PETITIONER: JAI KAUR & OTHERS Vs. RESPONDENT: SHER SINGH & OTHERS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/05/1960 BENCH: GUPTA, K.C. DAS BENCH: GUPTA, K.C. DAS GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. WANCHOO, K.N. CITATION: 1960 AIR 1118 CITATOR INFO : RF 1961 SC1374 (4) R 1966 SC1555 (4) RF 1980 SC2138 (5) ACT: Hindu Law-Jats of Grewal got-Customary law of succession-- Non-ancestral Property-Daughter, if preferrted to collateyals-Doctrine of surrender-Gift to daughter by widow, if accelerates succession-Rattigan's Customary Law of the Punjab, Para 23-Riwaji-am, 1882, Question 43. HEADNOTE: Under the customary law prevalent amongst the Hindu Jats of Grewal got in Ludhiana, a daughter is a preferential heir to her father in respect of his self -acquired property to his collaterals. Rattigan's Digest of Customary Law, paragraph 23, which records the correct law on the point, is not in conflict with Riwaji-am, 1882, Question NO. 43, which refers only to ancestral property and not to self -acquired property at all. Mt. Hurmate v. Hoshiaru, A.I.R. 1944 Lah. 21, approved. Mohinder Singh v. Kher Singh, A.I.R. 1949 East Punjab 328, disapproved. Mt. Subhani v. Nawab, A.I.R. 1941 (P.C.) 21, referred to. Case-law discussed. The doctrine of surrender in Hindu Law is based on a theory of complete self-effacement by the widow in favour of the reversioner and in order that such surrender can accelerate the reversion, it must be of the entire interest in the entire property. The law does not recognise a partial self- effacement nor a division between ancestral and non- ancestral property. The exception made in respect of a small portion of the property retained for the widow's maintenance does not detract from the rigour of the rule. Rangaswami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden, (1918) L.R. 46 I.A. 72 and Phool Kaur v. Prem Kaur, [1952] S.C.R. 793, referred to. Consequently, in a case where a Hindu widow of the Jat Grewal got made a gift only of the self-acquired property of her husband to her daughters such gift had not the effect of a surrender in law so as to accelerate the daughters' succession and the gift could not be valid beyond her lifetime. 976 JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 108/ 56.
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and decree dated
May 27, 1953, of the Punjab High Court in Regular Second
Appeal No. 176 of 1949, against the judgment and decree
dated December 20, 1948, of the District Judge, Ludhiana,
arising out of the Judgment and decree dated February 6,
1948, of the Subordinate Judge, 11 Class, Ludhiana, in Suit
No. 918 of 1946.
Gopal Singh, for the appellants.
C. B. Aggarwala and K. P. Gupta, for the respondents.
1960. May 6. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DAS GUPTA, J.-The suit out of which this appeal has arisen
was instituted by the respondents I and 2 Sher Singh and
Labh Singh, for a declaration that a deed of gift executed
by the first appellant, Jai Kaur, in respect of 8 (1-10)
Bighas of land which she had inherited from her husband, Dev
Singh, in favour of her two daughters, the 2nd & 3rd
appellants before us, ” shall be null and void against the
reversionary rights of the plaintiffs “, and defendant Nos.
4 to 6 after the death of defendant No. 1 (i.e., Jai Kaur)
and shall not be binding upon them. The plaintiffs’ case
was that these lands left by Dev Singh were all ancestral
lands qua the plaintiffs and according to the customary law
which governs the Jats belonging to Grewal got to which
these parties belong daughters do not succeed to property
left by sonless fathers and so the gift by Dev Singh’s widow
in favour of her daughters would be null and void as against
the plaintiffs and others who would be entitled on Jai
Kaur’s death to succeed to the estate as reversioners. In
the alternative, the plaintiffs contended that even if the
land in suit was not ancestral qua the plaintiffs then also
the deed of gift would be null and void as against their
reversionary interests inasmuch as even as regards
nonancestral property daughters do not succeed among the
Grewal Jats. The main contention of defendants 1 to 3 (the
appellants before us) was that the suit land was not
ancestral qua the plaintiffs and defendants
977
Nos. 4 to 6, and that according to the customary law
governing the Jats of the Grewal got, daughters exclude
collaterals as regards non-ancestral property and a widow is
competent to make a gift of such property in favour of her
daughters. It was pleaded on behalf of the two daughters
that they being preferential heirs in respect of the land in
suit as against the plaintiffs, the gift is tantamount to
acceleration of succession and is valid in every way. The
Trial Judge held that 2B-2B,14-B out of the land in suit was
ancestral and the gift was invalid to that extent, because
as regards ancestral property a daughter does not succeed in
the presence of collaterals. As regards the remainder of
the suit land which he held was non-ancestral, the learned
Judge was of opinion that the gift was merely an
acceleration of succession as under the customary law
governing the parties daughters exclude collaterals as
regards succession to non-ancestral property. Accordingly
he gave the plaintiffs a decree as prayed for as regards
2-B-2B, 14-B out of the land in suit and dismissed it as
regards the remaining portion of the land in suit.
