) from sealing the front portion of the basement of the plaintiff situated at G-13, M.B. Road Saket, New Delhi.
2. The aforesaid suit was initially filed against two defendants, namely MCD and Mr. O.P. Chopra. Later on Mr. Jatinder Nath was imp leaded as defendant No. 3. It may be mentioned that defendant No. 3 Jatinder Nath is the owner of the property in dispute and O.P. Chopra defendant No. 2 is the builder in respect of the property in dispute. The plaintiff claims to be in occupation of the property in dispute on the basis of a possession letter dated 2.11.1991 (Annexure-D at page 33 to the plaint). On persual of that letter it is to be found that M/s. Chopra Land Developers Pvt. Ltd. handed over the physical possession in respect of their constructed property in basement measuring three thousand square feet (approximately) constructed on four hundred square yards plot situated in residential colony G-31, Malviya Nagar, Saket, New Delhi to M/s. Bluechip Construction Company Pvt. Ltd. having its office at 155, Carriappa Marg, Sainik Farm, New Delhi – 110062. In the letter it is also mentioned that M/s. Chopra Land Developers Pvt. Ltd. confirmed that they had left with no right, title interest claim or concern of any nature with the said property and that M/s. Bluechip Construction Company Pvt. Ltd. could transfer the basement of the said property in its name or its nominee and in the concerned authorities they would have no objection for that.
3. Though in the plaint the plaintiff says that it purchased the property in dispute and is in possession thereafter since five years till date but it is to be found that no sale deeds have been filed and the plaintiff is relying only on the aforesaid possession letter.
4. Defendant No. 1 MCD and defendant No. 3 Jatinder Nath are vehemently by opposing this application on ground. Inter alia, that the relief prayed for is not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 347-E of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi Act which bars the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in respect of matters for which appeal is provided under Section 347-B of that Act. It is also being contended that the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 had preferred an appeal against the order of sealing and had lost.
5. Defendant No. 2 who is the builder admits that an appeal against the impunged order was filed and was dismissed but he is in support of this application. His support is but natural as he is the builder and he is interested that the property in dispute is not sealed by the MCD.
6. To substantiate the contention that the aforesaid alleged appeal was filed a copy in the form of appeal to appellate tribunal under sections 343 and 347-B of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act was placed on record. It shows that in the form of appeal, appellant No. 3 is one Shri Pramod Dang. Admittedly, he is Director of the plaintiff’s Company. In the form of appeal, appellant No. 1 is M/s. Chopra Land Developer Pvt. Ltd. and appellant No. 2 is Shri O.P. Chopra, who is the owner of appellant No. 1. When confronted with the aforesaid form of appeal in which Pramod Dang is shown statement that appellant No. 3, learned counsel for plaintiff made a statement that appellant No. 3 never filed that appeal and he was also not aware of the appeal till the matter was brought to the notice of the Court on 11.8.1998 and only thereafter on enquiry, it was found that Pramod Dang was shown as appellant in the said appeal. According to her Pramod Dang had never given his authority to file the appeal.
7. Learned counsel for plaintiff-applicant contended that since the plaintiff was in occupation of the property in dispute no sealing could have been made without notice to it and, therefore, applicant was entitled to an injuction as prayed for. She further contended that the plaintiff could not have filed an appeal against the sealing order as it had not been issued notice by M.C.D. and thus it was not a party to the proceedings of sealing before the MCD.
8. I have carefully considered the respective cases of the plaintiff and defendants. The law on the point of sealing is an enacted law and is contained in Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1987, Section 345-A thereof provides for sealing of an unauthorised construction. It empowers the Commissioner, at any time, before or after making an order of demolition under Section 343 or of the stoppage of the errection of any builder or execution of any work under Section 343 or under Section 344, to make an order directing the sealing of such erection or work or of the premises in which such errection or work is being carried on or has been completed in the manner prescribed by rules, for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act, or for preventing any dispute as to the nature and extent of such erection or work.
9. Section 347-B provides for appeal to the appellate tribunal constituted under Section 347-A against an order directing the sealing of unauthorised costruction under Section 345-A.
10. Then Section 347-E provides for bar of jurisdiction of courts. It provides as follows:-
“347.E. Bar of jurisdiction of courts-(1) After the commencement of Section 7 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1984, no court shall entertain any suit, application or other proceedings in respect of any order or notice appealable under section 343 or section 347-B and no such order or notice shall be called in question otherwise than by preferring an appeal under those sections.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), every suit, application or other proceedings pending in any court immediately before the commencement of Section 7 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1984, in respect of any order or notice appealable under Section 343 or Section 347-B, shall continue to be dealt with and disposed of by that court as if the said section had not been brought into force.”
11. Thus in view of the provisions of Section 347-E there is a complete prohibition on a court to entertain any suit, application or other proceedings in respect of any order or notice appealable under Section 343 or Section 347-B. It further provides that no order of sealing shall be called in question otherwise than by preferring an appeal under section 347-B.
12. Admitteldly, the order challenged in the main suit is an order of sealing under Section 345-A. Thus in view of the provisions of Section 347-E, the only remedy left with the aggrieved party is to prefer an appeal to the appellate tribunal constituted under section 347-A. The contention of the plaintiff-applicant that since no notice was issued to it, it could not prefer an appeal, is not acceptable. In fact it did file an appeal which is borne out from the form of appeal which is on record. Defendant No. 2 is admittedly an appellant in that appeal and it is also admitted that he lost the appeal. Even if for arguments sake the plaintiff may be heard on the point whether the plaintiff was not an appellant in that appeal still the plaintiff being in possession of the property in dispute through defendant No. 2, it has stepped into the shoes of defendant No. 2 and thus it is bound by orders passed in the proceedings initiated by defendant No.1. There is nothing on record to show that the plaintiff has any independent title in the property in dispute. As per the plaintiff’s case, the plaintiff is only in possession of the property in dispute through a possession letter given by defendant No. 2. Though the plaintiff claims that defendant No. 2 sold the property in dispute to the plaintiff but there is nothing on record to show that any such title had been passed in favour of the plaintiff except that possession of the property in dispute was given to the plaintiff. In these facts and circumstances of the case, presently, the plaintiff is only occupying the premises in dispute with the permission of defendant No. 2, who is the builder of the property in dispute. Therefore, in matters of sealing by defendant No.1, the plaintiff has no independent right and is not entitiled to challenge the impugned order by a civil suit on the grounds that no notice was issued to it as the settled law is that the notice could be issued only to the builder/owner of the construction.
13. In view of the above disussion, the plaintiff-applicant has no prima facie case.
14. In these circumstances, the application is rejected and the interim ex parte injunction order dated September 30, 1996 is hereby vacated.
15. I.A. is disposed of.