IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
C.W.P. No. 19446 of 2002
Date of Decision: November 26, 2008
Brig. Sassi Inder Singh (Retd.) and others
...Petitioners
Versus
State of Punjab and others
...Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.M. KUMAR
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SABINA
Present: Mr. M.L. Sarin, Senior Advocate, with
Mr. Hemant Sarin, Advocate,
for the petitioners.
Ms. Charu Tuli, Sr. DAG, Punjab,
for respondent No. 1.
Mr. A.R. Takkar, Advocate,
for respondent Nos. 2 to 4.
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be Yes
allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporters or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in Yes
the Digest?
M.M. KUMAR, J.
1. This petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution
prays for quashing notice dated 10.12.1999 (P-1), notification dated
22.11.2001 (P-4), award dated 20.11.2002 (P-7), amended award
dated 22.11.2002 (P-8) and all the subsequent proceedings thereto.
2. Brief facts of the case are that Smt. Devinder Kaur,
mother of petitioner Nos. 1 to 4 was owner of land measuring
C.W.P. No. 19446 of 2002 2
approximately 70 Kanals, comprised in Khasra Nos. 25//5(8-0), 6(8-
0), 7(8-0), 8(7-12), 9(8-0), 12(4-18), 13(4-4), 14/1(3-18), 15(3-0),
26//1/1(0-12), 9/3(1-12), 10(8-0), 11/1(3-9) and 12/1(0-15), in the
revenue estate of village Jawaddi, Tehsil and District Ludhiana. The
said land was bequeathed by her in favour of petitioner Nos. 1 to 4 in
equal shares and after her death petitioner Nos. 1 to 4 inherited the
land in question. The land in dispute falls within the municipal limits
of Ludhiana and various amenities viz. water, electricity, sewerage,
telephone and other civic amenities are available in the area. On
18.11.2001, petitioner No. 3 gifted her share in the land in dispute in
favour of petitioner Nos. 8 and 9. On 12.4.2002, petitioner No. 1 sold
his share in favour of petitioner Nos. 5, 6 and 7, vide two registered
sale deeds. On 12.4.2002 itself, petitioner No. 4 also sold half of her
1/4 share in favour of petitioner No. 5. On 3.5.2002, petitioner No. 4
further gifted her remaining share in favour of petitioner No. 7. It is
claimed that the change of ownership in respect of land in dispute has
been duly recorded in the revenue record and mutation has been
sanctioned in favour of petitioner Nos. 5 to 9.
3. On 16.11.1999, the Improvement Trust Ludhiana (for
brevity, ‘the Trust’) passed Resolution No. 165 and decided to frame
a development-cum-housing scheme under the provisions of the
Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 (for brevity, ‘the Act’) and
notice under Section 36 of the Act to acquire an area measuring 8.8
acres for the said development scheme was issued, which was
published in the official gazette on 10.12.1999, 17.12.1999 and
C.W.P. No. 19446 of 2002 3
24.12.1999 (P-1). Objections from the interested persons were
invited, which were to be filed within 30 days. Since the land of the
petitioners was also included in the proposed development scheme,
petitioner Nos. 1 to 3 filed objections with the Trust on 24.2.2000 (P-
2 & P-3). On 27.5.2000, objectors were called for hearing by the
Trust.
4. On 17.11.2000, the State Government sanctioned the
development scheme under Section 41 of the Act and notification in
this regard was published in the official gazette on 22.11.2000, under
Section 42 of the Act (P-4). On 18.7.2001, the State Level Land
Acquisition Board issued a No Objection Certificate for acquisition
of land for the development scheme framed by the Trust.
5. On 4.4.2002, the State Government exercising powers
under Section 103(1) of the Act, issued a notification and dissolved
the Trust (P-5) and vide a separate notification of even date appointed
an Administrator for the Trust.
6. It is significant to notice that on 6.5.2002, the Land
Acquisition Collector-respondent No. 4 issued notices under Section
9 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for brevity, ‘the 1894 Act’)
calling upon petitioner Nos. 1 to 4 to file their claims for
compensation and to appear before him on 27.5.2002. The petitioners
have claimed that no such notice was issued to petitioner Nos. 5 to 9
despite the fact that they stepped into the shoes of petitioner Nos. 1, 3
and 4.
