JUDGMENT
D.S.R. Varma, J.
1. Heard the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the appellant-Insurance Company and the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1-claimant since none appears on behalf of respondent No. 2-owner of offending vehicle, despite service of notice.
2. Aggrieved by the order and decree, dated 9-9-2003, passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-cum-Additional District Judge, Nizamabad (for brevity “the Tribunal”) allowing the petition O.P.No. 689 of 1998, filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity “the Act”), awarding a sum of Rs. 3,27,200/-, as against the claim of Rs. 2,50,000/- towards compensation to the petitioner therein, with costs and interest at 9 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the O.P., till the date of realisation, for the death of her husband, by name, Nalla Boi Chinnaiah (for brevity “the deceased”), in a motor accident that occurred on 16-9-1998, the respondent No. 1 therein-the New India Assurance Company Limited has preferred the present Motor Accidents Civil Miscellaneous Appeal.
3. Appellant is the New India Assurance Company Limited, respondent No. 1 is the claimant, the wife of the deceased, and respondent No. 2 is the owner of offending vehicle i.e., scooter bearing registration No. AP25-97, in the O.P., before the Tribunal.
4. For the sake of convenience, in this judgment, the parties will be referred to as “the insurer”, “the claimant”, and “the insured”, respectively.
5. It was the case of the claimant before the Tribunal that on 16-9-1998 at about 9.30 p.m., when the deceased was travelling on scooter bearing Registration No. AP.25.D-2916 and reached near Chakkada Mattadi Village on the road leading from Rudrur to Bodhan, the scooter bearing Registration No. AP25-97 came from opposite direction, driven by its driver, in a rash and negligent manner at high speed, dashed against the scooter of the deceased, due to which the deceased sustained multiple and grievous injuries and died on the spot. Therefore, she filed the said O.P., before the Tribunal under Section 166 of the Act read with Rule 455 of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (for brevity “the M.V. Rules”), claiming a sum of Rs. 2,50,000/- towards compensation.
6. The insurer filed written statement before the Tribunal denying the claim made by the claimant in the O.P., contending that the amount of compensation claimed by the claimant is highly excessive and sought for dismissal of the O.P.
7. The insured before the Tribunal remained absent and was set ex parte.
8. Basing on the above pleadings, the Tribunal framed appropriate points for consideration.
9. In order to substantiate her claim before the Tribunal, the claimant examined herself as P.W.I apart from examining an eye-witness to the accident as P.W.2 and got marked Exs.A-1 to A-5, copies of First Information Report, charge-sheet, postmortem report, inquest panchanama and insurance policy, respectively. On behalf of the insurer, which is the only contesting party, no oral or documentary evidence was adduced.
10. Considering the entire material, including the evidence, both oral and documentary, available on record, the Tribunal had allowed the O.P., granting a sum of Rs. 3,27,200/- towards compensation to the claimant, as against the claim of Rs. 2,50,000/-, with costs and interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the O.P., till the date of realisation, fastening the liability both on the insurer and the insured.
11. Aggrieved by the quantum of compensation, awarded by the Tribunal, the insurer has preferred the present Motor Accidents Civil Miscellaneous Appeal.
12. The particulars of accident, which are not in dispute, are not necessary to reiterate once again.
13. Therefore, the only question that remains for consideration, in this Motor Accidents Civil Miscellaneous Appeal, is -as to whether the quantification of compensation, made by the Tribunal, was just and reasonable or not ?
14. It is on record that the Tribunal had taken into consideration the income of the deceased as Rs. 2,400/- per month. After deducting l/3rd therefrom, towards personal expenditure of the deceased, basing on the balance amount, after applying multiplier ’16’, the Tribunal had awarded a total sum of Rs. 3,07,200/-, towards loss of earnings of the deceased, in addition to the awarding a sum of Rs. 15,000/- and Rs. 5,000/- towards loss of consortium and funeral charges, respectively, and in all Rs. 3,27,200/-.
15. It is the contention of the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the insurer that the present O.P., is filed under Section 166 of the Act and whereas the Tribunal applied the table under Second Schedule of the Act. According to him, the Second Schedule is prepared under Section 163-A of the Act and only in cases of O.Ps., filed under Section 163-A of the Act, the Second Schedule has to be applied, but not in all other cases, particularly in cases where the O.Ps., were filed under Section 166 of the Act.
