IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
WP(C).No. 8150 of 2010(P)
1. C.KRISHNA KUMAR, MEMBER (UNDER
... Petitioner
Vs
1. THE KERALA STATE ELECTION COMMISSION,
... Respondent
2. THE SPECIAL GRADE SECRETARY,
For Petitioner :SRI.V.CHITAMBARESH (SR.)
For Respondent :SRI.MURALI PURUSHOTHAMAN, SC,K.S.E.COMM
The Hon'ble MR. Justice T.R.RAMACHANDRAN NAIR
Dated :02/07/2010
O R D E R
T.R. Ramachandran Nair, J.
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W.P.(C) No. 8150 of 2010-P
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Dated this the 2nd day of July, 2010.
JUDGMENT
The petitioner is a member from Ward No.8 of Kadambanad Grama
Panchayat. Aggrieved by the intimation given by the Secretary of the
Panchayat that he has ceased to be a member in the Panchayat, under
Section 37(2) of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to
as ‘the Act’), he approached the State Election Commission by filing
O.P.No.6/2009. The Commission, by the impugned order Ext.P4, upheld
the communication issued by the Secretary, which is under challenge in this
writ petition.
2. The intimation issued by the Secretary has been produced as
Ext.P1, wherein it is mentioned that since the petitioner had not attended the
meetings of the Committee of the Panchayat held after 16.10.2008 for a
period of three months (five ordinarily meetings and one urgent meeting) in
spite of receipt of notice, he has ceased to be a member under Section 35
(k) of the Act, from 16.1.2009.
3. Heard learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner Shri V.
Chitambaresh, Shri Murali Purushothaman, learned Standing Counsel for
wpc 8150/2010 2
the Election Commission and Shri K. Shaj, learned counsel for the second
respondent.
4. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
intimation itself is not in tune with the provisions of Section 35(k) of the
Act. The notice has not been properly served for the meetings concerned,
by the Secretary of the Panchayat which amounts to infraction of the
procedure laid down in Rule 3(1)(d) of the Kerala Panchayat Raj (Manner
of Service of Notices) Rules, 1996 (for short ‘the Rules’). It is pointed out
that certain notices have been served by affixture and the said method can
be resorted to only if the the means of service of notice under Rule 3(1)(a),
(b) and (c) are exhausted. The employee of the Panchayat who was deputed
for serving notice, has clearly acted in violation of the provisions of these
rules.
5. The first question raised is about the validity of the intimation
given as Ext.P1. The relevant provision is Section 35(k) of the Act which
along with the provisos, are reproduced below:
“35. Disqualifications of members.– Subject to the
provisions of Section 36 or Section 102, a member shall cease to hold
office as such, if he–
xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx
wpc 8150/2010 3
(k) absents himself without the permission of the Panchayat
concerned from its meeting or the meeting of the Standing
Committee thereof for a period of three consecutive months reckoned
from the date of commencement of his term of office or of the last
meeting that he attended, or of the restoration to office as member
under sub-section (1) of Section 37, as the case may be, or if within
the said period, only in less than three meetings of the Panchayat or
of the Standing Committee as the case may be, have been held,
absents himself from three consecutive meetings held after the said
date:
Provided that no meeting from which a member absented
himself shall be counted against him under this clause if.-
(i) due notice of that meeting was not given to him; or’
(ii) the meeting was held after giving shorter notice than
that prescribed for an ordinary meeting; or
(iii) the meeting was held on a requisition of members;
or:
Provided further that no permission shall be granted by
the Panchayat to a member for absenting himself from meetings of
the Panchayat or of the Standing Committee for a continuous period
of more than six months.”
It is pointed out that going by the first limb of the section, the absence
should be for the meetings of the Panchayat for a period of three
consecutive months reckoned from the date of commencement of his term of
wpc 8150/2010 4
office or of the last meeting that he attended. Herein, the last meeting he
attended was on 16.10.2008. If three consecutive months are counted from
October 2008, it will be over only by the end of January 2009. Herein, the
notice Ext.P1 is dated 24.1.2009, prior to the expiry of the three months
period. The date on which the last meeting was conducted is 12.1.2009.
Therefore, it is submitted that the notice itself is illegal. Both parties relied
upon various decisions of this Court in this context. I shall now refer to
the principles discussed in the decisions cited at the Bar.
