ORDER
B. Subhashan Reddy. J.
1. This is a second round of litigation for the same cause. The cause for adjudication is whether the practising Advocates can represent the employer not as its Counsel but as office bearers of Federation of Andhra Pradesh Chambers of Commerce and Industry.
2. The Andhra Pradesh Power Diploma Engineers Association has raised and industrial dispute in I. D. No. 44 of 1991 on the file of the 2nd respondent. The respondents are the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board represented by its Member-Secretary and its Chief Engineer (Electrical). I. A. No. 181 of 1992 was filed by the above Association which is hereinafter referred to as the 1st respondent, while the Electricity Board and its Chief Engineer are referred to as the petitioners. When notice were served on the petitioners, they had engaged Mr. C. V. Mohan Reddy and another, Advocates, to represent the petitioners and to contest the case on their behalf. The said representation was not in the capacity of Advocates, but in the capacity of Honorary Joint Secretaries of Federation of A. P. Chambers of Commerce and Industry. I. A. No. 181 of 1992 was filed by the 1st respondents questioning the right of the said two Advocates contending that they are not the Officers, who fall within the ambit of sub-section (2) of Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and that they fall only within the meaning of the term ‘legal practitioner’ referable to Section 36(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and that in view of the bar contained under Section 36(3) thereof and as the 1st respondents is not consenting for the appearance of the above legal practitioners on behalf of the petitioners, the above legal practitioners cannot represent the cause of the petitioners before the Industrial Tribunal. On previous occasion, the Industrial Tribunal, which is the 2nd respondent herein, has upheld the contention of the 1st respondent. Then Writ Petition No. 11101 of 1993 was filed by the petitioners and the same was disposed of by me by Order dated 20-9-1993 remitting the matter back to the 2nd respondent for consideration afresh as some fact finding was necessary as also the consideration of judicial precedents pertinent to the matter. Again, the Tribunal passed the order holding the same view as contended by the 1st respondent, thus, disentitling the above legal practitioners from representing the petitioner in the above I. D. Hence, this Writ Petition.
3. On behalf of the Writ Petitioners, Mr. K. Srinivasa Murthy, contends that the above legal petitioners are the officers of Federation of A. P. Chambers of Commerce and Industry and as such as entitled to represent the cause of the petitioner under Section 36(2) of Industrial Act, 1947 and that merely because the above officers are the legal practitioners that should not make any difference.
4. Mr. Mukunda Reddy, party-in-person who is the office bearer of the 1st respondent, contends that the Federation of Andhra Pradesh Chambers of Commerce and Industry is not and Association of employers so as to come within the ambit to Section 36(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and that the same does not fit in any of the sub-clauses (a) (b) and (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and that the above two legal practitioners are appearing as Advocates and that they fall under Section 36(4) of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and as the 1st respondents is not consenting for their appearing on behalf of the petitioners, they cannot appear.
5. Mr. K. Srinivasa Murthy has taken me to the Articles of Association of Federation of A. P. Chambers of Commerce and Industry, as also to the statement of R. W. 1. He has cited judicial precedents in P. Mallesha v. Industrial Disputes Tribunal Hyderabad, 1977 LIC 248. Suryanaryana v. Vijay Commercial Bank, AIR 1958 AP 756 and Nandlal v. Ramachandra . Mr. Mukund Reddy has cited the judicial precedents in Agnani V. Badri Das & Ors. 1963 I LLJ 648 and K. C. P. E. Association Madras v. K. C. P. Ltd. 1978 LIC 518.
6. In Suryanarayana’s Case, construing the word “Officer” under the Companies Act, 1956 a Division Bench of this Court held that it should not be taken in a narrow sense and that the definition is not exhaustive, but is an inclusive definition and takes in all such persons who represent the company. Same view was taken in Nandlal case in P. Mallesha’s case, a Division Bench of this Court interpreting sub-sections (2) and (4) of Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947, held that even though a person is an Advocate, but he does not appear in the capacity of an Advocate : but only his capacity as an Honorary Joint Secretary of the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of which the company was a member and that the said Advocate being the member of the Managing Committee of the Federation, was competent to appear in that capacity before the Labour Court on behalf of the company and that such an appearance by the said Advocate not as an Advocate, but in the capacity of the Honorary Secretary was within the requirements of Section 36(2) (a) (b) and that sub-section (4) of Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was not attracted. In the said case, Duduwala & Co. v. Industrial Tribunal, , Sarbeswar Bardolol v. U. K. Gohain AIR 1955 Assam 148 and A. D. Shastry v. S. D. Patil 1975 I LLJ 448, were relied upon. In Agnani’s case (supra), it was held by the Supreme Court that a resolution authorising the enquiry committee to frame and to go into all the charges on the ground that the misconduct proved against the concerned employee for quarreling with the shop keeper was within the disciplinary jurisdiction of the employer and that the construction placed by the Industrial Tribunal on the said resolution was final and was not liable to the interfered with by the High Court. This has got no relevance to the instant case. In K. C. P. E. Association, Madras v. K. C. P. Ltd. (supra), it was held that in Industrial law, interpreted and applied in the perspective of Part IV of the Constitution, the benefit of reasonable doubt on law and facts, if there be such doubt, must go to the weaker section, labour. There, the subject matter was a bonus dispute between the Management and the workmen revolving round the applicability of the proviso to Section 3 of Payment of Bonus Act.
7. It is true that any beneficial legislation, particularly, where it is a labour welfare oriented legislation the benefit should always go to the beneficiary in case of doubt. There cannot be any quarrel on this proposition. Such an interpretation should certainly be given by the Court in case of any Court in case of any doubt. But the instant case does not admit of any doubt, as from a reading of Articles of Association of Federation of Andhra Pradesh Chambers of Commerce and Industry, it is clear that there can be Honorary Joint Secretaries and that the above legal practitioners being the Honorary Joint Secretaries of the Federation of Andhra Pradesh Chambers of Commerce and Industry, and there being no embargo for the legal practitioners being the office bearers of the Federation of A. P. Chambers of Commerce and Industry, come within the ambit of Section 36(2) (a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and are entitled to represent the employer i.e. the petitioners, not in the capacity of the legal practitioners, but in the capacity as office bearers. My view is fortified by an authoritative pronouncement of the Division Bench in P. Mallesha v. Industrial Disputes Tribunal, Hyderabad (supra).
8. In the circumstances, the impugned order is set aside holding that Mr. C. V. Mohan Reddy, being the Honorary Joint Secretary of Federation of A. P. Chambers of Commerce and Industry, is entitled to represent the cause of the petitioners in I. D. No. 44 of 1991 on the file of the 2nd respondent.
9. In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed; and without any order as to costs.