ORDER
S.S. Subramani, J.
1. One Loganayaki Ammal filed H.P.C.O.P. No. 9 of 1980, on the file of the Rent Controller (District Munsif), Kulithalai. Pending disposal of the said petition, she died, and the present petitioners have been impleaded as her legal heirs. Her husband Manimuthusamy has also been impleaded (as second petitioner).
2. The petition for eviction was filed on the ground that the first respondent herein is a tenant of the petition mentioned building, agreeing to pay a monthly rent of Rs. 90. It is an oral tenancy, and the rent is payable according to the English calendar month. Each month’s rent is payable on the 5th of every succeeding English calendar month. It is seen that the first respondent is an advocate and also a politician. While occupying the building, he stood for election, and it is seen that he was for sometime a Minister. The case that is put forward by the petitioners is that after he was elevated to the Cabinet, he shifted his residence to the Quarters and thereafter kept the premises locked from 1977 onwards. Since the building remained locked, it got damaged. It is also said that the same has affected the value and utility of the building. It is averred that till June, 1974 rent was paid and thereafter defaulted to pay rent from 1.7.1974. As on the date of petition, it is said that a sum of Rs. 6,300 is due from the respondent/tenant. On 22.1.1978, the petitioner (Loganayaki Ammal) issued a notice to the first respondent herein (tenant) demanding rent and possession. Though the same was received by the first respondent, he did not send a reply. Again, on 28.9.1979, the petitioner issued a registered notice. For that also, the respondent did not send any reply. Again, on 3.4.1980, the petitioner issued a notice to the respondent. For that also, the respondent did not send any reply. For the above reasons, the petitioners seek the assistance of court, to get the first respondent evicted from the building.
3. In the counter statement filed by the respondent, it is stated that the petition is frivolous and unsustainable, and that the petitioner has no title to the schedule mentioned property, nor was she in possession and enjoyment of the property. He specifically denied her title. He also said that he was not a tenant at any time in respect of the schedule property, much less under any tenancy agreement with the petitioner, on a rental of Rs. 90 per month. The matter did not end there. He further denied that Loganayaki Ammal is the wife of Mani Muthuswamy. He would say that she has nothing to do with him. According to the respondent, he is in possession and enjoyment of the schedule mentioned building in his own right. He has further stated that he has effected substantial improvements to the building by spending more than Rs. 10,000. Further down, he has stated that he was a tenant under one Mani Muthuswami who prefers to be the owner and was the ostensible owner and who was held out as such, and the respondent had been paying the rent to him and to his sons – Manoharan and Vetrivel. He has further said that the said Mani Muthuswami as such owner had entered into an agreement of sale with the respondent and had also delivered possession of the property to the respondent under the said agreement of sale and the respondent is now in possession of the same only under the said agreement of sale, not as a tenant even under the said Mani Muthuswamy. According to the respondent (tenant), he had been paying large cash to the said Mani Muthuswamy and as such the respondent’s occupation of the petition mentioned building was only under the agreement of sale and as owner in part performance of the said agreement of sale, the respondent has taken possession of the property and he had also been paying house-tax in his own right and had been effecting permanent improvements and repairs at a huge cost of more than Rs. 10,000, to the knowledge of the owner. He says that his possession is in part performance of the agreement of sale, that he is entitled to the benefits of Section 53(a) of the Transfer of Property Act and that he cannot be evicted. It is said that even Mani Muthus wamy has no title to the property and the petition has to be dismissed in limine. According to the respondent (tenant), the attempt by the petitioner is only to escape, if possible, from the obligations under the agreement of sale, and that it is an abuse of process of court. He says that he has never committed any default much less wilful default in the payment of rent from 1.7.1974. The hugeness of the alleged arrears itself betrays that the application is not what it purports to be, and also betrays the absence of ownership in the premises. The other allegations in the petition are also denied. For the above reasons, the respondent wanted the petition to be dismissed with costs.
4. Before the Rent Controller, P.Ws. 1 and 2 were examined on the side of the petitioners. They are respectively 4th and 2nd petitioners, and Exs. A-1 to A-13 were marked. The respondent got himself examined as R.W. 1 through Commission. Exs. B-1 to B-20 were marked on his side.
