ORDER
Saldanha, J.
1. The two petitioners were Officers of the respondent-1 Company and it is alleged that pursuant to an accident that took place at Gujarat on 22.4.1985 that they were deputed there in connection with a certain inspection with direction that they were to submit a report. Briefly stated, it is alleged that subsequent to this, it was necessary for the respondent-Company to take certain corrective action and that the conduct of the petitioners in the course of these subsequent developments is alleged to have given rise to certain disciplinary proceedings. In sum and substance, what is alleged against the petitioners is that while the question of placing orders for certain spare parts were concerned, that they had done so in a manner that was extremely prejudicial to the interest of the Company. It was therefore concluded by the Company that the petitioner have betrayed a total lack of integrity, that they have been guilty of serious disloyalty against the Company and that consequently, they had opened themselves for disciplinary action. What proceeded thereafter may be summarized in so far as charge-sheets were issued to both the petitioners and an enquiry proceeding was instituted. At the conclusion of the enquiry, the two petitioners were held guilty of acts of serious misconduct and the Disciplinary Authority who is the Managing Director of Company thereafter considered the entire material placed before him and recorded a finding that the two petitioner were liable to be dismissed from service. The petitioners thereafter filed appeals to the Board of Directors and the Board rejected their appeals. It is against this last order that the petitioners have filed the present petitions. Essentially, the petitioners have assailed the validity of the appellate order dated 11th September 1986, which in the case of the two petitioners is set-out at Annexures R-1 and R-2 to the petition.
2. Mr. U. L. Narayana Rao, the learned Counsel representing the petitioner has argued at considerable length and had initially contended that the charges themselves were groundless. He has attacked the charge-sheet on the ground of vagueness and he has also assailed the evidence that was led in the course of the enquiry. Learned counsel has also found fault with the procedure adopted and contended that it is vulnerable to challenge. He has thereafter submitted that the punishment was too harsh because according to him, the charges themselves have not been established and lastly, he contended that the Appellate Authority who ought to have carefully examined all the contentions that had been put forward, has disposed of the appeal through a short order which does not disclose any independent reasons whatsoever. Cumulatively therefore, what is submitted is that the orders dated 11th September 1986, which have culminated in the removal of the petitioners from service ought to be quashed. As a necessary consequence, the petitioners have prayed for an order of reinstatement with whatever other reliefs, such an order is passed.
3. On the other hand, Mr. Udaya Holla has sought to stoutly defend the ultimate order of dismissal because he submits that the petitioners were responsible Officers of the Company and that the essence of loyalty and integrity which are the fundamental requisites for their retention in service were totally absent as far as the conduct of the two petitioners were concerned. It is the submission of the learned Counsel that the instances on the basis of which the petitioners have been charge-sheeted cannot be lightly dismissed in so far as it clearly shows that while they were Officers of the Company their interest lay elsewhere and that this has been more than fully and adequately demonstrated. He therefore submitted that the action on the part of the Company was fully justified and he has referred to various parts of the record in support of his contention that the procedure adopted was unassailable. He thereafter proceeds to submit that if the misconduct was serious and if it is fully established, then the punishment of dismissal was perfectly justified. Mr. Holla has relied very heavily on the order of the Disciplinary Authority in this case. He submits that this order has embarked on a complete and careful examination of the entire record and have given very cogent reasons for the extreme penalty being imposed. According to the learned Counsel, when the Board, which is the Appellate Authority, was faced with this back ground and with the record of this type, all that is required on the part of the Board was to review the record in the light of the contentions raised by the petitioner in the appeal and if the Disciplinary Authority’s order was still unassailable, to uphold the same. Mr. Holla defends the appellate order principally on the ground that according to him, the duty of the Appellate Authority is virtually one of review or reconsideration because the entire case has been concluded at an earlier point of time. In an instance where different view is liable to be taken, according to the learned Counsel, it would be necessary to set out elaborate reasons but he submits that where the appellate Authority concurs with the Disciplinary Authority, no elaborate reasons are required to be set out particularly in case where the original gounds for the punishment and the original reasoning can be fully defended. Therefore, he submits that as long as the Appellate Authority has set out in its order that there has been due application of mind an that the case has been carefully considered in all relevant aspects, that no interference is warranted from this Court.
