High Court Kerala High Court

Beevi vs State Of Kerala on 14 January, 2010

Kerala High Court
Beevi vs State Of Kerala on 14 January, 2010
       

  

  

 
 
  IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

WP(C).No. 32572 of 2009(N)


1. BEEVI, W/O. AALIKUNJU,
                      ...  Petitioner

                        Vs



1. STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY
                       ...       Respondent

2. THE ADVISORY BOARD,

3. THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR/DISTRICT

4. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,

5. THE DY. SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE

6. THE C.I OF POLICE,

7. THE S.I OF POLICE,

                For Petitioner  :SRI.R.SUDHISH

                For Respondent  :GOVERNMENT PLEADER

The Hon'ble MR. Justice K.M.JOSEPH
The Hon'ble MR. Justice P.Q.BARKATH ALI

 Dated :14/01/2010

 O R D E R
             K.M.JOSEPH & P.Q.BARKATH ALI, JJ.
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                      W.P.(C) No.32572 OF 2009
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                 Dated this the 14th day of January, 2010

                               JUDGMENT

Joseph, J.

The petitioner seeks the following reliefs :

“i. Call for the records leading to issuance of

Ext.P1 from the 3rd respondent and quash the same by

issuing a writ of certiorari , or any other appropriate

writ, order of direction .

ii) Call for the records leading to issuance of

Ext.P7 and quash the same by issuing a writ of

certiorari and release the detenu K.K.Razack @

Abdul Razack from the prison forthwith .

iii) Declare that 7th respondent have no right

to register a crime against the detenu under Section 3

(1) of the Act for detaining him in Jail.”

2. The case of the petitioner in brief is as follows:

The petitioner is the mother of K.K.Razack @ Abdul Razack who

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is detained by an order passed under Kerala Anti-Social Activities

( Prevention) Act 2007 (herein after referred to as the Act). The order

of detention is dated 31-08- 09 (Ext.P1). The petitioner produced the

grounds of detention as Ext.P2. The allegation against the detenu

essentially is that the detenu is a ‘Known Goonda”. The basis for

objective satisfaction in this regard is sought to be derived from two

crimes registered under Section 21(a) of The Narcotic Drugs and

Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. It is alleged that on 8/8/2007 at

16.20 hrs. the Sub Inspector of Police arrested the detenu with 3 gms.

of brown sugar from Moonnamthode junction, Thamarassery chungam.

A charge sheet has been filed before the Judicial First Class Magistrate

I, Thamarassery on 22-01-2008 as C.C.No.50/2008 and the case is

pending trial. Again on 9/8/2008 at 9.40 hrs. the detenu came to be

arrested with 1gm and 510 m.g. of brown sugar from Thamarassery

Chungam and FIR was registered under Section 21(a) of NDPS Act on

9/8/2008. A charge sheet has been filed before the JFCM,

Thamarassery on 5/2/2009 and the case is pending as C.C.No.139/99.

It is further stated by the District Magistrate in Ext.P1, the order of

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detention, that he has evaluated the information received from the

Superintendent of Police and that he is satisfied that the detenu is a

‘Known Goonda” and if he happens to be released, he would indulge in

anti social activities detrimental to the maintenance of public safety

order and peace in the locality.

3. We heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. Learned

counsel for the petitioner would essentially make the following

submissions before us :

There is non-application of mind by the detaining authority. It is

pointed out that there are only two cases. The first case was in the year

2007. Thereafter the second crime was registered on 9-8-2008. There

is inordinate delay in passing the detention order and that it is passed

only on 31-08-2009. It is pointed out that there is no other instances.

It is submitted that the link between the incident and the need for

detention did not exist at the time when the order of detention was

passed. It is further contended that the offences are said to be

committed under Section 21(a) of NDPS Act and the maximum

punishment in respect of the offence alleged would be six months. It is

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submitted that the offences are minor offences . Reference is made to

the quantity of the substances which have been seized . It is submitted

that detenu has been in detention for four months and one week. It is

further contended that under Section 2(t) of the Act which defines the

word “Known rowdy”, only if he is found guilty in one offence which

bears punishment of more than five years or he commits three offences

where the sentence should not be less than one year can a person be

characterised or deemed as a “known rowdy”. It is pointed out that the

maximum punishment in both the crimes registered against the detenu

is only six months each. Reference is made to Nisha Salim v. State of

Kerala and others (2009(2) KHC 1014(DB) to contend that this is not

a case where the authorities were justified in ordering detention. It is

further contended that it is a case where there is violation of Sections 7

(1), 7(2) and 7(3) of the Act. It is the case of the petitioner that in

breach of the mandate of Section 7(1), the order of detention was

neither read out to nor served on the detenu. Instead, it was served on

detenu’s relative. There is also transgression of the dictate of Section 7

(2), it is contended, in so far as the materials were not made available

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to the detenu. It is further contended that Section 7(3) stood breached

by the reason of the fact that the detenu could not represent properly

and there is no opportunity for legal consultation made available. It is

further submitted that the detenu could not file any representation as he

is an illiterate person and he was not served with the order of detention

or the materials in breach of Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the Act.