C.W.P. No. 19446 of 2002 4
7. On 13.5.2000, the Land Acquisition Collector, Ludhiana
Improvement Trust, Ludhiana was transferred and when petitioner
Nos. 1 to 4 reached the office of the Collector on 27.5.2002 to lodge
their claims for compensation, no officer was present there to hear
them.
8. On 2.8.2002, the Administrator of the Trust-respondent
No. 3 wrote a letter to the State Government that the development
scheme would lapse in case the award was not announced and
possession taken before 20.11.2002 (P-6). On 12.11.2002, a new
incumbent was posted as Land Acquisition Collector, however, no
fresh notices under Section 9 of the Act were issued to the petitioners
for affording them hearing by the Collector.
9. It is claimed by the petitioners that on 17.11.2002, the
acquisition proceedings lapsed because no award was announced by
the Collector-respondent No. 4 within two years of sanction of the
development Scheme under Section 41 of the Act, which was
sanctioned by the State Government on 17.11.2000. On 18.11.2002,
the Collector-respondent No. 4 sent a draft award for approval to the
State Government, which was approved on 20.11.2002 and the
Collector-respondent No. 4 announced the award on the same day
(P-7). On 22.11.2002, an amended award was announced by the
Collector-respondent No. 4 because there were some arithmetical
mistakes in the original award (P-8).
10. On 27.11.2002, notices under Section 12 of the 1894 Act
were issued to petitioner Nos. 1 to 4 by the Collector-respondent No.
C.W.P. No. 19446 of 2002 5
4 informing them that possession of the land in dispute would be
taken on 10.12.2002 (P-9). However, no such notice was issued to
petitioner Nos. 5 to 9.
11. On 7.12.2002, the petitioner filed the instant petition and
vide order dated 9.12.2002, a Division Bench of this Court while
issuing notice of motion and notice regarding stay ordered that
dispossession of the petitioners was to remain stayed in the meantime.
On 23.4.2007, the instant petition was admitted and ordered to be
heard along with CWP No. 6252 of 2002. It was further ordered that
interim directions were to continue. It is apposite to mention here
that notification dated 4.4.2002, issued by the State Government
dissolving the Trust under the provisions of Section 103(1) of the Act
(P-5) and appointment of an Administrator of the Trust, was
challenged by Shri Madan Mohan Vyas, the then Chairman of the
Trust, in this Court by filing CWP No. 6252 of 2002, which has
already been dismissed on 25.4.2008 by a Division Bench of this
Court of which one of us (M.M. Kumar, J.) is a member and the
judgment is now reported as Bakshi Ram Arora v. State of Punjab,
2008(3) PLJ 167.
12. In the written statement filed on behalf of the Trust-
respondent Nos. 2 to 4 while admitting the factual position it has been
denied that the Trust was dissolved by the State Government
permanently. It has been claimed that it is common practice to
appoint an Administrator to run the affairs of an Improvement Trust
as and when such Trust is superseded, suspended or reconstituted. It
C.W.P. No. 19446 of 2002 6
has also been denied that the award by the Collector was passed after
two years. It has been asserted that the time period of two years starts
from the date of publication of notification under Section 42 of the
Act in the official gazette. Thus, it has been justified that the award
has been passed within the stipulated period of two years i.e. on
20.11.2002 as the notification under Section 42 of the Act was
published on 22.11.2000 although it was sanctioned on 17.11.2000.
It has been further asserted that the acquisition proceedings have been
validly and legally carried out and the same are sustainable in the
eyes of law. With regard to taking over possession of the land in
dispute it has been asserted that the same could not be taken because
the stay order passed by this Court in favour of the petitioners has
remained in operation. It is further pertinent to notice that in para 3
of the petition a reference has been made to the execution of gift
deed, dated 18.11.2001, transfer deed dated 12.4.2002 and gift deed
dated 3.5.2002. In the written statement the stand taken by the
respondents is that after issuance of notification dated 22.11.2000
under Section 42 of the Act, these transfer proceedings by way of gift
deed or execution of transfer deed stand vitiated. In para 18 of the
written statement further stand has been taken that no notice could
have been issued to petitioner Nos. 5 to 9 because they are transferee
after the notification under Section 42 of the Act was issued and,
therefore, their names would not appear in the revenue record. It has
also been submitted that compensation to the tune of Rs.
C.W.P. No. 19446 of 2002 7
3,59,00,000/- was duly deposited by the Trust with the Collector in
the Punjab National Bank, Ludhiana.
