THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment Reserved on: 1.3.2011
Judgment Pronounced on: 07.03.2011
+ I.A. No.3125/2010 in CS(OS) No. 1564/2008
Mrs. Anjana Vij .....Plaintiff
- versus -
Mr. Krishan Dev & Another .....Defendant
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Plaintiff: Mr. Brajesh K. Srivastava with Mr. Dinesh
Kumar.
For the Defendant: Mr. Pankaj Vivek for D-1.
Mr. Rajiv Bansal with Ms. R. Veena for
D-2.
Mr. Ajay Paul for applicants.
CORAM:-
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V.K. JAIN
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may
be allowed to see the judgment? Yes
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported Yes
in Digest?
V.K. JAIN, J
1. This is a suit for specific performance of the
agreement to sell dated 20th April, 2006 and for grant of
injunction. The case of the plaintiff is that vide an
agreement to sell dated 20 th April, 2006, defendant No.1
agreed to sell plot No.50 measuring 100 sq. meters at
CS(OS)No. 1564/2008 Page 1 of 21
Rangapuri, Vasant Kunj, New Delhi to her for a
consideration of Rs.3 lakhs and received a sum of
Rs.2,90,000/- from him leaving a very small amount of
Rs.10,000/- as the balance sale consideration. It is also
alleged that the plot, subject matter of the agreement was
initially allotted by the DDA to the father of defendant No.1,
who died on 18th March, 2006 and defendant No.1, claiming
to be the sole successor of his father, entered into the
abovementioned agreement with the plaintiff. Since
defendant No.1 failed to execute the sale document in
favour of the plaintiff, she is seeking specific performance of
the agreement and injunction restraining defendant No.1
from selling, transferring or assigning the aforesaid plot to
any person.
2. In his written statement, defendant No.1 has
alleged that one Sukhbir Singh approached him in March,
2006 and enquired as to whether he had been allotted any
plot by the DDA in its rehabilitation programme. When he
told him that no plot had been allotted to him, Sukhbir
Singh told him that his name figured in the serve list of
1971-72 for allotment of plots and further told him that he
could help in getting a plot allotted to him from the DDA.
CS(OS)No. 1564/2008 Page 2 of 21
Sukhbir Singh took a sum of Rs.10,000/- from him towards
expenses changes. He was then taken by Sukhbir Singh to
one Naresh Kumar, who offered loan to him and also offered
to purchase his entitlement to the plot at the rate of
Rs.90,000/- per sq. meter. It is further alleged by
defendant No.1 that he agreed to sell his entitlement to
Naresh Kumar whereafter he was taken to the office of Sub-
Registrar and his signatures were obtained on various
papers. He also claims that the contents of the document
were got signed from him but were not explained to him. A
sum of Rs.1,00,000/- was deposited by Sukhbir Singh and
Naresh Kumar in his account. He was then taken to
Syndicate Bank where his signatures were obtained on
some papers and some money was given to him, which was
taken by Naresh Kumar from him. He has also claimed that
Rishal Singh died on 18 th March, 2006 leaving behind his
widow Smt. Sarabati, five sons and two daughters and he
was not the exclusive owner of plot No.50, Block-A situated
at rehabilitate site Nangal Dewat and his entitlement was
only 1/8 share in the aforesaid plot. It is also alleged that
the allotment of plot No.50 in Block-A was cancelled by the
DDA and they were allotted plot No.11 in Block-1, in Village
CS(OS)No. 1564/2008 Page 3 of 21
Rangpuri, New Delhi in lieu of the plot acquird in Village
Nangal Dewat, which belonged to late Shri Rishal Singh.
3. I.A. No.3125/2010 has been filed by Karambir
Singh, Hanumat Singh, Bhim Singh, Rajesh Kumar and
Sharbati Devi. Sharbati Devi is the mother of defendant
No.1 whereas the other applicants are his brothers. It is
alleged in the application that the plaintiff is seeking specific
performance of an agreement to sell with respect to a
property, which is co-owned by the applicants, defendant
No.1 and two other persons namely Shakuntala and Suresh
Bala, who are the sisters of defendant No.1. Their case is
that since late Rishal Singh died intestate, all of them
inherited the aforesaid plot being his Class-I legal heirs.