Exts.P4 and P5 representations were filed by the petitioner

before the Government and the Advisory Board respectively and it is

submitted that the representation has been disposed of by the

government vide Ext.P6. There is no consideration as required in law.

It is again contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the

order approving the original order of detention under Section 3(3) was

communicated to the detenu only in English.

Lastly it is contended that there is violation of Section 20 of the

Act in so far as though Section 20 mandates that the orders issued by

the government under the Act should bear the seal and the signature of

the officer, Ext. P7 order approving the order of detention does not

bear the seal and signature of the officer and it is instead issued

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authenticated by the Section Officer.

4. Learned Government Pleader would contend that there is

no merit in the writ petition. He would point out that the offences are

serious as they relate to sale of brown sugar. He would submit that

having regard to the nature of the trade, this court need not be feel

persuaded by the quantity involved in judging the seriousness of the

issues . He would further contend that there is some time taken for

investigation and filing charge sheet in the second incident. The

charge sheet was filed, it is contended, on 5-2-2009 in respect of the

alleged offence committed on 9-8-2008. It is further stated that

necessarily procedures have to be complied with and in the facts of this

case there is no delay. It is submitted that the Sub Inspector of Police

has filed a report and it is considered by the Circle Inspector of Police

and it is placed before the Superintendent of Police and later the matter

was placed before the detaining authority and the order is passed within

a reasonable time. Having regard to the nature of the offences also, the

link has not been snapped. . It is pointed out that it is note worthy that

the second incident was committed by the detenu while he was on bail

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in connection with the earlier offence and this has been stated in the

counter affidavit. It is further submitted that there is no merit in relying

on Section 2(t) in a case where the allegation is that the detenu is a

“Known Goonda” and it is irrelevant. It is further submitted that all the

formalities have been complied with in this case. The order of

detention is served on the detenu and acknowledgment is received.

The materials were also served on the detenu. It is pointed out that

there is no question of opportunity being afforded to the detenu by way

of legal consultation, if the detenu does not make any demand and the

right to legal consultation is essentially enshrined in the context of the

right to make representation before the Government and the Advisory

Board which is essentially the right which is enshrined under Article

22(5) of the Constitution also. It is contended by the learned

Government Pleader that no grounds have been made out in the

representation filed by the petitioner. The representation was

considered and Ext.P6 order was passed. It is further stated that the

law does not require communication of the order approving the order

of detention which means that the fact that the order of approval was

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communicated to the detenu in English is irrelevant and cannot advance

the case of the petitioner. It is lastly contended that there is no merit

in the contention based on Section 20 of the Act.

5. Whether the order of detention is illegal by the reason of

the fact that it is passed on 31-08-2009 ?

The detenu is detained under Ext.P1 order on the basis that he is

a “Known Goonda”. For arriving at this objective satisfaction,

reference is made to two cases. Both the cases are under the NDPS

Act. The detenu has been charge sheeted in two separate instances not

forming part of the same transaction for having committed the acts

within the meaning of the term “goonda”. There is no dispute that the

two offences alleged against the detenu can be treated as acts within the

meaning of the term goonda. Neither the detaining authority or

government, nor this court is ordinarily concerned with as to whether

the said offenec is committed and it is a matter to be considered by the

criminal courts. For the purpose of this case that it can be safely said

that the detenu satisfies the objective criteria to be classified as a

known goonda. We are not inclined to render the order of detention

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vulnerable on the plea of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the

case against the detenu, in particular the second offence is fabricated.

There is absolutely no plea of malafides even warranting an

investigation into that question.

6. We notice that while it is true that the second incident took

place on 9-8-2008 and the detention order was passed on 31-08-2009.

But we cannot over look the fact that there had to be investigation and

filing of a final report and charge sheet was filed in respect of an

offence which was allegedly committed on 9-8-2008 on 5-2-2009.