13. It is pertinent to notice that on 20.4.2004, the learned
State counsel on instructions made a statement before the Division
Bench and adopted the written statement filed on behalf of the Trust-
respondent Nos. 2 to 4. However, the Division Bench, vide order
dated 24.5.2004, directed the respondent State to file a separate
written statement. A short affidavit of Shri G.R. Bansal, IAS,
Additional Secretary to Government of Punjab, dated 29.7.2004, was
filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 stating that all the paras of the
writ petition have been replied by respondent No. 2. Then, on
31.8.2004, a short written statement on behalf of respondent No. 1
was filed admitting factual position mentioned in the writ petition.
However, it has been pointed out that appointment of Administrator
was necessitated to run the day-to-day affairs of the Trust. It has been
denied that the Trust stands dissolved permanently because the State
Government has appointed an Administrator to run the Trust.
14. Controverting the averments made in the written
statement filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 to 4 and reiterating the
averments of the writ petition, the petitioners filed their replication.
It has been specifically denied that the Trust was
superseded/suspended vide notification dated 4.4.2002 (P-5). In
order to fortify their claim, the petitioners also placed on record a
copy of the written statement filed by the Additional Secretary, Local
Government, Punjab, in CWP No. 6252 of 2002 (P-10), wherein the
C.W.P. No. 19446 of 2002 8
Government of Punjab has taken the stand that the Trust stood
dissolved and not superseded/suspended. The petitioners also placed
on record the reference application filed under Section 18 of the 1894
Act claiming that the same was filed without prejudice to their rights
in the instant petition (P-11).
15. Mr. M.L. Sarin, learned senior counsel for the petitioners
has argued that execution of any scheme framed under Section 28 of
the Act cannot commence once the Trust stands dissolved in
pursuance to the provisions of Section 103 of the Act. He has placed
reliance on Section 103 of the Act, which deals with ultimate
dissolution of Trust and transfer of its assets/liabilities to the
Municipal Committee. According to the learned counsel in case of
dissolution, the Trust cease to exist as compared to suspension of
Trust under Section 72-F of the Act. He has emphasised that, in fact,
the dissolution takes place when all Schemes sanctioned under
Section 42 of the Act have either been executed or executed to such
an extent that continued existence of the Trust has not been
considered necessary in the opinion of the Government. He has also
referred to sub-clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 103 of the Act
by submitting that it is only in a case where a sanctioned scheme is in
the midst of execution that it could be continued but no new scheme
could be executed if it has not yet commenced. Learned counsel has
placed reliance on the expression used in clause (c) of sub-section (2)
of Section 103 of the Act ‘completing the execution of any scheme
sanctioned under this Act’ to argue that it is only those schemes
C.W.P. No. 19446 of 2002 9
which have not been completely executed which could be continued
to be handled by the Administrator after the dissolution and that no
new scheme could be taken up by him as there is complete bar.
16. He has also placed reliance on Section 42 of the Act and
has argued that after the scheme has been sanctioned, the execution
would not commence till the award is announced and possession of
the land is handed over to the Trust. Learned counsel has also
pointed out that the respondents cannot take a shifting stand by
arguing in this case that the Trust, in fact, has been suspended under
Section 72-F of the Act and not dissolved under Section 103 of the
Act because when such a stand was taken in C.W.P. No. 6252 of 2002
by the erstwhile Chairman/Members of the Trust then the State has
placed reliance on Section 103 of the Act by asserting that the Trust,
in fact, was dissolved. Referring to the facts of the present case,
learned counsel has argued that sanction to the scheme was accorded
on 22.11.2000 (P-4) and the Trust was dissolved on 4.4.2002 (P-5).
Notice for possession was issued on 2.8.2002 and award was
announced on 10.11.2002. On the basis of the aforementioned facts,
he has submitted that on the date of dissolution, possession was still
with the petitioners because no award was announced nor possession
was taken. After issuance of notice for taking possession on
2.8.2002, the petitioners have approached this Court and the
dispossession of the petitioners was stayed on 9.12.2002. Learned
counsel has also argued that the petitioners have not been given any
C.W.P. No. 19446 of 2002 10
opportunity of hearing by issuing notice under Section 9 to petitioner
Nos. 5 to 9. Therefore, announcement of award is vitiated.
