ORDER
P.K. Misra, J.
1. This matter, which was heard earlier, has been posted “For Orders” on 15.12.2004, as the Special Government Pleader wanted to make further submission. The matter was again directed to be listed to-day. However, the Office has not included the matter in the printed cause list, and therefore, the matter has been listed in the Additional List.
2. Heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties further.
3. The present writ petition has been filed by the Government against the order of the Tribunal dated 26.2.2002 in O.A. No. 4972 of 2000. Under the said order, the Tribunal quashed the punishment of stoppage of increment for three months without cumulative effect on the finding that the charges had not been properly established before the enquiry officer.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently contended that it was not within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere in the matter relating to disciplinary proceedings as if the Tribunal was sitting as an appellate authority.
5. Without going into merits of such contention, we feel that the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches, on the part of the Government.
6. The order of punishment was stoppage of increment for 3 months without cumulative effect. In other words, the punishment was very minor. Such punishment had been imposed on 12.3.1999, relating to some incident which occurred in the year 1986. Original Application was filed in 2000 before the Tribunal and was disposed of on 26.2.2002, quashing such punishment. The writ petition has been filed only in July, 2004, that is to say, after a lapse of 2 years and four months. In the writ petition itself not a single word has been whispered as to why there was such an inordinate delay in filing the writ petition. It is of course true that there is no prescribed period of limitation for filing a writ petition. However, law is well settled that a writ petition is to be filed as expeditiously as possible without any laches or without any unnecessary delay. Where, however, adequate explanation is furnished explaining the reason for not filing the writ petition within a reasonable period, the High Court can always consider such aspect and deal with the matter on merit. As already indicated, in the present case, nothing has been indicated as to why there is such inordinate delay. Thus the question of laches assumes importance in the present case.
7. The alleged incident took place in the year 1986 and the proceedings was initiated in the year 1992. Charge memo was issued in 1997 and the order of punishment of stoppage of increment for three months was imposed in March, 1999 and the order quashing such punishment was made on 26.2.2002. In other words, for such a minor matter the first respondent has already undergone considerable mental agony and has already faced the prolonged litigations and more than 18 years have been elapsed from the time of the alleged incident till now. In such circumstances, it would be more unjust to ignore the laches on the part of the Government.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court (THE SPECIAL TEHSILDAR, LAND ACQUISITION, KERALA v. K.V. AYISUMMA) and contended that so far as the position of the Government as a litigant is concerned, it stands on a different footing and the Court should not insist upon the delay being explained.
9. We have carefully gone through the decision and we do not find that the aforesaid decision has the effect of laying down a general principle that in every case where the Government as litigant files a writ petition or appeal, the question of laches or inordinate delay cannot be raised. As a matter of fact, the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court related to condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act under following circumstances. In proceeding arising under the Land Acquisition Act, the Review Application filed by the Government was beyond the period of limitation. However, the trial court considering the explanation had condoned such delay, which was reversed by the High Court, and the matter was taken to the Supreme Court. While considering this, the Supreme Court observed:-
“2. It is now settled law that when the delay was occasioned at the behest of the Government, it would be very difficult to explain the day to day delay. The transaction of the business of the Government being done leisurely by officers who had no or evince no personal interest at different levels. No one takes personal responsibility in processing the matters expeditiously. As a fact at several stages, they take their own time to reach a decision. Even in spite of pointing at the delay, they do not take expeditious action for ultimate decision in filing the appeal. This case is one of such instances. It is true that Section 5 of the Limitation Act envisages explanation of the delay to the satisfaction of the Court and in matters of Limitation Act made no distinction between the State and the citizen. Nonetheless adoption of strict standard of proof leads to grave miscarriage of public justice. It would result in public mischief by skilful management of delay in the process of filing the appeal. The approach of the Court would be pragmatic but not pedantic. Under those circumstances, the Subordinate Judge has rightly adopted correct approach and had condoned the delay without insisting upon explaining every day’s delay in filing the review application in the light of the law laid down by this Court. The High Court was not right in setting aside the order. Delay was rightly condoned.”
10. We are unable to find any support from the aforesaid principle in the present case. At the cost of repetition, it may be indicated that in the present case there is absolutely no whisper as to why the Government had taken more than 28 months for filing the writ petition. Moreover, as already indicated, a trivial matter has remained for 18 years at different stages causing much mental agony as well as attendant disadvantage to the first respondent in his service career and it would be indeed adding insult to the injury if such belated writ petition at the instance of the Government would be decided against the first respondent.
11. Learned Special Government Pleader has further submitted that since the matter was already admitted, the question of laches or inordinate delay in filing the writ petition has paled to insignificance and cannot be re-agitated at this stage.
12. We do not find any substance in such submission. It is well known that at the time of admission of the writ petition, the matter is taken ex-parte and such questions are not brought to the notice of the Court. It is of course true that there are several decisions of the Supreme Court as well as this Court to the effect that when there is question of exhausting the alternative remedy before a person comes to the Court by way of writ petition, which entertained is kept pending for a long time, such a delay is considered as a relevant aspect to repel such contention regarding existence of alternative remedy as it is considered that the person should not be driven to take resort to alternative remedy after a long lapse of time. However, such a principle cannot be applied to the case of question relating to laches. Even under the Limitation Act, when the appeal is admitted ignoring the question of delay or condoning the delay ex-parte, a litigant has every right to raise the question of delay at the final stage (see 1917 Privy Council 179 KRISHNASAMI PANIKONDAR v. RAMASAMI CHETTIAR and Ors.). Since the first respondent had no opportunity to oppose admission, it is always open to him to raise the question of laches at the time when the matter is taken up for final disposal.
13. Having regard to all these aspects, we dismiss the writ petition.
14. Learned counsel for the first respondent has submitted that pending of the departmental proceedings was considered as a bar for considering the question of promotion. Now that the departmental proceedings has been finalised and the punishment had been quashed, it goes without saying that the question of promotion shall be considered by the petitioner in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of the order.
15. Subject to the aforesaid observation, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, WPMP. No. 25820 of 2004 and WVMP. No. 1884 of 2004 are closed.