The plaintiffs appealed to the District Judge, Ludhiana,
against this decree and cross-objections were filed by the
defendants Nos. 1 to 3. The Trial Court’s finding about a
portion -of the land being ancestral and the rest non-
ancestral was not disputed before the appeal court. On the
question of custom the learned District Judge agreed with
the Trial Judge’s view that among the Grewal Jats of
Ludhiana the daughter excluded collaterals as regards non-
ancestral property. He held, therefore, agreeing with the
Trial Judge that as regards the non-ancestral property the
deed of gift was merely an act of acceleration of succession
and was, therefore, valid and binding. The appeal was
accordingly dismissed and so also were the cross-objections
which appear not to have been pressed.
On second appeal the learned judges of the East Punjab High
Court accepted the contention urged on behalf of the
plaintiffs that a special custom was proved to be in force
among the Grewal Jats under which the daughter does not
inherit even as regards
978
non-ancestral property. In that view they held that even as
regards the non-ancestral property the gift by Jai Kaur
would be valid only during her lifetime, and allowed the
appeal.
Against this decree of the High Court defendants Nos. 1 to
3-Jai Kaur and her two daughters, the donees-have filed this
appeal on the strength of special leave granted by this
Court.
Two questions arise for consideration in this appeal. The
first is whether under the customary law governing the Jats
of the Grewal got in Ludhiana to which the parties belong,
the daughter or the collaterals are the preferential heirs
as regards non-ancestral property. If the answer to this
question be that daughters have preference over collaterals
(the plaintiffs here), the other question which arises is
whether this gift is such acceleration of succession in
favour of the daughters as is permissible under the law.
On the question of custom the appellants rely on the
statements in paragraph 23 of Rattigan’s Digest of Customary
Law (Thirteenth Edition) that in regard to the acquired
property of her father the daughter is preferred to
collaterals. It is not disputed that nonancestral property
is ” acquired property ” within the meaning of this
statement by Rattigan. Against this the plaintiffs-
respondents rely on the answers to question No. 43 relating
to Hindu Grewal Jats of Ludhiana as appear in the Riwaji-am
prepared at the revised settlement of 1882. The question
and the answer are in these words:-
Question:
” Under what circumstances can daughters inherit ? If there
are sons, widows or near collaterals, do they exclude the
daughter ? If the collaterals exclude her, is there any
fixed limit of relationship or degree within which such Dear
kindred must stand
Answer:
” In our tribe the daughter does not succeed under any
circumstances. If a person dies sonless, his collaterals
succeed him. There is no fixed limit of relationship for
purposes of excluding her.
979
If there are no collaterals of the deceased, the owners of
the Thulla or Patti or village would be owners of his
property.”
The authoritative value of Rattigan’s compilation of
customary law is now beyond controversy, having been
recognised in the judicial decisions of the Punjab courts
too numerous to mention, which have also received the
approval of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
Therefore it is not, and cannot be disputed that under the
general customary law of the Punjab daughters exclude
collaterals in succession to non-ancestral property. The
value of entries in the Riwaj-i-am has, also however, been
repeatedly stressed. That they are relevant evidence under
s. 35 of the Evidence Act is clear and the fact that the
entries therein the the result of careful research of
persons who might also be considered to have become experts
in these matters, after an open and public enquiry has given
them a value which should not be lightly underestimated.
