PETITIONER:
SARNAM SINGH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SMT. PUSHPA DEVI & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT27/10/1987
BENCH:
VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)
BENCH:
VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)
SINGH, K.N. (J)
CITATION:
1988 SCR (1) 630 1988 SCC Supl. 65
JT 1987 (4) 158 1987 SCALE (2)861
ACT:
Representation of the People Act, 1951: Section l00-
Improper rejectionl/acceptance of nomination-Distinction and
effect of-Result of election-Whether materially affected-
Burden of proof-Whether discharged.
HEADNOTE:
%
In the election to the Uttar Pradesh State Legislative
Assembly from constituency No. 41 held in early March, 1985,
16 candidates contested. Respondent No. 1 was declared
elected having secured 23,006 votes. Respondent No. 2
secured 20,735 votes being the next highest. The difference
of votes secured by them was in the order of 2,271 votes.
Respondent No. 8 who was working as a teacher in a college
and who was one of the candidates secured 3,606 votes which
were more than the difference between the votes secured by
respondent No. 1 and 2.
The appellant who was an elector at the said election
filed an election petition contending that respondent No. 8
was holding an 'office of profit' under the State Government
as he was working as a teacher in a college and therefore,
the acceptance of his nomination by the returning officer
was illegal, that since respondent No. 8 secured 3,606 votes
which were higher than the difference between the votes
secured by respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2, the
election of respondent No. 1 should be considered as having
been materially affected by the wrongful acceptance of the
nomination paper of respondent No. 8, and the election of
the respondent No. 1 was, therefore, liable to be set aside.
Respondent No.1 contested the election petition pleading
that the acceptance of the nomination paper of respondent
No. 8 was not illegal since he was not holding an office of
profit under the State Government, and that even if the
acceptance was illegal the election could not be set aside
since the result of the election was not materially affected
thereby.
Dismissing the petition, the High Court held that the
acceptance of the nomination paper of respondent No. 8 was
not illegal as he was not holding an office of profit under
the State Government and that
631
even if the acceptance of the nomination paper was illegal,
the appellant had not established that the result of the
election of respondent No. 1 had been materially affected on
the facts and in the circumstances of the case.
In the appeal to this Court on the question: whether
the appellant had established that the result of the
election of respondent No. 1 had been materially affected by
the wrongful acceptance of the nomination paper of
respondent No. 8.
Dismissing the appeal to this Court,
^
HELD: The appellant has not discharged the burden which
clearly lay on him of proving that the result of the
election had been materially affected, even assuming that
the nomination of respondent No. 8 had been improperly
accepted. [640E]
Section 100 of the Representation of the People- Act
makes a distinction between the effect of improper rejection
of any nomination, and the effect of the improper acceptance
of any nomination on the election. If a nomination of any
person at an election had been improperly rejected the
election of the returned candidate is liable to be set aside
without any further proof because it is difficult to
visualise the number of votes which the person whose
nomination has been rejected would have secured at the
election and there is every likelihood of the returned
candidate not securing the highest number of votes. [634E-G]
Clause (c) of sub-section (1) states that if the High
Court is of the opinion that any nomination has been
improperly rejected it shall declare the election of the
returned candidate to be void. [634Gl
Sub-clause (i) of clause (d) of sub-section (1)
requires a petitioner in an election petition to establish
two grounds in order to get the election of the returned
candidate set aside. namely (i) that there has been improper
acceptance of any nomination and (ii) that by reason of
entry of the candidate whose nomination has been improperly
accepted into the contest the result of the election insofar
as the returned candidate is concerned has been materially
affected. [635A-B]
Having regard to the facts of the instant case it is
not possible to hold that the appellant has established that
the result of the election of the returned candidate had
been materially affected because the dif-
632
ference between the votes secured by respondent No. 1, the
returned candidate and respondent No. 2, the candidate who
secured next highest votes was 2,271 votes. Respondent No.
8, the validity of whose nomination was questioned, had
secured only about 1/7th of the number of votes polled by
respondent No. 1 and there were 15 candidates (excluding
respondent No. 8) contesting the election. It is not
possible to reach a finding in this case by making a
judicial guess that all the 3606 voters who had voted in
favour of respondent No. 8 would have cast their votes in
favour of respondent No. 2 alone. Even if about 1350 of them
had cast their votes in favour of any of the other 14
candidates (including the returned candidate) respondent No.