5. The Rent Controller, after taking into consideration the evidence, both oral and documentary, came to the conclusion that the petition is maintainable and ordered eviction against the respondent on the ground that he has committed wilful default in paying the rent. Regarding the alleged acts of waste and the consequence thereof, namely, acts affecting the value and utility of the building, the Rent Controller held that the landlords have not proved those allegations. Rent Controller ordered eviction on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent.
6. Against the order of eviction, respondent (tenant) filed C.M.A. No. 24 of 1964, on the file of the appellate authority, Karur. The appellate authority reversed the findings of the Rent Controller and dismissed the eviction petition. It is against that judgment, the petitioners have preferred this revision petition.
7. While considering the question of jurisdiction of this Court under Section 25 of the Rent Control Act, we have to find out whether the judgment of the appellate authority is in any way illegal, irregular or improper and whether the lower appellate court has taken into consideration irrelevant factors and whether it has also omitted to take note of relevant piece of evidence.
8. As I said already, before the Rent Controller, the 4th petitioner was examined as P.W. 1, and Mani Muthuswamy about whom the respondent (tenant)
had mentioned in his counter statement, was examined as P.W. 2. The first contention that is raised in the notice as well as in the counter statement is that the original petitioner Loganayaki Ammal had no title to the property, and there was no rental arrangement with her. That apart, the counter statement also alleges that Loganayaki Ammal had nothing to do with Mani Muthuswami, who allowed the respondent to occupy the building. First we have to consider whether the denial of title is proper and bona fide.
9. According to me, on going through the counter statement, I find that the respondent has taken inconsistent versions. Of course, as respondent he is entitled to take inconsistent versions, but to which extent, is the question. If we go through the counter-statement filed by him, we can find out that the contentions put forward by him are lacking in good faith. In paragraph 7 of the counter-statement, he has stated thus:
This respondent was a tenant under one Mani Muthuswamy who prefers to be the owner and was the ostensible owner and who was held put as such and this respondent had been paying the rent to him and to his sons – Manoharan and Vetrivel….
The said Manoharan and Vetrivel are petitioners 4 and 6 in the eviction petition. So, the initial rental arrangement with Mani Muthuswamy is admitted in para 7. There is one more document in this case, namely, Ex. A-7 dated 6.6.1968, written by the respondent herein, and it is addressed to Mani Muthuswamy, where it is said that the building bearing Door Nos. 1 and 2 of Mudaliar Street, by name ‘Valluvarillam’ has been taken by him on a monthly rent of Rs. 90 with effect from 7.6.1968. It is further stated that whenever he vacates the building, he will surrender vacant possession of the building and handover the key to Mani Muthuswamy. The execution of Ex. A-7 is not disputed. It is further said that thereafter, as per Ex. B-20, he has entered into an agreement for sale. It is dated 12.1.1976. The same is written on a plain paper wherein P.W. 1 has affixed his signature, on a 20 paise revenue stamp. In that receipt, it is said that the respondent is in possession as a tenant, agreeing to pay a monthly rent of Rs. 90, and that in the said building the respondent had done some repairs, and for the amount spent towards that head and also for the amounts borrowed towards family expenses by himself and his father Mani Muthuswamy, as per accounts as on 12.1.1976, a sum of Rs. 15,205 was payable to the respondent, that they were not in a position to repay that amount and that, therefore, till the amount is repaid, he may be in possession of the same as owner. It is witnessed by two persons and written by one P. Natarajan. Within a few days after Ex. B-20, Ex. A-1 notice was issued to the respondent, asking him to vacate the premises. It is said that as on that date, a sum of Rs. 1,650 was due towards arrears of rent, and they have also demanded vacant possession of the building. That notice was issued by an advocate on behalf of Mani Muthuswamy. For that, there was no reply from the first respondent (tenant). A second notice was issued by the original petitioner, Loganayaki Ammal, and it was marked as Ex. A-3, dated 28.9.1979. There also, the respondent is informed that he has committed default in paying rent from 1.7.1974, and that as on the date of issuance of that notice, a sum of Rs. 5,670 was due towards rent. The same was received by the respondent. But it was not replied. A further notice was issued as per Ex. A-6, by Mani Muthuswamy wherein reference is made to the earlier notices Exs.A-1 and A-3. There also, a demand is made to surrender vacant possession. We find that even though in the earlier portion of the notice Mani Muthuswamy’s name alone is mentioned, in the bottom, Mani Muthuswami and Loganayaki Ammal have signed the same. It is thereafter, the present eviction petition was filed.