17. Mr. Sarin has further submitted that Section 5A of the
1894 Act confer an important right on the land owner. An equivalent
provisions has been made under Section 38 of the Act, which
postulate service of notice on a land owner inviting objections to the
scheme and the acquisition. Learned counsel has argued that no
notice was issued to petitioner Nos. 5 to 9 and, therefore, the
acquisition proceedings are liable to be quashed because it is a
mandatory provision, as has been laid down by this Court in the case
of Gurdev Singh v. State of Punjab, 1979 PLR 85 and a Full Bench
judgment in the case of Prof. Jodh Singh v. Jullundur
Improvement Trust, 1984 PLJ 413. He has also submitted that
objection taken by the respondents that the petitioners have lost locus
standi to transfer the land after declaration made under Section 42 of
the Act, is not conceivable.
18. Ms. Charu Tuli and Mr. A.R. Takkar, learned counsel for
the respondents have argued that the development scheme framed by
the Trust has to be regarded as part of the execution once the
proceedings have been undertaken for its sanction under Section 42
of the Act. According to the learned counsel, Section 42 of the Act
contemplates a distinct stage whereafter the Trust is under an
obligation to forthwith execute the scheme irrespective of passing of
award and taking of possession of the land. It has been stated on the
basis of the record that the Trust has deposited a sum of Rs.
C.W.P. No. 19446 of 2002 11
3,59,51,952/- in the Punjab National Bank on 20.11.2002. As per the
assessment made by the Collector, the aforementioned amount was
deposited by the Trust from its own funds. It has been emphasised
that the Administrator is competent to continue with the execution of
the scheme and the State Government has regarded the existence of
the Trust unnecessary to complete the execution of the disputed
scheme. Both the counsel have placed reliance on Section 103(2)(c)
of the Act and argued that the Administrator is fully within its power
to continue with the execution of the scheme after the Trust has been
dissolved.
19. The factual position which emerges from the pleadings is
that a development scheme was framed and notifications dated
10.12.1999, 17.12.1999 and 24.12.1999 were issued, under Section
36 of the Act. Thereafter objections under Section 38 were filed
which were heard. Then sanction to the Scheme was accorded under
Section 41 of the Act on 17.11.2000 and a notification was published
in the official gazette on 22.11.2000. The trusts in the State of Punjab
were dissolved on 4.2.2002 (P-5) by invoking Section 103 (1) of the
Act. However, the acquisition proceedings continued and on
6.5.2002 notices under Section 9 of the Act were issued to petitioner
Nos. 1 to 4. A draft award was prepared on 18.11.2002 and the same
was approved and announced on 20.11.2002. According to Section
11A of the 1894 Act, the award is required to be announced within a
period of two years from the date of publication of the declaration and
if no award is made within that period then the entire proceedings for
C.W.P. No. 19446 of 2002 12
acquisition of the land would lapse. Section 59(b) of the Act
contemplates modification of the 1894 Act as per the Schedule
attached to the Town Improvement Act. According to the provisions
of clause 2 a notification issued under Section 4 of the 1894 Act is
considered equivalent to Section 36 of the Act and a declaration made
under Section 6 of the 1894 Act is considered equivalent to Section
42 of the Act. Accordingly, it has to be held that declaration under
Section 42 of the Act, which is equivalent to Section 6 of the 1894
Act, was made on 22.11.2000 and the award has been announced on
20.11.2002, which is within two years. Likewise, the development
scheme was notified under Section 36 of the Act, which is equivalent
to Section 4 of the 1894 Act, on 24.12.1999 and declaration under
Section 42 of the Act was made within a period of one year on
22.11.2000, after decision on the objections. Therefore, in so far as
acquisition proceedings are concerned, no fault can be found. In
respect of hearing of objections, the petitioners have stated in paras 5
and 6 of the petition that petitioner Nos. 1 to 3 had filed objections
and they were heard on 27.5.2000 when they were assured that their
land would be released from acquisition. The mandate of Section 38
of the Act, which is like Section 5A of the 1894 Act, stand complied
with. A Full Bench of this Court in Prof. Jodh Singh’s case (supra)
has laid down that when notification under Section 42 is issued then
all irregularities from the framing of Scheme to its sanctioning stand
condoned. Therefore, we do not find any such irregularity warranting
quashing of Scheme.
C.W.P. No. 19446 of 2002 13
20. However, a significant question raised by Mr. Sarin
concerning the effect of dissolution of Trust under Section 103 of the
Act remains to be considered. The controversy can be conveniently
answered by framing the following two questions:-
1. Whether the acquisition proceedings could be
continued after dissolution of the Ludhiana
Improvement Trust under Section 103 of the Act?