6. In Surabhi v. Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition) Kasaragod,
(2010 (1) KHC 68), the method of reckoning the period “three months”
under Section 28A(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, was considered. It was
held that the word ‘month’ has to be reckoned according to the British
calender. Para 3 of the judgment is reproduced below:
“Petitioner applied on 20th November, 2004 relying on an award
passed by the Court on 21st August, 2004. Section 28A(1) of the LA
Act provides that the written application under that provision shall
be made within three months from the date of the award of the
Court. The word ‘month’ is not defined in the LA Act. Therefore,
the definition of that term in Section 3(35) of the General Clauses
Act, 1897 applies. Hence, the month has to be reckoned according
to the British calendar. Therefore, the period of three months for
wpc 8150/2010 5
the purpose of an application under Section 28A (1) has to be
reckoned according to the British calendar applying Section 3(35)
of the General Clauses Act. The award of Court relied on by the
petitioner was delivered on 21st August, 2004. By the proviso to
Section 28A (1) of the LA Act, the date of pronouncement of the
award by the Court shall be excluded in computing the period of
three months. Therefore, the period of three months for the
petitioner to apply under Section 28A(1) on the basis of the award
relied on by her ends on 22nd November, 2004. The petitioner’s
application filed on 20th November, 2004 was, therefore, well within
time.”
This Court, thus relying upon Section 3(35) of the General Clauses Act,
held that the period has to be reckoned according to the British calendar.
But one important thing to be noticed is the wording of the section.
Therein, going by the provisions of Section 28A(1), a written application
has to be made within three months “from the date of the award” of the
Court.
7. Daryoth Singh v. Union of India and others (AIR 1973 Delhi
58) is a case where an interpretation of a clause in a decree came up for
consideration. The operative part of the decree is as under:
“It is ordered that decree of ejectment in respect of Garden and land
together with superstructure and two wells is passed against the
wpc 8150/2010 6
defendant. It is further ordered that the decree shall not be executed
till 15.7.1960 and the plaintiff shall pay Rs.4500/- to the defendant.
So long the plaintiff does not pay Rs.4500/- to the defendant two
months prior to 15.7.1960 he shall not be entitled to possession.”
Therein, the deposit was made on 16.5.1960. It was contended that the
deposit had to be made on 15.5.1960. This aspect was considered in para
15 of the judgment in the following words:
“The deposit of the amount of Rs.4500/- was actually made on May
16, 1960. It has, therefore, to be seen whether the deposit was
made “two months prior to 15.7.1960”. In its ordinary accepted
sense the expression “month” means a “calendar month” and not a
“lunar month”. As to how a calendar month is to be counted from a
date which is not the first of the month has been described in
paragraph 143 of Halsbury’s Laws of England Volume 37 (Third
Edition) in the following words:
“When the period prescribed is a calendar month running from any
arbitrary date the period expires with the day in the succeeding
month immediately preceding the day corresponding to the date
upon which the period starts; save that, if the period starts at the end
of a calendar month which contains more days than the next
succeeding month the period expires at the end of the latter month”.
Thus one month counted from July 15, 1960 would be on June 16
and the second month counted from June 16 would be on May 17,
1960. Evidently, therefore, the deposit made on May 16, 1960 was
wpc 8150/2010 7
two months prior to July 15, 1960.”
8. In fact, a similar question came up for consideration before the
Apex Court in Bibi Salma Khatoon v. State of Bihar and others {(2001)
7 SCC 197}.The interpretation of Section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms
(Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land), Act 1961 arose
for consideration. Therein, the crucial provision considered is Section 16
(3)(i) which is reproduced below:
“16.(3)(i) When any transfer of land is made after the
commencement of this Act to any person other than a co-sharer or a
raiyat of adjoining land, any co-sharer of the transferor or any raiyat
holding land adjoining the land transferred, shall be entitled,
within three months of the date of registration of the documents
of transfer, to make an application before the Collector in the
prescribed manner for the transfer of the land to him on the terms
and conditions contained in the said deed:
Provided that no such application shall be entertained by the
Collector unless the purchase money together with a sum equal to
ten per cent thereof is deposited in the prescribed manner within the
said period.”