4. The application has been opposed by the plaintiff,
who has denied the co-ownership claimed by the applicants.
5. A perusal of the allotment letter dated 19th June,
2007 issued by the DDA in respect of plot No.50, Block-A, in
Village Rangpuri shows that the allotment was made to the
legal representatives of Rishal S/o Neki (Julahan) resident
of Village and Post Office Nangal Dewat, New Delhi in lieu of
the plot acquired in the aforesaid village. A perusal of
allotment letter dated 28th July, 2008 issued by the DDA
CS(OS)No. 1564/2008 Page 4 of 21
again to the legal heirs of Rishal S/o Neki Julahan shows
that plot No.11, Block-B-1 in Village Rangpuri was allotted
to them in lieu of the plot No.50, Block A in Village
Rangpuri.
6. A perusal of the agreement to sell set up by the
plaintiff would show that vide this document defendant No.1
Krishan Dev claimed to be owner in possession of plot No.50
in Block A situated at Vasant Kunj, New Delhi and agreed to
sell the aforesaid plot to the plaintiff for a consideration of
Rs.3 lakhs.
7. It would thus be seen that no allotment letter had
been issued by DDA in respect of Plot No.50 in Block A in
Village Rangpuri in Vasant Kunj by 20th April, 2006 when
the agreement to sell is alleged to have been executed by
defendant No.1 in favour of the plaintiff. More importantly,
both the allotments were made by the DDA in favour of all
the legal representatives of late Rishal Singh, though they
were not named in the allotment letter. Though the case set
up in the plaint is that defendant No.1 had claimed to be
the sole legal heir of late Rishal Singh, there is no such
statement in the agreement to sell, alleged to have been
executed by him on 20th April, 2006.
CS(OS)No. 1564/2008 Page 5 of 21
8. It is plaintiff's own case that the allotment was
made by the DDA to Shri Rishal Singh though, in fact, it
was made to his legal heirs and not to him. It is strange
that despite claiming knowledge of allotment in the name of
late Rishal Singh and also claiming that defendant No.1 had
represented to the plaintiff that he was the sole successor of
late Rishal Singh, no statement to this effect was got
incorporated by the plaintiff in the agreement to sell alleged
to have executed on 20th April, 2006. This is also not the
case of the plaintiff that she had tried to verify the
particulars of the legal heirs of late Rishal Singh and had
come to know that defendant No.1 was his sole legal heir.
Since the allotment was made to all the legal heirs of late
Rishal Singh and this is not the case of the plaintiff that
other legal heirs had relinquished their share in favour of
defendant No.1, prima facie, it is difficult to dispute that
being only one of the legal heirs, defendant No.1 was not
competent to enter into an agreement to sell the aforesaid
plot to the plaintiff.
9. As a general principle of law, the plaintiff being
dominus litis, it is for him to chose the persons against
whom he wants to litigate and ordinarily he cannot be
CS(OS)No. 1564/2008 Page 6 of 21
compelled to implead a person against whom he did not
seek any relief but, this general rule, as observed by the
Supreme Court in Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd.
v. Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Pvt. Ltd. and
others, AIR 2010 SC 3109, is subject to the provision of
Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the CPC, which provides for
impleadment of proper and necessary parties. This
provision confers a power on the Court to direct to direct
addition of a person, who ought to have been joined as a
party to the suit but has not been joined, or a person,
whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order
to enable it to effectively and completely adjudicate upon
and settle the questions involved in the suit as a party to
the suit. A person, who ought to have been joined as a
party to the suit and in whose absence, no effective decree
can be passed by the Court, is a necessary party whereas a
person is a proper party though not a necessary party if his
presence would enable the Court to completely, effectively
and adequately adjudicate upon all the matters in dispute
in the suit even though no relief against him has been
claimed in the suit.
10. The impleadment of the applicants has been
CS(OS)No. 1564/2008 Page 7 of 21
opposed on the ground that being strangers to the
agreement to sell dated 20th April, 2006, they are neither
necessary nor proper parties to the present suit. Reliance
in this regard has been placed on the decision of Supreme
Court in Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal and others, (2005) 6
SCC 733. In that case, the appellant had filed a civil suit
against respondent Nos. 2 and 3 for specific performance of
contract, entered into between him and respondent Nos. 2
and 3. Respondent Nos. 1 and 4 to 11, who were not
parties to the contract and were setting up a claim of
independent title and possession over the contracted
property filed an application to implead them as defendants.
