IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Dated: 20/04/2006
Coram
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice T.V. MASILAMANI
A.S. No.35 of 1992
1. H.Abdul Aleem
2. H.Basheerunnizamma .. Appellants
-vs-
1. H.Rehima Bi
2. H.Halima Bi
3. H.Rahamath Bi
4. H.Ayisha Bi
5. H.Mahaboob Bi
6. H.Kathiza Bi
7. H.Abdul Rahim .. Respondents
Appeal Suit against the judgment and decree dated 20.12.1991 made in
O.S. No.520 of 1989 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Salem.
!For Appellants : Mr.R.Subramanian
^For Respondents : Mr.R.Mohan
...
:JUDGMENT
The appellants are the defendants who have preferred this appeal
challenging the judgment and decree dated 20.12.1991 in O.S.No.520 of 19 89 on
the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Salem.
2. The first plaintiff (since deceased) and the respondents 1 to 7
herein/plaintiffs 2 to 8 filed the suit for declaration of title and recovery
of possession of the suit property from the appellants and also for damages at
the rate of Rs.250/- per month for illegal occupation from 1.7.1988. The
appellants, who are none else than the other sons of the first plaintiff,
resisted the suit on various grounds. The learned Subordinate Judge having
analysed the evidence of both sides and upon hearing the submissions made on
behalf of them decreed the suit as prayed for with costs. Hence, the
appellants have filed this appeal challenging the legality of the judgment and
decree passed by the trial court.
3. The contentions of the respondents/plaintiffs in the plaint are
briefly as follows:-
(a) The first plaintiff was the absolute owner of the suit
property and he was in possession and enjoyment of the same in his own right.
He has gifted the suit property to the plaintiffs 2 to 8 by means of
registered gift deeds dated 16.6.1986 and 17.6.1986 and necessary changes have
been made in the municipal register and in revenue records in favour of donees
who have been paying the taxes thereafter.
(b) The defendants, who are the sons of the first plaintiff
and brothers of plaintiffs 2 to 8, have no manner of right or interest over
the suit property. The plaintiffs and the defendants are governed by the
personal law, namely, Muslim law. The first plaintiff, who retired from
Judicial Department in the year 1965, purchased the suit property with two
tiled buildings and a thatched shed in the year 1942. Even after retirement,
he was working as a job typist and earned considerable income so as to
maintain the family and also to perform the marriages of his sons and
daughters. He has also improved the property by putting up tiled house. The
defendants 1 and 2 have not contributed anything towards such improvement.
(c) The first plaintiff allowed the defendants to reside in a
portion of the suit property and therefore their possession is purely
permissive in nature. On 7.3.1986, the first plaintiff revoked the leave and
licence and called upon them to vacate the premises the premises bearing Door
Nos.88 and 89 Jalal Khan Street, Fort, Salem-1. The possession of the
property by the defendants thereafter was that of trespassers and they are
liable to pay damages for wrongful use and occupation.
(d) The defendants 1 and 2 out of jealousy and ill-will filed
a suit in O.S.No.309 of 1986 on the file of the District Munsif, Salem. After
considerable delay, interim applications filed by them in the said suit were
dismissed on merits and the matter went up to the High Court with reference to
the orders in the said applications. Again the defendants amended the plaint
and moved the Subordinate Court wherein the suit was registered as O.S.No.112
of 1988 on the file of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Salem and ultimately,
they allowed the suit to be dismissed on 25.7.1989. Therefore the defendants
are in unlawful possession without paying any amount and hence the plaintiffs
are constrained to file the suit. The first plaintiff died on 27.6.1 990
leaving behind the plaintiffs 2 to 8 and the defendants as his legal heirs.
Hence the suit.
4. The averments in the written statement filed by the second
defendant and adopted by the first defendant are briefly as follows:-
(a) It is false to allege that the first defendant is the
absolute owner of the suit property and that he has gifted the same to the
plaintiffs 2 to 8 under the gift deeds dated 16.6.1986 and 17.6.1986. But, on
the other hand, the suit properties are the absolute properties of the
defendants and the first plaintiff had no interest or title over the same on
the alleged date of gift deeds. The gift deeds are hit by the principle of
lis pendens. Further the gift deeds are not valid as the first plaintiff had
no ti tle to the same.