2 could not have become the candidate who had secured the
highest number of votes at the election. [639C-E]
The High Court was, therefore, right in taking the view
that the appellant or any other party had not placed any
satisfactory evidence to reach the conclusion that all or
sufficient number of wasted votes which had been cast in
favour of respondent No. 8 would have gone in favour of
respondent No. 2, had respondent No. 8 not been one of the
candidates at the election, that in the context particularly
of the poll being heavy and the contestants being large in
number, 16 in all It was unreasonable to guess that if the
respondent No. 8 were excluded from the arena of contest the
wasted votes would have gone to the respondent No. 2 thereby
enabling him to succeed, and that the burden Iying upon the
petitioner remained clearly undischarged and the speculative
possibility did not attain the level of proof. [640B-D]
Vashist Narain Sharma v. Dev Chandra and others, ]1955]
1 - S.C.R. 509; Samant N. Balakrishna etc. v. George
Fernandez and Ors. etc., [1969] 3 S.C.R. 603 and Chhedi Ram
v. Jhilmit Ram and others, p ] 1984] 2 SCC 281, referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1177
(NCE) of 1986.
From the Judgment and order dated 17.1.1986 of the
Allahabad High Court (Election Tribunal) in Election
Petition No. 54 of 1985.
R.K. Garg and Ravi Parkash Gupta for the Appellant.
Qamarrudin and Mrs. Qamarrudin for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
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VENKATARAMIAH, J. This appeal is filed under section
116A of the Representation of the People Act, 195 l
(hereinafter referred A to as ‘the Act’) by the appellant
against the Judgment dated January 17, 1986 of the High
Court of Allahabad in Election Petition No. 34 of 1985
dismissing the Election Petition.
The election to the Uttar Pradesh State Legislative
Assembly from Constituenc No. 41-Gunnaur, Village Mirzapur,
District Baduan took place in early March, 1985. 16
candidates contested at the said election. Respondent No. I-
Smt. Pushpa Devi was declared elected having secured 23006
votes. The next highest number of votes was secured by Shri
Naurangi Singh. He secured 20735 votes. The difference
between the votes secured by Respondent No. l and the votes
secured by Respondent No. 2 was in the order of 227 l votes.
Respondent No. 8, who was working as a teacher in the Babu
Ram Singh Intermediate College, Baburala, Baduan was also
one of the candidates in the election. He secured 3606
votes, which were more than the difference between the votes
secured by Respondent No., and by Respondent No. 2. The
appellant, who was an elector at the said election, filed
the Election Petition, out of which this appeal arises,
contending that Respondent No. 8, who was working as a
teacher in the Babu Ram Singh Intermediate College,
Baburala, Baduan, was holding an office of profit under the
State Government and, therefore, the acceptance of his
nomination by the Returning officer was illegal. Since
Respondent No. 8 secured 3606 votes, which were higher than
the difference between the votes secured by Respondent No. I
and the votes secured by Respondent No. 2, the election of
Respondent No. I should be considered-as having been
materially affected by the wrongful acceptance of the
nomination paper of Respondent No. 8 and the election of
Respondent No. 1 was liable to be set aside. The Election
Petition was contested by Respondent No. 1. It was pleaded
by Respondent No. 1 that the acceptance of the nomination
paper of Respondent No. 8 was not illegal since Respondent
No. 8 was not holding an office of profit under the State
Government and secondly even if the acceptance of the
nomination paper of Respondent No. 8 was illegal, the
election could not be set aside since the result of the
election was not materially affected thereby. The High Court
held that the acceptance of the nomination paper of
Respondent No. 8 was not illegal as Respondent No. 8 was not
holding an office of profit under the State Government and
it further held that even if the acceptance of the
nomination paper of Respondent No. 8 was illegal, the
appellant had not established that the result of the
election of Respondent No. I had been materially affected on
the facts and in the H
634
circumstances of the case. The High Court accordingly
dismissed the petition. Aggrieved by the judgment of the
High Court the appellant has filed this appeal.
Since it is possible to dispose of this appeal on the
second ground we do not propose to express any opinion in
this case on the question whether Respondent No. 8 was, in
fact, holding an office of profit under the State Government
or not on the date on which the nomination paper was filed
or on the date of the election. We leave the said question
open.
