JUDGMENT
R.J. Shah, J.
1. Being aggrieved by the judgment and Order dated 9-6-1988 passed by a learned single Judge of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 2772 of 1988, (Reported in 1988 (2) GLR 1273) the appellants-original petitioners have come in appeal.
2. The facts leading to the appeal briefly stated are as under:
The Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation is governed by the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949. Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 were duly elected Mayor and Deputy Mayor of the said Corporation for the year 1987-88 for a period of one year. Since their term of office was to end after the said period, respondent No. 3 in exercise of the powers vested in him under Sub-clause (c) of Clause (1) of Chapter II of Annexure A of the said Act convened a meeting of the Corporation to be held at 5-00 p.m. on 1-6-1988. Respondent No. 3 bad claimed that since he was required to go to Gandhinagar and Ahmedabad for urgent work, respondent No. 3 by his letter dated 31-5-1988 informed the Deputy Secretary to instruct the Secretary Mr. Acharya to postpone the meeting. Accordingly Secretary Mr. Acharya issued a circular informing the postponement of the meeting scheduled to be held on 1-6-1988. It is claimed by the respondents that the said notice was served on members either personally or by delivery of the notice at their residence, after obtaining signatures. In view of the said notice and circular postponing the meeting scheduled to be held on 1-6-1988, out of 51 Corporators, 32 Corporators did not remain present and the Secretary and the Officers of the Corporation also in the said circumstances did not remain present on 1-6-1988. Nevertheless, 19 Corporators of the opposite party remained present and held the election of Mayor and Deputy Mayor and in that election, the appellants herein were elected as Mayor and Deputy Mayor. When the present appellants asserted that they should be allowed to function as Mayor and Deputy Mayor, they were not allowed to function by respondents Nos. I to 4, nor did respondents Nos. 3 and 4 hand over charge to the appellants as Mayor and Deputy Mayor. In the aforesaid circumstances, the appellants had approached this Court by the above Special Civil Application, praying inter alia for issuance of a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ to quash and set aside the action of the respondent authorities adjourning the said meeting which was scheduled to be held on 1-6-1988 by virtue of the circular dated 1-6-1988, annexed to the petition, contending that it was illegal and contrary to the provisions of law. The appellants had further prayed in the said petition for directing the respondents, their agents and servants, to permit the appellants to hold the post of Mayor and Deputy Mayor respectively of the said Corporation and co-operate as such in all respects. There are consequential prayers also, including the one for a direction that the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 should vacate the office of the Mayor and Deputy Mayor respectively. The learned single Judge of this Court was pleased to reject the said petition, as stated above. Hence the present appeal.
3. Appellant No. 1 has argued in person the case of the appellants before us. The first contention raised by him is that respondents were not right in adjourning the convened meeting, as they have done, and the aforesaid action being unauthorised and illegal, should be declared as such and the appellants should be given reliefs accordingly. It has also been contended on behalf of the appellants that their own action of holding the meeting at the scheduled time and place should be held legal and all that was transpired at the said meeting held by them should be upheld and all consequential relief should be granted to the appellants.
4. In support of their case, appellants have put reliance on the decision in the case of Chandrakant Khaira v. Dr. Shantaram Kale and Ors. . In the above case, the facts in brief were that in the first meeting of the Corporation, which was scheduled, there was total confusion and bedlam inside the meeting hall apart from the fact that the entire atmosphere was surcharged with commotion and no business could be transacted and the Municipal Commissioner had merely suspended the proceedings till peace was restored and accordingly he announced on the mike that the proceedings would be resumed after 45 minutes for transacting the business for the day. It could not be said that the first meeting of the Municipal Corporation fixed by the Municipal Commissioner for that date was “adjourned for the day” or “adjourned sine die”. It had only been put off to a later hour i.e. the proceedings had only been suspended to recommence when peace and order were restored. Thus, before the Supreme Court the facts were not that any convened meeting was sought to be adjourned prior to the scheduled time of the meeting and before the meeting actually assembled. The Supreme Court, however, has held in paragraph 17 of the judgment as under:
A properly convened meeting cannot be postponed. The proper course to adopt is to hold the meeting as originally intended, and then and there adjourn it to a more suitable date. If this course be not adopted, members will be entitled to ignore the notice for postponement, and, if sufficient to form a quorum, hold the meeting as originally convened and validly transact the business thereat. Even if the relevant rules do not give the Chairman power to adjourn the meeting, he may do so in the events of disorder. Such an adjournment must be for no longer than the Chairman considers necessary and the Chairman must, as far as possible, communicate his decision to those present.