(b) The other allegations in the plaint are denied as false.
The suit properties were partitioned and the defendants put up the buildings
in the suit properties in their own right in the year 1960.
(c) The plaintiffs 2 to 8 obtained the documents by undue
influence and misrepresentation made to the first plaintiff as he was aged
about 80 years at that time. Therefore he was not having a sound and
disposing state of mind on the date of the gift deeds. Hence, there is no
cause of action and the one alleged is false. In these circumstances, the
suit may be dismissed with costs.
5. The averments in the additional written statement filed by the
second defendant are as follows:-
The first plaintiff had no right or interest over the
buildings bearing Door Nos.88 and 89 described in the plaint schedule. Even
if the defendants had any defect in their title, they have prescribed title by
adverse possession, as they were in continuous, uninterrupted and open
possession and enjoyment of the properties to the knowledge of the first
plaintiff and other plaintiffs from 1960. They have put up fresh construction
in the suit properties in their own right. Hence, the suit may be dismissed
with costs.
6. On the above pleadings, the trial court framed the following
issues:-
(1) Whether the gift deeds dated 16.6.1986 and 17.6.1986 are true,
valid and binding on the defendants?
(2) Whether the defendants have prescribed title to the suit property
by adverse possession?
(3) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief as prayed for?
(4) To what relief, the plaintiffs are entitled?
7. The respondents as plaintiffs in the suit examined the 8th
plaintiff as P.W.1 and two other witnesses as P.Ws.2 and 3 and produced the
documents under Exs.A-1 to A-30. The appellants as defendants examined the
second appellant as D.W.1 and another witness as D.W.2 and also produced the
documents under Exs.B-1 to B-31 in support of their respective contentions in
the pleadings. Learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Salem having analysed the
evidence both oral and documentary adduced on either side and upon hearing the
arguments of both sides held on issue Nos.1 and 2 that the gift deeds dated
16.6.1986 and 17.6.1986 are true, valid and binding on the defendants and that
the defendants have not acquired title to the suit property by prescription on
account of their adverse possession. Further he held on issue Nos.3 and 4
that since the plaintiffs have proved their title to the suit property, they
are entitled to the reliefs of declaration and recovery of possession as
prayed for. Similarly, learned Subordinate Judge held that the plaintiffs are
also entitled to recover damages for use and occupation of the property by the
defendants as prayed for. Therefore he held on issue No.4 that the plaintiffs
are entitled to a decree as prayed for with costs.
8. Heard Mr.R.Subramanian, learned counsel for the appellants and
Mr.R.Mohan, learned counsel for the respondents.
9. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted the
following contentions in support of the appellants herein:-
(a) The court below erred in holding that the gift deeds,
Exs.A-1 and A-19 are true, valid and binding on the defendants. Similarly, he
failed to appreciate the evidence on record to show that the first plaintiff
could not have sound and disposing state of mind on the date of the alleged
execution of Exs.A-1 and A-19, gift deeds in favour of the plaintiffs 2 to 8
and therefore the said documents have been obtained by undue influence.
Therefore, Exs.A-1 and A-19 are not valid and not binding on the defendants.
In the circumstances, learned Subordinate Judge should have rejected the
evidence of P.W.3 especially in view of the fact that another attestor and
scribe of the document have not been examined.
(b) Further the court overlooked the fact that it is essential
condition of the gift that there should be actual delivery of possession of
the property to the donee and therefore since the possession of the property
continued to be with the defendants, the plaintiffs could not have taken
delivery of the property as per the gift deeds Exs.A-1 and A-19 and therefore
the same are invalid under law.
(c) Even otherwise the gifts in favour of two or more persons
without specifying their specific share and without dividing the property are
invalid. Therefore the said documents should have been brought about to
defeat the claim of the appellants in the suit in O.S.No.112 of 1988 on the
file of the Subordinate Judge, Salem (O.S.No.309 of 19 86 on the file of the
District Munsif Court, Salem).
(d) On the contrary, learned Subordinate Judge on the basis of the
evidence of the defendants’ side should have held that their case in the
written statement is true and they have proved conclusively that they are in
possession of the suit properties in their own right. The defendants were put
in possession of the suit properties even in the year 1960 and thereafter they
made improvements to the same. Hence, they have prescribed title by adverse
possession of the suit property over 25 years.
