ORDER
R.K. Batta, J.
1. Heard the learned Advocate for the applicant and learned APP for non-applicants.
2. The applicant has been charge-sheeted for offence under Sections 406 and 420 read with Section 34 of I.P.C. The applicant filed an application before the Magistrate for discharge on the ground that sanction to prosecutre him has not been granted by the government. This application was rejected by the Magistrate vide order dated 15-1-1996 which was challenged in revision before the Sessions Court. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur vide order dated 14-6-1996, which is subject matter of challenge in this application, held that the revision was not maintainable. Accordingly, he dismissed the revision on the ground of maintainability.
3. Heard learned Advocates for the parties on the question of maintainability of revision before the Sessions Court. The issue is no longer res integra in view of the latest judgment of the Apex Court in K.K. Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2000 Cri LJ 4592 : (2000 Cri LJ 4592). In that case, the accused were prosecuted for offence under Sections 166, 167, 176, 201, 219, 220, 342 and 417 of the I.P.C. read with Sections 120-B, 34 and 109 of I.P.C as also offence under Section 147(G) of the Bombay Police Act. The Metropolitan Magistrate after taking the sworn statement of the complainant, took cognizance and issued process. The accused therein filed petition for discharge on the ground that no sanction was obtained to prosecute them. The Metropolitan Magistrate dismissed the said petition with a rider that “appropriate decision regarding prior sanction shall be taken on merits after considering the evidence that may be produced by the parties.” This order was challenged in revision by the accused before the Court of Session. The Court of Session upheld objections relating to sanction based on Section 197 of Cr. P.C. and Section 161(1) of Bombay Police Act. Consequently, the process issued by the trial Court was quashed and complaint itself stood dismissed. The matter then came up in revision before the learned single Judge of the Gujarat High Court and the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge was set aside mainly on the ground that the Sessions Court should not have entertained the revision at all as the order challenged before it was only interlocutory. On this controversy, the Apex Court in paras 12 and 13 has laid down :
12. That apart, the view of the learned single Judge of the High Court that no revision was maintainable on account of the bar contained in Section 397(2) of the Code, is clearly erroneous. It is now well-nigh settled that in deciding whether an order challenged is interlocutory or not as for Section 397(2) of the Code, the sole test is not whether such order was passed during the interim stage. (vide Amar Nath v. State of Haryana (1977) 4SCC 137: (AIR 1977 SC 2185: 1977 Cri LJ 1891); Madhu Limayae v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 : (AIR 1978 SC 47 : 1978 Cri LJ 165); V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI, (1980) 2 SCR 360 : (AIR 1980 SC 962 : 1980 Cri LJ 690); and Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam (1999) 3 SCC 134 :(1999 AIR SCW 606 : AIR 1999 SC 1028 : 1999 Cri LJ 1620). The feasible test is whether by upholding the objections raised by a party, would it result in culminaitng the proceedings, if so any order passed on such objections would not be merely interlocutory in nature as envisaged in Section 397(2) of the Code. In the present case, if the objection raised by the appellants were upheld by the Court the entire prosecution proceedings would have been terminated. Hence, as per the said standard, the order was revisable.
13. Therefore, the High Court went wrong in holding that the order impugned before the Sessions Court was not revisable in view of the bar contained in Section 392(2) of the Code.
4. In this judgment, the Apex Court has considered its earlier judgments already referred to in para 12 above has laid down that the feasible test is whether by upholding the objections raised by a party, would it result in culminating the proceedings, if so any order passed on such objections would not be merely interlocutory in nature as envisaged in Section 397(2) of the Code, (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Apex Court upheld that the order of the Magistrate rejecting plea of discharge on the ground of sanction was revisable in spite of the bar contained in Section 397(2) of Cr. P.C.
5. In Amarnath v. State of Haryana, (1977 Cri LJ 1891) (supra), it was laid down that any order which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision. It will be appropriate at this stage to quote the observations of the Apex court in the said case :
The term “interlocutory order” in Section 397(2) has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Section 397. Thus, for instance, orders, summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397(2). But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. Case law referred to.
The law provides for discharge in certain contingencies and any order passed in this respect would substantially affect the rights of the parties. Therefore, whether the application for discharge is rejected or granted, revision would be maintainable.
6. In view of this position of law, the conclusion of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur that revision is not maintainable is not correct and the impugned order on that count is required to be set aside. The matter shall now be considered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge on the question of sanction raised by the applicant and he shall dispose of the revision after hearing the Advocates for the parties within a period of three months from the receipt of this order.
7. Criminal application is accordingly allowed in aforesaid terms.