10. The first contention raised by learned Counsel for the respondent is that Loganayaki Ammal had no right over the building, and the tenancy is only with Mani Muthuswamy. It is, therefore, contended that Loganayaki Ammal had no locus standi to file the eviction petition. According to him, there is no landlord and tenant relationship between the parties. How far the said contention can be accepted is a matter to be considered.
11. Ex. A-6 is a document executed by Mani Muthuswami, Loganayaki Ammal and others. It is a simple mortgage executed by them for a sum of Rs. 36,000. From that document, it is clear that Loganayaki Ammal is the owner of the property and that she obtained right as per settlement deed executed by her in-laws. From the said document, one more thing is clear, namely, that Loganayaki Ammal is the wife of Mani Muthuswamy, and the additional petitioners in the eviction petition are her husband and children. We have also Ex. A-5 written by Mani Muthuswamy and Loganayaki Ammal, demanding rent and also vacant possession from the respondent. Ex. A-12 is a demand notice issued to Mani Muthuswamy and his wife Loganayaki Ammal, by the Town Panchayat. It shows that the joint ownership of the property was with them.
12. As I said already, Ex. A-7 is the letter written by the respondent to Mani Muthuswamy. I do not think there is an representation made by Loganayaki Ammal that her husband is the owner, She has not committed herself as not the owner, to any one. P.W.2, when he was examined, has said that Ex. A-7 was issued by the respondent at a time when his wife was not well and hospitalised. Again, as per Ex. A-3, a notice, was issued by Loganayaki Ammal, demanding possession, Even though it was acknowledged by the respondent, no reply has been sent. According to me, as per the definition of ‘landlord’ under the Rent Control Act, Loganayaki Ammal is the owner, entitled to get rent, and even if Mani Muthuswami had inducted the respondent as tenant, that cannot create ownership in him. Probably, as husband of the owner Loganayaki Ammal, Mani Muthuswamy might have inducted the respondent as tenant. Subsequent conduct also shows that even though the respondent was inducted as tenant by Mani Muthuswamy, she was demanding rent from the tenant. What is the effect of Ex. B-20 is also to be considered. We have to see whether an earlier rental arrangement has been given a goby on the basis of Ex. B-20. The rent control petition was filed in 1980 when Loganayaki Ammal was alive. During her lifetime and of Mani Muthuswamy, their children cannot have any right over the property. Therefore, Ex. B-20 has been written by the 4th petitioner at a time when he had no right at all. I will come to the evidentiary value of Ex. B-20 later. At a time when the fourth petitioner had no right over any portion of the building, he says that the respondent has spent money for carrying out repairs to the building and that the amount spent for those repairs and also the amount borrowed by him and his father for family expenses totally come to Rs. 15,205 and that the same was due and payable to the respondent as on that date. From that letter, it is also clear that the petitioners were in financial difficulties at that time. The respondent, who was then an influential person, within a few months became a Minister, and he had exploited the financial difficulties of the fourth petitioner. According to me, the stamped paper written by the fourth petitioner cannot be made use of against Loganayaki Ammal or Mani Muthuswamy, and no legal right will flow from Ex. B-20. In this connection, it is said in paragraph 7 -of the counter statement, that Mani Muthuswamy has represented himself to be the owner, and that he has entered into an agreement for sale, with the respondent. No document is forthcoming to show such an agreement. The same is belied by a subsequent event. Within ten days of Ex. B-20, Mani Muthuswamy himself issues a registered notice as per Ex. A-1, seeking the respondent to vacate the premises, and also saying that he has committed wilful default in payment of rent.