(e) Similarly, learned Subordinate Judge overlooked the fact that
since Exs.A-1 and A-19 are executed during the pendency of the suit filed by
the defendants in O.S.No.309 of 1996 referred to above and therefore since the
gift deeds were hit by the doctrine of lis pendens, the court below is not
justified in passing the decree. Similarly, the amount of damages at the rate
of Rs.250/- per month without any evidence cannot be sustained herein.
10. In the above circumstances, the following points arise for
determination:-
(1) Whether the finding rendered by the trial court that the gift
deeds dated 16.6.1986 and 17.6.1986 are true, valid and binding on the
appellants is not supported by any evidence?
(2) Whether the gift deeds dated 16.6.1986 and 17.6.1986 executed by
the deceased first plaintiff, the father of the appellants and the respondents
are hit by the doctrine of lis pendens?
(3) Is the court below not correct in holding that the appellants have
not acquired title to the suit properties by adverse possession?
(4) Whether the decision rendered by the court below with reference to
damages for use and occupation is not sustainable?
(5) To what relief the parties are entitled to?
11. Since all the above issues are with reference to the same set of
facts and evidence, they are considered together and answered as under. For
the sake of convenience, the parties to this appeal may be referred to
hereunder as they were arrayed in the suit before the trial court.
12. The relationship among the members of the family of the deceased
first plaintiff and his sons and daughters, who are the appellants and
respondents herein, is not under dispute. Admittedly, the deceased first
plaintiff, father of the appellants/defendants and the plaintiffs 2 to 8
worked in the Judicial Department till his retirement in the year 1965 and he
purchased the suit properties comprising of two tiled buildings and a thatched
shed under Ex.A-4 registered sale deed dated 11.2.1942. Therefore, under
Muslim law, the father of the plaintiffs 2 to 8 and the defendants, namely,
the deceased first plaintiff should be held to have acquired the suit
properties as his separate properties and that he had absolute dominion over
the same to deal with as he liked during his life time.
13. According to the plaintiffs, even after retirement, their father,
was doing job work as typist and out of his own income and pension, improved
the properties by putting up a tiled structure in the place of thatched
portion and also performed the marriage of his sons and daughters. Exs.A-1
and A-19 are the gift deeds executed by the first plaintiff in respect of the
suit properties in favour of the plaintiffs 2 to 8 and Exs.A-21 and A-22 are
the drafts of the said gift deeds written by the first plaintiff himself.
Similarly, on account of the mistake in quoting the assessment number of the
suit properties in the gift deeds referred supra, the first plaintiff executed
the rectification deeds dated 3.7.1986 copies of which form part and parcel of
the said documents under Exs.A-1 and A-19. It is no doubt true that during
the pendency of the suit and before ever the evidence was adduced, the first
plaintiff died on 27.6.1990, leaving behind the other plaintiffs and the
defendants as his heirs.
14. In the above circumstances, the first contention of the learned
counsel for the appellants that the gift deeds under Exs.A-1 and A-19 are not
true, valid and binding on the defendants has to be considered. It is not in
controversy that the defendants filed the suit in O.S.No.306 of 1986 on the
file of the District Munsif Court, Salem which was subsequently transferred to
the Additional Subordinate Court, Salem and renumbered as O.S.No.112 of 1988
and the defendants have questioned the validity of the gift deeds executed by
the first plaintiff in the said suit itself on the ground that the same were
created by disobeying the the order of injunction in their favour. As has
been rightly argued by the learned counsel for the respondents, the defendants
however allowed the said suit to be dismissed for nonprosecution ultimately
and therefore he has contended that the defendants are estopped from setting
forth the same plea again in this suit with reference to the validity and
binding nature of the gift deeds Exs.A-1 and A-19.
15. Be that as it may, since the question has been raised and
answered on the basis of the evidence adduced by both sides in this suit, this
Court is of the considered view that the defendants are not precluded from
raising the dispute in this suit, as the earlier suit was not disposed of on
merits. However, the fact remains that the first plaintiff executed Exs.A-1
and A-19 gift deeds during the pendency of the earlier suit filed by the
defendants against the plaintiffs and the first plaintiff herein, father has
also filed the written statement in the said suit along with the other sons
and daughters setting forth all the necessary averments so as to prove his
exclusive title to the suit properties and that he had executed the gift deeds
Ex.A-1 and A-19 in favour of the other plaintiffs in this suit and delivered
possession of the same, complying with the requirements under Muslim law. A
careful perusal of the records of the case would disclose the above facts.
