JUDGMENT
Jasbir Singh, J.
1. By filing this writ petition, petitioners have prayed for issuance of writ in the nature of certiorari to quash orders Annexures P/1 to P/4.
2. Briefly, it is case of the petitioners that they had purchased land, in dispute, in the year 1961 from Dharam Vir son of Sant Ram, to whom land measuring 53 kanals 14 marlas was allotted in lieu of land left by him in west Pakistan. He was a permanent allottee and on the basis of allotment made to him, mutation was sanctioned before 1950 in his favour and he was shown, in the revenue record as owner of the property, allotted to him. In due course of time, proprietary rights were also conferred upon him by the competent authority between 1955 and 1957. In the meantime, Sant Ram died leaving behind Dharam Vir, his son, as his legal heir. After death of Sant Ram, land referred to above, was mutated in the name of his son Dharam Vir. In the year 1961, vide different sale deeds, petitioners/their predecessor in interest had purchased 50 kanals of land from said Dharam Vir against valuable consideration. Before purchase of land, all possible enquiries were made by the petitioners, regarding title of Dharam Vir, in the land, in dispute. Having satisfied that he was lawful owner of the property, the same was purchased by the petitioners. After purchase, huge amount was spent on levelling/development of land and thereafter, petitioners had constructed their houses and shops by spending an amount of Rs.14 to Rs. 15 lacs. They were in peaceful possession when suddenly, a suo-moto reference, for cancellation of land was made on 17.7.1978 by respondent No. 3 on the ground that land allotted to deceased Sant Ram was in excess to his entitlement. Respondent No. 2 accepted that reference vide order date 24.10.1978. Formal order cancelling allotment, was passed by respondent No. 2 on 21,1.1979. Petitioners, feeling aggrieved, filed an application under Section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (in short, ‘the Act’), challenging orders, referred to above. However, their application was dismissed by respondent No.l vide order dated 15.6.1983. Hence, this writ petition.
3. Shri M.L. Sarin, Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Harpreet Singh Giani Advocate, appearing for the petitioners, has vehemently contended that the orders passed, deserve to be set aside on account of huge delay, after which, reference was initiated, to cancel excess allotment of land to Sant Ram. He further argued that the petitioners, being bona fide purchasers, for consideration, were entitled to get benefit of provisions of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. He prayed that writ petition be allowed and orders under challenge be set aside.
4. Prayer made has vehemently been controverted by counsel, appearing for the State, who by referring to contents of orders, under challenge, has argued that it was a case of excess allotment to Sant Ram, which was rightly cancelled by the competent authority as the petitioners have stepped into the shoes of Sant Ram, they are not entitled to claim any better title than the said person. He further argued that as and when factum of excess allotment came to notice of the authorities, immediately thereafter, suo-moto reference was made in the year 1978 and there was no delay on the part of the authorities to initiate cancellation proceedings qua excess area. He also argued that petitioners were not bona fide purchasers, as such, they are not entitled to claim any benefit of Section 41 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
5. It is apparent from the records that before the authorities below, a very fair offer was made by the petitioners to purchase the land from the respondent-State at the price, which was prevalent at the time, when they had purchased it from Sant Ram. This offer was even made before this Court but the same did not find favour with the respondent. Under these circumstances, this writ petition requires to be decided on merits.
6. After hearing counsel for the parties, this Court is of the opinion that the writ petition deserves to be allowed.
7. It is apparent from the records that after partition of the country, land was allotted to Sant Ram in lieu of land left by him in Pakistan. After allotment, he was put in possession of the property, mutation was entered in the revenue records and between 1955 and 1957, proprietary rights were also conferred upon him. Admittedly, thereafter till his death he continued to be shown as owner of the land, in dispute in the revenue records. After his death, on the basis of inheritance, mutation was sanctioned in favour of his son Dharam Vir, from whom, petitioners had purchased the land in the year 1961 vide registered sale deed, for consideration. During this entire period and even thereafter, no finger was raised by any of the government officials. Petitioners spent huge amount on development of the land and thereafter in constructing their houses and shops over the disputed property. They were in peaceful possession of the same for about 17 years when suddenly suo-moto reference was initiated by respondent No. 2 on 17.7.1978 on the ground that it was a case of excess allotment to Sant Ram.
