ORDER
1. This petition is directed against the order dated 7-1-1977 of the Land Tribunal, Bijapur, and passed in its proceeding bearing No. KLR/SR-59 (Exhibit D).
2. Venkappa, the 2nd respondent had claimed occupancy rights in an agricultural land comprised in Sy. No. 994/1 of village Toravi. Taluka Bijapur. The Tribunal has allowed his claim. The petitioner who claims to be the owner of the land and who had disputed the claim of Venkappa before the Tribunal, has been challenging the correctness of’the same.
3. A few facts which are not in dispute may be noted: This was a tenanted land. One allappa alias Mallari was the protected tenant TIM total extent of the land comprised in this number is 11 acres 171 guntas. The petitioner was the owner of the same. Seeking resumption of the land she had applied to the Court as constituted under the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (the Act) as they stood prior to 1-3-1974. That application for resumption was under Section 14 of the Act. That was allowed permitting her to resume half the extent and she is said to have obtained possession of that portion and regarding the remaining extent the Court held that the same was non-resumable. The same remained with the tenant Mallappa. Mallappa died on 8-9-1972. Within a few days disputes arose between the petitioner, Sitabai (the owner) and the 2nd respondent Venkappa. He claimed that after Mallappa’s death, being his heir, he had inherited the least rights in question and was entitled to cultivate the same. Sitabai disputed this claim, denied that Venkappa was the heir to the estate of the deceased, and challenging his claim to be in possession of this land as a lessee, filed a suit in 0. S. No. 251 of 19727 on the file of the Additional Munsiff, Bijapur, for a permanent injunction against him. The Munsiff, who had granted an ad interim injunction against Venkappa, modified that order and permitted him to cultivate the land dn furnishing some security. In the mean while the provisions of the Act came to be amended by Karnataka Act No. I of 1974. The amendments came into force with effect from 1-3-1974. Venkappa filed an application before the Tribunal in form No. 7 of the Act claiming occupancy rights in the land. Sitabai’s suit, which was pending on the file of the Munsiff, came to be disposed of in the month of August 1975. The suitt was decreed. Sitabai’s contention before the Tribunal was that the original tenant Mallappa had died issueless leaving behind him no heirs, that Venkappa was not his son and had not succeeded to the estate of Mallappa had no right to cultivate the land, and therefore was not entitled to claim occupancy rights. The Tribunal overruled these objections and passed the impugned order conferring occupancy rights on Venkappa.
4. It was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that on the death of Mallappa, his right of occupancy in the land in question cam to be extuingshed as he had not left any heir to inherit the same; that the lease right in the land had reverted to the owner; that, as this was not a tenanted land as on 1-3-1974, it did not vest in the State Government under Section 44 of the Act; that, therefore, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to consider the claim of Venkappa; that, even otherwise, the Tribunal had no powers to deal with the question as to whether Venkappa had succeeded to the estate of the deceased Mallappa; and it (the Tribunal) had failed to take note of the decree.passed by the learned Munsiff; and that, in the circumstances, the impugned order should be quashed.
5. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing, for Venkappa supported the order of the Tribunal stating that the finding of the Tribunal that his client was the tenant was a finding on facts; that the Tribunal had jurisdiction, to consider the claim of Venkappa; that by the impugned order substantial justice has been done between the parties; and that, in the circumstances, that order is not liable to be struck down.
6. I have perused the impugned order and also the records concerning this proceeding which had been secured for perusal from the Tribunal.
7. Let me first consider the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the Tribunal had erred in not noticing the importance of the decree and judgment of the Munsiff, Bijapur, in 0. S. No. 251 of 1972. As already stated that was a suit for permanent injunction. A copy of the judgment is available in the Tribunal’s papers. The parties went on trial on the following three issues :
“(i) Does the plaintiff prove her lawful possession of the suit land on the date of suit’?
(ii) Whether the defendant obstructed her such possession?
(iii) Is plaintiff entitled for the permanent injunction sought ?”
