ORDER
S.K. Bhatnagar, Vice President
1. This is a stay application filed with reference to the order of the
Additional Collector, Allahabad dated 6-2-1992.
2. The learned Counsel stated that in this case they stored molasses in
kachcha pits within the licensed premises initially with the permission of
the Department.
3. Subsequently, the permission was withdrawn and a show cause notice has
been issued demanding duty on molasses which were still lying in the
kachcha pits after the withdrawal of the permission.
4. It was also their contention that they had applied for remission of duty
in respect of the molasses stored in the kachcha pits as it had been
deteriorated but the Ld. Additional Collector has proceeded to adjudicate
this matter without first disposing of their remission application in spite
of their request to keep this matter in abeyance pending decision on their
remission application.
5. In this connection he would like to draw the attention of the Bench to
the show cause notice and the order-in-original itself.
6. Learned DR strongly opposed the prayer and reiterated the Department’s
view point as expressed in the order of the learned Additional Collector.
7. In response to queries from the Bench, the learned Counsel stated that
the learned Additional Collector has not recorded any finding with
referSence to their submission on limitation and has further wrongly
applied Rule 9A(5).
8. We have considered the submissions of both sides.
9. We observe that in view of the contents of the show cause notice and the
order-in-original itself, prima facie it appears that the material in
question was still in the kachcha pits said to be within the licensed
premises during the relevant time.
10. The fact of storage in kachcha pits was apparently known to the
Department. There is reference to the remission application in the order
itself and admittedly it was pending consideration of the Department, when
the adjudication proceedings in this matter were taken up. It is also a
fact that duty is normally required to be paid on excisable goods at the
time of removal from the factory. Looking to the totality of facts and
circumstances of this case and noting the above aspects in particular
including that of time bar we feel that the appellants were able to show a
prima facie case in their favour. We, therefore, grant the prayer.