Apart from the production of the said documents in support of the claim in the
suit, evidence has been let in by the plaintiffs to prove the execution of the
gift deeds, Exs.A-1 and A-19 and the validity as well as the binding nature of
the documents.
16. In this context, learned counsel for the respondents has referred
me to the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 3 to show that besides the admission made by
the deceased first plaintiff who executed the said gift deeds when he was in a
sound and disposing state of mind, the evidence of P.W.1, the 8th plaintiff as
son of the deceased first plaintiff who executed the gift deeds is to the
effect that till the date of death on 27.6.1990, his father was hale and
healthy, that he had not only executed the gift deeds in favour of him and his
sisters, but also delivered the constructive possession of the same as the
mutation in the records had been carried out in the names of the donees, that
his father permitted the defendants to occupy portion of the house by way of
permissive occupation, that he was occupying the house in Door No.89 and that
therefore the defendants are not in possession of any portion of the suit
properties in their own right. It is in his evidence that right from the date
of execution of Exs.A-1 and A-19 in 198 6 till the date of his death on
26.7.1990, his father was in a sound and disposing state of mind living along
with his sister in house bearing Door No.91 and in the year 1987 his father
left his sister and began to reside in a rental house till his death.
17. The evidence of P.W.1 is corroborated by P.W.2, who is his sister
and 7th plaintiff in the suit, in all respects and therefore the learned
counsel for the respondents would urge that the contentions put forth by the
appellants that due to old age and debility of mind, the plaintiffs influenced
the deceased first plaintiff and got the gift deeds under Exs.A-1 and A-19 is
not supported by any independent evidence. Admittedly, the first defendant
being the elder brother of the second defendant has not gone into box in
support of the claim put forth in the written statement. The evidence of
D.W.1, the second defendant though relied on by the learned counsel for the
appellants to prove the claim made in the written statement that the
plaintiffs 2 to 8 obtained the gift deeds Exs.A-1 and A-19 from their father
by undue influence when the executant of the documents was not in a sound and
disposing state of mind, his self serving testimony is not supported by any
independent evidence.
18. Though D.W.2 has been examined on the side of the defendants to
prove the plea of partition set forth in the written statement, he has
candidly admitted in his cross-examination that he is not aware whether the
first plaintiff divided the properties and put the defendants in possession by
way of oral arrangements or by means of any document such as gift deed or sale
deed in their favour. Therefore it has been rightly argued by the learned
counsel for the respondents that the evidence of D.W.2 is not helpful in any
way to advance the case of the defendants and that therefore the self serving
testimony of the second defendant as D.W.1 is the only evidence available on
record in support of the contentions put forth in the pleadings.
19. It follows necessarily that the defendants have miserably failed
to prove their contention that the properties had been allotted to their share
in the partition in the year 1960 as alleged and therefore this Court is of
the opinion that their plea of adverse possession also falls to the ground, as
the same is not only contrary to their earlier contentions that they became
entitled to the suit property by virtue of the partition in the family, but
also not supported by any evidence worth mentioning on their side.
20. Per contra, the evidence of P.W.3, an attestor who had witnessed
the execution of the gift deeds, Exs.A-1 and A-19 by the deceased first
plaintiff is relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents in support
of his contention that such evidence when considered in the circumstances of
the case as narrated above would go to show and prove the execution of the
gift deeds by the first plaintiff in a sound and disposing state of mind.
21. Though the learned counsel for the appellants has strenuously
contended that the non-examination of the other witness and the scribe of the
gift deeds, Exs.A-1 and A-19 is a valid ground in support of his contention
that the evidence of P.W.3 itself would not ipso facto prove the factum of the
execution of the said documents, I am unable to give credence to such
contention for the simple reason that the execution of the gift deeds was not
only admitted by the defendants in the prior suit filed by them against their
father, but also proceeded to take contempt action against him therein and
failed in their attempt as seen from the records of the case. Therefore, the
evidence of P.W.3 in my opinion would be sufficient to prove the execution of
Exs.A-1 and A-19 by the deceased first plaintiff. Having regard to the above
factual aspects of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
findings rendered by the learned Subordinate Judge that the gift deeds were
duly executed by the father of the other plaintiffs and the defendants cannot
be interfered with. It is therefore sustained.
