ORDER
S.B. Sinha, CJ
1. An order dated 18-12-2000 passed by the learned single Judge of this Court in WP No.2682 of 1994 is in question in this appeal.
2. The petitioner was appointed as Asst. Engineer (Electrical) in 1978. He was transferred and posted as Asst. Engineer, Maintenance in 1992 at Karimnagar. In September, 1998, the officials of Anti-Corruption Bureau of the State of Andhra Pradesh made search of Kakatiya Industrial Training Institute and pursuant to the report submitted by ACB, on It 11-1988, the petitioner was placed under suspension. A disciplinary proceeding was initiated against him in relation to the following charges:
Charge No.1:
Smt G. Kamamrutham, w/o. G Amruthaiah, Assistant Engineer/Maintenance/132 KV SS/Karimnagar has been the Secretary ofthe Managing Committee of the private Kakatiya Industrial Training Institute without the permission of A.P.S.E. Board.
Charge No. 2:
Sri G. Amruthaiah, Assistant Engineer, Maintenance, 132 KV SS, Karimnagar has been actively participating in the management of the private Kakatiya Industrial Training Institute. He has been collecting the fees personally as can be seen from the signatures on the receipt books. He got himself photographed along with the staff and students of Kakatiya Industrial Training Institute, Karimnagar.
Charge No. 3:
As seen from the attendance register of 132 KV SS, Karimnagar, Sri G. Amruthaiah, Assistant Engineer/ Maintenance/132 KV SS, is found to be absent from duty from 19-9-1988 to 23-9-1988.
Charge No.4:
Certain iron and steel materials as detailed in Annexure-A, were found by ACB lying in the premises of the private Kakatiya Industrial Training Institute, Karimnagar”.
In relation to charges 1 and 2, the Enquiry Officer held:
“….. the wife of the delinquent officer is involved in work of social nature on honourary basis without any remuneration and as such permission of the Board need not be taken by the delinquent officer under Regulation 4(ix) of APSE Board Revised Conduct Regulations, 1986 (hereinafter called as ‘Conduct Regulations’) and that the delinquent officer is involved in honourary work of social nature in helping and advising KES and KITI without any remuneration and hence his involvement does not constitute misconduct as per Regulation 4(ix) of the Conduct Regulations.”
As regards charge No.3, the Enquiry Officer held that the same is not proved. As regards
charge No.4, it was held that the delinquent Officer did not supply the materials in support of the charge-sheet and accordingly, the said charge was dropped.
3. A show-cause notice was issued on 9-1-1990 disagreeing with the findings of the enquiry officer on charges, 1, 2 and 4 and proposing further action purported to be in accordance with APSE Board Employees’ Discipline and Appeal Regulations, 1970.
4. The delinquent officer submitted his explanation; whereafter by an order dated 26-7-1990 upon holding that the respondent-delinquent officer is guilty of charges 1, 2 and 4, the punishment of removal was imposed upon him. An appeal and the review petition filed by the respondent there-against were dismissed.
5. In the writ petition, a question arose as to whether the petitioner should have been given an opportunity of being heard or not.
6. Before the learned single Judge, strong reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex Court in Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra, .
7. The learned single Judge having regard to the rival contentions framed the following questions for consideration:
“1. Whether the appellate order dated 5-9-1991 and the order of the revisional authority dated 1-10-1993 are illegal and liable to be set aside?
2. Whether the order passed by the disciplinary authority dated 26-7-1990, as confirmed by the appellate authority, is contrary to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Punjab National Bank (supra)?
3. To what relief?
8. As regards the first point, both the appellate order and the revisional order were held to be violative of Regulation 14(b), as also Regulation 15(1) of the Regulations. It was noticed that the Chairman being the designated appellate authority, the matter could not have been decided by circulation of and later on by discussion in a meeting by the Board. It was held that the appeal was disposed of without application of mind.
9. As regards the second question, the learned Judge following the Punjab National Bank’s case (supra) held:
“In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned orders of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority are set aside and the matter shall be remitted back to the disciplinary authority to take action in accordance with the principle laid down in Punjab National Bank’s case (supra) and the petitioner shall be deemed to be under suspension under Regulation 11(d) with effect from 11-11-1988 and for the period during which he is not paid subsistence allowance after July 1990, he shall be paid subsistence allowed as indicated hereinabove. There shall be no order as to costs”
10. Mr. S. Ravindranath, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants-Board submitted that having regard to the fact that notice was served to the petitioner, even if the principles of natural justice have not been complied with, the petitioner is not prejudiced. Strong reliance in this connection was placed on the decisions of the Apex Court in Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan, , Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana, , Asst. Supdt. of Post Offices v. G. Mohan Naif, , Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra (supra), Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, AIR 1994 SC 1075,
Union of India v. G. Ganayutham (D) by LRs., 2000 (2) LLJ 648 and a decision of this Court in Ch. Nagender v. Registrar (Management), High Cowl, (DB).