The trial Court allowed them to be added as parties and its
decision was upheld by the High Court. Reversing the
decision of the High Court, Supreme Court held that
stranger to the contract namely respondent Nos. 1 and 4 to
11, who were making claims independent and adverse to the
title of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were neither necessary nor
proper parties and, therefore, were not entitled to join as
party defendants to the suit for specific performance of
contract for sale. The Supreme Court was of the view that
the persons seeking addition in the suit for specific
CS(OS)No. 1564/2008 Page 8 of 21
performance of the contract for sale who were not claiming
under the vendor but were claiming adverse to the title of
the vendor do not fall in any of the categories enumerated in
sub-sections (a) to (e) of Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act.
During the course of the judgment, Supreme Court, inter
alia, observed as under:-
“11. As noted hereinearlier, two tests are
required to be satisfied to determine the
question who is a necessary party, let us
now consider who is a proper party in a
suit for specific performance of a contract
for sale. For deciding the question who is
a proper party in a suit for specific
performance the guiding principle is that
the presence of such a party is necessary
to adjudicate the controversies involved
in the suit for specific performance of the
contract for sale. Thus, the question is to
be decided keeping in mind the scope of
the suit. The question that is to be
decided in a suit for specific performance
of the contract for sale is to the
enforceability of the contract entered into
between the parties to the contract. If the
person seeking addition is added in such
a suit, the scope of the suit for specific
performance would be enlarged and it
would be practically converted into a suit
for title. Therefore, for effective
adjudication of the controversies involved
in the suit, presence of such parties
cannot be said to be necessary at all….
13……They were also not necessary
parties as they would not be affected by
the contract entered into between the
appellant and Respondents 2 and 3. In
the case of Anil Kumar Singh v. Shivnath
Mishra, (1995) 3 SCC 147, it has been
held that since the applicant who sought
for his addition is not a party to the
agreement for sale, it cannot be said thatCS(OS)No. 1564/2008 Page 9 of 21
in his absence, the dispute as to specific
performance cannot be decided. In this
case at para 9, the Supreme Court while
deciding whether a person is a necessary
party or not in a suit for specific
performance of a contract for sale made
the following observation:
“Since the respondent is not a
party to the agreement of sale, it
cannot be said that without his
presence the dispute as to specific
performance cannot be determined.
Therefore, he is not a necessary
party.” (emphasis supplied)
15….As noted hereinearlier, in a suit
for specific performance of a contract for
sale, the issue to be decided is the
enforceability of the contract entered into
between the appellant and Respondents 2
and 3 and whether contract was executed
by the appellant and Respondents 2 and
3 for sale of the contracted property,
whether the plaintiffs were ready and
willing to perform their part of the
contract and whether the appellant is
entitled to a decree for specific
performance of a contract for sale against
Respondents 2 and 3. It is an admitted
position that Respondents 1 and 4 to 11
did not seek their addition in the suit on
the strength of the contract in respect of
which the suit for specific performance of
the contract for sale has been filed.
Admittedly, they based their claim on
independent title and possession of the
contracted property. It is, therefore,
obvious as noted hereinearlier that in the
event, Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 are
added or impleaded in the suit, the scope
of the suit for specific performance of the
contract for sale shall be enlarged from
the suit for specific performance to a suit
for title and possession which is not
permissible in law.
15….. As discussed above, in the event
any decree is passed against
Respondents 2 and 3 and in favour of the
appellant for specific performance of theCS(OS)No. 1564/2008 Page 10 of 21
contract for sale in respect of the
contracted property, the decree that
would be passed in the said suit,
obviously, cannot bind Respondents 1
and 4 to 11. It may also be observed that
in the event, the appellant obtains a
decree for specific performance of the
contracted property against Respondents
2 and 3, then, the Court shall direct
execution of deed of sale in favour of the
appellant in the event Respondents 2 and
3 refusing to execute the deed of sale and
to obtain possession of the contracted
property he has to put the decree in
execution. As noted hereinearlier, since
Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 were not
parties in the suit for specific
performance of a contract for sale of the
contracted property, a decree passed in
such a suit shall not bind them and in
that case, Respondents 1 and 4 to 11
would be at liberty either to obstruct
execution in order to protect their
possession by taking recourse to the
relevant provisions of CPC, if they are
available to them, or to file an
independent suit for declaration of title
and possession against the appellant or
Respondent 3. On the other hand, if the
decree is passed in favour of the
appellant and sale deed is executed, the
stranger to the contract being
Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 have to be
sued for taking possession if they are in
possession of the decretal property.
