PETITIONER: STATE OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND OTHERS Vs. RESPONDENT: THAKUR GANGA SINGH AND ANOTHER DATE OF JUDGMENT: 26/11/1959 BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. GUPTA, K.C. DAS SHAH, J.C. CITATION: 1960 AIR 356 1960 SCR (2) 346 CITATOR INFO : R 1965 SC 682 (11) ACT: Supreme Court, Appellate jurisdiction of-Special leave to appeal-When can be granted-Substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution-Meaning of- Constitution of India, Art. 132(2). HEADNOTE: The respondents filed a petition in the High Court of Jammu JUDGMENT:
Kashmir Motor Vehicles Rules. The High Court held that the
said rule was ultra vires as offending Art. 14 of the
Constitution. The appellants filed an application in the
High Court for a certificate under Art. 132(1) of the
Constitution which was rejected on the ground that no
substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the
Constitution was involved in the case. Thereafter the
appellant applied to this Court for special leave under Art.
132(2) of the Constitution, which was granted with liberty
to the respondents to raise the question of maintainability
of the appeal. There was no controversy between the parties
in regard to the interpretation of Art. 14 of the
Constitution, and the dispute centered round the question
whether the impugned rule stood the test of reasonable
classification. The respondents raised a preliminary
objection that special leave under Art. 132(2) of the
Constitution could be granted by this court only if it was
satisfied that the case involved a substantial question of
law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, and that
since, in the present case, the interpretation of Art. 14 of
the Constitution was not in dispute by reason of a series of
decisions of this Court and no question of law, much less a
substantial question of law, could arise for consideration,
no special leave could be granted under the said Article.
It was contended on behalf of the appellants that whenever a
question of classification was raised that by itself
involved the interpretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution
so far as the impugned classification was concerned.
Held, that the principle underlying Art. 132(2) of the
Constitution is that the final authority of interpreting the
Constitution must rest with the Supreme Court. With that
object that Article is freed from other limitations imposed
under Arts. 133 and 134 and the right of appeal of the
widest amplitude is allowed irrespective of the nature of
the proceedings in a case involving only a substantial
question of law as to the interpretation of the
Constitution.
The interpretation of a provision means the method by which
the true sense or the meaning of the word is understood.
Where
347
the parties agree as to the true interpretation of a
provision or do not raise any question in respect thereof,
the case does not involve any question of law as to the
interpretation of the Constitution. A substantial question
of law cannot arise where that law has been finally and
authoritatively decided by this Court.
In the instant case, the question raised does not involve
any question of law as to the interpretation of the
Constitution.
T.M. Krishnaswami Pillai v. Governor General in Council
(1947) 52 C.W.N. (F.R.) 1, Bhudan Choudury v. The State of
Bihar, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1045, Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v.
Union of India, [1950] S.C.R. 869, Ram Krishna Dalmia v.
justice Tendolkar, [1959] S.C.R. 279 and Mohammad Haneef
Quayeshi v. State of Bihar, [1959] S.C.R.629, relied on.
&
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 217 of 1959.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
June 20, 1958, of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court, in Writ
Petition No. 108 of 1958.
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India,
N. S. Bindra, R. H. Dhebar and T. M. Sen, for the
appellants.
R. K. Garg and M. K. Ramamurthy, S. N. Andley, J. B.
Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the
respondents.
1959. November 26. The Judgment of the Court was delivered
by
SUBBA RAO J.-This appeal by special leave raises the
question of the scope of Art. 132(2) of the Constitution.
The first respondent is one of the shareholders of the
second respondent, M/s. Jammu Kashmir Mechanics And
Transport Workers Co-operative Society Limited Jammu
(hereinafter called the Society). The Society was
registered under the Jammu and Kashmir Co-operative
Societies Act No. 6 of 1993 (Vikrimi). They put in a number
of applications before the third appellant for the grant of
stage carriage and public carrier permits to them for
various routes in the State of Jammu & Kashmir, but no
permits were granted to them on the ground that under r. 4-
47 of the Jammu
348
and Kashmir Motor Vehicle Rules (hereinafter called the
Rules), service licence could only be issued to a person or
a company registered under the Partnership Act and that, as
the Society was neither a person nor a partner Ship, it was
not entitled to a licence under the Rules. The respondents
filed a petition in the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir under
S. 103 of the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir challenging
the vires of r. 4-47 of the Rules. To that petition the
appellants herein, viz., the Government of Jammu & Kashmir
State, the Transport Minister, the Registering Authority and
the Traffic Superintendent, were made party-respondents: The
High Court held that the said rule was ultra vires as
offending Art. 14 of the Constitution, and, on that finding
directed a writ of mandamus to issue against the appellants
herein from enforcing the provisions of the said rule. The
appellants filed an application in the High Court for a
certificate under Art. 132(1) of the Constitution, but the
High Court rejected it on the ground that no substantial
question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution
was involved in the case. Therefter the appellants applied
for special leave under Art. 132(2) of the Constitution and
this Court granted the same. The order giving the special
leave expressly granted liberty to the respondents herein to
raise the question of the maintainability of the appeal at
its final hearing.