8. It is not disputed before this Court that any fraud etc. was alleged to have been committed by Sant Ram in getting the land allotted to him. Under these circumstances, it is to be seen as to whether action of the respondents, to initiate cancellation proceedings, after a lapse of about three decades of allotment of land, was justified or not.
9. It is apparent from the records that suo-moto reference was made by respondent No. 2 to respondent No. 3, who, while exercising powers under Section 24 of the Act approved the same vide order dated 20.10.1978. Relevant provisions of Section 24 of the Act, reads thus;-
24. Power of revision of the Chief Settlement Commissioner.- (1) The Chief Settlement Commissioner may at any time call for the record of any proceeding under this Act in which a Settlement Officer. An Assistant Settlement Officer and Assistant Settlement Commissioner, an Additional Settlement Commissioner, a Settlement Commissioner, a managing officer or a managing corporation has passed an order for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any such order and may pass such order in relation thereto as he thinks fit.
10. In Section 24(1) of the Act, it has been mentioned that the powers of revision can be exercised by respondent No. 2 at any time, now it is to be seen whether the word ‘at any time’ means ‘for ever’.
11. Implication of above mentioned Section came up for consideration before Division bench of this Court in Karam Chand Thakar Dass v. Union of India and Anr. , wherein it was specifically held that powers under Section 24 requires to be exercised within a reasonable period. To the same effect is the ratio of judgment of Division Bench of this Court in Sucha Singh and Ors. v. Gurdial Singh and Ors. 1977 P.L.J. 6.
12. Learned State Counsel, to refute argument raised above, by counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon Division Bench judgment of this Court in the Union of India and Ors. v. Amin Chand .
13. A perusal of judgment, referred to above, clearly indicates that while interpreting provisions of Section 24 of the Act, to say that there is no limitation to entertain revision, reliance was placed upon an earlier Full Bench Judgment of this Court in Smt. Bal-want Kaur wife of Sardar Charanjit Singh Mann v. Chief Settlement Commissioner (Lands), Jullundur A.I.R. 1964 Punj. 33. The Full Bench, after holding that under Section 24 of the Act, revision can be entertained at any time, further observed that the ‘Chief Settlement Commissioner, suo-moto can interfere with the orders of his subordinate and no limitation is prescribed for that either in the rules of in the statute, but it is understood that he would interfere within a reasonable time depending on the circumstances of each case. It is assumed that he would exercise his discretion in a reasonable manner and not arbitrarily.
14. This Court is of the view that the facts of the present case were such that the ratio of judgment in Amin Chand’s case (supra) is not applicable.
15. No action was taken for a period of more than 30 years by the respondent-State. After purchase, petitioners had constructed residential houses and shops, as such, this Court is of the opinion that there was no reasonable, explanation with the respondents not to initiate any proceedings at an earlier point of time, especially, when it was not a case of fraudulent allotment to Sant Ram, the original owner.
16. A similar proposition came up for consideration before their Lordships of Supreme Court in Gram Panchayat Kakran v. Addl. Director of Consolidation and Anr. 1997(2) P.L.J. 375. In that case, while interpreting implication of words ‘at any time’, as used in Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 enabling the State Government to entertain revision, their Lordships of the Supreme Court had held as under:-
Even where no period of limitation is prescribed, the party aggrieved is required to move the appropriate authority for relief within a reasonable time. In fact this Court in the case of Gram Panchayat, Village Kanonda v. Director, Consolidation of Holdings , dealing with Rule 18 itself, said that when no limitation is prescribed for an application under Section 42 dealing with confirmation of the scheme, the application should be made within a reasonable time and this question will have to be decided on the facts of each case. In that case the delay of about 3 years and 8 months in filing an application under Section 42 by the Panchayat was held to be not unreasonable. In the present case, however, the delay is of 40 years. We have tried to ascertain from the 2nd respondent whether there is an explanation for this unreasonable long inordinate delay. But no satisfactory explanation appears to be there for this inordinate delay in making the application under Section 42.