2. Whether the acquisition proceedings are vitiated
on account of non-issuance of notices to petitioner
Nos. 5 to 9?
Re: Question 1:
21. In order to answer the first question, it would be
necessary to read Section 103 of the Act, which is as under:-
“103. Ultimate dissolution of trust, and transfer of its
assets and liabilities to the committee. – (1) When all
schemes sanctioned under this Act have been executed or
have been so far executed as to render the continued
existence of the trust, in the opinion of the State
Government, unnecessary, or when in the opinion of the
State Government it is expedient that the Trust shall
cease to exist, the State Government may by notification
declare that the trust shall be dissolved from such date as
may be specified in this behalf in such notification; and
the trust shall be deemed to be dissolved accordingly.
C.W.P. No. 19446 of 2002 14(2) From the date specified in the notification
referred to in sub-section (1), –
(a) all properties, funds and dues vested in or
realisable by the trust and the chairman
respectively shall vest in and be realisable by
the State Government till they stand
transferred to the municipal committee under
sub-section (3);
(b) all liabilities which are enforceable against
the trust shall be enforceable only against the
State Government to the extent of the
properties, funds and dues vested in and
realised by the State Government; and
(c) for the purpose of completing the execution
of any scheme sanctioned under this Act
which has not been fully executed by the
trust and of realising properties, funds and
dues referred to in clause (a), the functions
of the trust and the chairman under this Act
shall be discharged by such class I officer of
the State Government as may be appointed
by it in this behalf.
(3) After all functions referred to in clause (c)
of sub-section (2) are duly discharged, –
C.W.P. No. 19446 of 2002 15(a) the properties, funds and dues vested in or
realizable by the State Government under
clause (a) of sub-section (2) shall stand
transferred to, vested in and be realisable by
the municipal committee; and
(b) all liabilities enforceable against the State
Government under clause (b) of that sub-
section or incurred by it under this Act, shall be enforceable against the municipal committee."22. According to opening words of Section 103(1) of the
Act, ‘Trust’ could be dissolved in two eventualities:
(a) When the existence of the ‘trust’ in the opinion of
the Government is considered unnecessary
because all schemes sanctioned under the Act have
been executed or have been executed to an extent
so as to render the continued existence of trust un-
necessary.
(b) When the Government forms an opinion that it is
advantageous and expedient then it could dissolve
the Trust.
23. The formation of opinion does not require any elaborate
procedure of issuance of notice, reply and hearing to the objector.
Such an act has been considered to be legislative in character. That
C.W.P. No. 19446 of 2002 16
controversy we have dealt with in some details in the case of Bakshi
Ram Arora (supra).
24. In the first eventuality the sanctioned schemes are
required to be either executed completely or partially. The power of
the State Government to dissolve the ‘Trust’ is far wider in the second
eventuality. The power is in no way controlled by the first
eventuality which is clearly signified by use of word ‘or’. When the
notification dated 4.4.2002 is examined it becomes patent that it has
been issued under Section 103(1) part second. A perusal of the
notification would further clarify the aforesaid legal position and the
same reads thus:-
“No. 4/29/2002-4LGII/3482 – Whereas in the opinion of
the State Government it is expedient that the Ludhiana
Improvement Trust shall cease to exist.
Now, therefore, in exercise of the power conferred
by sub-section (1) of Section 103 of the Punjab Town
Improvement Act, 1922 (Punjab Act 4 of 1922) and all
other powers enabling him in this behalf, the Governor
of Punjab is pleased to declare that the Ludhiana
Improvement Trust shall stand dissolved on and with
effect from the date of publication of this notification in
the official gazette.”
25. It is, thus, evident that Government on formation of an
opinion that it was expedient to dissolve the trust, has taken the
decision to dissolve it. The decision to dissolve has not been taken
C.W.P. No. 19446 of 2002 17
on account of execution of all the sanctioned schemes or by forming
an opinion that the schemes so far executed have rendered the
continued existence of the trust unnecessary. In any case, Section
103 of the Act does not deal with the execution of the scheme but it
deals with dissolution of trust.
