PETITIONER: VAM ORGANIC CHEMICALS LIMITED & ANOTHERINDIA GLYCOLS LIMITED Vs. RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & OTHERS DATE OF JUDGMENT: 21/01/1997 BENCH: A.M.AHMADI, S.C. SEN ACT: HEADNOTE: JUDGMENT:
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 231 OF 1997
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 16889 of 1991)
J U D G M E N T
Ahmadi, CJI
Leave granted.
These two appeals are filed against the judgment of the
High Court of Allahabad dated 9.9.1991 whereby the writ
petitions filed by the appellants herein challenging the
Notification No.25/Licence/Part-3 dated 18.5.1990 issued by
the Excise Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh, were dismissed. The
impugned Notification dated 18.5.1990 was issued in exercise
of powers conferred by Section 41 of the U.P. Excise Act,
1910 (hereinafter called the Act’) with the prior approval
of the State Government. By the said Notification certain
amendments were made in the Rules published with
Notification No. 423-Five/284/B, dated 26th September 1910.
Section 41 of the Act gives power to the Excise Commissioner
to make Rules, inter alia, for regulating the manufacture,
supply, storage or sale of any intoxicant; for regulating
deposit and removal of any intoxicant and prescribing the
scale of fees or manner of fixing the fees payable for
licence, permit or pass, including for the grant of any
exclusive or other privilege under Sections 24 and 24A of
the said Act. The earlier Rule 2 was substituted by a new
Rule 2 entitled “Denaturation of Spirit”. The amended rule
provides for a new license for denaturation of spirit in a
prescribed form to be issued by the Collector to all
distilleries situated within his district holding licence
PD-1 or PD-2 and persons holding licences FL-16, FL-39, FL-
40 and FL-41 to denature the spirit. It further prescribed
that the distilleries mentioned above and holding licence
for denaturation of spirit shall be liable to pay a
denaturation fee at the rate of 7 paise per litre in
advance. The appellants Vam Organic Chemicals Limited are
manufacturing vinyl acetate monomer, a basic organic
chemical for which industrial alcohol is the main feed
stock. The industrial alcohol is being produced in the
distillery of the appellants and according to the appellants
the entire industrial alcohol produced is denatured as per
the method approved by the State Excise Authorities and is
being used in their factory for manufacturing vinyl acetate
monomer. The other appellants, viz., India Glycols Limited
and another, are manufacturing Monoethylene Glycol and its
products Diethylene glycol and heavy glycol. One part of the
factory of these appellants is being used for manufacturing
ethyl alcohol produced by them for being captively consumed.
The appellants hold licences in the form of FL-39 to
enable them to use the industrial alcohol as the main raw
material for their product. They were obliged to take out
licence in the form of DS-1 as prescribed in the impugned
Notification and pay a licence fee at the rate of 7 paise
per litre with effect from 2nd June, 1990. The Notification
is challenged on two grounds, namely, that the State of
Uttar Pradesh has no power to legislate in respect of
industrial alcohol or to levy taxes in respect thereof and
further that the levy being not based on quid pro quo was
otherwise bad. The State of Uttar Pradesh contested the writ
petitions. By the impugned judgment, the High Court rejected
all the contentions of the appellants and dismissed the writ
petitions. Hence these appeals by special leave.
Before proceeding further, it will be proper to
understand the difference between industrial alcohol,
denatured spirit and potable liquor. Ethyl alcohol is
rectified spirit of 95% v/v in strength. Rectified spirit is
highly toxic and unfit for human consumption. However,
rectified spirit diluted with water is country liquor.
Rectified spirit, as it is, can be used for manufacture of
various other products like chemicals, etc. Rectified
spirit, produced for industrial use is required by a
Notification issued under the Act to be denatured in order
to prevent the spirit from being directed to human
consumption. Rectified spirit is denatured by adding
denaturants which make the spirit unpalatable and
nauseating. As such rectified spirit can be converted to
potable liquor but once denatured it can be used only as
industrial alcohol. The process of denaturation described by
the respondent is narrated by the High Court in the
following words:
“Denaturation of rectified spirit
is a highly technical process.
