ORDER
G.N. Prasad, J.
1. Begusarai Municipality as the defendant in a title suit instituted by the plaintiff-opposite party in the court of the First Munsif at Begusarai is the petitioner, and the application is directed against the order of the learned Munsif dated the 9th June, 1971, allowing the prayer of the plaintiff for making certain amendment in the plaint.
2. In the suit as originally filed, the relief which the plaintiff sought was for a declaration to the effect that the suspension order passed on 27-2-1968, by the Chairman of the Municipality against the petitioner was illegal. The plaintiff had also prayed for an injunction to restrain the defendant from proceeding with the departmental enquiry contemplated to be taken against the plaintiff and from dismissing him from service. It so happened that the prayer made by the plaintiff for an interim order of injunction ultimately failed and thereupon a further event happened namely that an order of the plaintiff’s dismissal from service was passed on the 15th July, 1968. Thereafter on the 29th March, 1971, the plaintiff applied for amendment of his plaint. The substance of the amendment sought for was that a further relief should be granted to the plaintiff to the effect that the dismissal order dated the 15th July, 1968, was also illegal, mala fide and without jurisdiction and that the plaintiff should be declared to be continuing in service even after the date of passing of the dismissal order and to be entitled to his salary on that basis. The amendment was opposed on behalf of the defendant, but by the impugned order the learned Munsif has allowed the plaint to be amended as prayed for.
3. The main contention of learned counsel, appearing for the municipality is that the amendment should not have been permitted to be made inasmuch as it has the effect of introducing a totally new cause of action and of changing the entire complexion of the suit. In support of this contention reliance has been placed on the case of Kanda v. Waghu, AIR 1950 PC 68 and on the Bench decision of this Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Ramgarh Farms and Industries Ltd., 1961 BLJR 28 = (AIR 1961 Pat 302).
4. As against this, the order of amendment has been supported fay learned counsel, appearing for the plaintiff opposite party upon the footing that it has become necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties within the meaning of Rule 17 of Order VI by reason of the happening of a subsequent event. Learned counsel has relied in this connection upon the decisions in the case of K. S. Deenadayalu Reddy v. Lalita Kumari, AIR 1953 Mad 402, Amrit Lal N. Sah v. Alia Annapurnamma, AIR 1959 Andh Pra 9 and Satish Chandra Dasgupta. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1960 Cal 278. It may be mentioned here that the Calcutta case was a service case like the one in hand, and the principle which has been laid down in regard to such class of cases is as mentioned in Mulla’s Civil Procedure Code, Vol. I (1965 Edition) at page 749 as follows :–
“Ordinarily, the decree in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stand at the date of its institution. But where it is shown that the original relief claimed has, by reason of subsequent change of circumstances, become inappropriate, or that it is necessary to have the decision of the court on the altered circumstances in order to shorten litigation or do complete justice between the parties, it is incumbent upon a court of justice to take notice of events which have happened since the institution of the suit and to mould its decree according to the circumstances as they stand at the time the decree is made.”
5. Applying the above principle to the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is manifest that by reason of the changed circumstances created on account of passing of the dismissal order dated the 15th July, 1968, the grant of the relief originally sought for in the plaint had become inappropriate for the purpose of deciding the real controversy between the parties. In deciding the suit as it stood prior to the amendment the court could not possibly have overlooked the subsequent event of the 15th July, 1968 and in face of that order of dismissal the court would have found it difficult to adjudicate upon the claim made in the suit as originally made. Therefore two courses were open to the plaintiff, (i) to institute a separate suit impugning the dismissal order and asking for the reliefs sought as per amendment petition, or, (ii) to seek the same relief in the present suit by getting the plaint suitably amended. To ask the plaintiff to file a fresh suit would undoubtedly have been improper and in disregard of the well recognised principle that litigation should be shortened. The matter may be looked at from another point of view. Assuming that a separate suit was instituted by the plaintiff and that succeeded, the effect would have been that the dismissal order would have been quashed and the parties would have been relegated to the same position which prevailed prior to the 15th July, 1968, meaning thereby that the suspension order passed on the 27; h February, 1968 would have been revived and the departmental enquiry would have been also revived. Therefore it would have, become necessary for the plaintiff to seek the original relief claimed by him in the plaint and for that purpose to adduce almost the same kind of evidence which would have been necessary for his success in the contemplated subsequent suit. Therefore, in my opinion, this Is pre-eminently a fit case in which legal principle quoted above was applicable and that the amendment allowed by the learned Munsif was appropriate and just.
6. For the aforesaid reasons I decline to interfere and dismiss the application. But in the circumstances there will be no order with regard to costs.
7. Learned Munsif will now grant reasonable opportunity to the defendant to file his additional written statement, if any.