13. When P.W.2 was examined, he has stated that as per the terms of the tenancy, the respondent was bound to pay tax and only after deducting the amount of tax, he used to pay rents. Even that was not paid regularly, and coercive steps were attempted to be taken by the local authorities against the owners. Electricity charges were also not paid and, therefore, a registered demand was made by Loganayaki Ammal and her husband to disconnect electricity supply. For more than five years, electricity charges were not paid, and as per Ex. A-11, the Electricity Board informs the petitioner that there are arrears of electricity charges and they wanted that amount also to be paid before any disconnection was made. All this will show that the respondent was not acting in terms of the agreement. He was neither paying electricity charges, nor house tax, and even the rent he was not paying. His case is entirely built up on Ex. B-20 only. If Ex. B-20 cannot he used for any purpose, then he cannot say that he is not liable to pay rent. There is no proper agreement for sale. Again, Ex. B-20 cannot be read as an agreement for sale also. It only says that as on 12.1.1976, a sum of Rs. 15,205 is payable to him (respondent) and till that amount is paid, the respondent may make use of the building as his own. P.W. 1, when he was examined, has said that he was kidnapped on that day, and he was pressurised to sign such a letter. It is also spoken to by him that on the very next day, he informed the same to his parents, and a complaint was filed before the local police. But, due to the political influence of the respondent, police did not initiate any action against him (respondent). In this case, when P,W. 1 was examined, he has stated that the respondent has not done any repair to the building. In such circumstances, the burden was on the respondent (tenant) to prove that certain sums were due from the petitioners herein and that he was entitled to adjust the same towards rent payable by him. The best evidence that could be produced before court is now withdrawn. A reading of Ex. B-20 will show that it was executed at a time when the petitioners were in great financial difficulties. That difficulty was exploited by the respondent, and Ex. B-20 was obtained by him. It is for him to show that there was good faith in the transaction, but he has failed proves the same.
14. R.W. 1 is a member of the legal profession, and he knows that Ex. B-20 will have no legal validity, especially when the respondent has a case that he took the building from Mani Muthuswamy, father of the executant of Ex. B-20. To make use of Ex. B-20, there cannot be any defence for him.
15. Learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that originally the petition was filed by Loganayaki Ammal, and after her death, when her legal heirs are impleaded, they can take plea only as legal heirs of Loganayaki Ammal, and they cannot put forward their independent right in this case.
16. I can understand this argument only if Mani Muthuswamy or his children claim title in the building. From the very beginning, the petitioners have been saying that Ex. A-7 was written by the respondent at a time when Loganayaki Ammal was unwell, and that she alone was the owner. There is no change in the stand taken by the petitioners. In this case, the respondent (tenant) admits that Mani Muthuswami is the owner. He also says that he has been paying rents to petitioners 4 and 6 also. But according to him, when he is not recognising the right of Loganayaki Ammal, he cannot recognise their independent right also. The said contention has no legs to stand. The owners themselves say that they are claiming only under Loganayaki. Assuming that the said contention of the respondent can be accepted, even then this is a contention which the petitioners could have also taken alternatively but which they have not claimed in the petition. In such a case, nothing prevents this Court from granting a relief to the petitioners. I am supported in taking such a view by the decision reported in Firm Srinivas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad and Ors. at 180. In that case, their Lordships said thus:
…But when the alternative case, which the plaintiff could have made, was not only admitted by the defendant in his written statement but was expressly put forward as an answer to the claim which the plaintiff made in the suit, there would be nothing improper in giving the plaintiff a decree upon the case which the defendant himself makes….
The same was followed in the decision reported in The State of Rajasthan v. The Associated Stone Industries Kota Limited and Anr. A.I.R. 1971 Raj. 128. The question that came for consideration was, whether the contract was invalid, and whether on the admission of the defendant, a decree can be granted. While considering the same, in paragraph 29 of the judgment, a Division Bench of that High Court held thus:
In Firm Srinivas Ram v. Mahabir Prasad , the plaintiff brought a suit for specific performance of a contract to sell a house on the allegation that the defendant had agreed to sell it for Rs. 34,000 and out of this a sum of Rs. 30,000 had been paid by the plaintiff on behalf of the vendors to a creditor of the latter. The defendants contended that they had never agreed to sell the house to the plaintiff and the story of a contract of sale as set up was false. They however admitted that they had approached the plaintiff for a loan and the plaintiff advanced to them a sum of Rs. 30,000. The trial court came to the conclusion that the story of contract of sale was not established, that the defendants’ story was true and that the plaintiff did advance a sum of Rs. 30,000 by way of a loan to the defendants. In this view the trial court dismissed the plaintiff s claim for specific performance and passed a money decree for a sum of Rs. 30,000 against the defendants. On appeal the High Court agreed with the trial Judge that the plaintiff was not entitled to a decree for specific performance of the contract. As regards the money decree granted against the defendants the High Court held that this was not warranted in law as no case as a loan was made by the plaintiff in the plaint and no relief was claimed on that basis. Accordingly the High Court dismissed the suit in its entirety. On appeal the Supreme court held that the trial court was right in giving a decree for money against the defendants. It was observed by the Supreme Court:
The rule undoubtedly is that the court cannot grant relief to the plaintiff on a case for which there was no foundation in the pleadings and which the other side was not called upon or had an opportunity to meet. But when the alternative case, which the plaintiff could have made was not only admitted by the defendant in his written statement but was expressly put forward as an answer to the claim which the plaintiff made in the suit, there would be nothing improper in giving the plaintiff a decree upon the case which the defendant himself makes. A demand of the plaintiff based on the defendant’s own plea canj not possibly be regarded with surprise by the letter.