22. The next question for consideration is whether the gift deeds are
not valid for the reason of non delivery of possession of the property to the
donees. It is no doubt true that delivery of possession of the property
gifted is the sine qua non under Muslim law. According to the evidence of
P.W.1, immediately after the execution of Ex.A-1 in his favour, mutation in
the records had been carried out and that he paid house taxes (vide) Exs.A-2
and A-3. Similarly, the evidence of P.W.2, 7th defendant is that her father
executed the gift deed Ex.A-19 in favour of her as well as to the other
sisters, namely plaintiffs 2 to 6 in respect of Door No.91 and that since the
defendants were residing in the same house claiming right over their portion
of the house, her father joined them in filing the suit against the
defendants. She has categorically stated that the said property had not been
allotted to the defendants by any partition arrangement as alleged by them.
23. Learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on the
decisions M.BABU v. MRS.KHAMIRUNNIASA BEGUM (1990 T.L.N.J. 298) and MAHBOOB
SAHAB v. SYED ISMAIL (AIR 1995 S.C. 1205) in support of his argument that
the essentials of a valid gift under Mohammedan law have not been fulfilled in
this case and that therefore there could not have been a valid gift made by
the deceased first plaintiff by executing Exs.A-1 and A-19 in favour of the
plaintiffs 2 to 8. He has submitted that there was no delivery of possession
of the property in favour of the donees in this case and that therefore the
important requirement under Mohammedan law for a valid gift had not been
complied with. As has been rightly contended by the learned counsel for the
respondents in the case in 1990 T.L.N.J. 298, the settlor reserved her right
to live in a portion of the suit properties, to appropriate the entire income
derived from the properties, to lease out the properties and to determine the
rent during her life time and therefore on account of such reservation made by
the donor inconsistent to the requirement of absolute dominion conferred on
the donees, the gift in that case was held as invalid. A careful reading of
the said decision would disclose the above said facts and therefore the ratio
laid down therein is not applicable to the facts of this case.
24. In the case reported in AIR 1995 S.C. 1205, the question whether
the mother of a minor can act as a guardian under Muslim law came up for
consideration and in that context, while deciding several other questions, the
Honourable Supreme Court held in paragraph (5) as follows:-
“It would, thus, be clear that though gift by a Mohammedan is not required to
be in writing and consequently need not be registered under the Registration
Act; a gift to be complete there should be a declaration of the gift by the
donor; acceptance of the gift, expressed or implied, byor on behalf of the
donee, and delivery of possession of the property, the subject-matter of the
gift by the donor to the donee. The donee should take delivery of the
possession of that property either actually or constructively. On proof of
these essential conditions, the gift becomes complete and valid. In case of
immovable property in the possession of the donor, he should completely divest
himself physically of the subject of the gift.”
Further in that case, since it was not proved that the gift was declared and
accepted by and on behalf of the minor or delivery of possession or taking
possession or who had accepted the gift actually or constructively, it was
held on facts that the gift in that case was not valid in law. However the
principle of law as quoted above regarding the gift in Mohammedan law is not
in controversy. In view of the factual position, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the above decisions are not helpful in any way to the
appellants in this case.
25. Learned counsel for the respondents has contended in his argument
that even though Muslim Law mandates that delivery of possession of the
property by the donor to the donee of the property gifted is sine quo non to
validate the gift, there is nothing in the personal law of Muslim to prevent a
gift of right to property and that therefore in this case, the donor namely,
the first plaintiff put the donees, plaintiffs 2 to 8 in constructive
possession of the property and joined with them in filing the suit against the
defendants for declaration and recovery of possession of the suit property.
