ORDER
M. Karpagavinayagam, J.
1. Mr. R.N. Jeyaprakash, the petitioner herein, challenging the impugned order, dismissing his application in Crl. M.P. No. 69 of 1997 in Spl. C. C. No. 1 of 1997 on the file of the learned XI Additional and Special Judge, Chennai, requesting for discharge, has resorted to filing of this revision before this Court.
2. The State represented by Additional Superintendent of Police, Crime Branch C.I.D. Headquarters, Chennai, filed the charge-sheet against the petitioner and five others on the allegations that they committed offences punishable under Section 120-B r/w Sections 409, 420, I.P.C. and under Section 13(2) r/w 13(i)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act and 409, 409 r/w 109, 420, 420 r/w 109 I.P.C. and 13(2) r/w 14(i)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The petitioner is A2.
3. According to the prosecution, A1 to A6 agreed to do certain illegal acts in respect of placing of purchase orders for sarees and dhoties under the Chief Minister’s free distribution scheme for Pongal 1992 with the three bogus firms by violating the purchase procedure, norms and Government instructions for the puipose of committing criminal breach of trust on the funds of Tamil Nadu Textile Corporation, Government of Tamil Nadu and in furtherance of the said criminal conspirary, the accused persons committed criminal breach of trust by causing wrongful loss to the tune of Rs. 3, 54,98,049/-.
4. Mr. K. Asokan, the learned senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, while attacking the impugned order, has put forward the following submissions :
There is no legal evidence in support of the charge brought against the petitioner. The evidence of two witnesses which has been relied upon by the prosecution against the petitioner will not stand the test of sanctity under Section 239, Cr.P.C. The statement of witness No. 6 in relation to the portion where the petitioner is said to have informed him about the alleged conversation with the Minister, is in the nature of extra-judicial confession. This piece of evidence, being weak, is wholly insufficient. The alleged telephone calls made from the house of the mother-in-law of the petitioner and the alleged enquiry by this petitioner with regard to the files with the witness No. 6 relating to the imposition of penalty to the tenderers would not raise even any suspicion in order to substantiate the charges.
5. In support of the above contentions, the learned senior counsel as well cited the authorities of the Supreme Court and strenuously contended that the trial Court ought to have discharged the petitioner, as there is no sufficient evidence to frame charge against the petitioner. The authorities are: (1) Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal 1979 SCC (Cri) 609 : 1979 Cri LJ 154 and (2) Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya 1991 SCC (Cri) 47 : 1990 Cri LJ 1869.
6. The gist of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in consideration of Sections 227 and, 228, Cr.P.C. is this :
The words ‘not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused’ clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the Court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really his function after the trial starts. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. By and large, if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused. The Judge, exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227, Cr.P.C, is a senior and experienced person and he cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. The Court may for the limited purpose sift the evidence, as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.
7. In the light of the broad principles laid down by the Apex Court, as referred above, Mr. K. Asokan, the learned senior counsel took me through the relevant portions of the statements of the witnesses and contended that the said statements, besides not connecting the petitioner with the crime, would also not be sufficient to hold that there is a ground for presuming that the petitioner has committed the offence.
8. On careful consideration of the effective submissions made by the senior counsel and reading of the provisions in Cr.P.C, there is no difficulty for this Court to come to the conclusion that the trial Court shall discharge the accused, if there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused on consideration of both the records and the submissions of the accused and that on the contrary, if the trial Court has formed an opinion that there is ground to presume that the accused committed an offence triable by it, shall frame the charge.
9. As pointed out by the Apex Court, the Court while considering the application for discharge can sift the evidence and form opinion only on the limited question to decide whether a prima facie case is made out to frame charge, as it need not accept the prosecution case as a gospel truth and the trial Court is not a mouthpiece of the prosecution.
10. In the light of this dictum, let us now indulge in the sifting of the evidence to take note of the total effect of the materials collected by the prosecution as against the petitioner.
11. Al in this case is a former Minister. The case of the prosecution as projected by one Kanagaraj, an I. A.S. Officer who was working as the Managing Director of Tamil Nadu Textile Corporation at Coimbatore is this : He was compelled to give the advance amount to the bogus companies by violating the procedures. When he did not advance the amount as compelled by Al through telephone, the petitioner who is the brother-in-law of the former Minister (A1) threatened him to go on leave as the Minister has desired to appoint another I.A.S. Officer by name Narasimhalu in his place. After he went on medical leave, the said Narasimhalu was appointed in his place and the amounts have been distributed on various instalments to the bogus companies even without the supply of dhoties and sarees.
12. It is the prosecution case that the petitioner is closely connected with the said bogus companies and that the petitioner and others, the alleged proprietors of the said bogus companies, went and gave money to the former Minister (A 1) for favouring the said illegal acts.
13. There are two witnesses to speak about the part played by the petitioner. Mr. Kanagaraj, I.A.S. speaks as follows :-
(Being in vernacular is omitted in this report.-Ed.)
Then, witness Mr. Palmer Joseph, the former P.A. of the former Minister speaks as follows:-
(Being in vernacular is omitted in this report.-Ed.)
14. The reading of these statements given by two witnesses would go to show that the petitioner also pressuriised the Managing Director to make advance of the amount to the bonus companies that he is closely acquainted with the other proprietors and that both of them went to the former Minister and gave money.
15. In the light of this material, this Court, at this stage, could not come to the conclusion that there is no sufficient ground to proceed against the petitioner.
16. In this connection, I shall refer the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa 1996 SCC (Cri) 820 : 1996 Cri LJ 2448 in which it is held as follows at page 2455 of Cri LJ :-
To put it differently, if the Court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of a charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into.
17. So, in the light of this decision, at this stage, this Court could not but say that there are some materials to hold that there is a very strong suspicion which is sufficient to form a presumptive opinion, as to the existence of the factual ingredients, constituting the offences alleged, which may justify the framing of charge against the petitioner.
18. Therefore, I do not find any merit in this petition and as such the same is liable to be dismissed and accordingly it is dismissed. However, the observation made in this order shall not influence the trial Court during the course of trial. In view of the above order, Crl. M.P. No. 6493 of 1997 stands dismissed.