REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5292 OF 2004
FULJIT KAUR .... Appellant
VERSUS
STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. .... Respondents
JUDGMENT
Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.
1. This is a unique case which reveals that an influential
person can have allotment of a residential plot in discretionary
quota within 48 hours of submission of application and then
assert in Court that she has a right to have a land on a
throwaway price and not to deposit the sale price for quarter of
a century.
2. This appeal has been preferred against a Judgment and
Order dated 21.12.1999 in Writ Petition No. 4763 of 1992 of
the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh,
dismissing the petition against the Demand Notice of
additional price for residential plot.
3. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that
the appellant made an application on 23.02.1987 for allotment
of a residential plot in Urban Estates, SAS Nagar, Punjab. The
Administration, vide letter dated 25.02.1987, issued the
allotment letter in favour of the appellant in respect of plot No.
702, measuring 400 sq. yards in Sector 70 Urban Estate SAS
Nagar, making it clear that as the proper calculation could not
be made and tentative price had not been determined, the
allottee has to deposit provisional price of Rs. 93000/- in four
installments upto 15.10.1989. Subsequently, vide letter dated
25.03.1992, additional demand of Rs. 2,19,000/- was made,
however, instead of depositing the said amount, appellant
challenged the said Demand Notice by filing Writ Petition No.
4763 of 1992 before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana
contending that the additional demand was arbitrary and
unreasonable. A large number of similar cases were also
pending before the High Court and some had earlier been
disposed of. However, the Writ Petition filed by the appellant
has been dismissed by the High Court vide impugned
Judgment and Order dated 21.12.1999 upholding the demand
dated 25.03.1992. Hence this appeal.
4. Sh. Vijay Hansaria, learned senior counsel appearing for
the appellant, has submitted that the High Court committed
an error in dismissing the said Writ Petition relying upon the
Judgment of this Court in Preeta Singh & Ors. Vs. Haryana
Urban Development Authority & Ors. (1996) 8 SCC 756. In
D.S. Laungia & Anr. Vs. The State of Punjab & Ors. AIR
1993 Pub.&Har. 54, such unreasonable and arbitrary demand
had been quashed by the High Court and the State
Government was issued direction to re-determine the amount
taking into consideration the provisions of the Punjab Urban
Estate (Sale of Sites) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter called as, “the
Rules”) and provisions of Punjab Urban Estates (Development
and Regulation) Act, 1964 (hereinafter called as, “the Act”).
The said Judgment has attained finality as the State had
preferred Special Leave Petition against the said Judgment &
Order before this Court but later on, it was withdrawn. After
re-determining the additional price, no recovery has been
made from Sh. D.S. Laungia till date. Therefore, the appeal
deserves to be allowed.
5. On the other hand, Ms. Rachna Joshi Issar, learned
counsel appearing for the respondent vehemently opposed the
appeal contending that the High Court has rightly relied upon
the Judgment in Preeta Singh (supra). In D.S. Laungia
(supra), the State Government, being aggrieved, had
challenged the said Judgment and Order before this Court by
filing the Special Leave Petition but it was withdrawn for
certain reasons. Therefore, it cannot be held that the
Judgment in D.S. Laungia (supra) stood approved by this
Court. Calculations had been made strictly in consonance
with the Statutory provisions of the Act and the Rules,
particularly taking note of Rule 2(aa) and 2(e) of the Rules and
it is to be recovered from D.S. Laungia also. The High Court
was fully satisfied regarding determination of the additional
price and therefore, no fault can be found with impugned
Judgment and Order. Hence, the appeal is liable to be
dismissed.
6. We have considered the rival submissions made by
learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
7. The questions do arise as to whether such an order of
withdrawal passed by this Court amounts to
confirmation/approval of the judgment and order of the High
Court and as to whether appellant could be treated differently.
8. There is no dispute to the settled proposition of law that
dismissal of the Special Leave Petition in limine by this Court
does not mean that the reasoning of the judgment of the High
Court against which the Special Leave Petition has been filed
before this Court stands affirmed or the judgment and order
impugned merges with such order of this Court on dismissal
of the petition. It simply means that this Court did not
consider the case worth examining for the reason, which may
be other than merit of the case. Nor such an order of this
Court operates as res judicata. An order rejecting the Special
Leave Petition at the threshold without detailed reasons
therefore does not constitute any declaration of law or a
binding precedent. [Vide The Workmen of Cochin Port Trust
Vs. The Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust & Anr.