In order to decide the second question it is necessary
to set out the relevant part of section 100 of the Act which
reads thus:
“100. Grounds for declaring election to be void-
(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2)
if the High Court is of opinion-
…………………………………………..
(c) that any nomination has been improperly
rejected; or
(d) that the result of the election, in so far as
it concerns a returned candidate, has been
materially affected-
(i) by the improper acceptance of any
nomination, or…………”
Section 100 of the Act makes a distinction between the
effect of improper rejection of any nomination and the
effect of the improper acceptance of any nomination on the
election. If a nomination of any person at an election has
been improperly rejected the election of the returned
candidate is liable to be set aside without any further
proof because it is difficult to visualise the number of
votes which the person whose nomination has been rejected
would have secured at the election and there is every
likelihood of the returned candidate not securing the
highest number of votes. It is for this reason clause (c) of
section 100(1) of the Act states that if the High Court is
of the opinion that any nomination has been improperly
rejected it shall declare the election of the returned
candidate to be void. Sub-clause (i) of clause (d) of sub-
section (1) of section 100 of the Act is, however, worded
differently. It says that if the High Court is of opinion
that the result of the election insofar as it concerns the
returned candidate has been materially affected by the
improper acceptance of any nomination it
635
shall declare the election of the returned candidate as
void. Sub-clause (i) of clause (d) of section 100( I) of the
Act requires a petitioner in an election petition to
establish two grounds in order to get the election of the
returned candidate set aside, namely, (i) that there has
been improper acceptance of any nomination; and (ii) that by
reason of the entry of the candidate whose nomination has
been improperly accepted into the contest the result of the
election insofar as the returned candidate is concerned has
been materially affected. The reason for making a
distinction between a case falling under clause (c) of
section 100(1) of the Act and a case falling under sub-
clause (i) of clause (d) of section 100( I) of the Act can
be explained with reference to a hypothetical case. Let us
assume that the returned candidate has secured at an
election 30,000 votes and 20,000 votes have been secured by
a candidate who has secured the next highest number of
votes. We shall assume that a third candidate, whose
nomination paper had been improperly accepted has secured
just 1000 votes. In this case even if it is held while
deciding an election petition that the nomination of the
third candidate has been improperly accepted, there is no
justification to set aside the election of the successful
candidate because even if all the votes secured by the third
candidate are added to the candidate who has secured the
next highest number of votes he would be a person who has
secured 21000 votes and the successful candidate would still
be a person who has secured the highest number of votes at
the election. In this hypothetical case it has to be held
that the result of the election has not been materially
affected at all. Such election petition has necessarily to
be rejected. This Court was called upon to decide a case
similar to the present one in Vashist Narain Sharma v. Dev
Chandra and others. [1955] 1 S.C.R. 509. In that case the
returned candidate Vashist Narain Sharma had secured 12868
votes and Vireshwar Nath Rai secured the next highest number
of votes, i.e.,10,996. The difference in the number of votes
secured by these two candidates was 1872. Another candidate
by name Dudh Nath at the election, whose validity was in
issue in that case, had secured 1983 votes. There were also
two other candidates in the field. One of the grounds in the
election petition, out of which the above case arose, was
that the election of the returned candidate was liable to be
set aside since the nomination paper of Dudh Nath had been
improperly accepted by the Election Commissioner. The Court
in that case held that the burden of proving that the result
of the election had been materially affected on account of
the improper acceptance of a nomination was on the
petitioner and that even if there was wrongful acceptance of
the nomination having regard to the number of votes secured
by the several candidates it was not possible to hold that
the
636
result of the election had been materially affected. In
Samant N. Balakrishna etc. v. George Fernandez and Ors etc.,
[1969] 3 S.C.R. 603 section 100( l)(d)(i)) of the Act again
arose for consideration. In that case this Court commented
at pages 643-644 on the decision in Vashist Narain Sharma’s
case (supra) thus:-
“Mr. Chari relies upon the rulings of this Court
where it has been laid down how the burden of
proving the effect on the election must be
discharged. He referred to the case reported in
Vashist Narain Sharma v. Dev Chandra and Surendra
Nath Khosla v. Dilip Singh and the later rulings
of this Court in which Vashist Narain’s case has
been fol. lowed and applied.
In our opinion the matter cannot be
considered on possibility. Vashist Narain’s case
insists on proof. If the margin of votes were
small something might be made of the points
mentioned by Mr. Jethmalani. But the margin is
large and the number of votes earned by the
remaining candidates also sufficiently huge. There
is no room, there fore, for a reasonably judicial
guess. The law requires proof. How far that proof
should go or what it should contain is not
provided by the Legislature. In Vashist’s case and
in Inayatullah v. Diwanchand Mahajan, the
provision was held to prescribe an impossible
burden. The law has however remained as before. we
are bound by the rulings of this Court and must
say that the burden has not been successfully
discharged. We cannot overlook the rulings of this
Court and follow the English rulings cited to us.”
The very same question was considered by this Court in
Chhedi Ram v. Jhilmit Ram and others, 1984] 2 SCC 281 by a
bench of which one of us (Venkataramiah, J.) was a member.
The judgment in that case was delivered by Chinnappa Reddy,
J. In that case the returned candidate Jhilmit Ram had
secured 17, 822 votes and Chhedi Ram, the runner-up had
secured 17449 votes. Thus the difference between the
successful candidate and the candidate who secured next
highest votes was 373 votes. There were four other
candidates, of whom Moti Ram secured 6710 votes. Chhedi Ram
challenged the election of Jhilmit Ram on the ground that
Moti Ram was a Kahar by caste, not entitled to seek election
from the reserved constituency, i.e., his nomination had
been improperly accepted and the result of election was
materially affected. The High Court found that Moti Ram was
a Kahar by caste
637
and not a member-of the scheduled Castes. Having arrived at
the conclusion that Moti Ram’s nomination had been accepted
improperly, the High Court was not prepared to set aside the
election of Jhilmit Ram as it took the view that the result
of the election had not been shown to have been affected in
view of the improper acceptance of the nomination of Moti
Ram. The election petition in that case was, therefore,
dismissed. Chhedi Ram then preferred an appeal to this Court
against the judgment of the High Court. This Court allowed
the appeal. In the course of the judgment Chinnappa Reddy,
J. Observed thus
“2. We are afraid the appeal has to be
allowed. Under section l00(1)(d) of the
Representation of the People Act, 195 1, the
election of a returned candidate shall be declared
to be void if the High Court is of opinion that
the result of the election, in so far as it
concerns the returned candidate, has been
materially affected by the improper acceptance of
any nomination. True, the burden of establishing
that the result of the election has been
materially affected as a result of the improper
acceptance of a nomination is on the person
impeaching the election. The burden is readily
discharged if the nomination which has been
improperly accepted was that of the successful
candidate himself. On the other hand, the burden
is wholly incapable of being discharged if the
candidate whose nomination was improperly accepted
obtained a less number of votes than the
difference between the number of votes secured by
the candidate who got the next highest number of
votes. In both these situations, the answers are
obvious. The complication arises only in cases
where the candidate, whose nomination was
improperly accepted, has secured a large number of
votes than the difference between the number of
votes secured by the successful candidate and the
number of votes got by the candidate securing the
next highest number of votes. The complication is
because of the possibility that a sufficient
number of votes actually cast for the candidate
whose nomination was improperly accepted might
have been cast for the candidate who secured the
highest number of votes next to the successful
candidate, so as to upset the result of the
election, but whether a sufficient number of
voters would have so done, would ordinarily remain
a speculative possibility only. In this situation,
the answer to the question whether the result of
the
638
election could be said to have been materially
affected must depend on the facts, circumstances
and reasonable probabilities of the case,
particularly on the difference between the number
of votes secured by the successful candidate and
the candidate securing the next highest number of
votes, as compared with the number of votes
secured by the candidate whose nomination was
improperly accepted and the proportion which the
number of wasted votes (the votes secured by the
candidate whose nomination was improperly
accepted) bears to the number of votes secured by
the successful candidate. If the number of votes
secured by the candidate whose nomination was
rejected is not disproportionately large as
compared with the difference between the number of
votes secured by the successful candidate and the
candidate securing the next highest number of
votes, it would be next to impossible to conclude
that the result of the election has been
materially affected. But, on the other hand, if
the number of votes secured by the candidate whose
nomination was improperly accepted is
disproportinately large as compared with the
difference between the votes secured by the
successful candidate and the candidate securing
the next highest number of votes and if the votes
secured by the candidate whose nomination was
improperly accepted bears a fairly high proportion
to the votes secured by the successful candidate,
the reasonable probability is that the result of
the election has been materially affected and one
may venture to hold the fact as proved. Under the
Indian Evidence Act, a fact is said to he proved
when after considering the matters before it, the
court either believes it to exist or considers its
existence so probable that a prudent man ought,
under the circumstances of the particular case, to
act upon the supposition that it exists. If having
regard to the facts and circumstances of a case,
the reasonable probability is all one way, a court
must not lay down an impossible standard of proof
and hold a fact is not proved. In the present
case, the candidate whose nomination was
improperly accepted had obtained 67 10 votes, that
is, almost 20 times the difference between the
number of votes secured by the successful
candidate and the candidate securing the next
highest number of votes. Not merely that. Th
number of votes secured by the candidate whose
nomination was improperly accepted bore a fairly
high proportion to the number
639
Of votes secured by the successful candidate-it
was a little over one-third. Surely, in that
situation, the result of the election may safely
be said to have been affected.”
