Andhra High Court High Court

M. Butchi Reddy And Ors. vs Revenue Divisional Officer/Land … on 10 November, 2004

Andhra High Court
M. Butchi Reddy And Ors. vs Revenue Divisional Officer/Land … on 10 November, 2004
Equivalent citations: 2005 (1) ALT 226
Author: B S Reddy
Bench: B S Reddy, K Bhanu


JUDGMENT

B. Sudershan Reddy, J.

1. These three appeals are being disposed of by a common judgment since all of them are directed against the award and decree passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge at Nalgonda in O.P. No. 62 of 1995 dated 8-8-2000.

2. The claimants are the appellants in A.S. Nos.3790 and 3791 of 2000. The Land Acquisition Officer is the appellant in A.S. No. 3784 of 2000.

3. In order to consider as to whether the award and decree under appeal suffers from any infirmities requiring our interference, few relevant facts may have to be noticed.

4. Altogether, an extent of Ac. 370.09 guntas of land in various survey numbers situate at Kondapur village of P.A. Pally Mandal, Nalgonda District were acquired for a public purpose of construction of filteration plant and pumping station at Kondapur village of Nalgonda District. The draft notification appears to have been revised later indicating that the acquisition is confined only to an extent of Ac.321.14 guntas of patta land and Ac.9.19 guntas of Government land in respect of which no compensation need be paid.

5. The draft notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act was published in the Official Gazette dated 2-7-1993. The Land Acquisition Officer after following the requisite formalities, passed award on 1 -6-1994 awarding compensation at the rate of Rs. 9,000/- per acre in addition to value of the orchards, open wells and bore-wells separately. Being dissatisfied with the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer, the appellants-claimants sought for a reference under Section 18 of the Act which has been taken on file by the learned Single (sic. Senior Civil) Judge in O.P. No. 62 of 1995. The reference was confined only to an extent of Ac.111.35 guntas in these appeals.

6. The respondents(sic. appellants)- claimants in support of their claim seeking compensation at the rate of Rs. 60,000/- per acre examined P.Ws.1 to 11 and got marked Exs.A-1 to A-13. Ex.X-1 is the location map of the acquired land. Ex.X-2 is the market value certificate issued by the Agricultural Market Committee, Saroornagar. On behalf of the appellant therein, none were examined and no documents were marked.

7. The reference Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, assessed the market value of the acquired land at Rs. 12,000/- per acre and did not grant any further relief so far as the orchards, bore-wells and wells are concerned.

8. In these appeals, learned counsel for the appellants Sri A. Pulla Reddy as well as Sri S. Lakshma Reddy submitted that the award of the learned Senior Civil Judge suffers from legal infirmities requiring interference of this Court. The award, according to the learned counsel for the appellants, is contrary to the well settled principles for determining the market value of the acquired lands. The learned Senior Civil Judge ignored the factors that are required to be taken into consideration while assessing the market value of the acquired land. It-is further contended that the reference Court committed a serious error in not considering the evidence available on record for determining the compensation payable in respect of the sweet orange trees situate in a portion of the acquired land. This contention is specifically argued by the learned counsel for the appellants in A.S. No. 3790 of 2000. The appellants in A.S. No. 3790 of 2000 are not only aggrieved by the determination of the market value by the reference Court but are also aggrieved by the award passed by the reference court in not granting any enhanced compensation so far as the sweet lime trees are concerned. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the assessment of compensation made by the reference Court is contrary to the binding decisions of the Supreme Court. The learned Judge totally ignored the method to be adopted for assessing the compensation payable in respect of fruit bearing trees. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader submitted that the trial Court ought not to have granted any enhanced compensation over and above what has been awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer.

9. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions made during the course of hearing of this appeal. We have perused the judgment under appeal and as well as the evidence available on record.

10. The first claimant in the O.P. was examined as P.W.1. P.W.2 is the 7th claimant. P.W.3 is the 6th claimant. P.W.4 is the 19th claimant. Claimant No. 4 is examined as P.W.5 and 9th claimant as P.W.7. P.Ws.6 and 8 are the independent witnesses, P.W.9 is the Director of Horticulture Department, Nalgonda. P.W.10 is the husband of the 8th claimant. P. W. 11 is the neighbour of the 1st claimant.