18. That apart, there is another principle
which cannot also be forgotten. The
appellant, who has filed the instant suit
for specific performance of the contract
for sale is dominus litis and cannot be
forced to add parties against whom he
does not want to fight unless it is a
compulsion of the rule of law, as already
discussed above. For the reasons
aforesaid, we are, therefore, of the view
that Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 are
neither necessary parties nor proper
parties and therefore they are not entitled
to be added as party-defendants in the
pending suit for specific performance ofCS(OS)No. 1564/2008 Page 11 of 21
the contract for sale.”
11. However, in a subsequent decision in Sumtibai
and others v. Paras Finance Co., (2007) 10 SCC 82,
Supreme Court after considering its earlier decision in
Kasturi (supra), inter alia, observed as under:-
“9. Learned counsel for the
respondent relied on a three-Judge
Bench decision of this Court in Kasturi v.
Iyyamperumal (2005) 6 SCC 733. He has
submitted that in this case it has been
held that in a suit for specific
performance of a contract for sale of
property a stranger or a third party to the
contract cannot be added as defendant in
the suit. In our opinion, the aforesaid
decision is clearly distinguishable. In our
opinion, the aforesaid decision can only
be understood to mean that a third party
cannot be impleaded in a suit for specific
performance if he has no semblance of
title in the property in dispute. Obviously,
a busybody or interloper with no
semblance of title cannot be impleaded in
such a suit. That would unnecessarily
protract or obstruct the proceedings in
the suit. However, the aforesaid decision
will have no application where a third
party shows some semblance of title or
interest in the property in dispute. In the
present case, the registered sale deed
dated 12-8-1960 by which the property
was purchased shows that the shop in
dispute was sold in favour of not only
Kapoor Chand, but also his sons. Thus
prima facie it appears that the purchaser
of the property in dispute was not only
Kapoor Chand but also his sons. Hence,
it cannot be said that the sons of Kapoor
Chand have no semblance of title and are
mere busybodies or interlopers.
14…..we are of the opinion that Kasturi
CS(OS)No. 1564/2008 Page 12 of 21
case, (2005) 6 SCC 733, is clearly
distinguishable. In our opinion it cannot
be laid down as an absolute proposition
that whenever a suit for specific
performance is filed by A against B, a
third party C can never be impleaded in
that suit. In our opinion, if C can show a
fair semblance of title or interest he can
certainly file an application for
impleadment. To take a contrary view
would lead to multiplicity of proceedings
because then C will have to wait until a
decree is passed against B, and then file
a suit for cancellation of the decree on
the ground that A had no title in the
property in dispute. Clearly, such a view
cannot be countenanced.
12. In the case of Mumbai International Airport Pvt.
Ltd. (supra), Supreme Court, on examination of its earlier
decisions in the case of Kasturi (supra) and Sumtibai
(supra), felt that there was no conflict between the two
decisions since they were dealing with different situations,
requiring application of different facets of sub-Rule 2 of
Section 10 of Order 1 and this had been made clear by the
Court in Sumtibai itself.
