JUDGMENT
V.K. Bali, J.
1. The plaintiffs who lost their cause before both the courts below, have filed this appeal challenging the judgment and decree passed by Shri J.K. Sud, H.C.S.. Senior Sub Judge, Sirsa dated 6.2.1979, dismissing their suit for declaration to the effect that they are the owners in possession in equal share of the land, fully described in the head note of the plaint, which judgment and decree has since been upheld in an appeal preferred by them by learned Additional District Judge, Sirsa, on 21.2.1982.
2. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiffs are owners in possession in equal shares of 160/2014 share of agricultural land measuring 10 kanals and 14 marlas and similarly owners in possession in equal shares of 143/427 share of land measuring 21 kanals and 7 marlas, situated in village Rania, Tehsil and District Sirsa. The land was purchased through registered sale deeds dated 24.8.1962 and 27.1.1996, Exs.P-4 and P-5, respectively. Mohinder Singh, defendant, brought a suit in the year 1972 contending that he was owner in possession of 160/2014 share and the plaintiffs together in equal shares were owners in possession of 160/2014 share. Similarly, he averred that he was owner in possession of 143/427 share and the plaintiffs in equal shares were owners in possession of 284/427 share. Said suit was decreed by learned Subordinate Judge vide judgment and decree dated 5.6.1972. Mohinder Singh brought yet another suit in the year 1973 wherein, it was averred that he was owner in possession of 414/427 share of another parcel of land. This suit was also decreed on admissions by learned Subordinate Judge vide judgment and decree dated 29.12.1973. These both judgments were styled by the plaintiffs to be against the facts and law and as such null and void and ineffective against the rights of the plaintiffs. One ground that was pressed in seeking setting aside of the judgments and decrees, referred to above, was that Dayal Singh, plaintiff, was mi nor at the time when the decrees were passed and was not properly sued. There were other ground also challenging the decrees but the surviving one is only with regard to Dayal Singh being a minor at the time the decrees were passed. Respective pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues:-
“1. Whether the impugned decree and orders dated 5.6.1972 and 29.12.1973 are liable to be set aside on the grounds mentioned in the plaint? OPP
2. Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder of cause of action? OPD
2A. Whether the suit of the plaintiffs is barred by limitation? OPD
3. The matter with regard to Dayal Singh being a minor has been dealt with by learned Appellate Court in paragraph 7 of the judgment. Same reads thus:-
“The next contention of Mr. Thind is that the plaintiff Dayal Singh was a minor. In order to find strength for his argument he referred me to the copy of Matriculation Certificate Ex.P-22 of Dayal Singh to show that he was born on 12.5.1956 and on
5.6.1972 he was below 18 years and so also in December, 1973. He urged that the provisions of Order 32 Rule 3 of the CPC and Rule 15 are mandatory and, therefore, the said two decrees were patently bad in law as against him. He referred me to case Asha Rani v. Amrit Lal, (1977)79 P.L.R. 60 in this connection where it was ruled that the appointment of the guardian is not a mere formality, it is mandatory. The learned counsel then urged that the plaintiffs examined his father Balwant Singh and also his brother Ajit Singh who deposed about his age and they have not been questioned by the defendant. In those circumstances the evidence of plaintiffs should be accepted as it is because it had not been challenged and had been accepted by the defendant even. In this connection my attention was drawn to the following observations in case Chuni Lal Dwarka Nath v. Harford Fire Insurance Co. Ltd., A.I.R. 1958 Punjab 440:-
“It is well settled rule of evidence that a party should put to each of his opponent’s witnesses so much of his case as concerns that particular witness. If no such questions are put, the court presumes that the witness’s account has been accepted. If it is intended to suggest that a witness was not speaking the truth upon a particular point, his attention must first be directed to the fact by cross-examination so that he may have an opportunity of giving an explanation.”
The argument advanced by Shri Thind does prima facie sound well but on the close scrutiny of the evidence, it failed to click. The Matriculation Certificate is certainly not sure proof of the age of Dayal Singh who had earlier represented himself to be a major and now wanted to take advantage of the fact that he was a minor. Indeed, if he had really been a minor, the facts and circumstances to prove that fact would be exclusively within his knowledge or in the knowledge of his father and brother. They have not brought on file anything except the Matriculation Certificate and bald statement of Balwant Singh and Ajit Singh. When Balwant Singh and Ajit Singh were questioned about the age or the date of birth of the other children they failed to give satisfactory answer. Balwant Singh, could not give date of birth of the plaintiff Dayal Singh or any of the other sons which indicates the fallowness of his assertion regarding the minority of present plaintiff. It is true that Ajit Singh was not effectively cross examined regarding the age of Dayal Singh but that by itself would not be enough to accept his testimony for concluding that Dayal Singh was indeed a minor on the date of either of the two decrees.”
4. The observations made by learned first appellate court, as extracted above, in my view, are enough to hold that it could not be proved that Dayal Singh was minor at the ikne decrees were passed. That apart, it has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Brij Mohan Singh v. Priya Brat Narain Sinha, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 282 that “in actual life it often happens that persons give false age of the boy at the time of his admission to a school so that later in life he would have an advantage when seeking public service for which a minimum age for eligibility is often prescribed. The Court cannot ignore this fact while assessing the value of the entry and it would be improper for the court to base any conclusion on the basis of the entry, when it is alleged that the entry was made upon false information supplied with the above motive.”
5. There is a marginal difference in the age of Dayal Singh of his being a minor or a major, if his age is calculated as per the birth certificate produced by him and the dates of judgments and decrees, which was subject matter of challenge, in one there was a difference of one year and in another, there was a difference of little more than two years. The birth certificate, thus, could not be a sure proof of his being a minor at the time when decree aforesaid were passed. I find no illegality or infirmity in the judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court, which has been confirmed by learned first appellate court, as amended above.
Finding no merit in this appeal, the same is dismissed, leaving, however, the parties to bear their own cost.