Learned Counsel for the respondents raises a preliminary
objection to the maintainability of the appeal. Shortly
stated his objection is that under Art. 132(2) of the
Constitution special leave can be given only if the Supreme
Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial
question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution
that in the present case the interpretation Art. 14 of the
Constitution has been well-settled and put beyond dispute by
a series of decisions of this court, that, therefore, no
question of law as to the interpretation of the
Constitution, much less a substantial question of law in
regard to that mattter, arises for consideration and that,
therefore, no special leave can be granted under the said
Article.
349
This argument is sought to be met by the learned Additional
Solicitor-General in the following manner: Whenever a
question of classification is raised, it involves the
interpretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution with reference
to the classification impugned. To state it differently,
the argument is that the question in each case is whether
the classification offends the principle of equality
enshrined in Art. 14. Therefore, whether a registered firm,
a limited company and a person have equal attributes is a
question of interpretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution.
Before considering the validity of the rival contentions it
would be convenient to ascertain precisely what was the
question raised in the High Court and what was the decision
given thereon by it. The argument advanced before the High
Court on behalf of the Society was that under r. 4-47 a
licence can be issued only to a person or a firm registered
under the Partnership Act and not to a corporation
registered under the Co-operative Societies Act or
otherwise, and, therefore, the said rule, being
discriminatory in nature, offends Art. 14 of the
Constitution. The learned AdvocateGeneral appearing for the
appellants contended that under Art. 14 of the Constitution
rational classification is permissible and the legislature
has framed the impugned rule on such a basis, the object of
which is to safeguard the interest of the public. The High
Court, after considering the rival arguments, expressed the
opinion that the said rule did not proceed on any rational
basis of classification and that, as a corporation had been
arbitrarily singled out for discriminatory treatment, the
impugned rule offended the equality clause of the
Constitution. The appellants in their petition for special
leave filed in this Court questioned the correctness of the
conclusion of the High Court. They asserted that the said
rule was based upon reasonable classification and therefore
could not be struck down as repugnant to Art. 14 of the
Constitution. In other grounds they elaborated the same
point in an attempt to bring out the different attributes of
the two classes affording an intelligible differentia for
45
350
classification. They clearly posed the question proposed to
be raised by them in the appeal as under Ground
The Grouns iv: ” The aforesaid rule 4-47 (of the Motor
Vehicles Rules) is based upon reasonable classification and
is and was perfectly intra vires and valid and could not
be struck down as repugnant to Art. 14 of the Constitution
of India.”
Ground vi: ” There is a marked difference between a
corporate body and partnership registered under the
Provisions of the Partnership Act and these points of
difference provide an intelligible differentia for
classification. The Hon’ble High Court has only referred to
one point of difference and has overlooked other points of
distinction and has erred in striking down the aforesaid
rule 4-47.”
Ground viii : ” Rule 4- 47 was framed in the light of local
conditions prevailing. Co-operative Societies and
Corporations in the matter of transport were not considered
to be proper objects for the grant of licence or permit.
The classification is rational and reasonable. The
exclusion of artificial persons from the ambit of the Rule
is natural and not discriminatory.”
The other grounds are only a further clarification of the
said grounds. In part It of their statement of case
the appellants stated as follows;
” It is now well-established that while Art. 14 forbids
class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable
classification for the purpose of legislation.”
The respondents, in their statement of case, accepted the
said legal position but contested the position that there
was reasonable classification. It is therefore manifest
that throughout there has never been a controversy between
the parties in regard to the interpretation of Art. 14 of
the Constitution, but their dispute centered only on the
question whether the impugned rule stood the test of
reasonable classification.
In the premises, can special leave be granted to the
appellants under Art 132(2) of the Constitution ? Article
132(2) reads:
,,Where the High Court has refused to give such a
certificate, the Supreme Court may, if it is
351
satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of
law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, grant
special leave to appeal from such judgment, decree or final
order.”
Under cl. (2) of Art. 132 there is no scope for granting a
special leave unless two conditions are satisfied: (i) the
case should involve a question of law as to the
interpretation of the Constitution; and (ii) the said
question should be a substantial question of law. The
principle underlying the Article is that the final authority
of interpreting the Constitution must rest with the Supreme
Court. With that object the Article is freed from other
limitations imposed under Arts. 133 and 134 and the right of
appeal of the widest amplitude is allowed irrespective of
the nature of the proceedings in a case involving only a
substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the
Constitution.
What does interpretation of a provision mean ?