There is ‘, therefore, an initial presumption of correctness
as regards the entries in the Riwaj-i-am and when the custom
as recorded in the Riwaj-i-am is in conflict with the
general custom as recorded in Rattigan’s Digest or
ascertained otherwise, the entries in the Riwaj-i-am should
ordinarily prevail except that as was pointed out by the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in a recent decision
in Mt. Subhani v. Nawab (1), that where, as in the present
case, the Riwaj-i-am affects adversely the rights of females
who had no opportunity whatever of appearing before the
revenue authorities, the presumption would be weak, and only
a few instances would suffice to rebut it.
In the present appeal the oral. testimony given on behalf of
either party is practically valueless to show an-,, instance
in favour of the custom pleaded by them. If, therefore, the
-Riwaj-i-am does show as urged by the plaintiffs a custom of
daughters being excluded by collaterals in respect of non-
ancestral property, it is clear that Riwaji-i-am would
prevail. The real controversy in this litigation is,
however, on the question whether the entries in the Riwaj-i-
am on which
(1) A.I. R. 1941 (P.C.) 21.
980
the plaintiffs rely refer at all to non-ancestral property
or not. This controversy has ‘engaged the attention of the
courts in Punjab for a number of years beginning with 1916.
In that year in Mst. Raj Kaur v. Talok Singh (1) Sir Donald
Johnstone, the Chief Justice held that the Riwaj-i-am as
compiled, did not cover self-acquired property and that
where the Riwaj-i-am talked about succession to land without
discrimination between ancestral and self-acquired, the rule
laid down could usually only be taken to apply to ancestral
property. A similar view was taken by Shadilal and Wil be
force, JJ., in Budhi Prakash v. Chandra Bhan (2 ). The view
taken in these cases was followed by other judges of the
High Court in Narain v. Mst. Gaindo (3 ) and Fatima Bibi v.
Shah Nawaz (4). In Sham Das v. Moolu Bai (5) the learned
judges (LeRossignol and Fforde, JJ.) also laid down the same
principles, without any reference to the previous decisions,
in these words :-
“It is true in the Riwaj-i-ain no distinction is made
between ancestral and acquired property, but it is a well-
recognised rule that unless there are clear indications to
the contrary, such an entry in a record of custom refers
only to the succession to ancestral property. ”
After this view had been followed in several other decisions
a different line was struck in Jatan v. Jiwan Singh (6).
That was a case between Grewal Jats and the contest lay
between collaterals of the last male holder and his married
daughter with respect to his non-ancestral property. The
learned judges were of opinion that the Question No. 43 in
the Riwaj-i-am related to both ancestral and non-ancestral
property and so the answer to the question recorded in
Riwaj-iam proved that as regards the non-ancestral property
also the daughter was excluded by collaterals. In coming to
this conclusion they laid stress on the fact that in two
previous decisions, Ishar Kuar v. Raja Singh (7) and Pratap
Singh v. Panjabu (8) the questions and answers in the
Riwajiam as regards daughter’s
(1) A.I.R. 1916 Lah. 343.
(3) A.I.R 1918 Lah. 304
(5) A.I.R. 1926; Lah. 210
(7) (1911) 9 I.C. 608.
(2) A.T.R. 19T8 Lah. 225.
(4) A.I.R. 1921 Lah. 180.
(6) A.I.R. 1933 Lah. 553.
(8) (1911) 13 I.C. 177
981
right to succession were interpreted as covering
nonancestral property also and if it was contemplated that a
daughter should succeed to self-acquired property, one would
have expected that fact to be mentioned in the answer. It
was in view of the conflicting views which had thus arisen
on the question whether Question No. 43 in the Riwaj-i-ani
in the absence of a clear indication to the contrary related
to ancestral property only or to both ancestral and non-
ancestral property that a reference was made by Mr. Justice
Abdur Rahman in Mt. Hurmate v. Hoshiaru 1 to a Full Bench
of the High Court. The Full Bench reviewed the numerous
decisions of the Punjab courts in this matter and also took
into consideration the fact that Mr. Gordon Walker who had
prepared the Riwaj-i-am in 1882 had stated in the preface
that no distinction between self-acquired and inherited pro-
perty in land appeared to be recognised and the rules of
succession, restriction on alienation, etc., applied to both
alike; and after a careful consideration of all the relevant
factors recorded their conclusion that ” Question No. 43 of
the Customary Law of Ludhiana district relates to ancestral
property only and can in no circumstances be so interpreted
as to cover self acquired property as well. ” Mr. Justice
Din Mohammad who delivered the leading judgment observed :”
The raison d’ entre of those cases which lay down that the
manuals of Customary Law were ordinarily concerned with
ancestral property only is quite intelligible. Collaterals
are, as stated by Addison, J., in 13 Lab. 458, really
speaking interested in that property only which descends
from their common ancestor and this is the only basis of the
agnatic theory. What a male-holder acquires himself is
really no concern of theirs. It is reasonable, therefore,
to assume that when manuals of Customary Law were originally
prepared and subsequently revised, the persons questioned,
unless specific-ally told to the contrary, could normally
reply in the light of their own interest alone and that, as
stated above, was confined to the ancestral property only.