Thereafter we find on a perusal of the files that the Sub Inspector of

Police initiated the proceedings for filing a report before the

Superintendent of Police in June 2009. No doubt when the report of

the police was placed before the District Magistrate, he directed the

registration of crime under Section 3 of the Act. Whatever that be,

within a period of two months of the sponsoring of the case, an order

of detention has been passed by the detaining authority. Necessarily

the authorities must apply their mind as to whether resort must be

made to the grave powers which are available under the Act as it

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would involve deprivation of liberty of a person. We also cannot

overlook the fact that the second offence namely the offence on 9-8-

2008 was allegedly committed by the detenu while he was on bail. The

earlier offence was committed nearly one year back. Therefore it

cannot be said that in the facts of this case, there is snap of the link or

that there is no nexus available to pass the order of detention on

31-8-2009. The order was executed immediately without any delay

and the detenu was admittedly arrested on 6-9-2009.

7. There is compliant by the learned counsel for the petitioner

that under Section 2(t) of the Act unless there is an offence which bears

the maximum punishment which is not less than one year, it cannot be

taken into consideration, where as the offence committed by the detenu

allegedly is one where the maximum sentence is less than one year.

We are afraid that there is no merit in the contention. There is no

challenge to the vires of the Act. The order of detention is premised on

the detenu being a “known goonda”. We are only to consider whether

the detenu satisfies the objective criteria to be proceeded against as a

“known goonda”. We have already held that the detenu satisfies the

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criteria to be proceeded against as a “known goonda”. We are not sit in

judgment over the wisdom, legality and propriety of legislature

providing different criteria for persons to be classified as “known

Goonda” on the one hand and “known rowdy” on the other. It is a

matter which is clearly beyond the pleadings and the reliefs in the writ

petition.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that in

Ext.P1 there is reference to the report by the police authorities that

petitioner is continuing with his activities and there is no basis for that.

When an order of detention is passed, undoubtedly, there must be

subjective satisfaction. Subjective satisfaction is essentially a

prognosis of what a person may do in the future based on his activities

in the past. The Act in fact contemplates the fulfilment of objective

criteria on the basis of certain events which are predicated in the Act.

Learned Government pleader justified the report of the Superintendent

of Police that the detenu was active. We cannot overlook the line of

criminal activity that the detenu is alleged to be engaged in in this

regard also.

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9. We are also not convinced that the petitioner can derive any

assistance from 2009(2) KHC 1014. There is a distinction between the

public order, disorder or law and order. They are all well known

concepts. We should not be oblivious of the facts of this case. The

offences which are alleged against the detenu are, in our view, serious,

as they relate to the sale of brown sugar and are concerned with aspects

of safety and health of members of society. In fact there is reference

in the counter affidavit to the effect of sale of such substances on the

health of the young members of the society and if the detaining

authority as also the government felt that the detenue is to be detained

so as to prevent him from committing offences for which apparently

there is material and matter in the form of charge sheets filed in respect

of two offences committed under the said Act one in 2007 and another

in 2008, we do not think it is for this court to sit in judgment in

judicial review over the subjective satisfaction of the authorities in this

regard.

10. Whether there is violation of Sections 7(1), 7(2) and 7(3) of

the Act ? The allegation that there is violation of Sections 7(1) and 7

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(2) have been denied in the counter affidavit. It is stated that the order

of detention and the records were in fact served on the detenu under

proper acknowledgment. The learned Government Pleader made

available the files . A perusal of the files would also clearly probabilise

the case of the respondents that the detenu acknowledged the receipt of

the order of detention on the date of detention itself. Therefore we

cannot lay much store in the case of the petitioner that the detenu was

not served the order of detention. The acknowledgment would show

that the order of detention was indeed read out to him. There is also no

basis for the complaint under Section 7(2). The files would reveal that

the records were made available to him.

11. The next question is whether there is violation of Section 7

(3). Section 7(3) of the Act reads as follows :

“The Superintendent of the Jail where such

person is detained shall afford him reasonable

opportunity to consult a lawyer and reasonable

assistance in making a representation against the

detention order to the government or to the Advisory

Board.”

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12. We also bear in mind Article 22(5) which reads as

follows :

When any person is detained in

pursuance of an order made under any law

providing for preventive detention, the

authority making the order shall, as soon as

may be, communicate to such person the

grounds on which the order has been made

and shall afford him the earliest opportunity

of making a representation against the order.