11. There is no dispute whatsoever that the acquired land is situated at 115th km. on the main road from Hyderabad to Nagarujunasagar. There are orchards in certain portions of the acquired land. The existence of orchards and the number of trees in respect of which compensation has been assessed by the Land Acquisition Officer are not in dispute, No doubt, the appellants herein claimed that the Land Acquisition Officer did not properly estimate the total number of sweet orange plants situated in a portion of the acquired land but there is no evidence to substantiate the plea raised by the appellants. Therefore, the compensation is to be awarded only for the same number of plants for which the Land Acquisition Officer had awarded the compensation.

12. The question that falls for consideration is whether the reference court committed any error in assessing the market value of the acquired land at Rs. 9,000/- (sic. Rs. 12,000/-) per acre. Another question that falls for consideration is whether the reference court was justified in confirming the award so far as the compensation payable in respect of the sweet orange plants is concerned.

13. The learned Judge did not place any reliance upon Exs.A-2 to A-6 and Ex.A-10 documents. Admittedly, the transactions under Exs.A-2 to A-6 and Ex.A-10 are all subsequent to the requisition given by the General Manager submitting the proposals for acquisition of the lands in question for the stated public purpose. No doubt, the transactions under Exs.A-2 to A-6 and A-10 have come into existence prior to the publication of 4(1) notification dated 2-7-1993. The learned Judge rejected the transactions on the ground that they were brought into existence with full knowledge that their lands are likely to be acquired for the stated public purpose. Under Ex.A-3, an extent of 425 square yards; under Ex.A-4, an extent of Ac.0.20 guntas; under Ex.A-5 an extent of Ac.1.01 gunta; under Ex.A-6 an extent of Ac.2.01 guntas; and under Ex.A-10, an extent of Ac.1.00 of land were sold between 22-12-1992 to 19-3-1993. They have come into existence just prior to the date of publication of the draft notification but after the requisition made by the General Manager submitting proposals for acquisition of the land. Some of the claimants themselves are parties to the transactions. For instance, under Ex.A-10 transaction, Ac.1.00 of land was sold in favour of 20th claimant as is evident from the evidence of P.W.1 who is none other than the father of the 20th claimant. Clear suggestions have been made to the witnesses examined on behalf of the claimants that these transactions have been brought into existence to suit the convenience of the appellants-claimants. No consideration is stated to have been paid at the time of execution and registration of the documents. In all the transactions referred to above, consideration is stated to have been paid much earlier to the date of execution of the document. These are all the circumstances that were taken into consideration by the reference Court for rejecting Exs.A-2 to A-6 and A-10 documents. The reasons assigned by the reference Court, in our opinion, are totally satisfactory. No reliance could have been placed upon Exs.A-2 to A-6 and A-10 documents for the purposes of assessing the market value of the acquired land. Obviously, they were brought into existence at the instance of the appellants-claimants. The learned Judge rightly refused to place any reliance upon them and we are not inclined to take a different view other than the one taken by the reference Court.

14. But the question that falls for consideration is whether the reference Court was justified in discarding Exs.A-1 and A-7 to A-9. The learned Judge discarded Exs.A-1 and A-7 to A-9 since none connected with the transactions were examined. The view taken by the reference Court is an erroneous one. It is now well settled that the marking of the certified copy of the sale deed is admissible in evidence and there is no requirement that it should be further duly proved by examining the vendor or the vendee as the case may be. The law on the subject is not res Integra but is squarely covered by an authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Cement Corporation of India Limited v. Purya and Ors., 2004(1) Decision To-day (SC) 922. in which the Supreme Court took the view that under Section 51-A of the Land Acquisition Act, a presumption as to the genuineness of the contents of the documents is permitted to be raised, the same can be relied upon only if the said presumption is not rebutted by other evidence. It is true that there is no compulsion on the Court to accept such transactions as evidence but it is open to the Court to treat it as evidence. “Merely accepting the evidence does not mean that the Court is bound to treat them as reliable evidence. What is sought to be achieved is that the transactions, recorded in the documents may be treated as evidence just like any other evidence and it is for the Court to weigh all the pros and cons to decide whether such transaction can be relied on for understanding the real price of the land concerned.”