Interpretation is the method by which the true sense or the
meaning of the word is understood. The question of
interpretation can arise only if two or more possible
constructions are sought to be placed on a provision-one
party suggesting one construction and the other a different
one. But where the parties agree on the true interpretation
of a provision or do not raise any question in respect
thereof, it is not possible to hold that the case involves
any question of law as to the interpretation of the
Constitution. On an interpretation of Art. 14, a series of
decisions of this Court evolved the doctrine of
classification. As we have pointed out, at no stage of the
proceedings either the correctness of the interpretation of
Art. 14 or the principles governing the doctrine of
classification have been questioned by either of the
parties. Indeed accepting the said doctrine, the appellants
contended that there was a valid classification under the
rule while the respondents argued contra. The learned
Additional Solicitor General contended, for the first time,
before us that the appeal raised a new facet of the doctrine
of equality, namely, whether an artificial person and a
natural person have equal attributes
352
within the meaning of the equality clause, and, therefore,
the case involves a question of interpretation of
“the Constitution. This argument, if we may say so,
involves the same contention in a different garb. If
analysed, the argument only comes to this: as an artificial
person and a natural person have different attributes, the
classification made between them is valid. This argument
does not suggest a new interpretation of Art. 14 of the
Constitution, but only attempts to bring the rule within the
doctrine of classification. We, therefore, hold that the
question raised in this case does not involve any question
of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution.
Assuming that the case raises a question of law as to the
interpretation of the Constitution, can it be said that the
question raised is a substantial question of law within the
meaning of cl. (2) of Art 14. This aspect was considered by
the Federal Court in T. M. Krishnaswamy,Pillai v. Governor
General In Council (1). That decision turned upon the
provisions of s. 205 of the Government of India Act, 1935.
The material
S. 205: ” (1) An appeal shall lie to the Federal Court
from any judgment, decree or final order of a High Court if
the High Court certifies that the case involves a
substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this
Act or any Order in Council made thereunder….”
The Madras High Court gave a certificate to the effect that
the case involved a substantial question of law as to the
interpretation of s. 240(3) of the Government of India Act,
1935. Under s. 240(3) of the said Act, no person who was a
member of civil service of the Crown in India or held any
civil post under the Crown in India could be dismissed or
reduced in rank until he had been given a reasonable
opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to
be taken in regard to him. The High Court, on the facts
found, held that the appellant therein had been offered A
reasonable opportunity of showing cause within the meaning
(1) (1947) 52 C.W.N. (F.R.) 1.
part of that section says :
353
of the said section, but gave a certificate under s. 205(1)
of the Government of India Act, 1935.In dealing with the
propriety of issuing the certificate in the circumstances of
that case, Zafrulla Khan, J., speaking on behalf the Court,
concisely and pointedly stated at p. 2 :
” It was urged before us that the case involved a question
relating to the interpretation of sub-section (3) of section
240 of the Act. To the extent to which any guidance might
have been needed for the purposes of this case on the
interpretation of that sub-section that guidance was
furnished so far as this Court is concerned in its judgment
in Secretary of State for India v. I.M. Lal [(1945) F.C.R.
103 The rest was a simple question of fact. In our judgment
no ” substantial question of law ” as to the interpretation
of the Constitution Act was involved in this case, which
could have formed the basis of a certificate under section
205(1) of the Act.”
On the question of interpretation of Art. 14 of the
Constitution this Court in Budhan Choudhry v. The State of
Bihar (1) explained the true meaning and scope of that
Article thus:
” It is now well-established that while article 14 forbids
class legislation, it does not forbid reason. able
classification for the purposes of legislation. In order,
however, to pass the the test of permissible classification
two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the
classification must be founded on an intelligible
differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are
grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii)
that that differentia must have a rational relation to the
object sought to be achieved by the statue in question. The
classification may be founded on different bases: namely,
geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the
like. What is necessary is that there must be nexus between
the basis of classification and the object of the Act under
consideration.”
(1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1045,1049.
354
This in only a restatement of the law that has been
enunciated by this Court in Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri
v. The Union of India (1) and in other subsequent decisions.
The said principles were reaffirmed in the recent decisions
of this Court in Rama Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar (2
) and in Mohammed Haneef Qureshi v. State of Bihar (3).
In view of the said decision there is no further scope for
putting a new interpretation on the provisions of Art. 14 of
the Constitution vis-a-vis the doctrine of classification.
The interpretation of Art. 14 in the context of classifi-
cation has been finally settled by the highest Court of this
land and under Art. 141 of the Constitution that
interpretation is binding on all the Courts within the
territory of India. What remained to be done by the High
Court was only to apply that interpretation to, the facts
before it. A substantial question of law, therefore, cannot
arise where that law has been finally and authoritatively
decided by this Court.
In the result we accept the preliminary objection and
dismiss the appeal with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
(1) [1950] S.C.R. 869. (2) [1959] S.C.R. 279.
(3) [1959] S.C.R. 629.
355