JUDGMENT
A.S. Naidu, J.
1. What is impugned in this case is the order dated November 3, 2000 passed by the Sessions Judge, Cuttack in Crl. Revision No. 80 of 1999 holding that as more than two years have already elapsed from the date of the charge, the G. R. Case should be dropped in the light of the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Raj Deo Sharma v. The State of Bihar (1998) 15 OCR (SC) 530.
2. The short facts for appreciating the case are as follows:
On 18.8.88, an F.I.R. was filed in Purighat Police Station alleging that the accused persons have thrown Acid on the face of the informant and he sustained grievous injuries. On the basis of such an F.I.R., G.R. Case No. 1157 of 1988 was registered and the accused persons stood charged under Sections 341 and 324, I.P.C. Charges against the accused persons were framed on 29th July, 1993.
In course of trial, out of 9 charge sheeted witnesses, only 6 witnesses were examined by the prosecution. Thereafter, for the reasons best known, no action was taken for examination of the Investigating Officer. In this process, about six years passed. By order dated 30th July, 1999, the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Cuttack observed :
“As the prosecution has failed to examine all the witnesses within six years, as per the decision of the Supreme Court, the case is closed to-day. Put up on 2.8.99 for accused statement.”
3. Mr. Mohanty, learned counsel for the accused persons submits that in the meantime the accused statements have been recorded and the case is posted for argument.
4. Being aggrieved by the order dated 30th July, 1999, the State preferred Criminal Revision No. 80 of 1999 before the Sessions Judge, Cuttack. The learned Sessions Judge also agreed with the fact that there was inordinate delay and the prosecution has totally failed to discharge its duty to examine the Investigating Officer. The Sessions Judge has expressed his surprise on the fact that “the mighty State has paraded his incapability to present his police witness before the Court below.” But then relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Raj Deo Sharma’s case (supra), the learned Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that as the offences for which the accused persons had been charged, carry punishment of imprisonment for a period not exceeding seven years and that as more than two years have lapsed from the date of charge, no fault can be found in the order passed by the learned Magistrate in G. R. Case No. 1157 of 1988. The said order, as has been stated earlier, is impugned in this Criminal Misc. Case invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
5. Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that this is an exceptionally exception case where ends of justice and equity warrant that this Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr.P.C. inasmuch as the petitioner has been left with no other remedy whatsoever. It is further submitted by Mr. Mishra that great prejudice will be caused to the prosecution and it will be fatal to the trial itself. In support of his contention that in exceptional circumstances, inherent power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. an be invoked, the petitioner relied upon the decision in the case of Krishnan and another v. Krishnaveni and Anr. 1997 (II) OLR (SC) 95, (1997) 13 OCR (SC) 41. According to the Supreme Court to meet the ends of the justice or to prevent abuse of the process, the High Court would be justified to exercise inherent power to correct a wrong at the very inception to avoid unnecessary multiplicity of procedure, delay in trial and protraction of proceeding.
Mr. Mohanty, on the other hand, forcefully argued that the present revision being a second revision, the same is not maintainable and that the informant has absolutely no locus standi to file this revision. It is further submitted that the scope of interference in a proceeding filed by the informant is very much limited and it is a fit case where the High Court should restrain itself from interfering with the impugned order. In support of his submission, Mr. Mohanty relied upon decisions in the case of Dharampal and others v. Smt. Ramshri and others, 1993 Crl. L.J. 1049 and Trilochan Boe alias Gonda and after him Nimar Boe and others, (1994) 7 OCR 226.
6. Law is no more res integra that a second revision filed by the same person is not maintainable as would be stipulated under Section 397(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the present case, no revision was filed by the petitioner though the same order was impugned in the revision filed by the State. But then, according to the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Krishnan and another (supra) in exceptional cases where it appears to the High Court that prejudice will be caused to the prosecution unless an error apparent on the lace of record is rectified, it can exercise inherent power and an rectify the same.
7. Perusal of the case record as well as the impugned order clearly reveals that both the Courts below have directed to close, the prosecution case relying upon the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Raj Deo Sharma’s case (supra) wherein in has been held that no offence carrying imprisonment for less than 7 years will be permitted to proceed for more than two years. In the meanwhile, however, the decision in the case of Raj Deo Sharma (supra) has been explained and has been held to be not “Good Law’ by a Seven Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, 2002 (I) OLR (SC) 697, (2002) 22 OCR (SC) 779. In the said decision the Supreme Court has held as follows :
“29. (4) It is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor judicially permissible to draw or prescribe an outer limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings. The time-limits or bars of limitation prescribed in the several directions made in Common Cause (I) Raj Deo Sharma (I) and Raj Deo Sharma (II) could not have been so prescribed or drawn and are not good law. The Criminal Courts are not obliged to terminate trial or criminal proceedings merely on account of lapse of time, as presented by the directions made in Common Cause Case (I) Raj Deo Sharma case (I) and (II). At the most, the periods of time prescribed in those decisions can be taken by the Courts seized of the trial or proceedings to act as reminders when they may be persuaded to apply their judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the case before them and determine by taking into consideration the several relevant factors as pointed out in A. R. Antulay’s case and decide whether the trial of proceedings have become so inordinately delayed as to be called oppressive and unwarranted. Such time-limits cannot and will not by themselves be treated by any Court as a bar to further continuance of the trial or proceedings and as mandatorily obliging the Court to terminate the same and acquit or discharge the accused.”
In view of the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court, the ratio of the decision reported in 1998 (15) OCR (SC) 530, has no force. Consequently, the decision of the learned Sessions Judge also cannot be sustained.
8. I, therefore, have no hesitation to set aside the order dated 3.11.2000 passed by the Sessions Judge, Cuttack in Criminal Revision No. 80 of 1999 and the order dated 30.7.99 passed by the J.M.F.C., Cuttack in G. R. Case No. 1157 of 1988 and direct that the learned Magistrate shall issue summons immediately calling upon the concerned Investigating Officer to appear and give evidence. Copy of the said summons shall also be forwarded to the Director General of Police and the Director of Prosecution, to ensure appearance of the concerned Police Officer. I also direct the Director General of Police and the Director of Prosecution to take steps for appearance of the concerned Investigating Officer in the Court of the Magistrate to give evidence on the date fixed. I feel, any further delay in examination of the Investigating Officer shall also cause prejudice to the accused who stands charged for the last 14 years. I, therefore, further direct that non-compliance with the direction issued in this order and non-appearance of the I.O. to give evidence in G. R. Case No. 1157 of 1988 on the date fixed shall amount to contempts of this Court. I am sure that the authorities shall take appropriate steps to implement this order. In view of the fact that the case is pending for quite some time, I also direct the Magistrate to dispose of the same within four months from the date of communication of this order.
The Criminal Misc. Case is allowed.
The lower Court record be sent back forthwith.
Copy of this order shall also be communicated to the Director General of Police and the Director of Prosecution.