ORDER
Judgement pronounced by V.S. Sirpurkar, J.
1. This is an appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of this Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the petitioner challenging the advertisement issued by the respondents for appointment of the post of Principals in a higher secondary school run by the fifth respondent. A short factual history would not be out of place.
2. Petitioner joined initially as a Headmistress in the Montessori School run by the 4th, 5th and 6th respondents. The 6th respondent is the Correspondent. This was way back in the year 1978. Thereafter, the said school kept on progressing so much so that ultimately the school which had started as a Montessori school became a higher secondary school. It is an admitted position that the school belongs to the minority. It so happened that the petitioner who was serving as a Headmistress right from the beginning had also acquired the qualifications of B.Ed. and M.A. during all these years, so much so that she seems to have acquired the qualification of M.Ed. also. After the school was raised to the standard of Higher Secondary School, the respondents 4 to 6 issued an advertisement on 21.5.1995 inviting applications for the post of Principal of the said higher secondary school. Till then, admittedly the petitioner was continuing as an In-charge Headmistress all through. The petitioner came out with the writ petition praying for issue of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents 4 to 6 from interfering with the petitioner’s right to continue in service as the Principal of the 5th respondent school. In short, the petitioner contended that it was she who was liable to continue as a Principal even of the higher secondary school as she hold adequate qualifications and that the respondents 4 to 6 had no right to appoint any Principal from the open market. This writ petition came to be dismissed by this Court.
3. The defence to this writ petition in the first place was that the
petitioner did not have the adequate qualification in as much as she did not.
have an experience of ten years of teaching experience after obtaining her
post-graduate degree as she had only acquired her M.A. degree in the year
1992. The second defence and which is more substantial one is that this was a
minority school and therefore the management had full right to appoint the
Principal of their own choice, the post of Principal being a very sensitive post
for the administration of the school.
4. The learned single Judge of this Court dismissed the writ petition after hearing the other side. The learned single Judge came to the conclusion that the petitioner did not have the adequate qualifications and the learned single Judge further choose to follow the law laid down by the Apex Court in N. Ahmad v. Manager, Emjay High School and others, confirming the right of the management of the minority school to appoint, a Principal of their own choice as protected by Article 30(1) of the Constitution or India. Substantially following that judgment and quoting extensively from the same, the learned single Judge proceeded to dismiss the writ petition. It is now a settled position in law, in view of the Apex Court’s judgment, that the minority school would be entitled to appoint a Principal of their own choice considering the importance of the post of the Principal even ignoring the seniority of the staff who are working. However, such appointment would have to be of only a person who holds adequate qualifications. That appears to be the only rider in the afore mentioned decision, cited supra.
5. Mr.Rajan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner very fervently took us through the various Government Orders and tried to urge that the petitioner was fully qualified to hold the post in as much as she had the qualification of M.A. M.Ed. He took us particularly to G.O.Ms.No.1091 dated 16.05.1978 and tried to rely on Clause (ii) with regard to Aided Schools-(a) Headmasters, which is as follows:
“(ii) The Headmaster of a High School under Private Management when upgraded as a Higher Secondary School may also continue as the Head Master of the said Higher Secondary School.”
Relying on this, the learned counsel for the petitioner suggests that once the petitioner fulfilled the Qualification as per clause (i) and once this was a private management school which was upgraded as a higher secondary school, she can continue as a Headmistress. We do not agree with this proposition for the simple reason that the language does not permit any such Interpretation. According to us there is no right in the Headmaster/Headmistress of an upgraded school even if the concerned person was acting as a Headmaster/Headmistress prior to its upgradation even in an ordinary Institute. This is because of the use of the term “may”. We are more concerned with minority institutions. There would be no question of any qualification or any right to continue on a post of Headmaster or Principal, in view of the judgment of the Apex Court. The judgment of the Apex Court is very clear that the concerned management of a minority Institution could have the Headmaster or Principal of their own choice to run their school provided such an appointee has an adequate qualification. We are therefore not with the learned counsel for the petitioner and we would choose to dismiss the writ appeal.
6. However, before dismissing the writ appeal, we may only express that here is a case where the Headmistress has been working from the year 1979 and has served, for almost 21 years. She has made a representation on 25.5.1995 to the school, management. It does not seem that the school management has one way or the other considered or-answered the said representation. We would direct that the school management shall consider the representation of the petitioner dated 25.5.1995 within 15 days from to-day. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents 4 to 6 has promised that the school management would consider the representation of the petitioner within 15 days from to-day.
7. With this direction, we dismiss the writ appeal and confirm the order of the learned single Judge, but without, any order as to costs.