JUDGMENT
P.K. Balasubramanyan, J.
1. The petitioners are persons who were admitted to Teachers’ Training Courses. In the first, they were admitted by the Thirumala Devaswom Teachers’ Training Institute and in the second, by Institutes run by the members of the Christian Community. In both the Original Petitions, it is claimed that the Institutes are minority institutions entitled to the protection of Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, though in neither of the Original Petitions there is a specific allegation that the concerned Institute is ‘established and run’ by a minority community. But for the purpose of these cases, I propose to proceed on the basis that the Institutes that admitted these petitioners are minority institutions.
2. In Fr. K. J. Thomas v. State, 1993 (2) Ker LJ 402, a Division Bench of this Court, following the decision of the Supreme Court in St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi, AIR 1992 SC 1630, held that admission to 50% of the seats reserved for admission from the minority community concerned, should also be on merit basis. The Division Bench specifically held that the decision in Younus Kunju v. State of Kerala, 1988 (2) Ker LT 299, cannot be said to lay down the correct law in view of the decision in St. Stephen’s College case. The Division Bench directed that the admission to the seats reserved for the minority community in their institutions, should also be based on merits from the candidates of the concerned community.
3. In the light of this clear decision, the Government issued a direction as per Notification No. M2-120000/93/DPI dated 3-2-
1994 that admission to the seats reserved for being filled by the minority should also be on merits. Clause 20 of that notification was the relevant clause. This notification was challenged before this Court by some of the institutions. The cases were ultimately referred to a Full Bench presumably because the decision of the Division Bench in Fr. K. J. Thomas v. State, 1993 (2) Ker LJ 402, in respect of admission to the seats reserved for the minority was questioned. But, when the matter came up before the Full Bench, the Institutions or the other petitioners in those Original Petitions did not seek a decision on merits. The judgment of the Full Bench in O.P. 5427 of 1994 and the connected Original Petitions, states that a statement had been filed by the Stale to the effect that the Council of Ministers have decided that the Government need not oppose the prayer of the private management in respect of admissions to the T.T.C. Course, in the Original Petitions pending in the High Court of Kerala. It is further stated that the Advocate General submitted that Clause 20 in the notification will not be enforced during the academic year 1994-95. The Original Petitions were disposed of on the basis of that statement. It has to be noted that the decision in Fr. K. J. Thomas v. State was not sought to be in any way modified or varied by the Full Bench. But, apparently, the Full Bench was permitting the State to go against the specific direction issued and the managements to violate the positive direction given in Fr. K. J. Thomas v. State, in my humble view, since the decision in Fr. K. J. Thomas v. State was not overruled, the same continues to be the law for the State and binding on the State and the Institutions. I have also to notice that there was no decision on merits by the Full Bench, so that it cannot be taken that any law has been laid down by the decision in O.P. No. 5427 of 1994 and the connected cases. The disposal of the Full Bench was on 17-1-1995.
4. Well before the above disposal by the Full Bench, the petitioners herein had been admitted by the various Institutes, in the teeth of the direction in Fr. K. J. Thomas v. State. The enforcement or non-enforcement of
Clause 20 of the Notification dated 3-2-1994 had really no relevance. In fact, even a notification was not necessary, since neither the State nor the managements could ignore or go against the decision and direction of this Court in Fr. K.J. Thomas v. State. Nor could a Cabinet take a decision not to follow or act in accordance with a decision of this Court. The admissions of these petitioners to the respective Institutes, therefore, were clearly illegal and invalid. The admissions were in violation of the directions of this Court. In a legal sense, it could even be said that there were no admission at all in the eye of law, in the case of those admitted in violation of the directions of this Court. I am, therefore, inclined to think that the petitioners cannot raise any claim based on their so-called admissions to the Institutes.