AIR 1978 SC 1283; Ahmedabad Manufacturing & Calico
Printing Co. Ltd. Vs. The Workmen & Anr. AIR 1981 SC
960; Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.
AIR 1986 SC 1780; Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare
Association Vs. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1990 SC 334;
Yogendra Narayan Chowdhury & Ors. Vs. Union of India &
Ors. AIR 1996 SC 751; Union of India & Anr. Vs. Sher
Singh & Ors. AIR 1997 SC 1796; V.M. Salgaocar & Bros. (P)
Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax AIR 2000 SC 1623;
Saurashtra Oil Mills Assn., Gujrat Vs. State of Gujrat &
Anr. AIR 2002 SC 1130; Union of India & Ors. Vs. Jaipal
Singh (2004) 1 SCC 121; and Y. Satyanarayan Reddy Vs.
Mandal Revenue Officer, Andhra Pradesh (2009) 9 SCC
447].
9. In State of Maharashtra Vs. Digambar AIR 1995 SC
1991, this Court considered a case wherein against the
judgment and order of the High Court, special leave petition
was not filed but when other matters were disposed of by the
High Court in terms of its earlier judgment, the Authorities
approached this Court challenging the correctness of the
same. It was submitted in that case that if the State
Authorities had accepted the earlier judgment and given effect
to it, it was not permissible for the Authority to challenge the
subsequent judgments/orders passed in terms of the earlier
judgment which had attained finality. This Court repealed the
contention observing that the circumstances for non-filing the
appeals in some other or similar matters or rejection of the
SLP against such Judgment in limine by this Court, in some
other similar matters by itself, would not preclude the State
Authorities to challenge the other orders for the reason that
non-filing of such SLP and pursuing them may seriously
jeopardize the interest of the State or public interest.
10. In Kunhayammed & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Anr. AIR
2000 SC 2587, this Court reconsidered the issue and some of
the above referred judgments and came to the conclusion that
dismissal of special leave petition in limine by a non-speaking
order may not be a bar for further reconsideration of the case
for the reason that this Court might not have been inclined to
exercise its discretion under Article 136 of the Constitution.
The declaration of law will be governed by Article 141 where
the matter has been decided on merit by a speaking judgment
as in that case doctrine of merger would come into play. This
Court laid down the following principles:-
“(i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against
an order passed by a court, tribunal or any other
authority before superior forum and such superior
forum modifies, reverses or affirms the decision put
in issue before it, the decision by the subordinate
forum merges in the decision by the superior forum
and it is the latter which subsists, remains operative
and is capable of enforcement in the eye of law.
(ii) The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the
Constitution is divisible into two stages. The first
stage is upto the disposal of prayer for special leave
to file an appeal. The second stage commences if and
when the leave to appeal is granted and the special
leave petition is converted into an appeal.
(iii) Doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or
unlimited application. It will depend on the nature of
jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the
content or subject-matter of challenge laid or capable
of being laid shall be determinative of the
applicability of merger. The superior jurisdiction
should be capable of reversing, modifying or
affirming the order put in issue before it. Under
Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court
may reverse, modify or affirm the judgment-decree or
order appealed against while exercising its appellate
jurisdiction and not while exercising the
discretionary jurisdiction disposing of petition for
special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger can
therefore be applied to the former and not to the
latter.
(iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be
a non-speaking order or a speaking one. In either
case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An
order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand
substituted in place of the order under challenge. All
that it means is that the Court was not inclined to
exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being
filed.
(v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking
order, i.e., gives reasons for refusing the grant of
leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly,
the statement of law contained in the order is a
declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the
meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly,
other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated
in the order are the findings recorded by the
Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto
and also the court, tribunal or authority in any
proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial
discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of
the country. But, this does not amount to saying that
the order of the court, tribunal or authority below has
stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court
rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of
the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res
judicata in subsequent proceedings between the
parties.”
11. The Court came to the conclusion that where the matter
has been decided by a non-speaking order in limine the party
may approach the Court for reconsideration of the case in
exceptional circumstances.
12. In view of the above, in the fact-situation of the case in
D.S. Laungia (supra), question of application of doctrine of
merger did not arise and even by no stretch of imagination it
can be held that this Court has approved the judgment in D.S.
Laungia (supra), rather a different view is required to be
taken in view of the fact that this Court had expressed doubts
about the correctness of the impugned Judgment by making
the following observations :-
“In the instant matter as also in the matters
enumerated in the letter of Mr. G.K. Bansal, Advocate
for the petitioners dated January 25, 1994, seeking
withdrawal of all these matters, we are constrained
to remark that no reasons have been assigned as to
why the State of Punjab is submitting to the
impugned orders of the High Court which prima
facie appear to us to be unsustainable. The
direct result of the withdrawal would not only be
compounding to an illegality but would otherwise
cause tremendous loss to the State exchequer. We,
therefore, direct that the reasons which impelled the
State to seek withdrawal of these matters be placed
before us in the form of an affidavit by the Chief
Secretary, Punjab or the Secretary of the Department
concerned justifying the step for seeking
withdrawal.” (Emphasis added)
13. The respondent cannot claim parity with D.S. Laungia
(supra) in view of the settled legal proposition that Article 14 of
the Constitution of India does not envisage for negative
equality. Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate illegality or
fraud. Article 14 of the Constitution has a positive concept.
Equality is a trite, which cannot be claimed in illegality and
therefore, cannot be enforced by a citizen or court in a
negative manner. If an illegality and irregularity has been
committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals
or a wrong order has been passed by a Judicial Forum, others
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court
for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality
or for passing wrong order. A wrong order/decision in favour
of any particular party does not entitle any other party to
claim the benefits on the basis of the wrong decision. Even
otherwise Art.14 cannot be stretched too far otherwise it would
make function of the administration impossible. [vide
Coromandel Fertilizers Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Ors. AIR
1984 SC 1772; Panchi Devi Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
(2009) 2 SCC 589; and Shanti Sports Club & Anr. Vs. Union
of India & Ors. (2009) 15 SCC 705].
14. Thus, even if some other similarly situated persons have
been granted some benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such
order does not confer any legal right on the petitioner to get the
same relief. (Vide Chandigarh Administration & Anr Vs. Jagjit
Singh & Anr., AIR 1995 SC 705; Smt Sneh Prabha Vs. State
of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 540; Jalandhar Improvement
Trust Vs. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1999 SC 1347; State of Bihar
& Ors. Vs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh & Anr., AIR 2000 SC
2306; Union of India & Ors. Vs. Rakesh Kumar, AIR 2001 SC
1877; Yogesh Kumar & Ors. Vs. Government of NCT Delhi &
Ors., AIR 2003 SC 1241; Union of India & Anr. Vs.
International Trading Company & Anr., AIR 2003 SC 3983;
M/s Anand Button Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors., AIR
2005 SC 565; K.K. Bhalla Vs. State of M.P. & Ors., AIR 2006
SC 898; and Maharaj Krishan Bhatt & Anr. Vs. State of
Jammu & Kashmir & Ors., (2008) 9 SCC 24).
15. In view of the above, the submissions made by Shri
Hansaria, Amicus Curiae in this regard are preposterous and
not worth consideration.
16. In the instant case, the High Court has taken into
consideration all statutory provisions and calculations made
by the respondents as under what circumstances the
“tentative- price” had been fixed and reached the conclusion
that the demand was justified. The Court also rejected the
submissions made on behalf of the allottees that judgment in
D.S. Laungia (supra) was an authority on the issue.
17. Rules 2(aa), 2(e), 4 and 5 of the Rules which have direct
bearing on the questions raised in this appeal read as under:
“2(aa)- `Additional Price’ means such sum of
money as may be determined by the State
Government, in respect of the sale of a site by
allotment, having regard to the amount of
compensation by which the compensation awarded
by the Collector for the land acquired by the State
Government of which the site sold forms a part, is
enhanced by the Court on a reference made under
Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the
amount of cost incurred by the State Government in
respect of such reference.
2(e)- `tentative price’ means such sum of money as
may be determined by the State Government from
time to time, in respect of the sale of a site by
allotment, having regard among other matters, to the
amount of compensation awarded by the Collector
under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the land
acquired by the State Government of which the site
sold forms a part.
4. Sale Price:- In the case of sale of a site by
allotment the sale price shall be:
(a) where such site forms part of the land acquired
by the State Government under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894; and
(i) no reference under Section 18 thereof is made
against the award of the Collector of such
reference having been made has failed, the
tentative price.
(ii) On a reference made under Section 18 thereof
the compensation awarded by the Collector is
enhanced by the Court. The aggregate of the
tentative price and the additional price;
(b) in any other case, such final price as may be
determined by the State Government from time to
time.
(2) In case of sale of site by auction the sale price
shall be such reserve price as may be
recommended by the State Government from time
to time or any higher price determined as a result
of bidding in an open auction.
5-A: Liability to pay additional price.
(1) In the case of sale of site by allotment the
transferee shall be liable to pay to the State
Government in addition to the tentative price, the
additional price, if any determined in respect thereto
under these rules.
(2) The additional price shall be payable by the
transferee within a period of thirty days of the date
of demand made in this behalf by the Estate Officer.
Provided that the Chief Administrator may in a
particular case, and for reasons to be recorded in
writing allow the applicant to make payment of the
said amount within a further period not exceeding
thirty days.”
18. A perusal of the above quoted rules shows that the
“tentative price” means the price determined by the State
Government from time to time in respect of a sale of site by
allotment and while doing so, the Government has to take into
consideration various factors including the amount paid as
compensation.
19. The phrase `additional price’ has been defined as the
price determined by the State Government having regard to
the enhanced compensation payable to the land owners in
pursuance of the award passed by the court on a reference
made under Section 18 or further appeal under the Act 1894.
The sale price is the price payable in respect of an allotment of
site. If the site sold by the competent authority forms part of
the land acquired by the State Government under the Act
1894 and no reference under Section 18 thereof is made
against the award of the Collector or such reference having
been made has failed, the sale price is the tentative price as
defined in Rule 2(e) of the Rules but if the compensation
awarded by the Collector is enhanced by the court on a
reference made under Section 18 of the Act 1894, then the
sale price means the aggregate of the tentative price and the
additional price. If the site allotted by the competent authority
does not form part of the land acquired by the State
Government under the Act 1894, then the sale price would
mean such final price as may be determined by the State
Government. However, there is nothing in the scheme of the
Act 1964 and the rules from which it can be inferred that
tentative price is synonymous with the provisional price, and
that a person, to whom the plot has been allotted on
provisional price, cannot be asked to pay the tentative price
determined by the government. There is a difference between
the “provisional price” and the “tentative price” and it may
take a long time for the State to determine the tentative price.
20. In the instant case, the calculations had been furnished
by the respondents as on what basis tentative price had been
determined.
A. Cost of land
1. Cost of land per acre of Sector 70 SAS
Nagar Rs.90,000/-
2. Solatium charges @30% Rs.27,000/-
3. Interest charges from the date of
Notification till the date of Award
@12% from 1980 to 1984 for 4
Years Rs.43,000/-
4. Interest charges 15% from 1984 to
1990 for 6 years on the cost of land Rs.1,44,180/-
______________
Rs.3,04,380/-
B. Cost of Internal and External Development
1. Water Supply @ Rs.1.35 lacs. Rs.1,35,000/-
2. Sewerage @ Rs.59,000/- Rs. 59,000/-
3. Sterm Water @ Rs.1,32,000/- Rs. 1,32,000/-
4. Roads @ Rs.55,000/- per acre Rs. 55,000/-
5. Bridges & Others @Rs.11,000/-per acre Rs. 11,000/-
6. Horticulture @ Rs.36,000/- per acre Rs. 36,000/-
7. Street lightening @Rs.15,000/-per acre Rs. 15,000/-
8. Electrification @Rs.15,000/-per acre Rs. 15,000/-
9. Conservancy charges @Rs.9,000/-per acre Rs. 9,000/-
10. Utility services @Rs.20,000/-per acre Rs. 20,000/-
11. Maintenance & Re-surfacing of roads
for 5 years @ Rs.63,000/- per acre Rs. 63,000/-
12. Maintenance of Public Health service
@ Rs.39,000/- per acre Rs. 39,000/-
13. Maintenance & Re-surfacing of roads
Beyond 5 years @Rs.45,000/- per acre Rs. 45,000/-
14. Division of H.T. Line@ Rs.7,000/- per acre Rs. 7,000/-
15. Earth Filling @Rs.10,000/- per acre Rs. 10,000/-
_______________
Rs.6,51,000/-
C.(Establishment charges@14% + 3% on
the cost of land. Rs. 51,745/-
(ii) Interest charges @1% for plotable area(55%)Rs. 2,662/-
(iii) Interest charges for 3 years @10% each
Year on development charges Rs.1,51,200/-
(iv) Unforeseen charges as well as escalation
Charges @10% Rs.1,16,098/-
__________________
Total expenditure per acre Rs.12,77,064/-
Total Expenditure of 306.59 acres of land
Acquired for Sector 70 SAS Nagar Rs.39,15,34,824/-
Saleable area 6,74,233 Sq.yds.