26. We are further of the view that Section 103(2) of the Act
puts it beyond any reasonable doubt that dissolution of trust would
not put an end to a scheme framed and sanctioned for the welfare of
the residents of local area. It provides that from the specified date all
properties, funds and dues vested in the ‘Trust’ and realisable by it
and the Chairman would start vesting in and realisable by the State
Government till their transfer to Municipal Committee. Clause (a) of
sub-section (3) of Section 103 of the Act also clarify further that after
all functions are duly discharged as envisaged by clause (c) sub-
section (2) then the properties, funds and dues vested in or realisable
by the State Government under clause (a) of sub-section (2) would
transfer to, vested in and be realisable by the Municipal Committee.
27. On the basis of the expression ‘completing the execution
of any scheme sanctioned under this Act’, the argument raised is that
the Administrator could have only completed the execution of any
scheme but it would not include the acquisition proceedings which
are not complete because the word ‘execution’ would necessarily
postulate that the land was in possession of the trust free from all
encumbrances as contemplated by Section 17 of the 1894 Act and the
scheme has commenced which remain incomplete. However, the sub-
C.W.P. No. 19446 of 2002 18
section further postulate that the Administrator (Class-I Officer of the
State Government) could also, for the purposes of realising the
properties, funds and dues referred to in clause (a), act on behalf of
the Government. Once the properties, funds and dues vested in or
realisable by the trust/Chairman have been vested and be realisable by
the State Government on the dissolution of the trust then the question
is whether the proceedings, after the issuance of notification under
Section 42 could be dis-continued merely because the trust has been
dissolved. In other words, could it be said that after notification
under Section 42 of the Act, the land had vested or became realisable
by the trust, which function could be discharged by the State
Government through the Administrator. The trust in the present case,
after issuance of notification under Section 42 of the Act on
22.11.2000, obtained no objection certificate from the State Level
Land Acquisition Board on 18.7.2001 although the Trust was later on
dissolved on 4.4.2002. According to Section 3 of the Act, the trust is
a body corporate having perpetual succession and common seal
which can sue and be sued in its own name. It is an independent
entity as would be evident from the perusal of Sections 3 to 11 of the
Act.
28. It would also be relevant to refer to Section 3A of the
Act, which reads thus:-
“3-A. New trusts.- Notwithstanding anything contained
in this Act, if and when a new trust is created for a local
area where a trust was dissolved under section 103 and
C.W.P. No. 19446 of 2002 19the functions referred to in clause (c) of sub-section (2)
of that section have not been duly discharged,-
(a) all properties, funds and dues vested in or
realisable by the State Government under
section 103 shall stand transferred to, vested
in and realisable by the new trust;
(b) all liabilities enforceable against the State
Government under section 103 or incurred
by it under this Act shall be enforceable
against the new trust; and
(c) the new trust shall deal with any scheme
sanctioned under this Act, which has not
been fully executed by the officer appointed
by the State Government under section 103,
in accordance with the provisions of this
Act as fully as if it had been sanctioned at
the instance of the new trust.”
29. Section 3A of the Act further clarify that on the creation
of a new trust all properties, funds and dues vested in or realisable by
the State Government under Section 103 of the Act would stand
transferred to, vested in and realisable by the new trust. Sub-section
(c) of Section 3A provides for same role for the new trust which is to
be played by the State Government on the dissolution of the trust
under Section 103 of the Act. Therefore, it is not possible to
conclude that merely because the trust has been dissolved under
C.W.P. No. 19446 of 2002 20
Section 103 of the Act, the acquisition proceedings would come to an
end because the Administrator appointed by the State Government
would take over the functions of the trust and the Chairman under the
Act and would discharge the same. The expression ‘completing the
execution of any scheme sanctioned under this Act’ has to be
interpreted by keeping in view the word ‘scheme sanctioned’ which is
the expression used in Section 41 of the Act. In the present case, the
scheme was sanctioned under Section 41 of the Act on 17.11.2000
and notification under Section 42 of the Act was issued much before
dissolution on 22.11.2000. Therefore, on the dissolution of the trust
on 4.4.2002, under Section 103 of the Act, a sanctioned scheme
cannot come to an end because it cannot be regarded as incomplete
execution of a sanctioned scheme and argument to that effect would
lack merit because it ignores the provisions of clauses (a) and (b) of
sub-section (2) of Section 103 of the Act, which postulate that all
properties, funds and dues vested in or realisable by the trust and the
Chairman respectively are to vest in and be realisable by the State
Government through an Administrator and that all liabilities
enforceable against the trust would become enforceable against the
State Government. Therefore, we hold that steps taken after issuance
of notification under Section 42 of the Act, sanctioning the scheme,
which include announcement of award on 20.11.2002, are the steps in
the direction of execution of the scheme. The record further shows
that the possession was to be taken after depositing the amount of
compensation. According to the written statement filed by
C.W.P. No. 19446 of 2002 21
respondent Nos. 2 to 4, an amount of Rs. 3,59,00,000/- was duly
deposited with the Land Acquisition Collector. Thereafter on
27.11.2002, the Land Acquisition Collector of the trust issued a
notice dated 27.11.2002 to the Superintending Engineer of the trust
that announcement on the loudspeaker as well as by beat of drum be
made that the possession of the land would be taken on 10.12.2002.