16. In this regard, it is to be seen that in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Trilok Chandra and Supe Devi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. , the Apex Court held that the principles of Second Schedule under Section 163-A of the Act can be taken as guiding principles in appropriate cases. Appropriate cases, I mean, where just compensation has to be fixed since the Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation and to the extent possible, it is needless to say that the benefit should be given to the claimants, either in the case of death or injuries.
17. It is further to be noticed that the table prepared by this Court in Bhagawan Das v. Mohd. Arif 1987 (2) ALT 137, was prior to the New Act i.e., prior to the amendment effected in 1994. Of course, still various High Courts, including this High Court, have been following the table in Bhagwan Das’s case (supra), as a guiding principle, in appropriate cases.
18. There is one school of thought that, in the absence of any definite formula framed in applications filed under Section 166 of the Act, it is desirable to apply the table of Bhagwan Das’s case (supra). Another school is of the view that since the Apex Court stated that the table prescribed under the Second Schedule, which is applicable to cases under Section 163-A of the Act only, can also be made applicable for two reasons. Firstly, in order to maintain consistency and secondly in order to arrive at just and reasonable compensation.
19. Though the earlier view cannot be kept aside in appropriate cases, basing on the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that application of Schedule under Section 163-A of the Act is desirable.
20. Here, again, there is another area of controversy. It could well be seen that upto the age of 35 years, application of the table in Bhagwan Das’s case (supra), is beneficial to the claimants and whereas for the persons above 35 years application of the Schedule under Section 163-A of the Act is beneficial.
21. It is known law that the Motor Vehicles Act being a beneficial legislation, the Courts should always endeavour to extend the benefit to the claimants to a just and reasonable extent. In that pursuit, it is for the Courts again to think as to whether the application of the table under Bhagwan Das’s case (supra) or the Schedule under Section 163-A of the Act is beneficial and reasonable. I am of the view that it is not only be beneficial but also be reasonable. If the benefit, in other words, looks as out of proportion, by assigning reasoning, the Courts may resort to the application of the other table.
22. It is also to be remembered that in Trilok Chandra’s case (supra), and subsequent cases the Apex Court pointed out that the Schedule under Section 163-A of the Act is defective to the extent of reckoner. The same has been reiterated in subsequent judgments also, but no steps obviously have been taken to connect the reckoner. Nevertheless, the application of multiplier was not found fault with any time by the Apex Court.
23. It is to be further remembered that in Deepal Girishbai Soni v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Baroda , the Apex Court pointed out that if the annual income of the deceased or injured crosses beyond the maximum limit of Rs. 40,000/-, application of the table under Section 163-A of the Act is impermissible. But, in majority of the cases, where the Courts found the annual income of the deceased or injured as less than Rs. 40,000/- per annum, it is inevitable to apply the multiplier prescribed under the Schedule under Section 163-A of the Act.
24. Now, the question would be – as to which table has to be applied when the annual income of the deceased or injured crosses beyond the limitation of Rs. 40,000/- ?
25. In this regard, as already noticed and discussed, there is no explicit bar under the Act that the Schedule under Section 163-A of the Act shall not be made applicable in order to arrive at just and reasonable compensation.
26. In other words, there is no prescribed multiplier in cases where the applications are filed under Section 166 of the Act. In the absence of any such guiding principle, insofar as the applications filed under Section 163-A of the Act, it again just and reasonable in appropriate cases to apply the table prescribed under Section 163-A of the Act.
27. The whole thought process and the exercise, eventually would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and the endeavour of the Tribunal to arrive at just compensation, as envisaged under Section 168 of the Act. In other words, various principles laid down by various High Courts and the Apex Court in different context have got to be understood and harmonized by way of applying the appropriate multiplier, may it be the multiplier under Bhagwan Das’s case (supra) or under the Schedule under Section 163-A of the Act in order to arrive at just and reasonable compensation.
28. Coming to the present case, from a perusal of the impugned award, I am of the view that the conclusions arrived at and the assessments made by the Tribunal do not appear to be unreasonable and unjust.
29. For the foregoing, the Motor Accidents Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is bound to be dismissed.
30. Accordingly, the Motor Accidents Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs