ORDER
P.S. Narayana, J.
1. Heard Sri K.L.N. Rao.
2. The office had raised an objection that the condone delay application filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 instead of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be entertained. In view of the said objection, the matter had come up before this Court for orders of the Court.
3. The facts in brief are as follows:
4. CMA(SR)No. 10135 of 2003 is filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 aggrieved by the orders passed in O.P.No. 1014 of 1998 dated 26,11-2001 on the file of the Motor Vehicles Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-District Judge, Ranga Reddy District at Saroornagar. The aforesaid matter was presented along with an application for condonation of delay of 267 days in filing the appeal. The office had taken an objection to the effect that the correct provision of law has to be mentioned in CMP(SR)No. 10136 of 2003 i.e. the application for condonation of delay. The Counsel for the appellant represented the matter with an endorsement that provision mentioned is correct. In view of Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable. The office entertaining the doubt about the entertainability of application for condonation of delay under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 instead of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has posted the matter for orders of the Court.
5. Sri K.L.N. Rao, learned Counsel representing the petitioner/appellant submits that provision of law is Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in general and second proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 173 in particular. Learned Counsel would contend that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is a general provision, whereas Section 173(1) second proviso is a specific provision governing appeals filed under Section 173 of the said Act and
hence, in view of availability of specific
provision for condonation of delay mentioned
in Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988 itself the general provision of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 need
not be mentioned nor it is necessary in an
appeal presented under Section 173 of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 to present an
application under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1963.
6. There cannot be any doubt or controversy that a right of appeal is a statutory right. When an appeal is presented under a particular provision and it is specific and in the said provision itself it is provided even for condonation of delay, I am of the considered opinion that the specific provision alone prevails over the general provision and it is sufficient if the appeal is presented along with an application for condonation of delay in view second proviso to Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. May be appeals under Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 after expiry of period of limitation be presented under second proviso to Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 read along with general provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, but necessarily always it need not be that an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 necessarily should be filed in the light of specific provision under second proviso to Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. It is also represented that the office is raising this question quite often. It is made clear that there is no necessity of taking any such objection at all in the light of specific provision and hence whenever appeals are presented under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 beyond the prescribed period of limitation along with an application for condonation of delay under second proviso to Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the office shall entertain such applications without entertaining the doubts whatsoever in future.
7. The office objection is clarified accordingly and the office directed to number the application, if otherwise the same is in order.