Every drum/lot/batch has to be
tested by Chief Development Officer
at the Excise Head Quarters
Laboratory so as to ensure that the
same is according to the prescribed
specification before they are
allowed to be used for denaturing
the rectified spirit. After they
are properly tested, the
denaturants have to be separately
stored under lock and key of the
officer-in-charge of the
distillery, and measured quantities
are pumped into denaturation vats
at the time of denaturation. The
process of mixing goes on for
several hours. The resultant
mixture is denatured spirit or
specially denatured spirit, as the
case may be. After denaturing, it
is again tested to find out whether
it has been properly denatured or
not. The Excise Department is
obliged to, and does maintain
laboratory for this purpose at the
Head Quarters of the Excise
Commissioner. There is a Chief
Development Officer, assisted by
four Assistant Alcohol
Technologists and a large number of
supporting staff apart from
apparatus and other equipment.
Denaturation takes place under the
close supervision of the Excise
Officials in accordance with the
provisions of rule 785 of the U.P.
Excise Manual, volume I.”
The first contention raised before the High Court was
that rectified spirit being industrial alcohol as held by
the Supreme Court in Synthetic and Chemicals Ltd. v. State
of U.P. [(1990) 1 SCC 109] and being not fit for human
consumption, the State Legislature has no power to make a
law with respect to it or to charge licence fee or levy nay
other impost. It was submitted by the petitioners that
industrial alcohol is within the exclusive domain of the
Parliament by virtue of declaration made by it in Section 2
of the Industries Development & Regulations Act, 1956
(hereinafter referred to as “the IDR Act”) and the addition
of Item 26 in the Schedule to the Act. Further, it was
submitted that Entry 8 or 51 of List II of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution cannot support the impugned
Notification. Entry 33 of List III, the petitioners
submitted, could not sustain it as the field was occupied by
the provisions of Section 18G of the IDR Act.
So far as List II is concerned, the impugned judgment refers
to Entries 6, 8, 24, 51 and 66 to conclude that the
Notification is covered by Entries 6 & 8. The said entries
are reproduced below:-
“6. Public health and sanitation;
hospitals and dispensaries.
8. Intoxicating liquors, that is
to say, the production,
manufacture, possession,
transport, purchase and sale
of intoxicating liquors.
24. Industries subject to the
provision of
* **
Entries 7 and 52 of List I.
51. Duties of excise on the
following goods manufactured or
produced in the State and
countervailing duties at the same
or lower rates on similar goods
manufactured or produced elsewhere
in India:-
(a) Alcoholic liquors for human
consumption;
(b) opium, Indian hemp and other
narcotic drugs and narcotics;
but not including medicinal and
toilet preparations containing
alcohol or any substance included
in sub-paragraph (b) of this entry.
66. Fees in respect of any of the
matters in this List, but not
including fees taken in any court.”
Production, possession, storage, and distribution of
country liquor, IMFLs, wines etc. are fully controlled by
the State. (See Section 24-B, U.P. Excise Act). The U.P.
Excise Act & Rules made thereunder prescribe a system of
licensing for producing rectified spirit, for
___________________________________________________________
* 7. Industries declared by Parliament by law to be
necessary for the purpose of defence or for the prosecution
of war.
** 52. Quoted in the following page.
obtaining country liquor, etc., as well as for
possession, storage and trade in these products. The
licensing has the twin objective, the High Court points out,
of raising revenue and regulating trade in the noxious
goods. The High Court finds the Entries 6 & 8 of List-II as
providing the filed for legislation and consequent licensing
for denaturation of spirit and Entry 51 as providing the
scope for levy of duties.
Coming to List-III, the relevant Entry is 33:
“33. Trade and commerce in, and the
production, supply and distribution
of,
(a) the products of any industry
where the control of such industry
by the Union is declared by
Parliament by law to be expedient
in the public interest, and
imported goods of the same kind as
such products;
(b) foodstuffs, including edible
oilseeds and oils;
(c) cattle fodder, including
oilcakes and other concentrates;
(d) raw cotton, whether ginned or
unginned, and cotton seed; and
(e) raw jute.”
A similar Entry is 52 is List-I:
“52. Industries, the control of
which by the Union is declared by
Parliament by law to be expedient
in the public interest.”
A declaration is made by Section 2 of the IDR Act that
“it is expedient in the public interest that the Union
should take under its control the industries specified in
the First Schedule.”
