JUDGMENT
Dr. Couto, J.
1. These two revision applications will be disposed of by a common judgment, since the questions of law that gave rise to them and which are material for their disposal are the same.
2. The petitioner is a financial corporation governed by the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951. The respondents in both the revision applications approached the petitioners for financial assistance for the running of their industrial concerns and got, thereafter, some loans on the terms and conditions agreed upon with the petitioners. Some deeds of mortgage and hypothecation were signed and, in due course, the respondents defaulted. Therefore, the petitioners served on them notices on November 13, 1987, stating their intention to act upon the provisions of section 29 of the said Act and to take possession of the industrial concerns. It appears that, after the serving of the said notices, some negotiations took place but the respondents were unable to make payment of their dues. As such, a fresh notice was served on the respondent by the petitioners in February, 1988, stating that the petitioners would act on the basis of the clauses of the mortgage and hypothecation deeds as well as under the relevant provisions of the Act and would take possession of the industrial concerns for the purposes of realisation of the dues to them. They asked the respondents to make the payments due up to February 24, 1988, and in case of default, to hand over the industrial concerns on the 25th of the same month.
3. Before the expiry of the said date, the respondents filed a suit for a declaration, a permanent injunction and other reliefs in the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Ponda, and, at the same time, moved on application for a temporary injunction to restrain the petitioners from taking possession of their industrial concerns. The learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Ponda, dismissed the said applications for temporary injunction by his order dated May 16, 1988. Being aggrieved, the respondents moved the District Court in two separate appeals which were ultimately disposed of by the District Judge, Panaji, by two judgments dated March 31, 1989. It is against these judgments that the present revision applications were moved.
4. Mr. S. K. Kakodkar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, after inviting my attention to the provisions of sections 29, 31, 32 and 46B of the Act, submitted that the powers vested in the Financial Corporations under section 29 are entirely independent and separate from the powers given under section 31. Under the Act, the Corporation was given powers to act under section 29 and realise its dues directly without the intervention of the court or to approach the court under section 31 which is to be read with section 32. This clearly flows, according to learned counsel, from sub-section (1) of section 31 wherein it is stated that, without prejudice to the provision of section 29, any officer of the Financial Corporation may apply to the District Court for the reliefs mentioned therein. That apart, section 46B which deals with the effects of the Act on other laws provides that the provisions of the Act and of any rules or orders made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law in force or in the memorandum of association of any industrial concern or in any other instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than the Act. But the provisions of the Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any other law in force applicable to an industrial concern. According to learned counsel, it blows clearly from the wording of sections 29 and 31 that the remedies provided in law to a financial corporation to realise its dues are different and independent. Under section 29, the Corporation can directly take possession and also administer and sell the concern for the purposes of realising the dues to it. However, instead of acting under section 29, the Financial Corporation can, at its own option, act under section 31 and approach the District Court for the reliefs mentioned in sections 31 and 32. Learned counsel also urged that the provisions of section 31 of the Act are also without prejudice to the provisions of section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act wherever the said provisions are applicable. This being the position in law, the learned District Judge has erred in holding the view that the authorities of the Calcutta and Andhra Pradesh High Courts in Rose Potteries v. West Bengal Financial Corporation, and in Srinivasa Kandasari Sugars v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, , were not attracted as made on a totally different context or circumstances. He also was wrong in relying in the authority of the Allahabad High Court in Munnalal Gupta v. U. P. Financial Corporation, [FB], since the said decision stands only as regards a surety. What the Allahabad High Court held is that a Financial Corporation is not entitled to proceed directly under section 29 of the Act against a surety. It has to proceed under section 31. This is not at all a situation that occurs in the case before us. Learned counsel further urged that the law as laid down by the Calcutta and Andhra Pradesh High Courts in the authorities mentioned above reflects the unanimous view of the courts and, in this connection, he placed reliance also on the authorities of the Kerala High Court in Thressiamma Varghese v. Kerala State Financial Corporation, and K. Surendranathan v. Kerala Financial Corporation, . This being so and the petitioners having proposed to act under the powers vested in them by section 29 of the Act, it is obvious that there was no reason whatsoever for the learned District Judge to interfere with the orders of the trial court refusing the injunction. On the contrary, by interfering with these orders and by restraining the petitioners from acting in exercise of their powers under section 29, the District Judge has acted with material irregularity, if not illegality. The interference by this court in the exercise of its revisional powers is, therefore, required.