13. In Gyanender Prasad Tewari v. Om Prakash
and Another (CM (M) No.1873/2006 decided by this Court
on 26th November, 2007), respondent No.2 before this court
filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell
dated 18th June, 1990 with possession of the plot, subject
matter of the agreement. It was alleged in the plant that
CS(OS)No. 1564/2008 Page 13 of 21
defendant had represented to the plaintiff that he was the
sole and exclusive owner of the suit property on the basis of
registered Will dated 13 th February, 1980 executed by his
father bequeathing the suit property in favour of defendant
and his elder brother and a relinquishment deed had
thereafter been executed by the brother of the defendant in
his favour. The original Will and relinquishment deed were
delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff, who made part
payment of the sale consideration to him. On failure of the
defendant to perform his part of the obligation, a suit for
specific performance of the agreement was filed. In the
written statement filed by him, the defendant claimed that
the documents, which formed the basis of the suit, were
forged and fabricated documents and he was not the sole
and exclusive owner of the suit property. Independent
applications under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC were filed by the
defendant and his brother G.P. Tiwari for impleadment of
G.P. Tiwari as a defendant on the ground that both of them
were joint owners of the suit property. This Court, after
taking into consideration the decisions of Supreme Court in
Kasturi (supra) and Sumtibai (supra), took a view that
the ownership of suit property was an issue in the suit and,
CS(OS)No. 1564/2008 Page 14 of 21
therefore, the petitioner, who claimed to be co-owner of the
suit property, would be affected by the decision in the suit
and hence was a necessary party. His impleadment as
party to the suit was, accordingly, allowed.
14. In S.S. Bakshi v. P.M. Mathrani (I.A. Nos.11116,
11119, 11121 and 11132/99 in Suit Nos. 225, 226, 227
and 228 of 1998 decided on 19th December, 2000),
applications under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC were filed for
impleading the applicant Mrs. Sarla Mishra as party to the
suit. In that case, M.P. Mathrani, owner of Bungalow No.9,
Kautilya Marg, Diplomatic Enclave, New Delhi had entered
into five agreements to sell his share in the aforesaid
property to the five plaintiffs. On his failure to complete the
transaction, five suits for specific performance of those
agreements were filed in this Court. The applicant before
the Court was one of the sisters of the defendant. Her
impleadment was opposed by the plaintiff on the ground
that she was a total stranger to the agreement to sell
executed by defendant in favour of the plaintiff and,
therefore, was neither a necessary nor a proper party to the
suit. Rejecting the contention, it was held by this Court
that the applicant, being co-owner having undivided share
CS(OS)No. 1564/2008 Page 15 of 21
in the house, was entitled to be impleaded as a party to the
suit.
15. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has also relied
upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Bharat
Karsondas Thakkar v. Kiran Construction Company,
(2008) 13 SCC 658. In that case the issue before the
Supreme Court was as to whether the appellant, who had
acquired an independent right in the suit property by way of
separate decree but was not a party to the agreement
between respondent No.1 and M/s Modern Development
Corporation could be added as a party in the suit for
specific performance, which respondent No.1 had filed and
whether the decree passed in his favour could be assailed
by respondent No.1 in his suit for specific performance. The
Division Bench of the High Court had allowed the
amendment so as to implead the appellant as a party to the
suit for specific performance, which respondent No.1 had
filed. It had also allowed amendment of the prayer in the
plaint so as to include declarations with respect to the
decree, which had been passed in another suit and for
damages. During the course of the judgment, Supreme
Court, relying upon its earlier decision in Anil Kumar
CS(OS)No. 1564/2008 Page 16 of 21
Singh v. Shivnath Mishra, (1995) 3 SCC 147, held that
respondent No.1 was not entitled to be joined as a party to
the suit and he could file a separate suit to challenge the
consent decree. During the course of the judgment,
Supreme Court, inter alia, observed as under:-
“28. Along with that is the other
question, which very often raises its head
in suits for specific performance, that is,
whether a stranger to an agreement for
sale can be added as a party in a suit for
specific performance of an agreement for
sale in view of Section 15 of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963. The relevant provision of
Section 15 with which we are concerned
is contained in clause (a) thereof and
entitles any party to the contract to seek
specific performance of such contract.
Admittedly, the appellant herein is a third
party to the agreement and does not,
therefore, fall within the category of
“parties to the agreement”. The appellant
also does not come within the ambit of
Section 19 of the said Act, which provides
for relief against parties and persons
claiming under them by subsequent
title.”
