JUDGMENT
D.K. Seth, J.
1. The petitioner alleges that he was appointed in the post of Tax Recovery Clerk for the period 7.10.1989 till 15.11.1990 by the Town Area Committee, Jhinjhak, District Kanpur Dehat which has been so certificated by the said committee in Annexure-1 to the writ petition. Thereafter he was again appointed for the period between 1.2.1991 till 9.10.1991 which is so certificated by Annexure-2. He refers to another certificate dated 27.9.1991 whereby it has been certified that the petitioner had been working from 1.2.1991 till date which is Annexure- 3. Relying on this certificate he contends that he had been working till the date of moving the writ petition.
2. In paragraph 5. the petitioner points out that he was given a cheque for Rs. 3920/- stating that this was his entire salary due and he was informed that he was no more required for any work. It is contended that the petitioner is being refused to work since then. In this background he claimed that he had worked more than 240 days and therefore, eligible for regularisatlon.
3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner Mr. K.D. Tripathi placed reliance on a Government Order which he produced in Court today in support of his contention.
4. Mr. Upadhyaya, learned Standing Counsel on the other hand contends that the petitioner cannot rely on the Government Order which has not been disclosed and for the first time it is being produced before the Court. He seriously objected to the reliance on the said Government Order by the Court. He also contends that the petitioner has not been able to produce any order/circulars which might have overlapping the same in the mean time, where for the same cannot be relied upon. In course of argument, it has been conceded by Mr. Tripathi that the petitioner was working on daily wage basis. He further contends that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the certificates should be relied upon.
5. I have heare learned Counsel for the parties at length.
6. In fact the petitioner has not challenged the order of cessation of the service though he had moved the write petition on 1.4.1992 but on his own statement he was refused to work since after 22.2.1992. In the absence of any challenge to the refusal or cessation of the work, the petitioner cannot claim regularisation so long the said order remains unchallenged. When the petitioner is not in service, there is no scope or question of regularisation of the service until and unless the cessation or termination or refusal of work is set aside. Refusal or cessation amounts to termination of work. The same having not been challenged in the writ petition, it is not open to this Court to grant such relief. There is no scope for regularisation if he is not in service.
7. There is sufficient substance in the argument of Mr. Upadhyaya, learned Standing Counsel. The petitioner cannot rely on a document which has not been referred to in the writ petition and has not been pleaded but the fact remains that this is a document which can be said to be a public document and; can very much be relied upon. By the said Government Order, it was decided by the Kanpur Nagar Palika that those who had been in service till 11.10.1989 and completed 240 days should not be removed. The said order was learned on 8.1.1992. The said order has no manner of application in the present case. Inasmuch as the petitioner was engaged by the Town Area Committee, Kanpur Dehat whereas the said order was issued by the Kanpur Nagar which is altogether a different body. Then again the persons who had completed 240 days on 11.10.1989 were sought to be retained. Now the petitioner was appointed on 1.10.1989. Therefore, he cannot be said to have completed 240 days on 11.10.1986. For all these reaosns, the said order cannot be attracted for its application in the present case, Though the petitioner claims that he had been working after 22.2.1992 on the basis of certificate contained in Annexure-3 which was issued on 27.9.1991 but on the perusal of the said certificate it appears was certified that the petitioner had been working since 1.2.1991 till 27.9.1991. Whereas the certificate contained in Annexure-2 certificates that the petitioner had been working from 11.3.1989 to 18.11.1990 and the matter from 1.2.1991 till 9.10.1991. Thus the certificate contained in Annexure-2 appears to have been issued after 27.9.1991. Though it is not possible to decipher the date but because of the mention of the date 9.10.1991. the petitioner might have worked after 27.9.1991, till 9.10.1991. Therefore, the certificate contained in Annexure-3 at best prove that the petitioner had worked till 27.9.1991. There is nothing to show that after 9.10.1991 the petitioner had worked till the writ petition is moved in April, 1992. In the absence of any material, it is not possible to decide as to whether the petitioner had worked after 9.10.1991. It also appears from certificate contained in Annexure-1 that the petitioner was engaged on 7.10.1989 till 15.11.1990 and this was also his case as contended in paragraph 1 of the writ petition which was supported by affidavit whereas Annexure-2 indicates that he was engaged from 11.8.1989 to 18.11.1990 which also materially differs from Annexure-1. Relying on Annexure-5 which is a cheque issued to the petitioner by the Town Area Committee, the Counsel for the petition contends that this was the payment for the period till 22.2.1992. Receipt of the said cheque in the name of the petitioner cannot be taken into account for the purpose of proving the fact that the petitioner had worked till 22.2.1992 which are being disputed by the learned Standing Counsel. It is not known for what purpose and for what period the said cheque was issued on 22.2.1992. It is not possible to rely on the said cheque for determining the fact that the petitioner had been working during this period without any other supporting material. Even then as I have found earlier, the petitioner had not Challenged the cessation of his work and therefore, he cannot claim the relief which he had sought far.
8. For all these reasons, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.