The facts of the case show that the sale deed was registered on 30.1.1998
and the application before the Collector to enforce the right of pre-emption
was filed on 30.4.1998. The question arose, what is meant by the word
wpc 8150/2010 8
‘month’ and how the computation has to be made. “Their Lordships held
thus in para 8:
“In Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn. para 211 method of
computation of month is given as follows:
“211. Calendar month running from arbitrary date .– When
the period prescribed is a calendar month running from any
arbitrary date the period expires upon the day in the
succeeding month corresponding to the date upon which the
period starts, save that, if the period starts at the end of a
calendar month which contains more days than the next
succeeding month, the period expires at the end of that
succeeding month.
If a period of one calendar month includes the last day of
February there must be 29 or 28 days, according as the year is
or is not a leap year.”
Thus computed, the application filed by the appellant on 30.4.1988
is within limitation — a period of three months of the date of the
registered sale deed dated 30.1.1988.”
9. In Radhakrishnan v. Join Registrar (2008 (2) KLT 385), this
Court considered a similar issue, i.e. regarding the meaning of the words
‘month’ and ‘consecutively’. The question arose under the Kerala C-
operative Societies Act, 1969 and under Section 33(1) thereof. The crucial
provision under Section 33(1) reads thus: “where the committee fails to hold
wpc 8150/2010 9
its regular meeting consecutively for six months”. The last meeting of the
committee was held on 7.4.2007. Action was taken under Section 33(1) of
the Act on the ground that no meetings were held consecutively for six
months. The order appointing the Administrator was passed on 24.10.2007
and the contention was that it was passed before the expiry of six months. It
was also contended by the petitioner that actually a meeting was held on
31.10.2007. In para 10, this Court laid down thus:
“With or without the support of the decisions referred to on behalf
of the petitioner, it can be safely concluded that the term “month”
and the words “six months” in S.33(1) mean “month” or “six
months” as per the British calendar. The word “consecutively” is
different from the term “continuously”. “Consecution” is a train of
consequences; a series of things that follow one another,
succession of similar intervals in harmony. “Consecutive” is the
adjective form of consecution and it means, “following in regular
order or one after another, expressing consequence. Therefore, a
regular period of a month understood as defined in the General
Clauses Act has to consecutively occur for six times to attain the
status “consecutively for six months” enjoined by S.33(1) of the
Act. Hence, if a meeting is held in a month reckoned according to
the British Calendar, the meeting for the next consecutive month
can be held on any day in the next month reckoned as per the
British Calendar and in so calculating, if a meeting has been held in
wpc 8150/2010 10
a particular month, the vice of S.33(1) of the Act would be
attracted only on failure to hold a meeting on any of the days of its
6th consecutive month. Hence, a meeting having been, indisputably
held on 7.4.2007, i.e. in April, 2007, S.33(1) can be invoked on the
case in hand only if no meeting was held till the end of October,
2007, i.e. 31.10.2007. Therefore, the issuance of the impugned
Ext.P7 order on 24.10.2007, i.e. before the expiry of six months, is
without jurisdiction and is, hence, void.”
It was held that the section can be invoked in the case in hand only if no
meeting was held till the end of October, 2007, i.e. 31.10.2007 and
therefore issuance of the order Ext.P7 dated 24.10.2007 is before the expiry
of six months which is without jurisdiction. The meaning of the term
“consecutive” was also considered therein. It was also held that the word
“month” and the words “six months” mean “month” or “six months” as per
the British Calendar.
10. Herein, the question is whether the notice itself is valid or not.
Shri Chitambaresh, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that
since “month” has to be reckoned as per the British Calendar, as the last
meeting was held on 16.10.2008, the notice Ext.P1 which was issued prior
to 31.1.2009, is invalid. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State
Election Commission and the learned counsel for the second respondent
wpc 8150/2010 11
submitted that the provision herein, viz. Section 35(k) emphasises one
more fact for reckoning the period. It has to be reckoned from the date of
commencement of his term of office or of the last meeting that he attended.
Since the last meeting which the petitioner had attended is on 16.10.2008,
the period has to be reckoned from that date and if that be so, the notice
dated 24.1.2009 is perfectly within jurisdiction, as the period of three
months was over.
11. It is clear from the principles laid down in the above decisions
that the word “month” has to be reckoned. and the period has to be
computed in the light of the language employed in the provision itself.