It is to be noticed that the Supreme Court has ruled that a properly convened meeting, that is to say, a properly summoned meeting, cannot be postponed. The Supreme Court has further laid down that the proper course to adopt is to hold the meeting as originally intended which would mean that before the meeting is actually held as originally intended, neither the Chairman nor the President nor anyone else could postpone such a convened or summoned meeting. The Supreme Court has further laid down that in the meeting which is held as scheduled, the same could be adjourned for a more suitable date then and there. The aforesaid would, therefore, show that any adjournment of a convened or summoned meeting can only take place after such a meeting is held as originally intended and not at any time prior to the same by any authority whatsoever. The Supreme Court has further stated that if the said course, namely, to hold the meeting as originally intended and then and there to adjourn it to a more suitable date, was not adopted, then the members would be entitled to ignore the notice of postponement and if sufficient to form a quorum hold the meeting “as originally convened and validly transact the business thereat. The aforesaid clearly points in the direction that neither the Chairman nor the President also, nor the Chairman or the President with the consent of the majority of Councillors had the power to postpone such a convened or summoned meeting before it was actually held. What is required to be noticed is that it would be of no avail whatsoever if a properly convened or summoned meeting is sought to be adjourned by the Chairman or the President or the Mayor with the concurrence of majority of Councillors before such a meeting is actually held as originally intended. The Supreme Court has also made it clear that when the meeting as originally intended is actually held, then even if the relevant Rules do not give the Chairman power to adjourn the meeting, the Chairman may do so in the event of disorder, but such an adjournment must be for no longer than he considers necessary and the Chairman must so far as possible communicate his decision to those present. These last observations of the Supreme Court would point in the direction that the Chairman even if the Rules do not provide for empowering him to adjourn the meeting, could do so in the event of disorder, meaning thereby that the Chairman in the meeting itself has the power to adjourn it in the event of disorder without even consulting the Councillors present at the said meeting. All that is necessary when the Chairman exercises such power when such a meeting is actually held is to communicate his decision regarding adjournment to a suitable date to those Councillors who are present at such a meeting which is actually held.
5. In this connection, it is necessary to refer to Article 141 of the Constitution, which provides as under:
The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India.
6. This Article empowers the Supreme Court to “declare the law” and not enact it. Statements on matters other than “law”, for example, facts, have no binding force, for the facts of no two cases would be similar. What is binding is the ratio of the decision and not any finding on facts, or the opinion of the Court on any question, which was not required to be decided in a particular case. So far as obiter dicta is concerned, an obiter dictum is an observation by a Court on a legal question suggested by a case before it, but not arising in such manner as to require decision. It is not binding as a precedent because the observation was unnecessary for the decision pronounced by the Court.
7. All that is, therefore, necessary is that a point should directly and specifically be in issue before the Supreme Court and once it is so, the decision of the Supreme Court on the said point would be the law declared by the Supreme Court and is, therefore, binding on all the Courts within the territory of India. When viewed from that angle, in the said Supreme Court decision the point was directly and specifically in issue to the effect as to when a properly convened or summoned meeting could be postponed and in what manner such a meeting could be postponed. The Supreme Court has clearly provided an answer to the said point, which was directly and specifically before it, in the said decision by observing as aforesaid in paragraph 17 of the judgment.
8. When one attempts to apply the said ratio laid down by the Supreme Court to the facts of present case, one finds as under :
In view of the said notice and circular postponing the meetings scheduled to be held on 1-6-1988, out of 51 Corporators, 32 Corporators did not remain present when the said meeting was actually held by 19 Corporators at the appointed time and place on 1-6-1988. The Secretary and the Officers of the Corporation also did not remain present on 1-6-1988 because of the said circular postponing the meeting scheduled to be held on 1-6-1988. The aforesaid 19 Corporators, however, held the election of Mayor and Deputy Mayor and in that meeting, the appellants herein were elected as Mayor and Deputy Mayor. The minutes of the said meeting were accordingly recorded at the said time and place. The business that was transacted in the said meeting held by the said 19 Corporators was as per the Agenda of the said meeting, which was held as aforesaid. Since the appellants were not allowed to function despite the aforesaid undisputed facts, they had filed the aforesaid petition. The question, therefore, is as to whether the postponement of the said meeting in the aforesaid manner was legal and valid and if not what would be the reliefs that could be given in the present petition.