Item 26 of the 1st Scheduled reads:
“26. Fermentation Industries
1. Alcohol
2. Other products of fermentation
industries.
Recall Entry 24 of List-II :
“24. Industries subject to the
provisions of [Entries 7 and 52] of
List I.”
The impugned judgment now proceeds to examine how much
of the field is occupied by the IDR Act so that the area
available to the State Legislature can be ascertained.
Section 18G empowers the Central Government to provide
for regulating the supply and distribution and trade and
commerce in any article or class of articles relatable to
any scheduled industry insofar as it appears to it to be
necessary or expedient for securing the equitable
distribution and availability at fair price. Sub-section (2)
specifies the various provisions that can be made under sub-
section (1) :
“18-G. Power to control supply,
distribution, price, etc. of
certain articles. – (1) The Central
Government so far as it appears to
it to be necessary or expedient for
securing the equitable distribution
and availability at fair prices or
any article or class of articles
relatable to any schedule industry,
may notwithstanding anything
contained in any other provision of
this Act, by notified order,
provide, for regulating the supply
and distribution thereof and trade
and commerce therein.
(2) Without prejudice to the
generality of the powers conferred
by sub-section (1) a notified order
made thereunder may provide –
(a) For controlling the prices at
which any such article or class
thereof may be bought or sold;
(b) For regulating by licences,
permits, or otherwise, the
distribution, transport disposal,
acquisition, possession, use or
consumption of any such article or
class thereof;
(c) For prohibiting the
withholding from sale of any such
article or class thereof ordinarily
kept for sale;
(d) For requiring any person
manufacturing producing or holding
in stock such articles or class
thereof to sell the whole or the
part of the articles so
manufactured or produced during a
specified period or to sell the
whole or a part of the articles so
held in stock to such person or
class or persons and in such
circumstances as may be specified
in the order;
(e) For regulating or prohibiting
any class or commercial or
financial transaction relating to
such article or class thereof which
in the opinion of the authority
making the order are, or if
unregulated are likely to be
detrimental to public interest;
(f) For requiring persons engaged
in the distribution and trade and
commerce in any such article or
class thereof to mark the articles
exposed of intended for sale with
the sale price or to exhibit at
some easily accessible place on the
premises the price-lists of
articles held for sale and also to
similarly exhibit on the first day
of every month, at such other time
as may be prescribed, a statement
of the total quantities of any such
articles in stock;
(g) for collecting any information
or statistics with a view to
regulation or prohibiting any of
the aforesaid matters; and
(h) for any incidental or
supplementary matters, including,
in particular, the grant or issue
of licences, permits or other
documents and charging of fees
therefore.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the power under Section 18G can be exercised only
so far as is permitted by sub-section (1) viz., for securing
the equitable distribution and availability at fair price of
any article or class of articles relatable to any scheduled
industry. To this extent the State Legislature cannot make
any law. The High Court concludes that in other respects the
field is still open to the State Legislature. The High Court
goes on to say that the impugned Notification is issued to
ensure that rectified spirit sought to be used for
industrial purposes is not diverted for obtaining country
liquor or other forms of potable liquor and that it is not
concerned with equitable distribution and availability at
fair price of either rectified spirit or the denatured
spirit. The Notification was, thus, justified under Entry 6
of List-II-Public health; and Entry 8 of List – II –
Possession and sale of intoxicating liquors.
This Court dealt with the question of legislative
competence of the State to impose tax or levy on industrial
alcohol in the case of Synthetic Chemicals v. State of U.P.
[(1990) 1 SCC 109] = 1989 Supp. (1) SCR 623 and ruled in the
negative. The High Court took the view that the distinction
between ethyl alcohol/rectified spirit as such and denatured
spirit was not in issue, nor was it considered in that
judgment and held that this Court cannot be said to have
ruled that every rectified spirit/ethyl alcohol is
industrial alcohol. The High Court reiterated that once
denatured, the alcohol becomes exclusively industrial
alcohol since it cannot be used for obtaining country liquor
or for manufacturing IMFLs and said that it is to ensure
that ethyl alcohol meant for industrial use is not misused
or diverted for human consumption that impugned regulation
is provided for by the State and further that the regulation
being part of general regulation of the trade in alcohol in
the interest of public health is relatable to Entries 6 & 8
of List-II.
