ORDER
M.R. Agnihotri, J.
1. In this writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner-firm M/s. Kejriwal Enterprises, New Delhi, has prayed for the quashing of order dt. 16th Mar. 1982 (Annexure P-2), by which Industrial Plot No. 14 in Industrial Area, Gurgaon, was resumed by the Estate Officer. Haryana Urban Development Authority, Gurgaon. and the order dt 16th Aug. 1982. passed by the Administrator, H.U.D.A., exercising the powers of the Chief Administrator, H.U.D.A., by which the appeal of the petitioner-firm was rejected. By way of consequential relief, prayer has also been made for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the Stale of Haryana and the H.U.D.A. through its Chief Aministrator not to resume the plot in question as the petitioner-firm was keen to start construction in the near future.
2. Briefly stating, the petitioner firm applied to the Estate Officer, Faridabad, tor the allotement oi an industrial plot at Gurgaon, in the year 1971. Accordingly the Estate Officer alotted an industrial plot to the petitioner-firm vide allotment order dt. 14th Aug. 1972 (Annexure P-1). According to the terms and conditions of the order of allotment, possession of the site was to be delivered to the petitioner after the payment of 20 per ceni of the tentative price, if it was so desired, and construction was to be completed within two years from the date of allotment. On receipt of the allotment letter the petitioner-firm deposited a sum of Rs. 1,000/- by way of advance on 5th Nov. 1971, whereas 30 per cent of the price of the land was paid on 11th July, 1973. Thereafter, for about eight years, either the petitioner firm did not ask for possession of the plot or the respondents H.U.D.A. did not give possession of the plot to the petitioner-firm, but the admitted position of the partiesis that the actual possession of the plot in question washanded over to the petitioner-firm on 5th Aug. 1981.
3. During this period, the £state Officer, H.C.D.A. Gurgaon, issued a letter requiring the petitioner firm to start the construction forthwith. However, in reply, the petitioner-firm informed the respondent that as a copy ot the layout plan of the Industrial Area showing the exact location of the plot of the petitioner had not been supplied to it and the actual possession of the plat had not been delivered, it was impossibie for the petitioner-firm to start the construction. Ultimately, the Estate Officer, H.U.D.A. Gurgaon, resumed ihe plot vide his order dt. 16th Mar. 1982 (Annexure P-2), The petitioner-firm filed an appeal against the a foresaid resumption order which was dismissed on 16th Aug 1982 by the Administrator, exercising the powers of the Chief Administrator (Annexure P-4).
4. Both the impugned orders, that is, the order of the Estate Officer H.U.D.A., Gurgaon. dt. 16th Mar. 1982 (AnnexureP-2) resuming the plot and the appellate order dt. 16thAug 1982) Annexure P-4) dismissing the appeal, have been challenged by the learned counsel for the petitioner-firm on the ground that unless actual possession of the plot in dispute had been delivered to the petitioner firm tt was impossible for it to start the construction. In these circumstances, according to the learned counsel, the order of resumption passed by the H.U.D.A. was wholly arbitrary. In order to substantiate the submission, the learned counsel has relied upon Rule 14 of the Punjab Urban Estates (Sale of Sites) Rules, 1965 as applicable and extended to the State of Haryana, which reads as under :-
“14. Time within which building is to be erected. — The transferee shall complete the building within. a period of two years from the date of delivery of possession of the site. in accordance with the rules regulating the erection of buildings;
Provided that the time limit may be extended by the Estate Officer, if he is satisfied that the failure to complete the building over the site within the said period was due to causes beyond the control of the transferee.”
In any case, the learned counsel lor the petitioner-firm has vehemently stated that the petitioner-firm was keen and earnest to raise construction and complete the building now within a period of two years, for which purpose it will be having its project report, plan, etc. sanctioned without any further loss of time.
5. On the other hand. Mr. M. R. Verma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent State has relied upon the written statement filed by the respondents to plead that the petitioner-firm should have taken steps to take possession of the plot in question and the fact that the possession was not taken for a number of years alone disentitled the petitioner-firm to file the present writ petition. According to the learned counsel, para 19 of the letter of allotment clearly put the condition that. “You shall have to complete the construction within two years from the date of allotment”. This period of two years having expired much before even the date of delivery of possession by the H.U.D.A. to the petitioner-firm, according to the learned counsel, the order of resumption of the plot and the appellate order were legally valid.
6. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going through the pleadings and the material on the record, 1 am of the considered view that it was impossible for the petitioner-firm to start the construction and complete the same within the stipulated period unless possession of the plot had been delivered by H.U.D.A. to it. In any case, now since the petitioner-firm has shown keenness and anxiety on its part to undertake the construction and complete the same, I think it is a fit case in which the order of resumption should be set aside and the last opportunity be given to it for completing the construction. In this approach, I am fortified by the law laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in ‘Ram Puri v. Chief Commr, Chandigarh, (1982) . 84 Punj LR 388 : (AIR 1982 Pun] & Har 301). S. S. Sandhawalia, C.J. by majority judgnient, held that there is ao manner of doubt that resumption in the sense of a divestiture of title would be the ultimate civil sanction in the armoury of the authorities to effectuate the purpose of a regulated and planned development. It bears repetition that the power of resumption is the ultimate civil sanction and must, therefore, be a weapon of last resort. Inevitably it should be used with great caution and circumspection.
7. Consequently, both the impugned orders, that is, the order of resumption, Annexure P-2 and the appellate order, Annexure P-4, are quashed and a writ of mandamus is issued commanding the respondent authorities not to resume the plot in question but to permit the petitioner-firm to start and complete the construction on the plot. The learned counsel for the petitioner-firm undertakes that his clients would submit the plans of the building to be constructed on the plot, to the respondent authorities within fifteen days from today and after receipt of the sanction of the plan, it would complete the construction within a period of two years without seeking further extention of time, during which period it will be the responsibility of the peritioner-firm to complete the necessary formalities required for completing the construction, in accordance with law. I order accordingly. It is, however, made clear that in case the petitioner-firm fails to complete the construction on the plot in dispute as per the undertaking given above, the respondent authorities shall be at liberty to proceed against it in accordance with law.
8. In the result, the writ petition is allowed with no order as to costs.