5. Even as regards non-minority institutions, certain seats were reserved for the managements. The question whether the managements could ignore the rule of merit in respect of those seats came up for decision before this Court. The managements relied on the disposal in O.P. 5427 of 1994 and the connected cases, to contend that they are entitled to admit candidates of their choice especially in view of the concession made by the Advocate General based on the Cabinet decision referred to by the Full Bench. The Division Bench before which these cases came up, referred the said cases to a Full Bench for decision. Dealing with the contention based on the factum of admission relied on by the petitioners therein as against the decision of this Court, Shanmugham, J., speaking for the Full Bench held:
“We find, the notification issued by the Education Department is strictly in conformity with the rules and it has further incorporated the principle laid down in the judgment in O.P. No. 6241/93 dated 27-7-1993 wherein it was held that even in minority institutions selection should be based on merit to both categories of seats viz. 50% for the minority section and 50% for the non-minority community section. The managements of the private Teachers’ Training Institutes including the petitioner are bound to
follow the notifications. The communication sent by the Director of Public Instruction dated 24-10-1994 to the Deputy Director and the impugned order of the Deputy Director in Ext. P3 are for the implementation of the rules and the notification. The petitioner ought to have followed the rules and notification viz. the rule of selection by merit and the petitioner having forced to the law cannot take advantage of the verification endorsement of the Deputy Director in their illegal select list. The verification at best can only relate the minimum qualification and the requirement to be verified as per Ext. P1. The order of the Deputy Director cancelling the selection made by the management on the ground that the principle of merit has not been followed, is therefore, perfectly valid and is in accordance with the rules and the notification. The petitioners cannot be allowed to take advantage of their own wrong.”
6. Speaking on the effect of the Full Bench disposal in O.P. Nos. 5427 of 1994 and the connected cases, Shanmugham, J. (who was himself a party to that decision) states thus:
“A faint attempt was made to rely upon the order of the Full Bench of this Court in O.P. No. 5427 of 1994 etc. dated 17-1-1995. In the batch of O. Ps. the challenge was made against clause 20 of the Notification of the Director of Education dated 8-7-1994 which prescribed the rule of merit for selection. When the matter came up before the Full Bench the learned Advocate General submitted that he has been instructed not to oppose the prayer in those Original Petitions. But the Full Bench was not inclined to grant the prayer, but wanted to dispose of the matter on merits. Thereafter the Original Petitions were requested to be adjourned. On the subsequent date a statement on behalf of the Government was filed stating that clause 20 of the notification will not be enforced for the year 1994-95. As nobody opposed this, the Full Bench without examining the issues involved disposed of the Original Petitions recording the statement filed by the State. Thus the Full Bench did not decide the issues involved in those matters. Therefore it is idle to contend
that clause 20 of the Notification is not enforceable against those institutions. As rightly contended by the learned Advocate
General assuming the clause 20, is not insisted upon, the raw declared by me
Supreme Court as referred above are binding on all the T.T.Js. and they must select candidates only on merit.”
7. Sreedharan, J. who was a party to the decision in Fr. K. J. Thomas v. State and the earlier decision in Chandrasekharan v. State, ILR 1993 (3) Ker 590, in his concurring judgment, after referring to the statement of the law in Fr. K, J. Thomas v. State observed :
“This decision was correctly understood by the Director of Public Instruction when he issued notification dated 8-2-1994 inviting applications for admission to T.T.C. course 1994-95. Clause 20 of that notification stated that T.T.J. institutes belonging to minority communities should give 50% of the seats on merit basis to the candidates belonging to the concerned minority community and the remaining 50% of the seats should be given on merit basis to candidates of other communities. This provision in the notification was challenged by managements of minority communities before this Court. When the matter came before a Full Bench, a statement was filed by Government to the effect that Council of Ministers have decided not to oppose the prayer of the private managements in respect of admission to T.T.C. course. Learned Advocate General accordingly submitted to Court that Clause 20 of the notification will not be enforced during the academic year 1994-95. Since nobody opposed this stand taken by Government the Full Bench without examining the issues further, disposed of the original petitions regarding the statement filed by the State. Can the Government be allowed to take such a stand? This Court on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court in St. Stephen’s College laid down the principles governing admission to T.T.C. course in training colleges run by minority institutions. Those principles are binding on the Government and this Court unless changed by process known to law. No provision of the
Constitution has been placed before us by the learned Advocate General which conferred any power on the Government or for that matter to the Council of Ministers to act against the law laid down by this Court and the Supreme Court. The Council of Ministers if had taken a decision not to insist on the implementation of Clause 20 of the notification issued by the Director of Public Instruction has the effect of acting in violation of the principles laid down by this Court. Such a power cannot be attributed to the Council of Ministers. The statement filed in Court based on the said illegal decision has in fact gone to violate the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act as well. The decision of the Council of Ministers must be treated as non est. Selection made to T.T.C. course during 1994-95, contrary to the provisions contained in clause 20 of the notification is against law and will not confer on the selected candidates any right to continue in the course or to complete the same by taking the final examination.”