The second part of the case relates to the question of
quid pro quo between the services rendered by the State and
the rate of fee charged. According to the
petitioners/appellants, the fee charged was excessive and
hence bad. The High Court pointed to the distinction between
the regulatory fee and compensatory fee. It opined that the
licence fee imposed for regulatory purposes may not carry
with it any service rendered, but that such licence fee must
be reasonable. Further, the High Court said, it would be
appropriate to look to the expenditure which the State
incurs for administering the regulation and if there is a
broad co-relation between the expenditure which the State
incurs and the fees charged, the fees could be sustained as
reasonable. It also referred to the counter-affidavit of the
State to conclude that a good number of officers and
employees are engaged in managing the laboratories besides
the staff which is posted at the distilleries and so the
rate of 7 paise per litre was in order.
In these appeals the appellants reiterate that this
Court by its 7-Judge Bench decision in Synthetic Chemicals
(supra) has expressly ruled against legislative competence
of the State so far as ethyl alcohol/rectified spirit is
concerned. Further, they say that even if the State is left
with regulatory power to prevent misuse of industrial
alcohol for potable purposes, such power did not include
power to levy any impost. Further, the appellants say that
denaturation is a statutory duty imposed by a Notification
under the U.P. Excise Act and no service by the State being
provided for the same, no fee could be charged and in any
case even if the State has to incur any expenses for
enforcement of the requirement of denaturation, there is no
quid pro quo between the expenses incurred and the fees
charged.
We may not that the term `industrial alcohol’ is not
used in nay of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution. All the entries quoted in the earlier part of
the judgment have to be read with Article 248 of the
Constitution which specifies residuary powers of the Union:
“248. Residuary powers of
legislation. – (1) Parliament has
exclusive power to make any law
with respect to any matter not
enumerated in the Concurrent List
or State List.
(2) Such power shall include the
power of making any law imposing a
tax not mentioned in either of
those Lists.”
This is reflected in Entry 97 of
List-I :
“97. Any other matter not
enumerated in List II or List III
including any tax not mentioned in
either of those Lists.”
Whether alcoholic liquors other than “alcoholic liquors
for human consumption” of “intoxicating liquor” was a State
subject or a Union subject should be the real controversy.
It is with a view to describing this kind of liquor that the
term `industrial alcohol’ is used. After an analysis of all
the provisions of law giving the Union Parliament and the
State Legislature jurisdiction to legislate on alcohol, this
Court in the Synthetic Chemical case (supra) held that the
impugned Notifications imposing certain fees as vend fee or
transport fee etc., were held to be within the legislative
competence of the State. A careful reading of that judgment
shows that the Court was fully aware of the fact that
rectified spirit was the ingredient for intoxicating liquor
or alcoholic liquor for human consumption although rectified
spirit/ethyl alcohol as well as denatured spirit are
referred to as `industrial alcohol’ in that judgment. This
Court did not hold that the State will have no power
whatsoever in relation to “industrial alcohol”. In fact, in
the judgment itself, the Court has enumerated the various
areas relating to industrial alcohol in which the State
could still legislate or make rules. The following part of
the judgment can be read with profit.
“The position with regard to the
control of alcohol industry has
undergone material and significant
change after the amendment of 1956
to the IDR Act. After the
amendment, the State is left with
only the following powers to
legislate in respect of alcohol:
(a) it may pass any legislation in
the nature of prohibition of
potable liquor referable to entry 6
of list II and regulating powers.
(b) it may lay down regulations to
ensure that non-potable alcohol is
not diverted and misused as a
substitute for potable alcohol.
(c) the state may charge excise
duty on potable alcohol and sales
tax under entry 52 of list II.
However, sales tax cannot be
charged on industrial alcohol in
the present case, because under the
Ethyl Alcohol (Price Control)
orders, sales tax cannot be charged
by the state on industrial alcohol.
(d) however, in case State is
rendering any service, as distinct
from its claim of so-called grant
of privilege, it may charge fees
based on quid pro quo. See in this
connection, the observations of
India Mica’s case (supra).”
(1989) Supp.1. SCR 623 (681-682).