16. The facts and circumstances of this case are
altogether different from the facts in the case of Kasturi
(supra) and Bharat Karsondas Thakkar (supra). In
neither of these cases, the applicant seeking impleadment
as a party to the suit, claimed to be co-owner of the suit
property, along with the vendor. As noted earlier, the plot in
question was allotted by DDA to all the legal representatives
CS(OS)No. 1564/2008 Page 17 of 21
of late Rishal Singh and not to defendant No.1 alone. No
relinquishment deed in favour of defendant No.1 has even
been claimed by the plaintiff. There is no averment in the
agreement to sell set up by the plaintiff that defendant No.1
was the sole legal heir of late Rishal Singh. Therefore, the
fact situation in this case is altogether different and prima
facie, it appears that defendant No.1 alone had no legal
right to enter into an agreement with respect to the plot,
which had been allotted to all the legal heirs of late Rishal
Singh. In Sumtibai (supra), which is a decision later than
the decision in the case of Kasturi (supra) and has taken
Kasturi (supra) into consideration, Supreme Court was of
the view that if a third party shows some semblance of title
and interest in the property in dispute, he ought to be
impleaded as a party to the suit. In that case, it was found
that sale deed vide which the property was purchased was
executed in favour of not only Kapoor Chand but also his
sons, which indicated that Kapoor Chand had no semblance
of title in the property. In the present case also, the
allotment by DDA being in favour of all the legal
representatives of late Rishal Singh, it is difficult to dispute
that all his legal heirs have a share in the plot, subject
CS(OS)No. 1564/2008 Page 18 of 21
matter of the agreement to sale dated 20th April, 2006.
17. In State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra,
AIR 1968 SC 647, Supreme Court, inter alia, observed as
under:-
“there are two observations of a general
character which I wish to make, and one
is to repeat what I have very often said
before, that every judgment must be read
as applicable to the particular facts
proved, or assumed to be proved, since
the generality of the expressions which
may be found there are not intended to
be expositions of the whole law, but
governed and qualified by the particular
facts of the case in which such
expressions are to be found. The other is
that a case is only an authority for what
it actually decides. I entirely deny that it
can be quoted for a proposition that may
seem to follow logically from it. Such a
mode of reasoning assumes that the law
is necessarily a logical code, whereas
every lawyer must acknowledge that the
law is not always logical at all. “
In Bhavnagar University v. palitana Sugar Mill
(P) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111, Supreme Court, inter alia,
observed as under:-
“It is also well settled that a little
difference in facts or additional facts may
make a lot of difference in the
precedential value of a decision.”
CS(OS)No. 1564/2008 Page 19 of 21
Vairamani, (2004) 8 SCC 579, Supreme Court, inter alia,
observed as under:-
“9. Courts should not place
reliance on decisions without discussing
as to how the factual situation fits in with
the fact situation of the decision on which
reliance is placed. Observations of courts
are neither to be read as Euclid’s
theorems nor as provisions of a statute
and that too taken out of their context.
These observations must be read in the
context in which they appear to have
been stated. Judgments of courts are not
to be construed as statutes. To interpret
words, phrases and provisions of a
statute, it may become necessary for
judges to embark into lengthy
discussions but the discussion is meant
to explain and not to define. Judges
interpret statutes, they do not interpret
judgments. They interpret words of
statutes; their words are not to be
interpreted as statutes.”
18. Since the fact in the case of Sumtibai (supra) as
also in the case of Gyanender Prasad Tewari (supra) and
S.S. Bakshi (supra) were identical whereas the facts in the
case of Kasturi (supra) and Bharat Karsondas Thakkar
(supra) were altogether different, I am of the view that in the
facts and circumstances of this case, it would not be
appropriate to drive the applicants to another litigation by
compelling them to file a fresh suit instead of impleading
them as parties to the suit, when the facts and
circumstances of the case clearly indicate that defendant
CS(OS)No. 1564/2008 Page 20 of 21
No.1 was not the sole owner of the plot, subject matter of
the agreement to sell dated 20th April, 2006 and was only
one of its several co-owners.
19. For the reasons given in the preceding paragraphs,
I.A. No. 3125/2010 is allowed and the plaintiff is directed to
file amended memo of parties impleading the applicants as
well as Smt. Shakuntala and Smt. Suresh Bala, sisters of
defendant No.1 as parties to the suit. The applicants before
this Court will be entitled to file written statement within 30
days from the date of filing of the amended memo of parties.
Suit summons along with notice of pending applications, if
any, be also issued to Smt. Shakuntala and Smt. Suresh
Bala, sisters of defendant No.1, for 27th April, 2011.
20. The application stands disposed of.
(V.K. JAIN)
JUDGE
MARCH 07, 2011
vkm
CS(OS)No. 1564/2008 Page 21 of 21