IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P. (S) No. 1648 of 2008
Sateng Xaxa ... Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Jharkhand
2. State of Bihar
3. The Secretary, Department of Home, Government
of Bihar, Patna
4. The Secretary, Department of Home, Government
of Jharkhand, Ranchi
5. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna
6. The Deputy Commissioner, Gumla
7. The Superintendent of Police, Gumla
8. The Accountant General, Patna, Bihar
9. The Accountant General, Ranchi, Jharkhand
10. The District Provident Fund Officer, Gumla
11. The District Provident Fund Officer, Patna
... Respondents
.............
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D.N.PATEL
.............
For the Petitioner : Mr. Arshad Hussain, Advocate
For State of Jharkhand : J.C. to A.G.
For State of Bihar : Mr. S.P. Roy, Advocate
For Accountant Generals : J.C. to Mr. S. Shrivastava
.............
5/ Dated: 27th of August, 2009
1. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
husband of the present petitioner retired on 1st July, 1995 as
Constable, thereafter, the pension was paid by the State of
Bihar to the husband of the present petitioner. Husband of the
present petitioner expired on 24th April, 2004, thereafter, family
pension is paid to the petitioner by the State of Bihar, even on
today, but, several other retirement benefits like amount of
Gratuity, Group Provident Fund amount, Leave Encashment
amount, Group Insurance amount and such other retirement
benefits have not yet been paid, which are legally payable to the
petitioner and, therefore, let a suitable direction is given to the
concerned respondent authorities so that legally payable dues
to the petitioner, may be paid by the respondents. The
petitioner is residing within the State of Jharkhand, therefore,
the present petition has been instituted before this Court.
2. I have heard learned counsels for the respondents, who
have vehemently submitted that no cause of action has arisen
within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, much less part of
cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of
Jharkhand High Court and, therefore, the writ petition is not
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tenable at law before this Court. It is also submitted by learned
counsel for the State of Bihar as well as learned counsel on
behalf of Accountant General Offices at Bihar as well as at
Jharkhand that the petitioner's husband served with the State
of Bihar, he retired from the State of Bihar on 1st July, 1995.
After his retirement, pension was paid to him by the State of
Bihar. Husband of the petitioner expired on 24th April, 2004,
thereafter, family pension is also paid by the State of Bihar and,
therefore, the amount of Gratuity, Group Provident Fund
amount, Leave Encashment amount, Group Insurance amount
and such other retirement benefits is payable, by the State of
Bihar and, therefore, this petition is not tenable before this
Court. No cause of action has arisen within the State of
Jharkhand. Nonetheless, it is fairly submitted by learned
counsel for the State of Bihar that they will consider this writ
petition as a representation and the concerned respondent
authorities of the State of Bihar will decide the legally payable
amount of death-cum-retiral benefits to the petitioner and it will
be communicated also to the petitioner, she will have to collect
the amount from the office of the concerned respondent
authority i.e. respondent no. 5.
3. Having heard learned counsel for both the sides and
looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears
that:-
(i) The petitioner has served the State of Bihar and has
retired from the State of Bihar on 1st July, 1995 as constable.
The amount of pension was paid by the State of Bihar,
thereafter, husband of the petitioner expired on 24th April, 2004
and the family pension was also paid to the petitioner by the
State of Bihar.
(ii) It has been decided by this Court in the case of Narayan
Mochi vs. M/s Eastern Coal Fields Ltd., Kolkata & Ors. as
reported in 2009 (3) JLJR 114 that the situs of the petitioner is
not a cause of action nor it can be termed as a part of cause of
action. Paragraphs 16 and 17 thereof read as under:-
"16. The expression "cause of action" means that bundle of facts
which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a
judgment in his favour by the Court. Cause of action implies a
right to sue. The material facts which are imperative for the suitor
to allege and prove constitute the cause of action. It means every
fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if
traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court.
Negatively, it would mean that everything which, if not proved,
3
gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, would be part
of cause of action. For every action there has to be a cause of
action, if not, the plaint or petition, as the case may be, shall be
rejected summarily. The entire bundle of facts pleaded need not
constitute a cause of action as what is necessary to be proved before
the petitioner can obtain a decree, is the material facts. The
material facts is also known as integral part of the cause of action.
Unless the facts pleaded are such as have a nexus or relevance with
the lis that is involved in the case, they cannot give rise to a cause of
action within the court's territorial jurisdiction. The facts which
have no bearing with the lis or dispute involved in the case, do not
give rise to cause of action."
"17. Thus, the petitioner, who resides within the territorial
jurisdiction of this Court, has no bearing with the dispute, involved
in the case and, therefore, his situs in Jharkhand is not a cause of
action, because it has no bearing with the lis and, therefore, his
residence within the State of Jharkhand cannot confer a
jurisdiction to this Court, if it is otherwise not having."
(Emphasis supplied)
(iii) Thus, residence of the petitioner within the State of
Jharkhand has no relevance with the dispute and, therefore,
residence of the present petitioner within the State of
Jharkhand can not be labelled as part of cause of action and,
hence, merely because the petitioner is staying within the State
of Jharkhand, in background of the aforesaid facts, this Court
has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition, filed by
the petitioner.