13. A perusal of Section 7(2) would show that the materials,

the grounds of detention and other documents are to be served on the

detenu. It further provides that he must be specifically told that he has

a right to make a representation to the government and to the Advisory

Board. It is in the context of this right to make a representation that

Section 7(3) provides that the Superintendent of Jail shall make

available opportunity for legal consultation and to assist him in the

making of representation. There can be no doubt that in view of the

compliance with Section 7(2) it must be held that the detenu was aware

of his legal right and constitutional right to make a representation to

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the government and to the Advisory Board. The order would also show

that the detenu was informed that he has a legal right to make

representation to the government and to the Advisory Board. The

detenu may or may not exercise the right to make a representation.

Neither the constitution nor any law compels a person detained to

make a representation. It is a right which is available to him which he

may or may not exercise. What Section 7(3) of the Act contemplates in

our view is that if the detenu upon being informed of his right to make

a representation under Section 7(2) desires to make a representation,

the Superintendent of Jail is legally obliged to assist him in the making

of representation and also in this direction to afford a reasonable

opportunity to consult a lawyer. We would think that the consultation

with a lawyer under Section 7(3) is essentially for the purpose of

making representation. The law of preventive detention does not

contemplate grant of bail.

14. In the context of the provisions, we cannot hold that there

is a duty on the part of the Superintendent of Jail to inform the detenu

that he has a right to consult a lawyer even if the detenu does not seek

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it. We find merit in the contention of the learned Government Pleader

that where the legislature intended that the right should be made

known to the detenu, it has been specifically incorporated. A case in

point is the mandate of Section 7(2) that the detenu must be informed

of his right to make a representation to the government and to the

Advisory Board. There is no such right which is incorporated in the

Act to make known to the right of the detenue for consultation with a

lawyer. Essentially if the detenu seeks any such consultation, it cannot

be denied to him by the Superintendent of Jail and the Superintendent

of Jail is bound to make available opportunity for consultation with a

lawyer. This we think is the scheme of the Act. Therefore, we see no

merit in the contention of the petitioner based on Section 7(3) of the

Act.

15. We see no merit in the contention based on Ext.P6. Ext.P6

is the order by which the petitioner was informed that the

representation filed by her stands rejected. Exts.P4 and P5 are the

representations filed. On a perusal of the representation, the substance

of the representation appears to be, in short, that the detenu is innocent.

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We do not think that it could be said on the basis of the representation

filed by the petitioner that Ext.P6 is vitiated or that there has been no

proper consideration of the representation. As far as the question of

communication of the order of approval in English is concerned, we are

of the view that there is no merit in the same. If there is no legal

obligation to communicate the order of approval of detention to the

detenu we see no purpose or merit in the contention that the detention

is bad as the order is not communicated in Malayalam.

16. We also see no merit in the contention based on Section 20

of the Act. Ext.P7 is the order approving the detention. Therein the

name of Additional Chief Secretary to Government is shown and it is

signed by the section officer. The answer to petitioner’s contention is

found in paragraph 18 of the counter affidavit of the first respondent.

It reads thus :

“The averments in para 15 of the writ

petition are not true. As per para 163, Chapter X

of the Secretariat Manual, when final decision of

Government are communicated, they have to be

embodied in the form of Government Order or

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Circular. A confirmation Order under Section 10

(4) of the Act is final in nature and therefore the

decision in this case was communicated as G.O.

(Rt)No.3353/2009/Home dated 12-11-2009 in

the form of a Government Order prescribed in

Appendix II of the Secretariat Manual. The

format so prescribed does not require the seal and

signature of the Secretary to Government.

17. Learned Government Pleader would submit that the order

containing the seal and signature as required under Section 20 should

be there in the files. At any rate we do not think that this is a ground on

which we should grant relief to the petitioner. There is another aspect

of the matter. It is brought to our notice by the learned counsel for the

petitioner that the law of preventive detention is not a punitive

measure, but it is a jurisdiction to prevent commission of undesirable

activities. It is pointed out that the person who is preventively

detained is however sent to jail and has to spend time with convicted

persons. Far from reforming any person so detained, it may only make

matters worse. We feel that this is a matter which should engage the

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attention of the government and we direct the Secretary, Ministry of

Home to bestow his attention in the matter so that persons who are

detained need not spend time detained with convicts.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that petitioner has

already undergone detention for a period of four months and one week.

However, we do not think that the petitioner has made out any ground

for interfering with the order of detention. Accordingly, the writ

petition fails and the same is dismissed.

K.M.JOSEPH, JUDGE

P.Q.BARKATH ALI, JUDGE

sv.

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                               K.M.JOSEPH, JUDGE



                           P.Q.BARKATH ALI, JUDGE

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sv.