11. Despite violation of the principles of natural justice, the Court invoking the prejudice doctrine shall interfere with the matter or not depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sarma, , wherein it was held:
“33.(6) & (7):
While applying the rule of audi alterant partem (the primary principle of natural justice) the Court/Tribunal/ authority must always bear in mind the ultimate and overriding objective underlying the said rule, viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no failure of justice. It is this objective which should guide them in applying the rule to varying situations that arise before them. There may be situations where the interests of State or public interest may call for a curtailing of the rule of audi alteram partem. In such situations, the Court may have to balance public/State interest with the requirement of natural justice and arrive at an appropriate decision”.
12. It is not in dispute that the disciplinary proceedings against a delinquent employee have to be conducted in terms of the A.P. State Electricity Board Employees’ Discipline and Appeal Regulations, 1970, as also the A.P.S.E. Board Revised Conduct Regulations, 1986, (‘Conduct Regulations’ for the sake of brevity) which is statutory in nature. Regulation 10 of the Conduct Regulations provides for the procedure for imposing penalties. A detailed provisions have been laid down therein as to the mode and manner in which a disciplinary proceeding shall be conducted. The
appellants herein are bound to comply with the requirements laid down therein. It may be that in a given situation compliance of one or the other procedure may not be insisted upon, if it is found that there has been a substantial compliance. But, it is another thing to say that there shall be no compliance of the principles of natural justice. Principles of natural justice, as explained by the Apex Court in Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd v. Girja Shankar Pant, AIR 2001 SC 24, postulates that at every stage requirements thereof should be complied with. By reason of the report of the enquiry officer, the delinquent employee derived a right of being considered for exoneration from the charges at the hands of the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority, undoubtedly, is entitled to differ with such findings, but, before it arrives at a conclusion that the findings arrived at by the enquiry officer are not correct and/or perverse, an opportunity of hearing must be given to the delinquent employee. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that if at that stage the principles of natural justice are not complied with, the delinquent employee will suffer a great prejudice. This aspect of the matter is squarely covered by a decision of the Apex Court in Punjab National Bank’s case (supra) wherein it had been categorically held:
“18…..1t is the disciplinary authority which can impose the penalty and not the inquiry officer. Where the disciplinary authority itself holds an inquiry an opportunity of hearing has to be granted by him. When the disciplinary authority differs with the view of the inquiry officer and proposes to come to a different conclusion, there is no reason as to why an opportunity of hearing should not to be granted. It will be most unfair and iniquitous that where the charged officers succeed before the inquiry officer they are deprived of representing to the disciplinary authority
before that authority differs with the inquiry officer’s report and, while recording a finding of guilt, imposes punishment on the officer. In our opinion, in any such situation the charged officer must have an opportunity to represent before the Disciplinary Authority before final findings on the charges are recorded and punishment imposed. This is required to be done as a part of the first stage of inquiry as explained in Karunakar’s case (1994 AIR SCW 1050) (supra).
19.The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the inquiry authority on any article of charge then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the inquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the inquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority, which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer”.
13. Yet again, the Apex Court in Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra, , held:
“29. We have already extracted Rule 9(2) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979, which enables the disciplinary authority
to disagree with the findings of the enquiry authority on any article of charge. The only requirement is that it shall record its reasoning for such disagreement. The rule does not specifically provider that before recording its own findings, the disciplinary authority will give an opportunity of hearing to a delinquent officer. But the requirement of “hearing” in consonance with the principles of natural justice even at that stage has to be read into Rule 9(2) and it has to be held that before the disciplinary authority finally disagrees with the findings of the enquiry authority, it would given an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer so that he may have the opportunity to indicate that the findings recorded by the enquiring authority do not suffer from any error and that there was no occasion to take a different view. The disciplinary authority, at the same time, has to communicate to the delinquent officer the “Tentative” reasons for disagreeing with the findings of the enquiry authority so that the delinquent officer may further indicate that the reasons on the basis of which the disciplinary authority proposes to disagree with the findings recorded by the enquiring authority are not germane and the finding of “not guilty” already recorded by the enquiring authority was not liable to be interfered with”.
14. The Apex Court relied upon the decisions by it in Kunj Behari Mishra (supra), State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar Pandit, , Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna, , Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar (supra), and Ram Kishan v. Union of India, . There cannot, therefore, be any doubt whatsoever that the delinquent employee has a right of hearing even at the stage when the findings are considered by the disciplinary
authority, as also when it arrives at a tentative opinion that it does not agree with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer, which is all the more necessary when the charges are being held to have been proved.
15. It is also no doubt true that in a given case, the doctrine of prejudice as adumbrated by the Apex Court in several decisions may be invoked, but, having regard to the fact that in the instant case there has been a fragrant violation of the principles, we are of the opinion that the said doctrine cannot be applied in the instant case.
16. The decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellants have no application in the facts of the present case.
17. For the reasons afore-mentioned, no case has been made out for interference with the judgment of the learned single Judge and the same is accordingly confirmed. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. No order as to costs.