The fact that on some occasions
(1) A.I.R. 1944 Lah. 21,
127
982
the questioner had particularly drawn some distinction
between ancestral and non-ancestral property would not have
put them on their guard in every case, considering their
lack of education and lack of intelligence in general.
Similarly, the use of the terms ” in no case ” or ” under no
circumstances ” would refer to ancestral property only and
not be extended so as to cover self-acquired property unless
the context favoured that construction. ”
One would have thought that after this pronouncement by a
Full Bench of the High Court the controversy would have been
set at rest for at least the Punjab courts. Surprisingly,
however, only a few years after the above pronouncement, the
question was raised again before a Division Bench of the
East Punjab High Court in Mohinder Singh v. Kher Singh(1).
The learned judges there chose to consider the matter afresh
and in fact disregarded the pronouncement of the Full Bench
in a manner which can only be said to be unceremonious.
Teja Singh, J., who delivered the leading judgment said that
the Full Bench, though noticing the cases of Ishar Kaur v.
Raja Singh (2) and Pratap Singh v. Panjabu (3), had not
said that those cases had been wrongly decided. It has to
be noticed that the Full Bench in no uncertain terms
expressed their conclusion that question No. 43 of the
Customary Law of the Ludhiana district related to ancestral
property only and could in no circumstances be so
interpreted as to cover self-acquired property as well. In
coming to that conclusion they had considered numerous
decisions of the Punjab courts in support of the general
proposition that unless there are clear indications to the
contrary the questions relate to ancestral property,
considered the cases in which a contrary view had been taken
including the three cases of Jattan v. Jiwan Singh (4),
Ishar Kaur v. Raja Singh (2 ) and Pratap Singh v. Panjabu
(3) and gave their own reasons why the view that unless
there are clear indications to the contrary the manuals of
customary law should be taken to refer to ancestral property
only, and after considering the
(1) A.I.R. 1949. East Punjab 328
(3) (1911) 13 I.C. 177.
(2) (1911) 9 I.C. 608.
(4) A.I.R. 1933 Lah. 553.
983
question and answer in question No. 43 in the case before
them as regards the Mohammadan Rajputs, recorded their final
conclusion. It is neither correct nor fair to say that the
learned judges of the Full Bench did not hold Jattan’s Case,
Pratap Singh’s Case and Ishar Kaur’s Case to have been
wrongly decided in so far as these decisions held the
question No. 43 of the Customary Law of the Ludhiana dis-
trict to refer both to ancestral and non-ancestral property.
It is true that they did not say in so many words that these
cases were wrongly decided; but when a Full Bench decides a
question in a particular way every previous decision which
had answered the same question in a different way cannot but
he held to have been wrongly decided. We had recently
occasion to disapprove of the action of a Division Bench in
another High Court in taking it upon themselves to hold that
a contrary decision of another Division Bench on a question
of law was erroneous and stressed the importance of the well
recognised judicial practice that when a Division Bench
differs from the decision of a previous decision of another
Division Bench the matter should be referred to a larger
Bench for final decision. If, as we pointed out there,
considerations of judicial decorum and legal propriety
require that Division Benches should not themselves
pronounce decisions of other Division Benches to be wrong,
such considerations should stand even more firmly in the way
of Division Benches disagreeing with a previous decision of
the Full Bench of the same court.
In our opinion, the view taken by the Full Bench in Mt.