9. From the aforesaid undisputed facts, it is clear that Mayor had attempted to postpone the said meeting, which was properly convened or summoned before it was actually held. By virtue of the said circular, it is clear that the said meeting was adjourned before it was actually held at the appointed time and place. It is, therefore, clear that the Supreme Court’s ruling in the aforesaid decision was not followed in the matter of adjourning the convened or summoned meeting. Even if such a meeting was adjourned by the Mayor in the aforesaid manner with the consent of the majority of the Councillors, the same could not have made any difference as the legality and validity of the action of adjournment did not depend upon the fact as to whether it was done by the Mayor with or without the consent of the majority of the Councillors. It depended only on the fact whether the same was sought to be adjourned prior to the holding of the actual meeting which was properly convened or summoned, or it was sought to be adjourned after the same was held at the appointed time and place. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is undisputed that the convened or summoned meeting was sought to be adjourned in the manner aforesaid prior to its being actually held. Such a course could not have been adopted according to law and according to the ratio laid down in the aforesaid Supreme Court decision and, therefore, the conclusion is irresistible that the convened or summoned meeting was not adjourned according to law and in keeping with the ratio in the aforesaid Supreme Court decision. The appeal should, therefore, have been allowed on this score alone and without more. For reaching such a conclusion, we consider it unnecessary to enter into a discussion about the truthfulness Or otherwise of the reasons claimed by the Mayor for adjourning the aforesaid properly convened or summoned meeting. We also do not find it necessary for reaching the above conclusion to take into consideration that the said circular does not state the specific reasons for adjourning the meeting; that it vaguely mentions and states unavoidable circumstances; that it does not state that it is with the consent of majority of Councillors; that it is because of the Mayor’s order that the Secretary has issued the said circular; that it does not state on what date the said meeting was adjourned; that is looked as if the said meeting was adjourned sine die; and that it was, therefore, vague as well as arbitrary.
10. Mr. Vakharia, learned Advocate for the respondents, has vehemently argued before us that the Mayor had the power and authority to adjourn such a meeting. In support of the said submission, Mr. Vakharia has put reliance on the decision dated 20-11-1974 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 183 of 1974 rendered by a Division Bench of this Court. The said Letters Patent Appeal arose from a decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Babubhai Girdharbhai Patel v. Manibhai Ashabhai Patel and Ors. [1975] 16 GLR 566. In that reported case, an important question relating to the convening of a statutory ordinary general meeting of a municipality constituted under the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963, namely, whether the President of a Municipality having convened a meeting has the power to cancel or adjourn the meeting unilaterally before the Councillors assemble at the appointed hour without the consent or against the wishes of the Councillors, at his pleasure, acting on his own, fell for consideration in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India at the instance of a Councillor of Anand Municipality.