4. In the view that it is necessary for this Court to take, I have deliberately refrained from setting out elaborate details in relation to the record of the case for the reason that the last submission canvassed by the petitioner’s learned Counsel was that the appellate order which is the ultimate order on the basis of which the dismissal order took effect, is assailable on the ground that it is a non-speaking order and that consequently, the petitioners are justified in law in praying for a relief that the appellate order to be quashed on the ground that it is a will settled principle of service jurisprudence that a non-speaking order would necessarily fail on the ground of non-application of mind. It is true that Mr. Holla has attempted, and admirably so, to defend the appellate order and I have briefly set out his first submission namely, that according to learned Counsel where the appellate order is sought to attacked on the ground that it concurs with the Disciplinary Authority’s order, it is the previous order namely that of the Disciplinary Authority which will have to be examined and which will have to be faulted. He therefore, insisted that this Court must adjudicate on the validity or otherwise of the Disciplinary Authority’s order and if it is satisfied than the order is sustainable, de hors the fact that no independent reason have been set out by the Appellate Authority, that no interference would be justified. In support of this contention, Mr. Holla has advanced a familiar example of a situation where the Appellate Authority after a complete consideration of the appeal comes to the conclusion that Disciplinary Authority’s order is faultless and where according to Mr. Holla, the addition of any grounds or new reasons or material would be superfluous. Mr. Holla also pointed out that a distinction will have to be drawn between a similar situation in judicial proceedings and what happens in Service Law and he stated that the Board of Directors of the Company are admittedly laymen and the only duty cast upon them by law was to re-examine in the course of the appeal the correctness both on facts and in law of the earlier decision. In the present case according to Mr. Holla, nobody could have found fault with the Disciplinary Authority’s order and he argued that as per that order he will be in a position to demonstrate to this Court that the order was right up to the point of quantum and punishment and is wholly and fully defensible. I refrain from making any observation with regard to this head of arguments because to may mind, the appellate orders passed in the present case are liable to be quashed. In that event, what subsequently follows is that the option in law may be open to the respondent-1 Company to reconsider the appeal de novo from that stage onwards. The advisability or otherwise of doing so is left open to the petitioners to advance their contention with regard to whether at all at this point of time even if such a course of action is technically open, whether it should be permitted.
5. The position in law is well crystalised in so far as under the scheme of Service Law, where a Court is concerned with the imposition of a major penalty such as removal from service, dismissal etc., which has been likened in the context of the employment situation in this Country, virtually to economic death, the punishment order is necessarily subject to an appeal. Even under Criminal Law, extreme penalty is subject to confirmation by the High Court and the identical position arises under Service Law in cases where a major penalty has been imposed. This duty is not to be loosely construed nor will Court be justified in upholding a situation where an Appellate Authority passes a stereo-typed order which mechanically states that the record has been looked at and examined or for that matter where the usual phrase appears “having carefully applied my mind”. A recital of the requirements of law and reproduction of facts will not be sufficient for a Court to hold that in fact the Appellate Authority has done what is merely stated in that order. It is not required of me to reproduce in elaborate detail the string of cases decided by the Supreme Court and the various High Courts of this Country because the position in law is now very clear namely, that the order passed by the Appellate Authority is a complete and independent order which must be capable of being sustained on it own footing and not by virtue of the earlier orders or by subsequent padding up that may be done in the course of the filing of Affidavits in judicial proceedings. The Courts have to take cognisance of the fact that imposition of a major penalty is something grave, the consequences to the employee disastrous and in these situations, a heavy responsibility is cast on the Appellate Authority which cannot under any circumstances be abdicated. If there has been due consideration of the record, which in this case runs into a couple of hundred pages excluding the earlier orders passed, I do not see what the difficulty was on the part of the Board or whosoever drafted out the order on their behalf to have set out specifically though very precisely the grounds on which the Appellate Authority held that the charge was proved and that the punishment was justified. The functions of the Appellate Authority are not to be confused or equated with the earlier stages of the proceedings. Invariably, Service Law requires that the Appellate forum be a relatively high powered Authority. It must also be understood that the appeal is an independent and distinct stage. Once this position in law is accepted, it will have to be held that the appellate order will have to be a self-sustained order and can never be justified as being the extension of the Disciplinary Authority’s order.