However, before the possession could be taken on 10.12.2002,
dispossession was stayed by this Court, vide order dated 9.12.2002.
Accordingly, we find that all steps necessary for acquiring the land
and vesting the same in the trust were taken. On the dissolution of
the trust, the Administrator has worked on behalf of the Government
and all properties, funds and dues vested in or realisable by the trust
and the Chairman start vesting in and also could be realisable by the
State Government. Therefore, we are of the view that the question
No. 1 must be answered against the petitioners and the land
acquisition proceedings could continue after dissolution of the trust.
There is no legal bar to the continuation of the acquisition
proceedings either under the provisions of the Act or any other law.
Re: Question 2:
30. The facts emanating from the pleadings of the parties
shows that transaction of gifting the land in dispute took place on
12.4.2002 or 18.11.2002. Some sale deeds were also executed on
12.4.2002 and other gift deed was registered on 3.5.2002. All these
transactions are after 22.11.2002 when notification under Section 42
of the Act had already been issued. To a specific averment by the
C.W.P. No. 19446 of 2002 22
petitioners that mutation has been sanctioned in their favour,
respondent Nos. 2 to 4 in their written statement has controverted the
aforementioned fact by asserting that petitioner Nos. 5 to 9 were not
entitled to any notice because their names did not figure in the
revenue record. It is well settled that no notice is required to be
issued to a person whose name does not appear in the land revenue
register. In that regard reliance may be placed on the judgment of
Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner, Bangalore
Development Authority v. K.S. Narayan, (2006) 8 SCC 336.
Likewise, it is also equally well settled that if the land has been
purchased after issuance of notification under Section 4 and
declaration under Section 6 of the 1894 Act then such a purchaser
does so at his own perils. Such an alienation would not bind the
Government or the beneficiary under the acquisition. Therefore, we
find that there is no substance in the argument that the acquisition is
vitiated on account of non-issuance of notice under Section 38 of the
Act or under Section 9 of the 1894 Act, to petitioner Nos. 5 to 9.
They did not have any right as they are transferee after issuance of
notification under Sections 36 and 42 of the Act, which are equivalent
to Sections 4 and 6 of the 1894 Act.
31. It is well settled that notice could be issued under
Section 9 of the 1894 Act to the recorded owner. In that regard
reliance may be placed on the judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme
Court in the case of Union of India v. Pramod Gupta, (2005) 12
SCC 1. It has been observed that ‘service of notice upon the recorded
C.W.P. No. 19446 of 2002 23
persons whose names appear in the revenue records only would sub-
serve the purpose for which notice is required to be served. In the
present case notices on petitioner Nos. 1 to 4 have been issued who
were recorded as owners. The others acquired rights after sanction of
the scheme on 22.11.2000. Even otherwise non-issuance of notice
under Section 9 of the Act does not vitiate the acquisition
proceedings as has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the
case of Nasik Municipal Corporation v. Harbanslal Laikwant
Rajpal, (1997) 4 SCC 199.
32. The judgments cited by the learned counsel for the
petitioners in the case of Gurdev Singh (supra) and Jodh Singh
(supra) have no application to the facts of the present case because in
those cases transfer of the acquired land did not take place after
issuance of notification under Section 42 of the Act or declaration
under Section 6 of the 1894 Act. Therefore, no detailed examination
of the aforementioned judgments would be necessary. Accordingly,
the second question is also answered against the petitioners.
33. For the reasons aforementioned, this petition fails and
the same is dismissed.
(M.M. KUMAR)
JUDGE
(SABINA)
November 26, 2008 JUDGE
Pkapoor