8. This Full Bench decision in O.P. No. 15567 of 1994 and connected cases was challenged before the Supreme Court by the parties. Though Leave to Appeal was granted, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals in the following words:
“We have heard learned Counsel for the parties. The Full Bench has passed its judgment primarily on the law laid down by this Court in St. Stephen’s case, 1992 (1) SCC 558 : (AIR 1992 SC 1630). We agree with the reasoning and the conclusions reached therein. The Special Leave Petitions and Writ Petitions are dismissed. Needless to say that it would be open to the admitting authority to have the exercise of admission once again in accordance with law. The learned Senior Counsel for the State of Kerala has no objection to this course.”
9. In the light of the permission given to the Institutes “to have the exercise of admission once again in accordance with law, it is clear that the admissions now relied on the petitioners in these Original Petitions were treated as non est by the Supreme Court. It is, therefore, impossible to accept the submission of
counsel for the petitioners that their admissions create an estoppel against the revocation or confers a right on the petitioners to continue their studies notwithstanding the illegality and invalidity surrounding it.
10. Learned Counsel for the petitioners made an attempt to contend that the petitioners are innocent victims of the managements and that they should be permitted to continue their studies, whatever may be the clear legal position arising from the decisions of this Court in Fr. K. J. Thomas v. State, and O.P. No. 15567 of 1994 and connected cases and of the Supreme Court in appeal therefrom. Counsel relied on Ashok Chand Singhvi v. University of Jodhpur, 1989 (1) SCC 399 : (AIR 1989 SC 823); Andhra Kesari Educational Society v. Director of School Education, 1989 (1) SCC 392 : (AIR 1989 SC 183); Sanatan Gauda v.’Berhampur University, 1990 (3) SCC 23 : (AIR 1990 SC 1075); Suresh Pal v. State of Hafyana, 1987 (2) SCC 445; and Sheela Ashok Patwardhan v. V. M. Medical College, 1989 (3) SCC 362 : (AIR 1989 SC 382) in support ,of his case. But as I have held, the admissions relied on are not admissions in the eye of law. “The selection made to T.T.C. course during 1994-95 conrtrary to the provisions contained in Clause 20 of the notification is against law and will not confer on the selected candidates any right to continue in the course or to complete the same by taking the final examination”. This Court cannot issue directions or grant reliefs which are not legally available to the litigants. The Supreme Court in Gurdeep Singh v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1993 SC 2638, has held:
“What remains to be considered is whether the selection of respondent No. 6 should be quashed. We are afraid, unduly lenient view of the Courts on the basis of human consideration in regard to such excesses on the part of the authorities, has served to create an impression that even where an advantage is secured by stratagem and trickery, it could be rationalised in courts of law. Courts do and should take human and sympathetic view of matters. That is the very essence of justice. But considerations of judicial policy also
dictate that a tendency of this kind where advantage gained by illegal means is permitted to be retained will jeopardise the purity of selection process itself; engender cynical disrespect towards the judicial process and in the last analyses embolden errant authorities and candidates into a sense of complacency and impunity that gains achieved by such wrongs could be retained by an appeal to the sympathy of the Court. Such instances reduce the jurisdiction and discretion of Courts into private benevolence. The tendency should be stopped.”