Hurmate v. Hoshiaru (1) is consonant with reasons and
consistent with probability. The fact that the great
majority of judges, who brought to bear on the question, an
intimate knowledge of the ways and habits of the Punjab
peasantry thought that when tribesmen were asked about
succession to property, they would ordinarily think that
they were being asked about succession to ancestral
property, is entitled to great weight. It cannot, we think,
be seriously disputed that at least in the early years
(1) A.I.R. 1944 Lah 21.
984
when the Riwaj-i-am was in course of preparation most of the
property in the countryside was ancestral property, and ”
self-acquisitions ” were few and far between. This fact, it
is reasonable to think, had the consequence of concentrating
the attention of the tribesmen on the importance of having
the tribal custom correctly recorded by the Settlement
Officers and their agents, as regards succession to
ancestral property, and of attracting little attention, if
any, to matters regarding non-ancestral property. Unless
the questions put to these simple folk, were so framed as to
draw pointed attention to the fact that the enquiries were
in respect of non-ancestral property also, they could not
reasonably be expected to understand from the mere fact of
user of general words in the questions that these referred
to both ancestral and non-ancestral property. As Din
Mohammad, J., said in his judgment in the Full Bench, even
the fact that on some occasions, the questioner had drawn
some distinction between ancestral and nonancestral
property, could not have put them-(i.e., the persons
questioned)-on their guard in every case, considering their
lack of intelligence in general. Their minds being obsessed
with the idea that such enquiries would only refer to
ancestral property, they would direct their answers to
matters in respect of ancestral property only, and in using
forceful terms like ” in no case ” and ” under no
circumstances these persons were really saying that ” in no
case would ancestral property devolve in a particular way
and have a particular incidence; and under no ” cir-
cumstances ” would ancestral property devolve in a
particular way, and have a particular incidence.
These considerations, we think, outweigh the statement made
by Mr. Gordon Walker that no distinction between self-
acquired and inherited property in land appeared to be
recognised, and the rules of succession, restriction on
alienation, etc., applied to both alike.
We think, therefore,, that the view taken by the Full Bench,
and the many previous cases mentioned in the judgment of the
Full Bench, that questions and answers in the Riwaj-i-am
refer ordinarily to
985
ancestral property, unless there is clear indication to the
contrary, is correct. Question No. 43 in the Ludhiana
district, appears to be the same for all the tribes. There
is not the slightest indication there that the questioner
wanted information about nonancestral property also. The
answer given by the Grewal Jats to this question also gives
no reason to think that the persons questioned were thinking
in giving the answers of both ancestral and non-ancestral
property.
We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the entries
in the Riwaj-i-am on which the plaintiffs respondents rely
do not refer at all to non-ancestral property, and are,
therefore, not even relevant evidence to establish the
existence of a custom among Grewal Jats of Ludhiana
district, entitling collaterals to succession to non-
ancestral property, in preference to daughters.
Reliance was next placed on behalf of these respondents on
the fact that the existence of such a custom was recognised
in a number of judicial decisions, viz., Jattan v. Jiwan
Singh (1), I shar Kaur v. Raja Singh (2) and Pratap Singh v.
Panjabu (3). If these decisions in so far as they
recognised the existence of such a custom, had been solely
or even mainly based on evidence, other than entries in the
Riwaji-i-am, they might have been of some assistance.
Examination of these cases, however, shows unmistakably that
they were either wholly, or mainly based on the entries in
the Riwaj-i-am on the assumption that these entries referred
to both ancestral and non-ancestral property. This
assumption having been established to be baseless, these
decisions are valueless, to show that the custom as alleged
by the plaintiffs-respondents did exist as regards non-
ancestral property. Further, the oral evidence produced in
the present case is wholly insufficient to prove such a
custom.
It must, therefore, be held that the customary law among the
Grewal Jats of Ludhiana district as regards succession to
non-ancestral property is the same as recorded generally for
the Punjab in Paragraph 23 of Rattigan’s Digest-i.e., the
daughter is preferred to
(1) A.I.R. 1933 Lah. 553. (2) (1911) 9 I.C. 608.
(3) (1911) 13 I.C. 177.
986
collaterals, and consequently, the second and the third
appellants, were the next reversioners to that portion of
Dev Singh’s property which has been found to be non-
ancestral.