In the opinion of the Court the answer to the lst issue was not material and therefore observing “not material to consider”, did not give any specific finding on the same. It answered the 2nd and 3rd issues in the affirmative i.e., in favour of the plaintiff. While granting a decree for permanent injunction the Court has observed in its judgment as follows on issue No. 3:
“From the above facts following things will be clear. Plaintiff is admittedly the owner of the suit property. Though she has not satisfactorily proved her possession on the suit property after the death of Malhari she will have a substantial right to prevent any other person from going on the said property as she is the owner of the same. Defendant has failed to prove that he is the son of the deceased Malbari and as such be has no right to cultivate the land or interfere in it. Plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought for the prevention to the defendant from interfering into the suit land”.
It is not clear as to whether there was an appeal against the above judgment and decree. However, in considering the claim of Venkappa for occupancy rights, that judgment and decree are not of much consequence. Venkappa’s claim for occupancy rights has to be decided with reference to the state of affairs existing as on 1-3-1974, the date on which, under Section 44 of the Act, all tenanted lands came to vest in the State Government. Now that aspect has been considered by the Tribunal in its order and the finding is that he was a tenant as on 1-3-1974 and he bad been prevented from cultivating only from the date of the judgment of the Munsiff referred to above. Having this in its view the Tribunal has observed in its order -that Venkappa should take appropriate steps to get the possession of the land restored to him. Any way this is left to Venkappa and we need not bother about it.
8. The next important question that calls for our decision in this petition is whether, as contended by the Counsel for the petitioner, the land had not vested in the State Government under Section 44 of the Act and therefore the Tribunal bad no jurisdiction to consider the claim of Venkappa. The examination of this question necessarily gives rise to another important question and that concerns the very right of the petitioner to challenge the impugned order, i. e. her locus standi to question the correctness of the impugned order. In the circumstances of this case she will have such a right only if she can show that the land, for the reasons stated by her, had not vested in the State Government.
9. As observed earlier the original tenant Mallappa died on 8-9-1972. The petitioner’s contention is that he had died issueless and had left no heirs and therefore the right of occupancy which Mallappa had in the land in question came to be extinguished on his death and that right had reverted to her, the owner. The contention on behalf of Venkappa in this Court is that Venkappa was the adopted son of Mallappa and as such had succeeded to the estate of Mallappa which included the occupancy rights in the land in question. At para, 4 of his objection statement filed in this Court Venkappa says as follows :-
“The mother of this respondent is Yenkavva and his, mother had married Mallappa aliar, -.Mallaii Gouli wbo was a widower without any children. Mallappa alias, Mallari Gouli had married Yenkavva when this respondent was an infant child of tender age. That Mallappa alias Mallari Gouli had taken this respondent in adoption and this respondent as the child of Mallappa was housed, clothed, sheltered and maintained and got .married by the aforesaid Mallappa alias Mallari Gouli. This respondent lived with the aforesaid Mallappa Gouli in the same house till Mallappa died”.
On similar lines was his statement before the Tribunal, The finding of the Tribunal on this aspect of the controversy is that Venkappa had been brought up since his childhood by Mallappa, had been treated as his own (Mallappa’s) son, that he (Venkappa)was also cultivating the land along with Mallappa. and that, in the circumstances. Venkappa could be construed as a lessee of the land in question at the relevant time. Even though the Tribunal bad the competency to consider Venkappa’s claim for occupancy rights and to confer that right on him on proof of such cultivation by him (Venkappa) the Tribunal had no jurisdiction or powers to deal with the question as to whether or not Venkappa was the adopted son -of Mallappa. But the finding of the Tribunal that Venkappa was living with Mallappa, the protected tenant, since many years prior to Mallappa’s death and that even after Mallappa’s death he had continned to remain in possession of the land in question up to and as on 1-3-1974 is a finding on facts and it cannot be said that that ,finding had been arrived at by the Tribunal without any basis. It is doubtful if such cultivation alone, was sufficient to establish the relationship of tenant and landlord between Venkappa and the petitioner unless we have proof to show that the latter had treated the former as a tenant. That proof is lacking in this case.