In Kerala Solvent Extractions Ltd. v. Unnikrishnan (1994 (1) KLT 651) it was reiterated.
“In recent times, there is an increasing evidence of this, perhaps well-meant but wholly unsustainable tendency towards a denudation of the legitimacy of judicial reasoning and process. The reliefs granted by the Courts must be seen to be logical and tenable within the framework of the law and should not incur and justify the criticism that the jurisdiction of Courts tends to degenerate into misplaced sympathy, generosity and private benevolence. It is essential to maintain the integrity of legal reasoning and the legitimacy of the conclusions. They must emanate logically from the legal findings and the judicial results must be seen to be principled and supportable on those findings. Expansive judicial mood of mistaken and misplaced compassion at the expense of the legitimacy of the process will eventually lead to mutually irreconcilable situations and denude the judicial process of its dignity, authority, predictability and respectability”.
11. Having found that the process of admission relied on by the petitioners was illegal at its inception, I am not in a position to accede to the plea based on estoppel or equity put forward on behalf of the petitioners. Such a course, in my view, is also precluded by the direction of the Supreme Court to the Institutions to have the exercise of admission once again in accordance with law.
12. Counsel relied on the communication from the Director of Public Instruction, produced with C.M.P. 30800 of 1995 in
O.P. 15992 of 1995 to point out that the petitioners were permitted to take the first year examination and in view of this, there may be a direction to the respondents not to implement the circular dated 21-6-1895. First of all, the circular, the implementation of which is sought to be restrained is in accordance with the decisions of this Court as affirmed by the Supreme Court. This Court cannot in law or equity direct the Educational Authorities not to implement that circular. The Authorities are bound to implement the same or otherwise, they will be in contempt of this Court, as pointed out by Sreedharan, J. in the Full Bench. The order itself actually directs the Institutions to relieve the irregularly admitted students and not to permit them to study the second year. Secondly, the circular dated 30-9-1995 itself clearly indicates that the irregularly selected candidates in Teachers Training Institute, both minority and non-minority institutions, are not eligible to continue their studies in the second year. Learned Liaison Officer explains that the order dated 30-9-1995 was issued only because, in one or two cases, this Court by interlocutory orders (they appear to be against the ratio of the decisions of the Supreme Court like the one in Guru Nanak Dev University v. Parminder Kr. Bansal (AIR 1993 SC 2412) and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ramona Perhar (1994 (6) SCC (1) permitted the petitioners therein, who were similarly situated, to appear for the first year examination provisonally and in view of this, all such students were permitted to write the examination subject to the result of the Original Petitions pending in this Court. In such a situation, the order dated 30-9-1995 does not confer any right or equity in favour of the petitioners.
13. Learned counsel for the petitioners
submitted that there were various Original Petitions filed in this Court which have been referred to a Division Bench and consequently these cases also must be referred. J am afraid that I cannot accede to this request. The law has been laid down by a Division Bench of this Court, has been affirmed by a Full Bench of this Court which in turn has been affirmed by the Supreme Court. I do not
think that it is proper or conducive to judicial discipline to refer these cases to a Division Bench merely because, the decisions have caused inconvenience to these petitioners or to the Institutes that flouted the law. Moreover, I am in respectful and complete agreement with the ratio of the decision in Fr. Thomas v. State and see no reasons to change my view expressed by the Full Bench to which I was also a party and which was affirmed by the Supreme Court. All that Fr. Thomas v. State directed and the Full Bench approved was that the managements should not arbitrarily exclude the more meritorious in favour of the less meritorious even from among the candidates belonging to the community which runs the institution. What is intended is only to eliminate arbitrariness and discrimination in the process of selection of candidates of that community as well. In such a situation, I think it impermissible to accede to the request of counsel to refer these cases to a Division Bench on the ground that some other similar cases have been so referred.
The order sought to be challenged is an order in consonance with the decision of this Court as affirmed by the Supreme Court. As I find that the authorities are bound to implement the order dated 21-6-1995, I hold that the petitioners are not entitled to any relief in these Original Petitions. Consequently I dismiss these Original Petitions.