In the case before us Respondent No. I had secured
23006 votes and Respondent No. 2 had secured 20735 votes.
The margin thus was of 22371 votes. Respondent No. 8, the
validity of whose nomination was questioned, had secured
3606 votes. It is no doubt true that if we assume that all
the 3606 votes secured by Respondent No. 8 would have gone
to Respondent No. 2, Respondent No. 2 would have been the
successful candidate. at the election. Having regard to the
facts of this case we feel that it is not possible to hold
that the appellant in this appeal has established that the
result of the election of the returned candidate had been
materially affected because the difference between the votes
secured by Respondent No. 1 and the votes secured by
Respondent No. 2 was 2272 votes. Respondent No. 8 had
secured only about 1 7th of the number of votes polled by
the Respondent No. l and there were 15 candidates (excluding
respondent No. 8) contesting the election. It is not
possible to reach a finding in this case by making a
judicial guess that all the 3606 voters who had voted in
favour of Respondent No. 8 would have cast their votes in
favour of Respondent No. 2 alone. Even if about 1350 of them
had cast their votes in favour of any of the other 14
candidates (including the returned candidate) Respondent No.
2 could not have become the candidate who had secured the
highest number of votes at the election. At this stage it is
relevant to refer to the observation of Gulam Hasan, J. In
Vashist Narain Sharma’s, case (supra) which run thus:-
“But we are not prepared to hold that the
mere fact that the wasted votes are greater than
the margin of votes between the returned candidate
and the candidate securing the next highest number
of votes must lead to the necessary inference that
the result of the election has been materially
affected. That is a matter which has to be proved
and the onus of proving it lies upon the
petitioner. It will not do merely to say that all
or majority of the wasted votes might have gone to
the next highest candidate. The casting of votes
at an election depends upon a variety of factors
and it is not possible for any one to predicate
how many or which proportion of the votes will go
to one or the other of the candidates. While it
must be recognised that the petitioner in such a
case of confronted with a difficult situation, it
is not possible to relieve him of the duty imposed
upon him H
640
by section 100(1)(c) and hold without evidence
that the duty has been discharged. Should the
petitioner fail to adduce satisfactory evidence to
enable the Court to find in his favour on this
point, the inevitable result would be that the
Tribunal would not interfere in his favour and
would allow the election to stand.”
In the case before us we are of the view that the High
Court was right in observing that the appellant or any other
party had not placed satisfactory evidence to reach the
conclusion that all or a sufficient number of the wasted
votes which had been cast in favour of Respondent No. 8
would have gone in favour of Respondent No. 2, had
Respondent No. 8 not been one of the candidates at the
election. The High Court has on the evidence before it held
that “in the context particularly of the poll being heavy
and the contestants being large in number 16 in all-it
remains unreasonable to guess that if the respondent No. 8
were excluded from the arena of contest the wasted votes
would have gone to the respondent no. 2 thereby enabling him
to succeed. The burden Iying upon the petitioner remains
clearly undischarged and the speculative possibility does
not attain the level of proof.” We agree with the above
observation of the High Court since the appellant has not
discharged the burden which clearly lay on him or proving
that the result of the election had been materially affected
even assuming that the nomination of Respondent No. 8 had
been improperly accepted. This appeal should, therefore,
fail. We accordingly dismiss it. We, however, make no order
as to costs.
N.P.V. Appeal dismissed.
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