When a particular date which is not the first of the month has to be
reckoned, the first month will have to be computed by reckoning the said
factor. When the period has to be counted from a date which is not the first
day of the month, the method of computation as described in Halsbury’s
Laws of England has to be adopted which is the safest method. This is
clear from the decisions in Daryoth Sigh’s case (AIR 1973 Delhi 58), Bibi
Salma Khatoon’s case {(2001) 7 SCC 197) and Surabhi’s case (2010 (1)
KHC 68). In all these three cases the word “month” is qualified by the
words “from the date” etc. Therefore, when the word “month” is followed
wpc 8150/2010 12
by such an expression indicting the date from which it has to be computed,
the principles stated in the above three decisions will squarely apply and the
period will expire upon the day in the succeeding month corresponding to
the date upon which the period starts. Evidently, in Surabhi’s case (supra),
this Court considered an identical situation like one herein, wherein under
the Land Acquisition Act, viz. Section 28A(1), the application had to be
made within “three months from the date of award of the court”. Therefore,
the calendar month has to be reckoned from the date of the award. The
Apex Court in Bibi Salma Khatoon’s case (supra), also has considered a
similar issue. Therefore, the said dictum alone will apply to the facts of this
case. The decision of this Court in Radhakrishnan’s case (2008 (2) KLT
385), was one considering a case where the wording of Section 33(1) of
the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 was not the like one in Section
35(k) of the Panchayat Raj Act. Therefore, it is in that context this Court
said that when ‘month’ followed by the words, “consecutively six months”
has to be reckoned based on British calendar, till the end of the six months
period.
12. Herein, going by the facts of the case, the last meeting which the
petitioner had attended, was on 16.10.2008. The notice Ext.P1 was issued
wpc 8150/2010 13
on 24.1.2009. Therefore, reckoned from the date 16.10.2008, on which he
last attended the meeting and even excluding one day, the period of three
months will expire before 24.1.2009, the date of Ext.P1 notice. It is not as
if the Secretary should have waited till the end of January, i.e. 31.1.2009.
Therefore, the contention raised by the petitioner that the notice itself is
without jurisdiction, cannot be accepted.
13. The other issue that is raised is regarding the manner of service of
notice. Herein, the crucial dates on which the meetings were held, are
28.10.2008, 1.11.2008, 17.11.2008, 29.11.2008, 11.12.2008 and 12.1.2009,
out of which the meeting dated 1.11.2008 was an urgent meeting.
Therefore, that has to be excluded. The petitioner did not attend the
meetings held on all these dates. The notices for the meetings held on
28.10.2008 and 29.11.2008 were served by affixture. As regards the
meetings held on 17.11.2008, 11.12.2008 and 12.1.2009, he has admitted
to have received notices also.
14. It is the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner that the notice for the meeting held on 28.10.2008 was affixed
and such affixture is bad in the light of the fact that the manner of service of
notice as provided under the relevant rules, were not exhausted. Rule 3
wpc 8150/2010 14
(1)(d) of the Rules can be applied only if all the three methods of service
under Rules 3(1)(a), (b) and (c) are exhausted.
15. Here, the Commission in its order, has taken the view that there is
nothing wrong in the affixture done by the serving officer who was deputed
for the same by the Secretary. The relevant evidence including oral and
documentary, have been discussed by the Commission. It was held that
there is nothing wrong in affixing the notice of the meeting at the residence
of the petitioner when there was nobody to receive the notice. Accordingly,
it is further held that the serving officer has followed the above rule.
16. Herein, some aspects which are relevant require consideration.
Rules 3(1)(a) to 3(1)(d) are extracted below:
“3. Serving of notice.– (1) in case the Act or rules or bye-laws made
thereunder requires the Panchayat to serve any notice or document to
a person, such service or sending shall, unless otherwise provided in
the Act or rules or bye-laws made thereunder, be done.–
(a) by service or sending of notice or document to such
person; or
(b) If such person cannot found out, by leaving such notice or
document at his last known place of abode or business or by
entrusting the same to some adult member or servant of his family
and in the case of employees working in firms, factories, plants and
workshops where admission to notice server is prohibited or where
wpc 8150/2010 15
service of notice cannot be possible in the ordinary course, by
entrusting the same to the head of the institution or to any authorised
person, or
(c) if such person’s address elsewhere is known to the
Secretary, by sending the same to that address by registered post; or
(d) if none of the aforesaid means are available, by affixing the
notice in some conspicuous part of his abode or work place.”