Their Lordships relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Mohan Manuchas ‘s case A.I.R. 1943 P.C. 29.
In the present case the defendant pleaded that the agreement dated 2.4.1945 became void on the coming into force of the Constitution. The plaintiff company can be granted relief under Section 65 of the Contract Act on the basis of this plea.
17. In Shikharchand and Ors. v. Mst. Bari Bai and Ors. , a Division Bench of that High Court held thus:
It is no doubt true that ordinarily the plaintiff is entitled to a relief only on the basis of the cause of action stated in the plaint but it is open to the court in suitable cases to afford a relief on the basis of the case as set up by the defendant. In such a case, there is no prejudice to the defendant because the relief legitimately springs from the case as set up by him.
18. In New Shorock Mills Division of Mafatlal Industries Limited v. Samabhai Mathurbhai Patel , in paragraph 12 of the judgment (at page 26 of the reports), a learned Judge of that High Court has held thus:
It was open to the petitioner to plead an alternative case that the respondent was its tenant and it was entitled to recover possession of the suit premises from him under the provisions of the Act. As in the case of Mahabir Prasad , alternative case which the petitioner could have made was not only admitted by the respondent in his written statement, but was expressly put forth as an answer to the claim which the petitioner made in the suit. Therefore, there would be nothing improper in giving petitioner a decree upon the case which the respondent himself makes. When no injustice can possibly result to the respondent, there is no point in driving the petitioner to a separate suit.
19. In view of the said settled position of law, even admitting that Mani Muthuswamy is the landlord, in view of the admission on the part of the respondent himself, if grounds have been made out under the Rent Control Act, eviction could be ordered, and the same will not cause any prejudice to the respondent.
20. A further question may arise, namely, whether, when Mani Muthuswamy and other petitioners have been impleaded as legal representatives of deceased Loganayaki Ammal, Mani Muthuswamy can put forward an alternative case of his own ownership on the basis of Ex. A-7. In Jagadish Chander Chatterjee and Ors. v. Shri Sri Kishan and Anr. , their Lordships said that a legal representative could urge not only the contentions as representatives, but also put forward his independent right. Their Lordships held thus:
Under Sub-clause (ii) of Rule 4 of Order 22, Civil Procedure Code the heirs and the legal representatives could urge all contentions which the deceased could have urged except only those which were personal to the deceased. Indeed this does not prevent the legal representatives from setting up also their own independent title, in which case there would be no objection to the court impleading them not merely as the legal representatives of the deceased but also in their personal capacity avoiding thereby a separate suit for a decision on the independent title.
The said decision was approved in Vidyawati v. Man Mohan and Ors. .
21. In view of the above legal position, I hold that Loganayaki Ammal, as owner, was entitled to file the petition for eviction, and the landlord and tenant relationship was only between Loganayaki Ammal and tenant, and, on her death, the right devolved on Mani Muthuswamy and other petitioners. Hence they are entitled to prosecute the case, and the petition prosecuted by them is maintainable. The landlord and tenant relationship already created by Loganayaki Ammal devolves on the petitioners also.
22. Even if we take that Mani Muthuswamy is the owner of the property, and even though he is impleaded only as legal representative, recognising the contention of the respondent (tenant), he can take alternative contentions as owner and, therefore, he can claim eviction in that capacity also.
23. Learned Counsel for the respondent placed before me a decision reported in Lodd Balamukundas v. K. Kothandapani and Ors. 84 L.W. 172. He relied on the following passage:
Held, it is not open to a plaintiff who came to the court with a specific case and with a specific ground for relief to go back on them and abandon the same and seek to claim the same relief on the facts alleged by the defendant.