Rate per sq.yd. 39,15,34,824 = Rs.580/-
6,74,233
21. The plots measuring 100 sq.yds. were to be allotted at
tentative price calculated at subsidized rate of 10% less than
the reserve price while plots measuring 150, 200 and 250
sq.yds. were to be allotted at tentative price equal to the
reserve price. The plots measuring 300 and 400 sq.yds. area
are to be allotted at tentative price equal to 1-1/2 times of the
reserve price and plots measuring 500 sq.yds. were to be
allotted at tentative price equal to double the reserve price.
Taking the overall position into account, the Government fixed
the reserve price at Rs.520/- per sq.yd. for calculating the
tentative prices, in the above manner, for plots of various
sizes.
22. There is nothing on record to show that the
tentative price determined by the State could be
unreasonable or arbitrary and it is not the case of the
allottee that the market value of the land has not been
enhanced while deciding the reference under the Act 1894.
While deciding this case, the High Court placed heavy reliance
upon the judgment of this Court in Preeta Singh (supra)
wherein after taking note of various statutory provisions of
Act 1964 and Rules 1965, particularly, Rule 2(aa) and sale
price as determined in Rule 4, this Court came to the following
conclusion:
“7. A conjoint reading of the above Rules would
clearly indicate that the allottee is liable to pay a
sale price including the additional price and the
cost incurred and also the cost of improvement of
the sites. It is to be remembered that the
respondent HUDA is only a statutory body for
catering to the housing requirement of the persons
eligible to claim for allotment. They acquire the
land, develop it and construct buildings and allot
the buildings or the sites, as the case may be.
Under these circumstances, the entire expenditure
incurred in connection with the acquisition of the
land and development thereon is required to be
borne by the allottees when the sites or the
buildings sold after the development are offered on
the date of the sale in accordance with the
regulations and also conditions of sale. It is seen
that in the notice dated 9-8-1990, the total area, net
area, the payable amount for the gross acreage, the
acreage left for the developmental purpose, balance
recoverable from the plot-holders, plot-table area
have been given for each of the areas and recovery
rate also has been mentioned under the said notice.
Under these circumstances, there is no ambiguity
left in the calculations. If, at all, the appellants had
got any doubt, they would have approached the
authority and sought for further information. It is
not the case that they had sought the information
and the same was withheld. Under these
circumstances, we do not find any illegality in the
action taken by the respondents. The High Court,
therefore, was right in refusing to interfere with the
order.”
23. In Bangalore Development Authority Vs. Syndicate
Bank (2007) 6 SCC 711, this Court, while considering a
similar issue, laid down large number of principles including
the following : –
“Where the plot/flat/house has been allotted at
a tentative or provisional price, subject to final
determination of price on completion of the
project (that is acquisition proceedings and
development activities), the development
authority will be entitled to revise or increase the
price. But where the allotment is at a fixed price,
and a higher price or extra payments are illegally
or unjustifiably demanded and collected, the
allottee will be entitled to refund of such excess
with such interest, as may be determined with
reference to the facts of the case.”
24. In Tamil Nadu Housing Board & Ors. Vs. Sea Shore
Apartments Owners’ Welfare Association (2008) 3 SCC 21,
while deciding the similar issue, this Court held as under :-
“So far as price is concerned, in 1991, when the
names of applicants were registered, it was
clarified that the price indicated was ‘tentative
price’ and it was subject to ‘final price’ being
fixed by the Board. In any case when the scheme
was altered from seven types to fifteen types
flats, it was stated that the amount shown was
merely tentative selling price. The intending
purchasers, therefore, were aware of the fact
that the final price was to be fixed by the Board.