Sub-rule (1)(a) provides for service of notice to the person concerned and
sending of it also. The method under sub-rule (1)(b) is required when such a
person cannot be found in the residence. The method under sub-rule 1(c)
could be invoked if the person has got an address elsewhere. Sub-rule (1)
(d) enables the service of notice by affixture if none of the above means are
available. Herein, the serving officer went to the house of the petitioner and
after recording that no member of the family was present, affixed the notice
in the presence of two witnesses.
17. Learned Standing Counsel for the Commission submitted that
actually the Rules, viz. Kerala Panchayat Raj (Manner of Service of
Notices) Rules, 1996 may not apply here, as the said rules have been framed
under clause (xv) of sub-section (2) of Section 254 of the Panchayat Raj Act
and the only Rule applicable as regards the meetings of Panchayats, is “The
Kerala Panchayat Raj (Procedure for Panchayat Meeting) Rules, 1995.”
wpc 8150/2010 16
The said rules have been framed under Sections 157, 158 and 161 of the
Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994. Shri Chitambaresh, learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioner points out that actually the Commission has
considered the matter under the former rules, and hence the present
contention is not available
18. The conduct of the meetings of Panchayats are governed by the
provisions of 161 of the Act. It is provided under Section 161(1) of the
Act that the meetings of a Panchayat at any level shall be held at such
intervals, as may be prescribed. The Kerala Panchayat Raj (Procedure for
Panchayat Meeting) Rules, 1995 is framed in exercise of the powers
conferred by Sections 157, 158 and 161 of the Act read with Section 254
thereof. Rule 4 (1) of the above rules reads as follows:
“The notice regarding the place, date and time of the meeting and
subject to be discussed in the meeting shall be given to the members
at least three clear days prior to the date fixed for beginning of the
meeting:
Provided that, in the above said clear days, declared holidays
shall be included but the date of receipt of notice and the date of
meeting shall not be included.”
19. In Ext.P1, the plea raised by the petitioner in para 4 is by relying
upon the above rules which require at least three clear days notice for the
wpc 8150/2010 17
meeting. The specific plea in Ext.P1 is that the respondent has violated the
said provision. This is evident from para 3 of the petition also, wherein it is
mentioned that there was no sufficient notice to the petitioner as
contemplated under law, to attend the meeting.
20. I may now refer to the stand taken in the written statement of the
Secretary. The method for service of notice has been clearly explained in
paragraphs 8 and 9, wherein it is mentioned that “the notice of the
committee meetings are generally and ordinarily issued by direct service to
all the members including the petitioner. This is the general mode of
service followed by the Panchayat from the beginning till date. The
petitioner herein has received notices of three out of the six issued to him
during the period.” In para 9 it is further mentioned that the service of the
Peon is utilised for the direct service in all the cases and reliance is placed
on the notice delivery book also.
21. Therefore, as pointed out by the learned Standing Counsel for
the Commission, the question posed by the petitioner was only with regard
to the above aspect and no contentions are seen raised with regard to the
violation of the Kerala Panchayat Raj (Manner of Service of Notices) Rules,
1996. This Court, in like circumstances, considered the applicability of
wpc 8150/2010 18
Rule 3(a) of the above Rules in respect of convening of Grama Sabhas, in
the decision in Mavoor Grama Panchayat v. Ombudsman, Local Self
Government Institutions (2007 (4) KLT 886). It was held that the above
rule applies only in cases where the Panchayat Raj Act or Rules by Bye-
laws made thereunder requires the Panchayat to serve notices to a person.
After considering various rules, it was held in para 7 as follows:
“It is true that as per R.3(a) of the Kerala Panchayat Raj (Manner of
Service of Notices) Rules, 1996, service of individual notice to the
person who is intended to be served with notice has been
contemplated. But R.3 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj (Manner of
Service of Notices) Rules, 1996 applies only in cases where the
Panchayat Raj Act or Rules or Bye-laws made thereunder requires
the Panchayat to serve notices to a person. The Panchayat Raj Act
does not insist on service of notice of Grama Sabha meetings to the
persons who constitute the Grama Sabha as per S.3(2) or to the head
of the families within the area of the Grama Sabha. The relevant
Rule is R.4 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj (Procedure for convening
the Grama Sabha) Rules, 1995. Thus under the Rule what is
required is only that there shall be publicity regarding the proposed
meeting of the Grama Sabha and that the Convener concerned shall
try to inform the members of the Grama Sabha, the place, date and
time of the meeting and cause them to attend the meeting. What is
contemplated is publication of the date, place and time, by affixing
notice in public places, Government Offices, Schools in the area of
wpc 8150/2010 19
the Grama Sabha and in the office of the Panchayat. The mandate
to the Convener is only that he shall try to inform the members of
the venue and time of the meeting and also cause them to attend the
meeting.”