6. On the facts of the resent case, I find that there are recitals to the effect that the Board had considered the material placed before it. There are also recitals to the effect that the earlier orders had been looked into. Besides these recitals, there is no material whatsoever on record from which this Court can come to the conclusion that the Appellate Authority has examined the record and that therefore, it independently concurred with the findings and conclusion of the Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority. One of the salient aspects that arise in cases of the present type is that the question with regard to the quantum of punishment. The Appellate Authority which considers the record carefully and applies its mind to it is required to consider also this aspect of the matter. In the present order, there is not a word with regard to this most crucial aspect of the case. In sum and substance therefore, despite the fact that Mr. Holla learned appearing on behalf of the respondents has argued at great length, that the Court should not go by the mere letter of the appellate order but that the Court should read into it the substance of the action, I am unable to uphold the argument in question. If such an arguments were to be upheld, the consequences will be dangerous in so far as even in cases where there is no application of mind, a mechanical recital of what is stated in the appellate orders in these cases would be used as a justification and the Court would be asked to impose faith in the Appellate Authority’s statement that if had in fact applied its mind. Fortunately, the position in law is otherwise and it will have to be therefore concluded that in the absence of adequate, proper and cogent reasons and in the absence of a correct speaking order, that this Court will have to conclude that there is no legal application of mind in the present cases and consequently, the appellate orders dated 11.9.1986 will have to be quashed.
7. The petitions accordingly succeed and the appellate orders passed against the petitioners dated 11.9.1986, are set aside. At this stage, Mr. Holla on behalf of the respondents advanced one more submission. He relied on the analogy in Judicial Proceedings where a Court may set aside an appellate order of the lower Court on the ground that there has been no application of mind and Mr. Holla submitted that in these circumstances, the High Court invariably remands the matter to the lower Appellate Court for a de novo consideration of the appeal from that stage of the proceedings. He therefore submitted that in the present cases, the same position should apply in so far as even if the appellate order were to be set aside that the matter may be remanded to the Appellate Authority even if it is on a time bound basis, for a de novo consideration of the appeals and that no consequent relief should be granted. This prayer has been opposed by the petitioners who contend that once the appellate order is quashed, they are ispo facto entitled to the consequential reliefs. They have also submitted that once the appellate order is quashed, that there is no ground for remand.
8. The principles adopted by the Courts in respects of Judicial matters are not necessarily a pointer with regard to an order which this Court is required to pass while deciding Service Proceedings. The human factor involved is also paramount in these Cases and under these circumstances therefore, though I have quashed the appellate orders, I do not propose to pass any order remanding the matter to the Appellate Authority for a de novo consideration. I have stated earlier that if the Authorities after a consideration of the case desire to re-open the appeal, that the petitioners are entitled to raise whatever objections in law that they are entitled to with regard to that aspect of the matter. As of now however, once the appellate order is quashed, it necessarily follows that the two petitioners will have to be reinstated in service and that they would be entitled to the back wages and other benefits including continuity of service as a necessary consequence of their success in these petitions.
9. The petitions accordingly succeed. Rule is made absolute in both cases to the extent indicated by me in this judgment; on the facts of these cases, there shall be no order as to costs.
10. At this stage, Mr. Holla points out to me that the question with regard to the payment of back wages for this long period of time is an independent issue. The petitioners will have to demonstrate that they had no sources of income whatsoever during this period in order to qualify for it whereas the Company is entitled, if there is material available to it to dispute this position. The petitioners Counsel has contended that the order for payment of back wages is automatic and that therefore, it is unnecessary for this issue to be kept open. In this connection, she has relied on a decision of this Court reported in R. A. Bhat v. Syndicate Bank, 1989 (3) Kar. L.J. 386. I have gone through the decision in question, which does not apply to the facts of the present case. The quashing or setting aside or a punishment order does not automatically entitle the employee to payment of full back wages though he may be entitled to the full or part thereof provided the facts justify and he makes out a case for the same. Under these circumstances, it is clarified that the issue with regard to the payment of back wages is kept open and petitioners can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Company if they so desire that they are entitled to the receipt of full back wages. In such an event, the Company will decide the matter on the basis of the material place before it.