11. The facts in the said case were that by a notice dated 15-1-1974 the President of the Anand Municipality issued a notice convening a meeting to transact 46 items of business specified in the notice, Annexure A. The meeting was convened for 24-1-1974. Two days before the scheduled date of meeting i.e. on 22-1-1974, the President of the Municipality issued a notice informing the Councillors that having regard to the situation obtaining in the City, the meeting scheduled to take place on 24-1-1974 would take place on 5-2-1974. On 5-2-1974 the District Magistrate issued an order under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prohibiting the assembly and movement of more than five persons within the specified locality. By this order, the members of the public were restrained from entering the municipal office premises, but it was clarified that the order would not apply to municipal Councillors and municipal employees. The District Magistrate also made it clear that curfew permits would be issued to the Municipal Councillors and to the employees in order to enable them to assemble at the meeting scheduled to take place at 4-00 p.m. on that day. At about 2-00 p.m. on the day of meeting, the President of the Municipality took a mental decision to postpone the meeting and issued a circular addressed to the Municipal Councillors. At the material time, there were 35 elected Councillors. Out of them 20 Councillors refused to endorse or take cognizance of the circular addressed by the President to them giving intimation as regards the postponement of the meeting. At 4-00 p.m. at the appointed hour, 20 Councillors assembled in the lobby of the municipal hall. The President and 14 other Councillors were not present. As the President was absent, Vice-President presided at the meeting. The meeting took place as scheduled at 4-00 p.m. Several items of business, including the business of electing the executive committee and various other committees were transacted at the meeting. Thus, the 20 Councillors who were present elected the members of various committees notwithstanding the fact that President and 14 others were absent. The petitioner, who was one of the absentee Councillors, bad challenged the legality and validity of the business transacted at the meeting of 5-2-1974 inter alia claiming a declaration that the business transacted at the meeting of 5-2-1974 was illegal and unauthorised and that the meeting was not a duly constituted meeting. He had also claimed for an appropriate writ restraining the respondents from treating the business transacted at the meeting as valid. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it was held inter alia that on a plain reading of Sub-section (11) of Section 51 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963, it was evident that a general meeting could be adjourned only provided the majority of the Councillors present accorded their consent to such adjournment. The Legislature has envisaged and anticipated numerous situations and had made a provision for almost all conceivable situation in the Act itself. If, therefore, no provision was made in regard to unilateral cancellation by the President of a statutory ordinary general meeting, once it is convened, such a power could not be presumed or deemed to exist. It was also held that it was possible to visualise a situation where on account of an emergency or in view of extraordinary circumstances it became physically impossible for the Councillors of a municipality to assemble at the appointed hour at the appointed place, then meeting would have to be abandoned. If the Councillors could physically remain present and if the situation so demanded the meeting could be adjourned as contemplated by Sub-section (11) of Section 51 with the consent of the majority. It was also held that it was not possible to accede to the argument mat the President could cancel or adjourn the meeting if he personally considered it necessary to desire to do so before the Councillors assemble. The learned single Judge in that decision further held that assuming that such a power were to be presumed to exist, even then he could cancel or adjourn the meeting only with the express or implied consent of a majority of the Councillors. In terms, it has been held that it was reasonable to hold that the President did not have unrestricted power to cancel or adjourn a meeting at his humour or pleasure or caprice and that when the Act was silent and when there was no other provision which empowered the President to do so, it would be difficult to confer the power on the President to cancel the meeting by implication by resort to the theory of a power which was concommitent to a power to convene the meeting. It was also pointed out in the said case that it should be realised that to confer such a power by implication was to open the gates to arbitrariness and caprice; that it would also be against public policy to confer such power by implication by virtue of a theoretical doctrine that the power to convene a meeting includes the power to cancel a meeting; and that if that were so, the President would go on cancelling a notice convening a meeting from time to time and make it difficult for the Councillors to discharge their public duties. It has also been pointed out regarding Section 52 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act that it did nothing more than casting a duty or an obligation on the Chief Officer to remain present at the meeting and if the Chief Officer was unable to remain present or refused to remain present, it could have no impact on the validity of the meeting. Ultimately, the learned single Judge dismissed the petition filed by an absentee Councillor, who had challenged the legality and validity of the business transacted at the said meeting of 5-2-1974 and so in effect the learned single Judge held that the business transacted at the meeting of 5-2-1974 was legal and authorised and that the said meeting held by 20 Councillors who had assembled in the lobby of the municipal hall was a duly constituted meeting. Mr. Vakharia, however, was at pains to submit that the aforesaid Division Bench had not agreed with the learned single Judge on the aspect that the President had no power to adjourn such a meeting, which was convened before it was held. The said Division Bench in the said Letters Patent Appeal against the said judgment disagreeing with the learned single Judge came to the following conclusion:
We are, therefore, unable to agree with our learned Brother that the doctrine that he who had such power to convene a meeting has also the power to adjourn the meeting if the circumstances so demand, cannot be read into the provisions of the Gujarat Municipalities Act.