It was found that separate rules are there for the convening of the meetings
of the Grama Sabhas.
22. Section 161 of the Panchayat Raj Act is concerned with the
meetings of the Panchayats. Sub-section (1) states that “the meetings of a
Panchayat at any level shall be held at such intervals, as may be prescribed.”
Sub-section (4) of the said section provides that “Save as provided in this
Act, the time and place of a meeting of a Panchayat, the quorum of such
meeting, the procedure for calling such meeting and the procedure at such
meeting shall be such as may be prescribed.” The rules framed, viz. The
Kerala Panchayat Raj (Procedure for Panchayat Meeting) Rules, 1995, is
the rules applicable as all these aspects are covered by the said rules. As
already noticed, there should be at least three clear days prior to the date
fixed for the meeting, after giving notice to the members. Nothing is
mentioned therein regarding manner of service of notice. Therefore,
plainly the matter depends upon the way by which and the practice by
which the Panchayat usually serve notice of such meeting, which has clearly
wpc 8150/2010 20
been mentioned in the written statement of the Secretary that personal
service is always resorted to by the Panchayat. Therefore, as is proved in
the evidence, personal service was resorted to on all days and on
28.10.2008 the notice was served by affixture. The said method is plainly
legal and valid and the argument, therefore, that for want of proper notice
the said meeting has to be eschewed for considering the question of
disqualification, cannot be accepted. The same is the situation in respect
of the affixture effected for the meeting held on 29.11.2008. There were
three clear days of notice in respect of the five meetings which are crucial
for the consideration of disqualification. Therefore, the only plea raised by
the petitioner in Ext.P2 petition that there was no three clear days for the
service of notice, having been found against by the Commission, it does not
require any interference, in these proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
23. It is true that the Commission has considered the matter in the
light of the Kerala Panchayat Raj (Manner of Service of Notices) Rules,
1996 also. The view taken is that they have resorted to Rule 3(1)(d) for
affixture, which cannot be said to be wrong. Even though learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioner Shri V. Chitambaresh submitted that the said
wpc 8150/2010 21
mode can be resorted to only after exhausting all the three other modes, it
is evident that as the petitioner or any other member was not there at the
time when the peon went to his house, and the evidence shows that the
house was remaining closed and hence the only method by which the notice
was served, cannot be said to be wrong. For the meeting held on
29.11.2008, affixture was effected as he had refused to receive the notice.
Obviously, Rule 3(1)(a) was resorted to by sending the notice to the
petitioner through the peon which was a practice in vogue in the Panchayat.
The method under Rule 3(1)(b) could not have been resorted to, in the
absence of any adult member or servant in the family available at that point
of time. Sub-rule(c) does not apply herein as it provides for sending the
notice by registered post if the person is having an address elsewhere.
Rule 3(1)(d) clearly provides that if none of the aforesaid means are
available, notice can be affixed in some conspicuous part of his abode or
work place. Considered in that manner also, I am of the view that even if
the said rules are applied herein, there is no illegality as far as the service of
notice is concerned.
24. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon
the principles stated in Kuppuswamy v. Viswam Chits (1986 KLT 98),
wpc 8150/2010 22
which considered the interpretation of Order V Rule 17 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, wherein it was held that service by affixture can be made if
all the other modes are exhausted. The rules provide for specific conditions
for service by affixture, which are absent in the rule in question, viz. Rule 3
(1)(d) of the Kerala Panchayat Raj (Manner of Service of Notices) Rules,
1996. Therefore, the principles laid down therein may not help the
petitioner in this case.
For all these reasons, I find that no interference is called for on the
order passed by the Commission and the writ petition is dismissed. No
costs.
(T.R. Ramachandran Nair, Judge.)
kav/