Denaturation of spirit meant for industrial use is
meant to prevent misuse of non-potable alcohol for human
consumption and as such specifically mentioned by the Court
to be within the legislative competence of the State.
It is to be noticed that the States under Entries 8 and
51 of List-II read with Entry 84 of List-I have exclusive
privilege to legislate on intoxicating liquor or alcoholic
liquor for human consumption. Hence, so long as any
alcoholic preparation can be diverted to human consumption,
the States shall have the power to legislate as also to
impose taxes, etc. In this view, denaturation of spirit is
not only an obligation on the States but also within the
competence of the States to enforce.
This court had occasion to deal with the same entries
in the three Lists and their effect when confronted with the
IDR Act in the case of Shri Bileshwar Khan Udyog Khedut
Sahakari Mandali Ltd. v. State of Gujarat & Anr. [1992] 1
S.C.R. 391. In that case, the matter under challenge was the
validity of demand under Section 58-A of the Bombay
Prohibition Act for maintenance of the excise staff for
supervision of the manufacture of industrial alcohol which
was assailed for lack of legislative competence of the
State. The appellant in that case urged that even if State’s
power to supervise production of alcohol is conceded, the
State could not be said to have the power to impose any levy
to meet the cost of supervision. The court observed:
“According to learned counsel since
the entire judgment of the High
Court proceeded on privilege theory
it cannot withstand the principle
laid down in Synthetic & Chemical’s
case. Levy as a fee under Entry 8
of List II of VIIth Schedule or
excise duty under Entry 51 are
different than cost of supervision
charged under Section 58A. The
former has to stand the test of
levy; being in accordance with law
on power derived from one of the
constitutional entries. Since
Synthetic & Chemical’s case finally
brought purview of either Entry 8
or 51 of List II of VIIth Schedule
of the competency of the State to
frame any legislation to levy any
tax or duty is excluded. But by
that a provision enacted by the
State for supervision which is
squarely covered under Entry 33 of
the concurrent list which deals
with production, supply and
distribution which includes
regulation cannot be assailed. The
Bench in Synthetic & Chemical’s
case made it clear that even though
the power to levy tax or duty on
industrial alcohol vested in the
Central Government the State was
still left with power to lay down
regulations to ensure that non-
potable alcohol, that is,
industrial alcohol, was not
diverted and misused as substitute
for potable alcohol. This is enough
to justify a provision like 58A. In
paragraph 88 of the decision it was
observed that in respect of
industrial alcohol the States were
not authorised to impose the impost
as they have purported to do in
that case but that did not effect
any imposition of fee where there
were circumstances to establish
that there was quid pro quo for the
fee nor it will affect any
regulatory measure. This completely
demolishes the argument on behalf
of appellant.”
The judgment was followed in a later case raising the
same questions and challenging the validity of Section 58-A
of the Bombay Prohibition Act, namely, Gujchem Distillers
India Ltd. v. State of Gujarat and Anr. 1992.
(1) S.C.R. 675. On a proper appreciation of the legal
situation, the fee of 7 paise per litre has to be seen as a
part of the regulatory measure, namely, denaturation of
spirit and supervision of the said process.
More recently by effect of interaction of entries 8 and 24
List II, entry 52 of List I of the Seventh Schedule and
entry 26 of the First Schedule of the IDR Act came to be
considered in the case of State of A.P. & Ors. etc. v.
McDowell & Co. & Ors. etc. reported in JT 1996 (3) SC 679.
The State of Andhra Pradesh prohibited the manufacture of
liquor by an amendment in the Andhra Pradesh Prohibition
Act, 1995. `Liquor’ in the Act was defined as under:
“(7). `Liquor’ includes, –
(a) spirit of wine, wine, beer and
every liquid consisting of or
containing alcohol including Indian
liquor and Foreign Liquor,
(b) any other intoxicating
substance which the Government may
by notification, declare to be
liquor for the purposes of this
Act,
but does not include today,
denatured, spirits, methylated
spirits and rectified spirits;”
We may also notice Section 7A. By that Section
manufacture of liquor came to be prohibited.