He has however cited the decisions, QHAMRUNNISSA BEGUM v. FATHIMA BEGUM (1968
(1) M.L. J. 470) and M.A.KHAN v. KHODAIJA (1996 (3) SCR 479) in support of
such proposition of law put forth by him. The ratio laid down in 1968 (1)
M.L.J. 470 on this aspect of the matter reads as under:-
“The three essential requisites that have to be complied with for a
valid gift under the Muhammadan law are (i) a declaration of gift by the
donor, (ii) acceptance of the gift, express or implied, by or on behalf of the
donee and (iii) delivery of s possession, of the subject of the gift by the
donor to the donee as the subject of gift is susceptible of.
There can be no doubt that taking of possession of the subject of a
gift may be either actual or constructive and constructive possession is a
question of fact depending on the circumstances.”
26. Further, “Principles of Mahomedan Law” by Mulla 15th edition at
page 157 is quoted therein and it runs as follows:-
“Learned author points out that there is nothing in Mahomedan Law to
prevent a gift of right to property. In such a case the donor must so far as
it is possible for him, transfer to the donee that which he gives, namely such
rights as he himself has but this does not imply that where a right to
property forms a subject of a gift, the gift will be invalid unless the donor
transfers what he himself does not possess, namely corpus of the property. He
must evidence the reality of the gift by divesting himself so far as he can of
the whole of what he gives.”
27. Similarly, the principle of law on the subject as laid down in 1
996 (3) S.C.R. 479 is as under:-
“In Mohammad Abdul Ghani v. Fakhr Jahan Begam (1992 L.R. 49) Sir
John Edge said:
“For a valid gift inter vivos under the Mohomedan law applicable in
this case, three conditions are necessary, which their Lordships consider have
been correctly stated thus: (a) manifestation of the wish to give on the part
of the donor; (b) the acceptance of the donee either impliedly or expressly;
and (c) the taking of possession of the subject matter of the gift by the
donee, either actually or constructively (Mahomedan Law, by Syed Ameer Ali,
4th ed. vol.I, pg.41)”
28. On a careful reading of the said decisions in the light of the
principle of law enunciated on the subject under consideration, it would thus
be seen that if the donor has divested of his whole interest in the property
in favour of the donee and delivery of such possession of the subject of the
gift as susceptible of has been given, the gift deeds are valid under
Mohammedan law. Therefore in this case the deceased first plaintiff had not
only duly executed the gift deeds, Exs.A-1 and A-19 but also divested all the
rights over the properties in favour of the donees and joined with them and
filed the suit for declaration and recovery of possession of the subject
matter of the gift from the defendants. Hence, this Court is of the
considered view that the gift deeds, Exs.A-1 and A-19 are true, valid and
binding on the defendants.
29. Learned counsel for the respondents has drawn the attention of
this Court to the recitals in Ex.A-1 which categorically show that the donor
had settled the properties in favour of the donees with immediate effect and
also expressed his intention to deliver possession of the property to the
donees on the date of the gift deeds by effecting mutation in the revenue
records in favour of the donees and that he had no right or interest over the
properties thereafter so as to enable him to cancel the deeds of gift executed
by him. Moreover, the subsequent conduct on the part of both the donor and
donees in filing the suit against the defendants for declaration and recovery
of possession of the suit properties would lend support to the contentions of
the learned counsel for the respondents in the light of the ratio laid down in
the decisions cited by him that the donor had delivered constructive
possession of the property to the donees as the subject of gift is susceptible
of and that the donees’ acceptance of the gift is also implied as they joined
with the donor and filed the suit for the reliefs as prayed for. In view of
the above factual aspects of the case in the light of the ratio laid down in
the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents, this Court
is of the considered view that the gift deeds, Exs.A-1 and A-19 were executed
in accordance with the Mohammedan law and are therefore valid and binding on
the defendants.
30. Similarly, the issue with reference to the question whether the
said gift deeds are hit by the doctrine of lis pendens does not arise for
consideration for the simple reason that the earlier suit filed by the
defendants against their father, the donor under the said gift deeds was not
decided and disposed of on merits and therefore, I am unable to accept the
contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that by reason of the
doctrine of lis pendens the gift deeds under Exs.A-1 and A-19 are not valid
under law.
31. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court renders the findings on the
above said points against the appellants and therefore the judgment and decree
passed by the court below are sustained. Thus the appeal is dismissed with
costs.
dpp
To
1. The Principal Subordinate Judge, Salem.
2. The Section Officer, V.R.Section, High Court, Madras.