17. This Court is of the view that the controversy in the present case is squarely covered by ratio of judgment in Gram Panchayat Kakran’s case (supra). Delay in the present case, for making suo-moto reference is more than 30 years, for which no explanation has been furnished by the respondents.
18. Further contention of Shri Sarin that the petitioners were the bona fide purchases for consideration and as such, they are entitled to get benefit of provisions of Section 41 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is also justified.
19. It has specifically been averred by the petitioners in this writ petition that before making purchase from Dharam Vir son of Sant Ram, they had made every possibly enquiries to verify his title and after fully satisfying themselves,-from the revenue records etc. they had purchased the property in dispute.
20. To this averment, it has only stated in the written statement that since the allotment made to Sant Ram was not valid, no benefit of provisions of Section 41 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 could have been extended to the petitioners. Facts of the case are such that the petitioners are bound to get benefit of purchase made by them from the ostensible owner. It is an admitted fact that the land was allotted to Sant Ram before 1950, mutation etc. was sanctioned in his favour in the year 1955-57, thereafter, he was shown as full fledged owner in the revenue record and after death, on the basis of inheritance, his son Dharam Vir was shown as owner of the property, in dispute. In the year 1961, when land was purchased by the petitioners from said Dharam Vir, his title was not in dispute at all. Property was purchased vide registered sale deed and against payment of price. Under these circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the petitioners were the bona fide purchasers and they are entitled to get benefit of the provisions of Secuon 41 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882. While interpreting provisions of Section 41 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, in Rattan Singh and Anr. v. Chief Settlement Commissioner, Haryana and Ors. 1978 P.L.J. 47, a Single Bench of this Court has held as under:-
The language of this section envisages four main requirements:(i) that the transferor is the ostensible owner, (ii) that he is so by the consent, express or implied, of the owner, (iii) that the transfer is for consideration and (iv) that the transferee has acted in good faith taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had the power to transfer. An ostensible owner is the one, who has all the indicia of ownership without being the owner. The impugned order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner has now led to the position that the owner is the Union of India and prior to that it had transferred the proprietary rights in favour of Labh Singh. The functionaries of the Rehabilitation Department conferred proprietary rights on Labh Singh. Entries were accordingly made in the revenue records and Labh Singh was projecting himself as the owner on the authority of the orders in his favour and the entries in the revenue records. After, quite a few years of the conferring of the proprietary rights, the petitioners made purchases from him for consideration after making due enquiries. It is presumed that the petitioners must have taken reasonable care to make enquiries about the title of Labh Singh. When Labh Singh was in possession of the property, was recorded as owner, held the title deed and dealt with the petitioners in respect of it, there is nothing to suggest want of good faith in the petitioners dealing with him in respect of that property. In such a case, good faith would mean that the transferee acted honestly, in the real belief that Labh Singh was the real owner. Reasonable care as normally understood is that which an ordinary man of business would take to satisfy himself. So far as the petitioners are concerned, there was no dispute about the rights of Labh Singh till 3rd of August, 1966, when appeal was filed before the Settlement Commissioner by the respondents Nos. 3 to 5. All the four ingredients of Section 41 of Transfer of Property Act are found in this case.
21. Similarly, in Achhar Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab and Ors. 1979 P.L.J. 278, it has been held that once land was allotted to the original allottee and was purchased by a bona fide purchaser, cancellation of allotment thereafter on the ground that the original allottee had left no land in Pakistan, the land cannot be taken away from the subsequent purchaser.
22. Ratio of the judgments, referred to above, squarely covers the dispute in the present case.
23. After allotment of land to Sant Ram and his son, they remained in possession of the same for about 11 years and they were shown as owners in the revenue record. Under these circumstances, if the petitioners had purchased that land, after verifying their title from the revenue record and against payment of price, they cannot be thrown out at this stage, out of the land, in dispute being bonafide purchasers.
24. In view of facts, referred to above, this writ petition is allowed and orders An-nexures P/1 to P/4 are set aside. No order as to costs.