In fact an agreement to that effect was executed
by all prospective allottees wherein they agreed
that they would pay the amount which would be
finally fixed by the Board…………….In the
circumstances, it cannot be said that the
allottees were not aware of the above condition
and they were compelled to make payment and
thus were treated unfairly or unreasonably by
the Board.”
25. The instant case is squarely covered by the aforesaid
Judgments of this Court and particularly, Preeta Singh
(supra) and in view thereof, the appeal is liable to be
dismissed.
26. Before parting with the case, it may be pertinent to
mention here that the allotment had been made to the
appellant within 48 hours of submission of her application
though in ordinary cases, it takes about a year. Appellant had
further been favoured to pay the aforesaid provisional price of
Rs. 93,000/- in four installments in two years, as is evident
from the letter dated 8.4.1987. Making the allotment in such
a hasty manner itself is arbitrary and unreasonable and is hit
by Article 14 of the Constitution. This Court has consistently
held that “when a thing is done in a post-haste manner,
malafide would be presumed.” Anything done in undue haste
can also be termed as “arbitrary and cannot be condoned in
law.” [vide Dr. S.P. Kapoor Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh &
Ors. AIR 1981 SC 2181; Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas
Nigam Ltd. Vs. Devendra Kumar Jain & Ors. (1995) 1 SCC
638; Bahadursinh Lakhubhai Gohil Vs. Jagdishbhai M.
Kamalia & Ors. AIR 2004 SC 1159; and Zenit Mataplast P.
LTd. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2009)10 SCC 388].
Thus, such an allotment in favour of the appellant is
liable to be declared to have been made in arbitrary and
unreasonable manner. However, we are not inclined to take
such drastic steps as the appellant has developed the land
subsequent to allotment.
27. We further find no force in submission made by Sh. Vijay
Hansaria, Sr. Advocate, that in spite of making recalculation
in view of the directions issued by the High Court in the case
of D.S. Laungia (supra), State could not make any recovery
from Sh. Laungia. This Court, vide order dated 20.05.2010,
asked the respondents to explain this aspect and file an
affidavit of the Administrator of the Authority. In response
thereto, an Affidavit had been filed by the Chief Administrator,
Greater Mohali Development Authority, explaining the entire
position in respect of the allotment and recovery of dues
furnishing all details and according to this Affidavit, the
money is being recovered from all defaulters including Shri
D.S. Laungia along with interest.
28. In view of the above, we find no force in the appeal, it
lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. No order as to
costs.
……
……………………………J.
(Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)
…………………………………J.
(SWATANTER KUMAR)
New Delhi,
June 3, 2010.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3546 OF 2007
STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. .... Appellants
VERSUS
COL. KULDEEP SINGH .... Respondent
JUDGMENT
Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.
We have heard Ms. Rachna Joshi Issar, learned counsel
appearing for the appellant. In spite of notice, respondent did
not enter appearance. We requested Sh. Vijay Hansaria,
learned senior counsel for the respondent, to assist the Court
as Amicus Curiae.
For the reasons recorded in Civil Appeal No. 5292 of
2004 (Smt. Fuljit Kaur Vs. State of Punjab & Ors.) decided
on this date, the appeal stands allowed. Judgment and Order
of the High Court dated 06.12.2006 is set aside and the
Demand Notice is upheld. The appellant is entitled to make
recovery in accordance with law.
…………………………………J.
(Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)
…………………………………J.
(SWATANTER KUMAR)
New Delhi,
June 3, 2010.
2
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3392 OF 2007
STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. .... Appellants
VERSUS
G.S. RANDHAWA .... Respondent
JUDGMENT
Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.
We have heard Ms. Rachna Joshi Issar, learned counsel
appearing for the appellant. In spite of notice, respondent did not
enter appearance. We requested Sh. Vijay Hansaria, learned senior
counsel for the respondent, to assist the Court as Amicus Curiae.
For the reasons recorded in Civil Appeal No. 5292 of 2004
(Smt. Fuljit Kaur Vs. State of Punjab & Ors.) decided on this
date, the appeal stands allowed. Judgment and Order of the High
Court dated 06.12.2006 is set aside and the Demand Notice is
upheld. The appellant is entitled to make recovery in accordance
with law.
…………………………………J.
(Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)
…………………………………J.
(SWATANTER KUMAR)
New Delhi,
June 3, 2010.
2