This brings us to the question whether the gift of this
portion, by the first appellant to these reversioners, gives
them a good title, beyond the widow’s lifetime. We have to
remember in this connection that as regards the ancestral
property, these daughters were not the reversioners, and the
further fact that out of the ancestral property, the house
was not included in the deed of gift. The position,
therefore, is that out of the property in which the first
appellant held a widow’s estate, she gave by the deed of
gift a portion to the reversioners as regards that portion,
a portion to persons who were strangers to the reversion as
regards that portion and a portion was retained by her. The
doctrine of Hindu law according to which, a limited owner
can accelerate the reversion, by surrendering her interest,
to the next reversioner, is based on a theory of self-
effacement of the limited owner. That is why it has been
laid down that in order that a surrender by a limited owner
to a reversioner, may be effective, the surrender must be of
the entire interest of the limited owner in the entire
property. The exception made in favour of the retention of
a small portion of the property for her maintenance, does
not affect the strictness of the requirement that a surren-
der to be effective, must be of the entire interest in the
entire property: Vide Rangasami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden
(1) and Phool Kaur v. Pem Kaur (2).)
In so far as there is gift to a stranger, there is no
effacement of the limited owner; nor is there any effacement
in respect of the property which is retained. We find it
impossible to say, therefore, that there is such effacement
of the limited owner in this case, as would accelerate the
daughter’s rights by converting the future contingent right
into a present vested right.
On behalf of the appellants it is argued that there is
certainly a total effacement in respect of the nonancestral
property, so that the right of the next reversioners-the
daughters-in that property has
(1) (1918) L.R. 46 I.A. 72.
(2) [1952] S.C.R. 793,
987
been accelerated. We do not think we shall be justified in
recognising this novel doctrine of the possibility of
effacement of the limited owner vis-a-vis the next
reversioner of the non-ancestral property when there is no
effacement vis-a-vis the reversioner of the ancestral
property, and vice versa. Effacement cannot be broken up
into two or more parts in this manner; and however much the
limited owner may wish to efface herself only vis-a-vis
those next reversioners whom she wants to benefit, law does
not recognise such ” partial effacement “.
The Hindu Law doctrine of surrender does not, therefore,
make the gift of the non-ancestral property to the daughters
valid beyond the widow’s lifetime.
It is not suggested that there is any customary law, by
which such surrender can be made.
Though, therefore, we have found disagreeing with the
learned judges of the High Court that tinder the customary
law governing the Grewal got of Jats to which the parties
belong, the daughters-the second and the third appellants-
are preferential heirs to the non-ancestral portion of the
suit land, we hold that their conclusion that this deed of
gift in favour of the daughters is not valid even as regards
the non-ancestral property, beyond the donor’s lifetime is
correct and must be maintained.
As a last attempt Mr. Gopal Singh, counsel for the
appellants, wanted us to hold that under s. 14 of the Hindu
Succession Act, which became law in 1956, either the mother
or the daughters have become full owners of this property,
and so the plaintiffs’ suit should be dismissed. As the
Hindu Succession Act was not on the statute-book, when the
written statement was filed or at any time before the suit
was disposed of in the courts below, the defence under s. 14
of that Act could not be thought of and was not raised. The
necessary consequence is that evidence was not adduced, with
the facts material for the application of s. 14 in view, by
either party. Mr. Agarwala has, on behalf of the
plaintiffs-respondents, contended that as the record stands
the mother had ceased to be in possession and could not get
the benefit of s. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, and that
the
988
daughters in possession, would not become full owners under
s. 14. We do not think it would be proper to consider these
questions in the present suit in this haphazard manner when
on the all-important question of possession, the appellants
themselves do not wish to say whether the mother was in
possession actually or constructively, whether the
daughters’ possession was merely permissive, or whether the
daughters were in independent possession, on their own
behalf These and other questions of fact, and the questions
of law that have to be considered in deciding a claim by the
first appellant or the other two appellants under s. 14 of
the Hindu Succession Act, should properly be considered in
any suit that -they may bring in future, if so advised. We
express no opinion on any of these questions.
For the reasons which have been mentioned earlier, we hold
that the High Court rightly decreed the suit in favour of
the plaintiffs in respect of the nonancestral property also,
and dismiss the appeal. In the circumstances of the case,
we order that the parties will bear their own costs
throughout.
Appeal dismissed.