5. Mr. M. S. Usgaonkar, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, in all fairness, did not at all challenge the submission made by Mr. Kakodkar that sections 29 and 31 of the Act are entirely independent and different and separate powers are given to a Financial Corporation by each of those provisions of law. He, however, contends that the notice given to the respondents in February, 1988, disclosed that the petitioners had purported to act under the clauses of the mortgage/hypothecation deeds or, in other words, under section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act. The petitioners could not have acted under the said provision of law, since no notification was issued as required in clause (c) to sub-section (1) of section 69, enabling the petitioners to act directly without the intervention of the court. This being so, according to learned counsel, the only remedy left to the respondents to react against the proposed action of the petitioners was to file a suit and restrain them from acting by way of a temporary injunction. To make good the above submission, learned counsel took me through the contents of the notice and stated that it is clear that the petitioners intended to act only on the basis of clause X(1) of the mortgage deed, although in the notice, a reference is made also, in general, to the powers vested in the petitioners by the Act.
6. Replying to this submission made by learned counsel for the respondents, Mr. Kakodkar submitted that no notice was at all necessary to act under the provisions of section 29 of the Act. The powers were vested in the Financial Corporation in order to avoid inordinate delay in recovering public monies which are managed and administered by it. No statutory notice is required and nowhere in the Act, is it laid down that, prior to acting under the said section, the Corporation is bound to give a notice. If such notice was given, it was merely by courtesy, although the law did not require it. That apart, even if the notice can be found to some extent to be defective as the Corporation could not act under section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, the fact remains that, by virtue of section 46B of the Act, the powers of the Corporation under section 29 are in addition to powers which are conferred on it by other laws.
7. In view of the above rival contentions, it is not necessary for me to go into the question whether or not sections 29 and 31 of the Act confer separate and independent powers on a Financial Corporation. I may only say that the very wording of section 31 leaves no ground for any doubt in that respect and it becomes exceedingly clear that sections 29 and 31 are entirely independent and the Corporation is free at its option to act either under one or the other provision of law. But the question before me is completely different, namely, whether the notice given by the petitioners in February, 1988, enabled them to act under section 29. Mr. Usgaonkar took me through the said notice and he submitted that it becomes clear from the several paragraphs of the said notice that the petitioners purported to act under the clauses of the mortgage and hypothecation deeds. The reference to the provisions of the Act was made in a very casual manner and nowhere is the intention to act under section 29 stated. It is, therefore, the case of Mr. Usgaonkar that, since the intention of the petitioners was to act under the clauses of the mortgage and hypothecation deeds, i.e., under section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, it was not open to them to change their stand and come out in court with a case that they acted under the provisions of section 29 of the Act. It is rather difficult to accept the above submission of Mr. Usgaonkar. No doubt, on going through the said notice, one feels that the clauses of the mortgage and hypothecation deeds were very much present in the mind of the petitioners, but it is also clear that they were fully alive to the rights vested in them by section 29 of the Act. The references to the mortgage and hypothecation deeds and to their clauses, apparently, were made only to give the history of the case. However, the petitioners made a plea that they purported to act not only under the clauses of the mortgage and hypothecation deeds but also under the provisions of the law. Now, it is well-settled that, if a party does not quote a provision of law under which he seeks relief, or if he misquotes a provision of the law, that omission to quote or misquotation will not disentitle him to the relief, if otherwise, the party is entitled to it. Section 69(1)(e) of the Transfer of Property Act is not at all attracted in the case, since no notification, as required, had been made. Therefore, the petitioners could never have acted under the said provision of law and realised their dues without the intervention of the court. The only other provision of law which permitted them to act directly without the intervention of the court is the provision of section 29 of the Act. Therefore, the aforesaid notices given by the petitioners to the respondents in February, 1988, are to be construed as notices communicating to the respondents the intention of the petitioners to act under section 29 of the Act. For this reason alone, the argument of Mr. Usgaonkar fails. That apart, Mr. Kakodkar seems to be correct in his submission that no notice is required to be served by a financial corporation before acting in the exercise of the rights vested in it by section 29 of the Act. At least, no provision exists in the Act requiring such notice to be given.
8. This being the case, it is obvious that the learned District Judge has erred in holding the view that it was not permissible to the petitioners to act without the intervention of the court. In so holding and accordingly granting the injunction in favour of the respondents, the learned District Judge, Panaji, acted with material irregularity in exercise of the jurisdiction vested in him.
9. The result, therefore, is that this revision application succeeds and, consequently, the impugned judgments dated March 31, 1989, are quashed and set aside. The injunction application filed by the respondents accordingly, stands, dismissed. Costs by the respondents.
10. Mr. Usgaonkar prays that the operation of the judgment just delivered be stayed for four weeks in order to enable the respondents to produce before the Corporation a purchaser for the industrial concerns. Mr. Kakodkar has no objection provided the respondents undertake not to challenge the judgment just passed in appeal or revision, if available to them.
11. Mr. Usgaonkar states that it is not possible for him to give the undertaking as required by Mr. Kakodkar.
12. In view of the above, the application of Mr. Usgaonkar is rejected.