JUDGMENT
S. B. Sinha, J.
1. This appeal is directed against a Judgment and order dated 26.4.95 passed by a learned single Judge on this Court in C.O. No. 16474(WJ of 1993, whereby and whereunder the said learned Judge dismissed a writ application filed by the writ petitioner.
2. The basic fact of the matter is admitted.
3. The writ petitioner/appellant was appointed by the respondent No. 2. a contractor of respondent No. 1. The writ petitioner himself has described the respondent No. 1 as his principal employer. On various grounds of misconduct, as is evident from the Judgment under appeal, the respondent No. 2 terminated the services of the appellant. The claim of the writ petitioner in the writ application was that as he had been doing job of a perennial nature, he automatically became employee of the principal employer, particularly in view of the fact that allegedly provident fund was deducted from his salary. For the aforementioned purpose, the writ petitioner has impleaded the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner as party respondent in the writ petition.
4. The learned trial Judge appears to have entered into the merit of the matter and. Inter alia, held that the writ petitioner was guilty of misconduct. However, the learned trial Judge rightly pointed out that in the event the writ petitioner is aggrieved by the order of termination passed by the respondent No. 2, he may raise an industrial dispute.
5. Mr. Majumdar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, inter alia, submitted that the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 being a beneficial legislation and provident fund having been educated from the salary of the writ petitioner, he would be deemed to have become employee of the respondent No. 1, and thus, his services ought to have been absorbed by the said respondent. It is now well settled principles of law that in terms of the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, relationship of employer and employee conies into being. In terms of the provisions of the aforementioned Act, however, the principal employer has certain duties. Such duties are enumerated in section 21 of the said Act. Apart from the duties to be performed by a principal employer in terms of the provisions of the said Act itself, it has not given any other benefit to an employee. All the claims of an employee of a contractor must be made against the employer by the employee. It is also not a case where the Central Government in exercise of its power under section 10 of the Contract Labour [Regulation and Abolition) Act abolished employment of contract labour in relation to jobs performed by the writ petitioner along with others. In absence of such a notification abolishing contract labour, the principal employer is not statutorily obliged to absorb the contractor’s labourers. Mr. Majumdar, when questioned, very fairly stated that no such notification has been issued by the Central Government. In this view of the matter, only on the basis of the purported deduction of provident fund, the writ petitioner could not have maintained the writ application. We may notice that the learned trial Judge has disbelieved the statement made by the writ petitioner to. the effect that there has been any such deduction by the respondent No. 1. Apart from the fact that in the premises aforementioned, no writ petition was maintainable as against the respondent No. 1, which was a Slate within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of india, the fact giving rise to the cause of action for fiiing the writ application, if any was against the respondent No. 2, which is a private body as against the said respondent, no writ petition was maintainable. The dispute between the writ petitioner and the said respondent, if any was a private dispute, and in the event, the writ petitioner was aggrieved by the order of termination passed by the said respondent his only remedy was to raise an industrial dispute in terms of the provisions of the industrial Disputes Act. It is now a well settled principles of law that High Court cannot convert itself into an industrial court. It is further well known that the courts shall as of rule, refuse to entertain such a writ application where a more expeditious remedy by way of raising an industrial dispute is available. Reference in this connection may be made to the decisions reported in 1995 L1C 1105, 1995 L1C 1433, and 69 FLR 1061, apart from other decisions.
6. For the reasons aforementioned, in our opinion, there is no merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed. However, if an industrial dispute is raised by the writ petitioner, it goes without saying the same may be considered and appropriate order be passed by the authority concerned at an early date.
7. Urgent xerox certified copy, if applied for, be supplied on priority basis.
D.B. Dutta. J.
8. –I agree.
9. Appeal dismissed