JUDGMENT
M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J.
1. Prahlad Tiwary, the respondent herein has filed petition in WC Case No. 1 of 2001 before the learned Labour Court. Deoghar claiming compensation as he is entitled to the compensation as a workman working under the appellant as he met with an accident while performing his duty and sustained injuries as such he is entitled to approach the Labour Court under the provisions of Workmen’s Compensation Act.
2. Even before commencement of enquiry, the appellant, ‘Satsang’ filed an interlocutory application, stating that Satsang is not an industry nor is an employer under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and therefore, on the basis of the preliminary issue the main petition to be dismissed. The said interlocutory application was dismissed by the Labour Court on 19.7.2002, holding that since the question as to whether ‘Satsang’ comes under the category of industry or not is a mixed question of fact and law requiring evidence from both sides, as such preliminary issue can be decided along with other issues only at the final stage.
3. The said order dated 19.7.2002 was challenged by the appellant before the Single Judge in WP (C) No. 271 of 2003. The learned Single Judge dismissed the same by order dated 14.8.2003. Hence this Letters Patent Appeal. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant contended that Labour Court should have decided as a preliminary issue as to whether or not ‘Satsang’ is an industry and whether or not is covered by Workmen’s Compensation Act, especially when earlier an award was passed by the Labour Court in respect of a different workmen under the Industrial Disputes Act in which it had been held that ‘satsang’ is not an industry, as defined under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
4. Learned Counsel also placed reliance upon another decision of the Labour Department to, the effect that Satsang is not an ‘establishment’ as construed under the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act. Besides that, the appellant has brought to the notice that this Court already confirmed the award passed by the Labour Court stating that it is not an industry in WP(L) No. 6669 of 2002 by order dated 10.1.2008 holding that Satsang does not carry out any trade or business.
5. Learned Counsel, Mr. Satish Bak-shr. who is appointed as Amicus Curiae to assist this Court, would strenuously contend that the impugned order of the learned Labour Court and the Hon’ble Single Judge do not suffer from any infirmity. In the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in case of D.P. Maheshwari reported in 1983 LIC 1629 it has been held that the preliminary issues should not be separately framed and decided by Labour Tribunals.
6. According to the counsel for the respondent, the Amicus Curiae, even though there are some decisions to the extent that the preliminary issues can be taken up by Labour Tribunals only if they relate to the question of jurisdiction, the jurisdiction issue does not come in this matter since the question that whether the respondent is a workman or Workmen’s Compensation Act would apply to the present facts of the case is concerned only depend upon the evidence to be taken before the Labour Court. Counsel on both sides cited number of authorities. We have carefully considered the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioners-appellants and the counsel for the respondents, the Amicus Curiae.
7. The learned Counsel for the appellant heavily relied upon two decisions, namely, one of Labour Court’s award which has been confirmed by this Court and other one of the Labour Department under the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act. As correctly pointed out by the Amicus Curias, the definition of the terms ‘Industry’, ‘Establishment and ‘workman’ under the Industrial Disputes Act and the Shops and Establishment Act are different from the definition given in the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The term ’employer’ is defined in Section 2(e) while the term ‘workman’ is defined in Section 2(n) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
8. The Workmen’s Compensation Act underwent an amendment by Act 46 of 2000 whereby in the definition of ‘Workman’ the words “other than a person whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purpose of the employer’s trade or business” were omitted. After the amendment the question whether the person works for employer’s trade or business or not are wholly immaterial and inconsequential. Now the term ‘workman under the Workmen’s Compensation Act will simply mean any person employed in any capacity as specified in Schedule-II. A perusal of Schedule-II shows how comprehensive and extensive are the areas of work and employment and almost any kind and every kind of work is included therein.
9. According to the counsel for the respondents, the Amicus Curiae, in the present case, the concerned workman was employed as Electrical and Generator Mechanic, as such he falls under item No. (xix) in the Schedule-II.
10. As correctly pointed out by the Counsel for the respondents, it is possible that an organisation may not qualify for being called an ‘establishment’ under one Labour Legislation while it may qualify as such under another Labour Legislation. The judgment passed by this Court in WP(L) No. 6669 of 2002 dealt with the question whether it is an industry under the Industrial Disputes Act, and not under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Further the said judgment was based on the materials and evidence on record and as such it is a judgment in personam and not a judgment in rem.
11. Under these circumstances the contention that ‘Satsang’ was not an ’employer’ and Workmen’s Compensation Act will not apply to it cannot be accepted at this preliminary stage. On the other hand, as correctly held by the Labour Court, it is a mixed question of law and facts and only after allowing both sides to let in evidence, the final decision with regard to the same can be arrived. Hence both the parties shall be allowed to let in evidence to enable the Labour Court to decide all the issues that may arise in this case. As such, we find no merit in this appeal. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed. Before parting with this case this Court record its appreciation for the services rendered by Mr. S. Bakshi, the learned Counsel, who ably assisted this Court as Amicus Curiae.
D.G.R. Patnaik, J.
12. I agree.