After observing as aforesaid, the Division Bench has further observed as under:
However, the fact that such a power is to be read by necessary implication and by inference does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the President of the Municipality has an unrestricted power to go on adjourning the meeting. Unless unusual circumstances beyond the control of the President of the Municipality prevail, he cannot utilise this power to adjourn a meeting which has once been notified. In the present instance, the President of the Municipality in the notice postponing the meeting of 5-2-1974 referred to the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of 5-2-1974. However, he adjourned the meeting indefinitely and sine the on the ground that the situation in Anand town had not yet improved between 24-1-1974 and 5-2-1974. A perusal of the order issued by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is Annexure ‘B’ to the petition, shows that it was only because of the tension prevailing between the two groups of Municipal Councillors that there was an apprehension of breach of the peace of law and order and it was to prevent an ugly situation arising because of this tension between the two groups of Municipal Councillors that the order under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure came to be issued. The order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate itself specifically says that it was not to apply to the Councillors of the Anand Municipality and to the Officers and servants of the said Municipality to whom permits had been issued either by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or by the Officer-in-charge of Anand Town Police Station. Thus, in the present case there was no apprehension of the Civil commotion or any general disturbance in Anand Town on 5-2-1974. The meeting of the Municipality was to be held at 4-00 p.m. on 5-2-1974 and on that day apprehending some breach of law and order and of peace, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate issued this order under Sec 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It, therefore, cannot be said that apart from a situation which might arise at the ordinary general meeting of the Municipality because of the tension between the two groups of Municipal Councillors, there was anything also in Anand Town on that day, which required the meeting of the Municipality to be adjourned. Exhibit ‘C to the petition is a copy of the notice issued by the President of the Municipality on 5-2-1974, adjourning the meet indefinitely and in this notice, he has specifically mentioned that in view of the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Anand issued on 5-2-1974, the situation in Anand Town had yet not improved and hence the meeting was being adjourned indefinitely. In our opinion, the objective fact, namely, prevalence or existence of circumstances outside the control of the Presiding authority and prevailing generally in the surrounding areas which would justify the adjournment of the meeting, was not in existence at the time when the President issued Annexure ‘C’ postponing the holding of the meeting. It seems to us that the power vested in the President of adjourning the meeting in unusual circumstances has in the instant case been exercised by him arbitrarily and capriciously and the circumstances which would justify the exercise of that power did not exist in this particular case. Hence, we agree with our learned Brother that the action of the President of the Municipality in adjourning the meeting of 5-2-1974 indefinitely was not valid in law and cannot be upheld.
In that view of the matter. Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed by the said Division Bench and the decision of the learned single Judge was upheld in all other respects.
As discussed above and in view of the Supreme Court decision, even the view of the said Division Bench in the said Letters Patent Appeal cannot advance the case of the respondents in the settings of the present case.
12. Moreover, the Division Bench has nowhere considered the aspect that a properly convened or summoned meeting can be considered as an abandoned meeting if the circumstances of a case so demand. Such a convened or summoned meeting cannot be adjourned before it is actually held even on the assumption that such an implied power to adjourn the meeting exists in the Mayor in view of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act.
Mr. Vakharia had also put reliance on the decision in the case of Mohd. Yunus Saleem v. Shivkumar Shastri and Ors. . This was a matter which arose under the provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The Supreme Court was examining inter alia one of the aspects, namely, whether the Election Commission had got power to alter the date of poll under Section 30 of the Act read with Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, which was undoubtedly applicable in interpretation of the provisions of the Act. After considering Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:
The Election Commission in this case exercised power under Section 30 of the Act and issued the notification appointing the various dates mentioned therein for the purposes specified. Once this power is conferred under Section 30 upon the Election Commission, the power to amend the same, which will include alteration of the dates of poll, can be exercised under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act There is, therefore, no merit in the contention that the Election Commission had no power or jurisdiction to alter the date of poll from 3rd March to 9th March 1971 in the remaining constituencies in this case.
Dealing with another submission made by the learned Counsel for the appellant in the said case that there should have been afresh notification of the date in Form No. 1 under Rule 3, read with Section 31 of the Act, of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961, the Supreme Court concluded that they were not impressed by the said submission as the amendment of the date of poll gets engrafted in the original form in pursuance of the subsequent notification dated 2-3-1971 made in valid exercise of the power under Section 30 of the Act read with Section 21 of the General Clauses Act.