M/s. McDowell & Co., manufacturers of intoxicating
liquors challenged the constitutional validity of the Act by
which the Prohibition Act was amended to include Section 7-
A. One of the grounds of challenge was lack of Legislative
competence in view of entry 26 in the First Schedule of the
IDR Act which according to the writ petitioners, vested the
control of alcohol industries exclusively in the Union and
denuded the State Legislature of its power to licence or
regulate the manufacture of liquor. This submission was
based on the fact that fermentation industries were included
in the Schedule of the IDR Act and hence the State was
denuded of its power to licence and regulate manufacture of
liquor. Entry 26 reads “Fermentation Industries; (1)
Alcohol, (2) other products of fermentation industries”. It
was argued that after the amendment the control and
regulation of such industries and their product fell within
the exclusive province of the Union and hence the State lost
its competence to grant, refuse or renew the licences. After
an analysis of all the relevant provisions of the law the
Court concluded as under:
“(W)e must first carve out the
respective fields of Entry 24 and
Entry 8 in List II. Entry 24 is a
general entry relating to
industries whereas Entry 8 is a
specific and special entry relating
inter alia to industries engaged in
production and manufacture of
intoxicating liquors. Applying the
well-known rule of interpretation
applicable to such a situation
(special excludes the general), we
must hold that the industries
engaged in production and
manufacture of intoxicating liquors
do not fall within Entry 24 but do
fall within Entry 8. This was the
position at the commencement of the
Constitution and this is the
position today as well. once this
is so, the making of a declaration
by the Parliament as contemplated
by Entry 52 of List I does not have
the effect of transferring or
transplanting, as it may be called,
the industries engaged in
production and manufacture of
intoxicating liquors from the State
List to Union Lists. As a matter of
fact, the Parliament cannot take
over the control of industries
engaged in the production and
manufacture of intoxicating liquors
by making a declaration under Entry
52 of List-I, since the said entry
governs only Entry 24 in List II
but not Entry 8 in List II.”
It was reiterated in the later part of the judgment as
under:
“It follows from the above
discussion that the power to make a
law with respect to manufacture and
production and its prohibition
(among other matters mentioned in
Entry 8 in List-II) belongs
exclusively to the State
Legislatures. Item 26 in the First
Schedule to the I.D.R. Act must be
read subject to Entry 8 – and for
that matter, Entry 6 – in List-II.
So read, the said item does not and
cannot deal with manufacture,
production of intoxicating liquors.
All the petitioners before us are
engaged in the manufacture of
intoxicating liquors. The State
Legislature is, therefore,
perfectly competent to make a law
prohibiting their manufacture and
production – in addition to their
sale, consumption, possession and
transport – with reference to
Entries 8 and 6 in List-II of the
Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution read with Article 47
thereof.”
The High Court in the impugned judgment has drawn a
distinction between fees charged for licences, i.e.,
regulatory fees and the fees for services rendered as
compensatory fees. The distinction pointed out by the High
Court can be seen in clause (2) of Article 110 :
“110.(2) – A Bill shall not be
deemed to be a Money Bill by reason
only that it provides for the
imposition of fines or other
pecuniary penalties, or for the
demand or payment of fees for
licences or fees for services
rendered, or by reasons that it
provides for the imposition,
abolition, remission, alteration or
regulation of any tax by any local
authority or body for local
purposes.”
The High Court has quoted from this Court’s decision in
Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema, AIR 1965 SC 1107
1965 2 S.C.R. 477, which was based on a Privy Council
judgment in Shennon v. Lower Mainland Dairy Products Board,
1938, AC 708 = AIR 1939 PC 36. This Court said in the
Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema (supra) :
“In fact, in our Constitution fee
for licence and fee for services
rendered are contemplated as
different kinds of levy. The former
is not intended to be a fee for
services rendered. This is apparent
from a consideration of Article
110(2) and Article 199(2) where
both expressions are used
indicating thereby that they are
not the same.’
The High Court has taken the view that in the case of
regulatory fees, like the licence fees, existence of quid
pro quo is not necessary although the fee imposed must not
be, in the circumstances of the case, excessive. The High
Court further held that keeping in view the quantum and
nature of the work involved in supervising the process of
denaturation and the consequent expenses incurred by the
State, the fee of 7 paise per litre was reasonable and
proper. We see no reason to differ with this view of the
High Court.
In view of the foregoing, the appeals are dismissed. No
costs.