15. The evidentiary value of Exs.A-1 and A-7 to A-9 are required to be considered. They cannot be thrown out on the ground that they are not admissible in evidence. The law as it stands does not require examination of the vendor, vendee or even the attestor as the case may be for the purpose of proving the document as such.

16. Now we shall proceed to discuss the evidentiary value of Exs.A-1 and A-7 to A-9. It is not possible to accept that Exs.A-1 and A-7 to A-9 were also brought into existence. No doubt a sweeping suggestion as such appears to have been made that all the transactions were brought into existence to suit the convenience of the claimants- appellants. The suggestion cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the transaction under Ex,A-1 had taken place as early as on 11 -7-1990, that is to say, three years prior to publication of the draft notification in the Official Gazette. The transaction was even prior to the publication of requisition made by the General Manager submitting proposals for acquisition of the land. Under Ex.A-1, an extent of one gunta was sold for a valuable consideration which works out to Rs. 38,722/- per acre. Under Ex.A-7 sale deed dated 15-3-1993, an extent of Ac.1.00 of land in S. No. 345 situate in the same village was sold at the rate of Rs. 40,000/- per acre. Ex.A-8 is another transaction dated 16-3-1993 whereunder an extent of Ac. 1 -06 guntas of land in S. No. 336 was sold for a valuable consideration of Rs. 40,000/- per acre. Likewise, under Ex.A-9 sale deed dated 16-3-1993, Ac.1.00 of land was sold for a valuable consideration of Rs. 40,000/- per acre. We have no particular reason to believe (sic. disbelieve) the genuineness of these transactions. Not even some vague suggestion is given to the claimants in the cross-examination by the learned Government Pleader. The transactions have been taken place earlier to the publication of the draft notification. The claimants are in no way concerned with those transactions. It is no doubt true that insignificant extents of lands have been sold under Ex.A-1 and Exs.A-7 to A-9 in comparison to vast extents of acquired land. It is very well settled that valuation of small extents of lands is no real indicator of the prices of the lands when the acquisition is for larger extents. It is observed by a Division Bench of this Court in Special Deputy Collector v. P. Vidya Sagar Rao, . as under:

“Fixation of compensation for any acquired land is largely an act of estimation on the basis of evidence adduced. It is for the parties contesting, to lead evidence to serve as the basis for making the exercise. In the present case the three sale deeds are respectively only for 487 1/2, 440 and 440 square yards, viz., for about 1/10th of an acre or less. It has been held various times by the Supreme Court that the valuation of small patches of land is no real indicator of the price of the lands when the acquisition is for larger areas. This is so for the reason that while a higher price may be paid for smaller piece of land which may have peculiar or distinctive features like as abutting the road or having a special value for the purchaser, yet those factors, would largely be absent in larger areas. Some part of the larger area may abut the road, but necessarily the other parts would be located beyond and as the distance of different portions of the land to the road increases, the prices would proportionately decrease. That apart to make the different parts of the acquired lands saleable, development programmes have to be undertaken like laying of roads, drainage system, providing electricity, entertainment, etc, The Supreme Court in Administrator General of W. G. v. Collector, Varanasi, held that deductions for roads and other developmental expenses can, together, come upto as much as 53%. Thus even if the valuation of small pieces of land is taken into account, yet in deciding the valuation of larger areas, deductions are to be made for the developmental expenses, value of which may, depending upon varying facts, come up to even 53% or higher or less.

Where evidence is not coming forth directly as to the price of large areas of land in the area of acquisition and the Courts are called upon to determine the valuation on the basis of evidence which is inadequate, necessarily an element of best judgment-assessment is involved to make the valuation. Of course the valuation cannot be made in vacuum and necessarily also not arbitrary but on cogent reasons and plausible inferences which must steer clear of any arbitrariness or unreasonableness.”

17. In Ravinder Narain v. Union of India, . the Supreme Court while recognizing that there is always any amount of speculation in assessing the market value of the acquired land observed that the element of speculation so involved could be reduced to a minimum if the underlying principles of fixation of market value with reference to valuable sales can be made:

(i) “when sale is within a reasonable time of the date of notification under Section 4(1);

(ii) it should be a bona fide transaction;

(iii) it should be of the land acquired or of the land adjacent to the land acquired; and

(iv) it should possess similar advantages.”