13. We fail to see as to how the aforesaid decision helps the respondents in the present appeal. We have already stated hereinabove the real issues in the matter and the views of the Supreme Court as directly taken on similar contentions raised before it in the aforesaid decision. The question in the present case, as stated above, is as to when and in what circumstances a properly convened or summoned meeting could be adjourned. As stated above, a properly convened or summoned meeting could not have been adjourned by any authority before it assembled at the appointed time and place and so far as the power of the Mayor or the Chairman or the President in a meeting which is held pursuant to a properly convened meeting is concerned which could be exercised in the said meeting itself, the same has been properly covered by the aforesaid Supreme Court decision where it has been stated that even in the absence of any rule, the President or the Chairman or the Mayor could adjourn such meeting in the event of disorder and that too without even consulting the Councillors who are present in the said meeting.
Mr. Vakharia, learned Advocate for the respondents, has submitted that it is a practice of the Municipal Corporation that once the Mayor adjourns the meeting, the Corporators take it that it has been postponed for a future date. In this connection, he has put reliance on the affidavit of respondent No. 3 in petition No. 2772 of 1988. In the said affidavit of respondent No. 3, three instances have been cited in support of the said practice. Mr. Vakharia has also pointed out from the affidavit of respondent No. 5 that it is a consistent practice prevailing in the Corporation that the Mayor fixes the time, place and date of the meeting of the Corporation and that if due to any unavoidable reason the time, place and date are not convenient to the Mayor, he can postpone or cancel the meeting. Mr. Vakharia, however, has candidly admitted before us that there is not a single instance in the history of Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation where a meeting called for the purpose of electing a Mayor and Deputy Mayor has ever been adjourned. Thus, even the so-called practice does not cover such a meeting. Besides, in any event, any such practice cannot hold water when Supreme Court Rules that a properly convened or summoned meeting can never be adjourned before it is actually held.
14. In the view that we are taking of the matter, it is not necessary to consider mala fide the aspects as alleged by the appellants. Likewise, it is also totally unnecessary to consider in this judgment whether the letter addressed by the respondent No. 3 to Deputy Secretary Mr. Pandya dated 3-5-1988 is a forged one as alleged by the appellants.
The next question that arises for consideration is as to whether what was transacted in the said meeting which was actually held by 19 Corporators could be regarded as legal and valid. It is not in dispute that 19 Corporators were having the necessary quorum to transact business. It is not in dispute that they had actually held the meeting at the appointed time and place, which was properly convened or summoned. It is also not in dispute that they had transacted the business in the said meeting which was as per the agenda of the said meeting, which was convened or summoned. As per the said Supreme Court decision, it has, therefore, to be concluded that the business that was transacted in the said meeting which was actually held pursuant to the properly convened or summoned meeting was legal, valid and proper. We are aware that the resultant conclusion would be a little startling inasmuch as the party, which is in the majority in Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation, would not be having a Mayor or Deputy Mayor from its own party, but would have to suffer as Mayor and Deputy Mayor the persons who belong to the minority party. But such a result could not be helped because it seems to us that the majority of the Councillors who had given their consent to the postponement of the said meeting which was convened or summoned before it was actually held, had acted illegally and had thereby invited the said result, as they had presumed that the course that they had adopted was legal, proper and valid, even though it was otherwise, as stated above. It is hardly permissible to allow the hard facts of a case to make bad law.
15. In the result, this Letters Patent Appeal succeeds. The judgment and order dated 9-6-1988 passed in Special Civil Application No. 2772 of 1988 Reported in 1988 (2) GLR 1273 by the learned single Judge are set aside. The circular dated 1-6-1988, annexed to the petition as well as appeal, postponing the meeting is held to be illegal, unwarranted and arbitrary. All actions of the authorities concerned pursuant to the said circular are also declared to be illegal and unwarranted. It is further declared that the business transacted at the said meeting held on 1-6-1988 by 19 Corporators is legal, valid and binding on all concerned. It is also declared that the appellants have been validly elected as Mayor and Deputy Mayor of Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation and are therefore, entitled to act as such and so it is directed that the charge should be handed over to them as such. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the petition and the appeal succeed, as stated hereinabove. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
16. At this stage, Mr. Vakharia makes a request that the operation of the order that we have passed allowing the Letters Patent Appeal be stayed for a period of 8 weeks from today in order to enable the respondents to pursue the matter in the Supreme Court. The request is reasonable, but not in respect of time. At the same time, it has to be kept in mind that the term of the Mayor is for one year, from which already four or five months have expired. In that view of the matter, we are granting stay of the operation of this order for a period of four weeks from today. We make it clear that further extension of the stay will not be granted by this Court.