10. But then, admittedly, this land was subject to a lease and that Mallappa was the protected tenant. Now, assuming that Mal.lappa had died without leaving any heirs and that Venkappa is not his adopted son and had not acquired any interest in the lease right in question what might havo happened to that occupancy right after his death? Did that right revert to the owner or merged.with the right of her ownership as contended on her behalf by her Counsel here? It’is not the case of the owner that under any terms of the lease it stood extinguished on the lessee dying intestate and leaving no heirs to succeed to his estate. In a case like this the only inference is that the tenant’s (Mallappa’s) interest in the land had come to the Government by escheat. The following observations of the Suprerric Coutt in Narendra Babadur Tandon v. Sbariker Lai, may be noted :
“The next question which we must consi der is what was the effect of the dissolution of the company on the leasehold interest which the company had in the land. No term of the lease had been brought to our notice by which the lease would stand ex tinguished on the dissolution of the company. If the company had a subsisting interest in the lease on the date of dissolution such interest must necessarily vest in the Government by escheat or as bona vacantia. In India the Law is well settled that the property of an intestate dying without leaving lawful heirs and the property of a dissolved Corporation passes to the Government by escheat or as bona vacantia. Of course such property will be subject to trusts and charges if any previously affecting it: vide Pierce Leslie and Co. Ltd. v. Violet Ouchterlony Wapshare, . It is also to be noticed here that Section 244-B of the Companies Act, 1913, as well as Section 555(2) of the Companies Act 1956 expressl enjoin a duty on the liquidator to deposit on the dissolution of the Company, into an account in the Reserve Bank of India known as the Companies Liquidation Account any money representing unpaid dividend or undisputed assets lying in his hands at the time of dissolution. The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the decisions of the Allahabad High Court in Tulsi Ram Sabu v. Gur Dayal Singh, (1911) ILR 33 All III (FB) and Musammat Ramman Bibi v. Mathra Prasad, (1923) 75 Ind Cas 621. Both were cases of fixed rate tenancies. As pointed out by the Full Bench in Tulshi Ram Sabu Y. Gur Dayal Singh, one of the incidents of a fixed rate tenancy was that pro vided by Section 18 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901 which prescribed that a right of occupancy would stand extinguished when a fixed rate tenant died leaving no heir entitled under the Act to inherit the right of oc cupancy. It followed therefroe that the land had to revert to the landlord and could not go to the Government by escheat. On the other hand in Sonet Kooer v. Mirzah Himmut Babadoor, (1875-76) ILR I Cal 391 the Privy Council held that on the failure of heirs to a tenant holding land under Mukkrari Tenure there was nothing in the nature of the tenture which prevented the Crown from. taking the Mukkarrari by escheat subject to the payment of rent to the Zamindar. If the lease-hold interest of the company in the land become vested in the Government on the dissolution of the company it must follow that the suit at the instance of the plaintiffs was not maintainable”.
(paragraph 7)
If Mallappa’s right of occupancy in the land in question had come to the State by escheat on 8-9-1972 (the date of his death) what right the owner of the land had subsequently in the land in question? The only right she bad was the right to recover rent. Such was the situation even as on 1-3-1974. On that day all tenanted lands came to be vested in the State under Section 44 of the Act and one of the consequences of such vesting was the right, title, and interest vesting in the owners ceased and vested absolutely in the State Government and the owners were only entitled to receive the amount from the State Government as provided in the Act. Viewed in this way it has to be stated that the only right the owner of the land has in the instant case is right to receive the amount. She had no right to challenge the claim of Venkappa for occupancy rights. Even if the decision of the Tribunal conferring occupancy rights on Venkappa is erroneous on facts or law the owner, in the circumstances of this case, has no right to challenge that decision. She has no locus standi to maintain this petition. Her right to receive the amount, as provided under the Act, has in no way been affected by the impugned 6rder, Her being in possession, if at all she is in possession on the basis of the decree of the Civil Court referred to above, does not confer on her any right to challenge the impugned order. It is for Venkappa or the State Government, if they are aggrieved by the decree, to take such steps as are available’ in law to obtain possession of fhe lane in question.
11. For the reasons mentioned above this petition has to fail and therefore the same is hereby dismissed and the rule issued is discharged.
12. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.