JUDGMENT
Vishnu Sahai, J.
1. Heard Mr. C.R. Dalvi for the Petitioner, Mr. Abhay Oak for Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and Mr. I.S. Thakur, Additional Public Prosecutor for the Respondent No. 3 – State of Maharashtra.
2. This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India arises out of the following factual matrix : –
On 7.3.1996, the Respondent No. 2 Chief Officer; Navghar – Manikpur Nagar Parishad, Vasai Road, Taluka Vasai, District Thane sent a notice dated 7.3.1996 to the Petitioner to pay an amount of Rs. 1,58,86,894/- as the difference between the octroi duty of goods brought by the Petitioner during the period 14.6.1994 and 9.1.1996. The Petitioner assailed the said notice by preferring Regular Civil Suit No. 75 of 1996 in the Court of C.J. (J.D.) at Vasai, praying for a declaration that the said notice be declared illegal, inoperative and ineffective. The learned Civil Judge heard the Petitioner’s application for injunction and for raising the attachment of the Petitioner’s factory premises and thereafter rejected the same.
Aggrieved thereby, the Petitioner preferred Misc. Civil Appeal Nos. 53 and 54 of 1996 before the Additional District Judge, Palghar, District Thane which were also dismissed. Against the said order, the Petitioner preferred Writ Petition No. 692 of 1999 in this Court which was disposed off by R.M. Lodha, J. utctehis order dated 8.2.1999. A perusal of the said order would show that the Petitioner’s counsel urged before His Lordship that he was under an impression that the communication dated 7.3.1996 did not amount to a bill as contemplated under Sections 149 and 150 of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965 and therefore, he had not preferred an appeal under Section 169 of the said Act. It further appears from a perusal of His Lordship’s order that it was, canvassed on behalf of the Petitioner that the Petitioner be accorded liberty to withdraw the civil suit and challenge the communication dated 7.3.1996 in appeal under the said provision. The said course, as it appears, from the said order, was not opposed to by the Respondent’s counsel and consequently. His Lordship permitted the Petitioner to challenge the communication dated 7.3.1996 as a bill under Sections 149 and 150 of the said Act, in an appeal under Section 169 of the said Act. His Lordship was pleased to observe that the said appeal would be decided in accordance with law.
3. It appears that when the said appeal i.e. Municipal Appeal No. 1 of 1999 was preferred before the J.M.F.C., Vasai, a preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the Respondents that since Section 170 of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965 made it. a condition precedent that an appeal could only be entertained if the amount claimed was first deposited and since it had not been deposited, an appeal would not lie. The learned Judicial Magistrate upheld the contention and dismissed the appeal vide order dated 5.8.1999.
4. Aggrieved by the said order, the Petitioner preferred Criminal Revision Application No. 25 of 1999 and the Revisional Court also upheld the same preliminary objection vide order dated 25.4.2000. But instead of dismissing the revision as not maintainable, the Revisional Court took a more charitable view and granted the Petitioner three months time, with effect from 25.4.2000, for paying the amount claimed namely Rs. 1,58,86,894/ – and kept the revision pending.
5. Aggrieved by the orders dated 5.8.1999 and 25.4.2000 the Petitioner has preferred the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions and I find no infirmity in both the orders. Since Section 170 of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats, and Industrial Townships Act, 1965 makes it a condition precedent that an appeal can only be entertained after the amount claimed has been deposited and admittedly since the amount claimed has not been deposited, the J.M.F.C. was justified in passing the order dated 5.8.1999. Since the order of the J.M.F.C. has been assailed, by way of Criminal Revision Application No. 25 of 1999, for the said reason, the Revisional Court was also justified in directing the Petitioner to first make the payment of the amount claimed, namely Rs. 1,58,86,894/- within a period of three months and to keep the revision pending during the said time.
Thus, on merits, I find that this petition which as observed earlier, has been preferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is devoid of substance.
It should be borne in mind that although under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court has the power of judicial revision even where no appeal or revision lies to it, the power has to be exercised in the most exceptional cases, where a manifest error resulting in grave injustice has been committed by a Court or Tribunal under its jurisdiction which is not the case here.
This principle applies with all the more rigor where the impugned order is an interlocutory one, as in the present case. The legislative intent is that such orders should have a finality and consequently the legislature enacted Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. which provides that no revision shall lie against a interlocutory order. This Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227, save in the most exceptional cases, in which the present case does not fall, would respect that legislative intent, bearing in mind, the time-honoured principle that what cannot be done directly, the law would not permit to be done indirectly.
I make no bones in observing that layman invariably and men of law often are under the illusion that existence of a power ipso facto means that it is meant to be used in a routine manner. Nothing can be farther from truth. It should be always remembered that concomitant with power are limitations. The limitations may be a part of the statute which confers a power, like Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. which is apart of Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. which deals with revisional powers of a High Court or a Court of Session or the result of judicial precedents such as this Court should only interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution of India where a Court or Tribunal subordinate to it commits a manifest error resulting in grave injustice, more so if the impugned order is an interlocutory one.
So far as the present case is concerned, no statutory limitations are ingrained in Article 227 which may be an impediment in my way in examining the impugned order but, the weight of precedent is decidedly heavily loaded against the Petitioner.
To my dismay, I do not find any error in the impugned order, much less a manifest one, which has resulted in grave injustice. As observed by me earlier the Revisional Court instead of dismissing the Petitioner’s revision in limine, because, it had not paid the amount, gave the Petitioner three months time to make the payment.
6. For the said reasons. 1 dismiss this petition in limine.
At this stage, counsel for the Petitioner prays that two months further time be granted by me to the petitioner to pay the amount due. Counsel for the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 has no objection if six weeks time is granted. In the circumstances, 1 grant the Petitioner time till 7.9.2000 to pay the amount.
Certified copy expedited.