(iv) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Addl. General Manager-Human Resources, Bharat
Heavy Electricals Ltd. vs. Suresh Ramkrishna Burde, as
reported in (2007) 5 SCC 336, especially in paragraph no. 15,
as under:-
"15. Before parting with the case we would like to observe that the
order invalidating the caste certificate had been passed by the
Scrutiny Committee at Nagpur and, therefore, the earlier two writ
petitions filed by the respondent were maintainable before the
Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court. However, in the third
and final writ petition the order under challenge was the order of
termination of service which was passed by the appellant on
16.7.2004
at Hyderabad as the respondent was working with Bharat
Heavy Electrical Ltd.’s Heavy Power Equipment Plant, Hyderabad.
Therefore, the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court had no
jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition wherein challenge was
raised to the said order. However, in order to cut short the litigation
and settle the controversy we have decided the case on merits.”
(Emphasis supplied)
(v) It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Aligarh Muslim University vs. Vinay Engineering
Enterprises (P) Ltd., as reported in (1994) 4 SCC 710,
especially in paragraph no. 2, as under:-
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“2. We are surprised, not a little, that the High Court of Calcutta
should have exercised jurisdiction in a case where it had absolutely
no jurisdiction. The contracts in question were executed at Aligarh,
the construction work was to be carried out at Aligarh, even the
contracts provided that in the event of dispute the Aligarh Court
alone will have jurisdiction. The arbitrator was from Aligarh and
was to function there. Merely because the respondent was a
Calcutta-based firm, the High Court of Calcutta seems to have
exercised jurisdiction where it had none by adopting a queer line of
reasoning. We are constrained to say that this is a case of abuse of
jurisdiction and we feel that the respondent deliberately moved the
Calcutta High Court ignoring the fact that no part of the cause of
action had arisen within the jurisdiction of that Court. It clearly
shows that the litigation filed in the Calcutta High Court was
thoroughly unsustainable.”(Emphasis supplied)
(vi) It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. Utpal Kumar
Basu, as reported in (1994) 4 SCC 711, especially in paragraph
no. 12, as under:-“12. Pointing out that after the issuance of the notification by the
State Government under Section 52 (1) of the Act, the notified land
became vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances
and hence it was not necessary for the respondents to plead the
service of notice under Section 52 (2) for the grant of an appropriate
direction or order under Article 226 for quashing the notification
acquiring the land. This Court, therefore, held that no part of the
cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High
Court. This Court, therefore, held that no part of the cause of action
arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. This Court
deeply regretted and deprecated the practice prevalent in the High
Court of exercising jurisdiction and passing interlocutory orders in
matters where it lacked territorial jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the
strong observations made by this Court in the aforesaid decision and
in the earlier decisions referred to therein, we are distressed that the
High Court of Calcutta persists in exercising jurisdiction even in
cases where no part of the cause of action arose within its territorial
jurisdiction. It is indeed a great pity that one of the premier High
Courts of the country should appear to have developed a tendency to
assume jurisdiction on the sole ground that the petitioner before it
resides in or carries on business from a registered office in the State
of West Bengal. We feel all the more pained that notwithstanding
the observations of this Court made time and again, some of the
learned Judges continue to betray that tendency. Only recently while
disposing of appeals arising out of SLP Nos. 10065-66 of 1993,
Aligarh Muslim University vs. Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P)
Ltd., this Court observed:-“We are surprised, not a little, that the High Court of
Calcutta should have exercised jurisdiction in a case where it had
absolutely no jurisdiction.”In that case, the contract in question was executed at Aligarh,
the construction work was to be carried out at Aligarh, the contracts
provided that in the event of dispute the Aligarh Court alone will
have jurisdiction, the arbitrator was appointed at Aligarh and was to
function at Aligarh and yet merely because the respondent was a
Calcutta based firm, it instituted proceedings in the Calcutta High
Court and the High Court exercised jurisdiction where it had none
whatsoever. It must be remembered that the image and prestige of a
5court depends on how the members of that institution conduct
themselves. If an impression gains ground that even in cases which
fall outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court, certain members
of the court would be willing to exercise jurisdiction on the plea that
some event, however trivial and unconnected with the cause of
action had occurred within the jurisdiction of the said court, litigants
would seek to abuse the process by carrying the cause before such
members giving rise to avoidable suspicion. That would lower the
dignity of the institution and put the entire system to ridicule. We
are greatly pained to say so but if we do not strongly deprecate the
growing tendency we will, we are afraid, be failing in our duty to the
institution and the system of administration of justice. We do hope
that we will not have another occasion to deal with such a situation.”(Emphasis supplied)
4. In view of the aforesaid decisions also, the present
petition is not tenable at law before this Court for want of
territorial jurisdiction as no cause of action or part of cause of
action as said to have been arisen within the territorial region of
the State of Jharkhand.5. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid fact, reasons and
judicial pronouncements, this writ petition is not tenable at law
before this Court for want of territorial jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, learned counsel for the State of Bihar submitted
that they will consider the case of the petitioner, in accordance
with law and the decision is taken by the State of Bihar and will
be conveyed to the petitioner.6. The petition is, hereby, disposed of as dismissed.
(D.N. Patel, J.)
Ajay/