18. In the same decision, it is observed that “it cannot be laid down as an absolute proposition that the rate fixed for the small plots cannot be the basis for fixation of the rate. For example, where there is no other material, it may in appropriate cases be open to adjudicating court to make comparison of the prices paid for small plots of land. However, in such cases, necessary deductions/adjustments have to be made while determining the prices.”

19. We shall bear these principles in mind and proceed to determine the market value of the acquired land. We shall also bear in mind that while determining the market value of the land acquired, the Courts must ensure that there is neither unjust enrichment on the part of the acquirer nor undue deprivation on the part of the owner. The compensation must be so determined that a just and reasonable compensation is awarded to the claimants.

20. The transactions under Exs. A-7 to A-9 whereunder an extent of Ac. 1.00 each was sold at the rate of Rs. 40,000/- per acre. They are not small bits of any developed lands sold as house-site plots. The transactions reflect that they were sold as agricultural lands. Therefore, those transactions can be taken into consideration for the purpose of assessing the market value of the acquired lands, which were admittedly agricultural lands. Formation of roads and other developmental expenses as such do not arise but at the same time we cannot adopt the same valuation as shown under Exs. A-7 to A-9 and assess the market value of the acquired land at Rs. 40,000/- per acre. In deciding the value of larger areas, adjustments are required to be made even in cases where no deductions are required to be made for the developmental expenses, which may depend upon varying factors which may go upto 53% as has been held in P. Vidyasagar’s case (2 supra). Therefore, in the case on hand, what is required to be made is an adjustment and not any deduction for roads and other developmental expenses. In our considered opinion, a deduction of 30% from out of the value shown under Exs. A-7 to A-10 (sic. A-9) would be reasonable.

21. In the result, it would be reasonable to assess the market value of the acquired land at Rs. 28,000/- per acre. We accordingly assess the market value of the acquired land at Rs. 28,000/- per acre at which rate the appellants-claimants shall be entitled for payment of compensation.

22. So far as the claim in respect of sweet orange plants is concerned, the learned Judge did not assign any reasons whatsoever for accepting the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer. The oral evidence adduced by the appellants- claimants has not been taken into consideration. The findings recorded by the reference Court for accepting the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer are totally unsatisfactory. It is a clear case of non-consideration of evidence so far as the assessment of compensation payable in respect of the plants is concerned. The reference Court is required to appreciate the evidence for which purpose we consider it appropriate to remit the matter for fresh consideration by the reference Court in accordance with law. It shall be open to the parties to lead further evidence. It shall also be open to the beneficiary to lead evidence if it so chooses. However, we make it clear that the appellants herein are bound by the claim statement submitted by them in the reference Court restricting their claim at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per each sweet orange plant. The reference Court under no circumstances can grant beyond what has been claimed by the appellants in the claim statement. There is some dispute raised by the appellants with regard to the number of plants existing in the acquired land. But there is no evidence for the same. The appellants are therefore bound by the number of plants estimated by the Land Acquisition Officer in respect of which award has been granted. However, it shall be open to the reference Court to consider the claim of the appellants herein for payment of compensation at the rate claimed by them for which purposes alone the appellants shall be entitled to lead further evidence.

23. In the result, the appeals preferred by the claimants are allowed in the manner referred to hereinabove without any order as to costs. A.S. No. 3784 of 2000 preferred by the State shall accordingly stand dismissed without any further orders as to costs.

24. We also make it clear that the appellants herein shall not be entitled to payment of two sets of compensation, one for the land and another for the plants. Such of those claimants who are claiming compensation for the plants are entitled to payment of compensation only for the plants and no separate compensation for the lands. The reference Court on remand shall also reconsider the claim of the appellants herein for grant of enhanced compensation for the bore wells but the appellants are not entitled for payment of any separate compensation so far as the wells are concerned. The reference Court is directed to dispose of the OP. within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order for which purpose it shall proceed with the trial on day-to-day basis without granting any unreasonable adjournments to any of the parties. No order as to costs.