According to me, the said decision has no application to the facts of this case. In this case, the additional petitioners are still prosecuting their case only on the basis of the averments in the petition. They are, accepting the alternate case only as put forward by the respondent. They have never given up their case. Further, before the learned Judges, the decision reported in Firm Srinivas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad was not cited. Once I hold that the petitioners are landlords entitled to maintain the eviction petition, the other question to be considered is, whether grounds have been made out for eviction.
24. The case put forward by the petitioners is that from 1.7.1974, rent at the rate of Rs. 90 per mensem has not been paid. Exs. A-1, A-3 and A-5 are registered notices issued to the respondent (tenant). Even though the postal acknowledgments are filed, the respondent denies his signature. The specific averment in the eviction petition is that three notices were issued, and, though the respondent (tenant) received the same, they were not replied. In the counter statement, those allegations have not been answered. His deposition as R.W. 1, therefore, cannot be believed.
25. Further, he has produced Ex. B-1 to show that he has paid rent. We find that the rent has been paid to some other lady, whose name appears to be one Lalithambal. P.Ws. 1 and 2 have stated that Lalithambal has no connection with petition mentioned building. According to R.W. 1, she was introduced by P.W. 1 to him. The best thing would have been, to examine the said Lalithambal herself before court. But that has not been done. Again, her name does not appear anywhere in the counter statement, so, the theory that the rent was paid to Lalithambal also appears to be an after thought. After the eviction petition was filed, no amount has been deposited into court. It is more than 16 years since the eviction petition has been filed. Rent Controller has given detailed reasoning to hold that the respondent (tenant) is a defaulter, and that he is liable to be evicted. When the matter was taken in appeal, the appellate authority curiously enough has given some reasons, which the Authority itself might have known as untenable. The appellate authority has said that there is no proper termination of tenancy, which is essential thing in rent control proceedings. Such a conclusion reached by the appellate authority is fundamentally wrong, when courts have already declared the law that before initiating rent control proceedings, termination notice is not required. The appellate authority assumed that Ex. B-20 creates co-ownership in favour of the respondent (tenant). If only the appellate authority had understood the minimum requirement of law, it would not have stated so. When the parents are alive, and the property belongs only to the parents, how the fourth petitioner could claim right over the property, was not even considered by the appellate authority. A reading of the judgment of the appellate authority shows that he did not want to consider the evidence in this case. It only wanted to side track the issue and somehow favour the respondent (tenant) by dismissing the eviction petition. The reasoning given by the appellate authority is one not expected from a court of law.
26. The respondent (tenant) is liable to be evicted on more ground also, namely, that he has denied the title of the petitioners without any good faith. On the basis of the decision reported in Majati Subbarao v. P.V.K. Krishna Rao (deceased) by L.Rs. , also, the tenant is liable to be evicted. This Court is entitled to take note of the stand taken by the tenant, namely, denial of title, in the eviction proceeding, In the said decision, the Supreme court has held thus:
To insist that a denial of title in the written statement cannot be taken advantage of in that suit but can be taken advantage of only in a subsequent suit to be filed by the landlord would only lead to unnecessary multiplicity of legal proceedings as the landlord would be obliged to file a second suit for ejectment of the tenant on the ground of forfeiture entitled by the tenant’s denial of his character as a tenant in the written statement.
In view of the said decision, the landlords can take advantage of the denial of title as an additional ground for setting eviction. The same need not be anterior to the proceedings.
27. The respondent is a member of the legal profession. He was also a Minister of State for sometime. In spite of the high offices he has held, he has taken untenable contentions before authorities below, only to deny the legal rights of the petitioners herein. Even though the Rent Controller negatived his contentions, the appellate authority found favour with the respondent (tenant) and reversed the findings rendered by the Rent Controller. The approach of the appellate authority was illegal and perverse. From a court of law, we cannot expect such a judgment. I do not want to further impute any mala fides on the part of the appellate authority.
28. In the result, I set aside the judgment of the appellate authority, and restore the order passed by the Rent Controller. The revision petition is allowed with costs throughout. The respondent (tenant) is directed to surrender vacant possession of the demised premises to the petitioners herein forthwith.