JUDGMENT
L. Narasimha Reddy, J.
1. This Transfer C.M.P. is filed by the A.P. State Financial Corporation, seeking transfer of O.S. No. 56 of 2003 on the file of the Agent to the Government; and District Collector, Khammam, Respondent No. 3; to the Court of District Judge, Khammam.
2. The 1st respondent obtained loan from the petitioner for the purpose of establishing rice mill at Bandarugudem Village of Khammam District. On the ground that the 1st respondent did not repay the loan, petitioner exercised its rights under Section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), and claims to have effected the sale of the rice mill in favour of the 2nd respondent, on the basis of a tender, opened on 16-1-2003. The 1st respondent filed O.S. No. 56 of 2003, before the 3rd respondent, claiming the relief of declaration of his title; restoration of the possession of the rice mill, recovery of a sum of Rs. 5 lakhs, towards damages, and for grant of a perpetual injunction against the petitioner, 1st respondent and two others. The petitioner filed written statement, and the suit is pending disposal.
3. Sri Y.N. Lohita, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that several complicated questions of law are involved in the matter, and the 3rd respondent may not be in a position to adjudicate upon the same. He also attributes bias on the part of the 3rd respondent, particularly in the context of certain steps, that have been taken subsequent to the filing of the suit. He also contends that the 2nd respondent, who is the purchaser of the unit, is unable to run it, on account of non-co-operation on the part of various officials in the area. Learned Counsel further alleges that though the suit claim is valued at Rs. 28,50,000/-, no Court fee was paid, and the same indicates element of bias by the 3rd respondent in favour of the 1st respondent in entertaining the suit.
4. Sri V. Raghu, learned Counsel for the 1st respondent, on the other hand, submits that the suit was instituted before the 3rd respondent, in view of the specific provisions of the A.P. Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation, 1959, as amended by Regulation 1/70, (hereinafter referred to as “the Regulation). He contends that the suits, in respect of causes of action, arise in an agency area, cannot be tried by the regular Courts. He also contends that taking advantage of the innocence of the 1st respondent, the petitioner had acted in a very highhanded manner and flouted all the laws, which are in force in the agency area.
5. Petitioner advanced amount towards loan to the 1st respondent for the purpose of establishing a rice mill. The 1st respondent is a tribal, and the rice mill is situated in an agency area. The petitioner seized the rice mill on the ground that the 1st respondent committed default. It ultimately put the unit to sale through tender notice dated 27-12-2002. The 2nd respondent alone submitted his tender and the same was accepted.
6. Alleging that the unit was seized highhandedly with the collusion of some private individuals, the 1st respondent filed O.S. No. 56 of 2003 before the 3rd respondent. Under Section 4 of the Regulation, every suit against a member of a Scheduled Tribe (ST), shall be instituted only in the Court having jurisdiction over the agency tracts. The District Collectors, Agents to Government, and the Special Deputy Collectors, in the cadre of Revenue Divisional Officers, are conferred with the powers of the Courts to adjudicate upon the matters in relation to members of ST in the agency tracts. Not only the 1st respondent, the plaintiff in O.S. No. 56 of 2003, but also the 2nd respondent herein, the purchaser of the mill, impleaded as Defendant No. 5, belong to ST. The rice mill is situated in agency area. Section 4 of the Regulation reads as under:
“Suits against a member of a Scheduled Tribe to be instituted in the Agency Courts:–Notwithstanding anything contained in any enactment, rule or law in force in the Agency tracts, every suit against a member of a Scheduled Tribe instituted after the commencement of this Regulation shall be instituted only in the Court having jurisdiction over the Agency tracts.”
7. Section 4 imposes a total ban, on adjudication of such matters by any other Courts. The Regulations have overriding effect on any other law for the time being in force. An altogether different and special procedure is prescribed for adjudication of such suits of this category, be it, in the matter of attachment of immovable property, forum of appeal, or revision, or nature of other proceedings. In that view of the matter, even if there existed any basis for the petitioner to seek transfer of the suit to any other Court, it is not permissible to transfer it to a Court, than the one which is conferred with the jurisdiction over agency tracts.
8. On behalf of the petitioner, it is contended that the suit involves complicated questions of law and the Agent to the Government may not be in a position to adjudicate upon them effectively.
9. It is not uncommon that powers of adjudication, which are otherwise exercisable by the Courts of law, are conferred upon specialized agencies, depending on the nature, or residence of parties, subject-matter of proceedings etc. Conditions and situations prevailing in agency tracts, are invariably different from those obtaining in the rest of the areas. In view of the typical lifestyle, innocence and backwardness of the persons residing in agency tracts, special provisions have been made to protect them by the Governments, be it, before or subsequent to independence. The matters in relation to such areas need to be dealt with on considerations, different from those in relation to the other areas. For example, transfer of lands in the agency tracts is prohibited under Section 3 of the Regulation. In view of the special status conferred upon the STs under the Constitution of India, such provisions were upheld.
10. It is not as if the petitioner averse or alien to exercise of adjudicatory powers by an agency other than a Court. By advancing amounts to various industrialists, the petitioner assumes the character of a moneylender, and where the properties of borrower are mortgaged with it, it becomes a mortgagee. In the ordinary course of things, if the persons, or agencies, who borrowed the amount from the petitioner, fail to repay, suits are required to be filed to recover the amount. It is only when a decree is passed, that execution proceedings can be initiated to effect attachment and sale of the properties offered as security for repayment. The petitioner has to figure as plaintiff and hereinafter as decree holder.
11. Under Section 29 of the Act, the petitioner, which is a lender, is conferred with the power of adjudicator, equivalent to passing a decree and to execute the decree. In the present case itself, the petitioner had exercised such powers and brought about the sale of the unit of the 1st respondent. It is rather curious that, having exercised the powers of a Court, not even being an administrator, but only a financier, the petitioner takes exception to institution of the suits before the 3rd respondent under Regulation made under the Constitution. If the submission of the petitioner that the 3rd respondent may not be in a position to exercise adjudicatory powers effectively, is extended to its logical end, the exercise of powers by the petitioner under Section 29 of the Act, in various cases, or at least, in the present case, deserved to be treated as an imperfect. For this reason, it is rather derogatory on the part of the petitioner to have doubted the capacity of the 3rd respondent to adjudicate upon the matter.
12. The petitioner contends that the bias exhibited by the 3rd respondent in favour of the 1st respondent can be discerned from the fact that no Court fee was collected, though the suit is valued at Rs. 28,50,000/-. The learned Counsel for the 1st respondent has categorically pleaded that the Government had issued orders granting exemption from payment of Court fee in the suits filed in the agency tracts. This is not disputed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. It is also contended that the officials of the Revenue Department in the area are not permitting the 2nd respondent to run the rice mill. If at all any one, it is the 2nd respondent, who should have any grievance about it. The fact that the petitioner is canvassing on behalf of the 2nd respondent, would only lend support to the allegations of the 1st respondent about collusion etc.
13. The learned Counsel further submits that though a Division Bench of this Court directed disposal of the suit within three months, the petitioner had obtained an order of stay in this case and stalled the progress in the suit.
14. Under these circumstances, no case is made out for transfer of the suit O.S. No. 56 of 2003 on the file of the 3rd respondent to the Court of the District Judge, Khammam. The Transfer CMP is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.