JUDGMENT
S.N. Jha, C.J.
1. This letters patent appeal arises from the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge on a writ petition, SWP No. 185/1990. By the order impugned, part of the order of Labour Court Jammu, dated 17th March, 1989 in the case titled Bodh Raj V Managing Director, J&K Tourism Development Corporation, whereby termination of the appellant’s services had been set-aside, was quashed. The facts giving rise to the writ petition are as follows:
short, the Corporation) on 20th March, 197 1. He was promoted on the post of Pantry-man on 10th April, 1980 but soon after, on 20th October, 1980, demoted to the post of Chowkidar. The demotion order was set-aside by the Labour Court, Jammu, in case No. 26/B on 11th December, 1985. The appellant was held entitled to arrears or wages and other service benefits. Complaining of non-payment of the consequential benefits, the appellant filed application for computation of wages etc. under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short, the Act) before the Labour Court, Jammu, which was registered as case No. 421/LC on 1st April, 1987. During pendency of the case, his services were terminated by the Corporation. The Labour Court by an interim order dated 5th February, 1988 stayed the termination order. Finally, by the impugned order dated 17th March, 1989, while calculating the appellant’s entitlement to wages etc., the Labour Court set aside the termination. It would be useful to quote the relevant part of the order in extenso as under:
“During the pendency of these proceedings, the petitioner has stated that he has been terminated from service which order was, however, stayed by this Court vide order dated 05-02-1988 and it was held that the respondent cannot terminate services of an employee Under Section 33 of the I.D. Act during the pendency of any proceedings before the Court/Tribunal.
The said termination order is found to be illegal which is accordingly set-aside.”
2. Feeling aggrieved by the order the Corporation filed the writ petition which was allowed in part on 13th December, 1998. While maintaining other part of the order of the Labour Court, the afore-quoted part of the order, was set-aside.
3. The Labour Court took the view, as seen above, that the service conditions of an employee cannot be changed during pendency or any proceedings before the Labour Court/ Industrial Tribunal in terms of Section 33 of the Act, therefore, the appellant’s set-vices could not be terminated during the pendency of the aforementioned case. Section 33 so far as relevant and Section 33C(2) may be quoted at one place hereunder:
“33. Conditions of service, etc., to remain unchanged under certain circumstances during pendency of proceedings. — (1) During the pendency of any conciliation proceeding before an arbitrator or a conciliation officer or a Board or of any proceeding:
(a) in regard to any matter connected with the dispute, alter, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or
(b) for any misconduct connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workman concerned in such dispute;
save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending.”
“33C(2) Recovery of money due from an employer. —
(1)…….
(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government within a period not exceeding three months.
Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary, or expedient so to do he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit.”
4. As seen above, the proceeding in which the impugned order was passed was one under Section 33C(2) of the Act, and the question for consideration is whether the proceeding referred to in Section 33(1) is covered by Section 33C(2) of the Act. On a plain reading of Section 33(1), it would appear that the section prohibits taking action by the employers altering, to the prejudice of the workmen, the conditions of service applicable to them in regard to ‘any matter connected with the dispute’ which is subject-matter of any conciliation proceeding before the arbitrator or conciliation officer etc., or any proceeding before the Labour Court or Tribunal etc. In other words, the impugned action of the management must have nexus with the dispute which is subject-matter of the proceedings. In the present case, the subject-matter of proceeding pending before the Labour Court was the claim of the appellant for monetary benefits and other benefit arising from the award of the Labour Court, in which he had sought computation, and the Labour Court was merely required to compute the benefits in terms of money. The impugned action of the Corporation, terminating the appellant’s service had no nexus with his claim which related to past period, arising from the award of the Labour Court. Notwithstanding the subsequent action of the management, terminating his service, the monetary benefits he was entitled to under the previous award could be computed. The impugned order of the management had no nexus with the subject-matter of the pending proceedings. The words “is entitled to receive” occurring in Section 33C(2) also clearly indicate that the claim/proceeding envisaged therein must relate to enforcement of some pre-existing rights of the workman.
5. To cut the matter short, the question as to whether the validity of an order of dismissal or termination of service, or the like, can be gone into in proceedings under Section 33C(2) is not res integra. In Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P. S. Rajagopalan, AIR 1964 SC 743, dwelling upon the scope of Section 33C(2) of the Act, a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that the nature or proceedings under Section 33C(2) is akin to execution proceedings under the Civil Procedure Code in which the existing rights of the employees are sought to be implemented by the individual workman. The question as to whether validity of dismissal order can be gone into in such proceedings was answered in these words:
“If an employee is dismissed or demoted and it is his case that the dismissal or demotion is wrongful, it would not be open to him to make a claim for the recovery of his salary or wages under Section 33C(2). His demotion or dismissal may give rise to an industrial dispute which may be appropriately tried, but once it is shown that the employer has dismissed or demoted him, a claim that the dismissal or demotion is unlawful and, therefore, the employee continues to be the workman of the employer and is entitled to the benefits due to him under a preexisting contract, cannot be made under Section 33C(2)…”
6. The legal position that the proceedings under Section 33C(2) are analogous to execution proceedings and the Labour Court is like an executing court, was reiterated in Chief Mining Engineer East India Coal Co., Ltd. v. Rameshwar and Ors., AIR 1968 SC 218. The following observations in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. The Workmen (1974)4 SCC 696, may also be usefully quoted:–
“By merely making a claim in a loaded form the workmen cannot give the Labour Court jurisdiction under Section 33C(2). The workman who has been dismissed would no longer be in the employment of the employer. It may be that an industrial tribunal may find on an investigation into the circumstances of the dismissal that the dismissal was unjustified. But when he comes before the Labour Court with his claim for computation of his wages under Section 33C(2) he cannot ask the Labour Court to disregard his dismissal as wrongful and on that basis compute his wages. In such cases, a determination as to whether the dismissal was unjustified would be the principal matter for adjudication, and computation of wages just consequential upon such adjudication. It would be wrong to consider the principal adjudication as ‘incidental’ to the computation. Moreover, if we assume that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to make the investigation into the circumstances of the dismissal, a very anomalous situation would arise. The Labour Court after holding that the dismissal was wrongful would have no jurisdiction to direct reinstatement under Section 33C(2). And yet if its jurisdiction to compute the benefit is conceded it will be like conceding it authority to pass orders awarding wages as many times as the workman comes before it without being reinstated. Therefore, the Labour Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 33C(2) has got to be circumspect before it undertakes an investigation, reminding itself that any investigation it undertakes is, in a real sense, incidental to its computation of a benefit under an existing right, which is its principal concern.”
7. Adverting to the instant case, it is manifest from the aforementioned citations that the Labour Court was completely unmindful of its legal position in interfering with the termination order. By doing so, it went beyond the scope of the proceedings. Besides, the ground on which the Labour Court interfered with the order, namely, alleged violation of Section 33 of the Act, is also untenable in the absence of any nexus with the subject-matter of dispute and the impugned action of the Corporation. It was open to the appellant notwithstanding pendency of proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the Act, to raise an industrial dispute and get the validity of the order of termination adjudicated upon by the Labour Court; instead he took a short cut and attempted to get the order set-aside in the pending proceeding. Curiously, the Labour Court readily obliged him without any ado.
8. In the ordinary course, notwithstanding the question as to whether the Labour Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the issue, the validity of any action/order could be adjudicated after taking evidence on the point. Nothing of the kind was done in the instant case. Simply on the ground that the order of termination had been passed during pendency of the proceedings, on supposed violation of Section 33 of the Act, the Labour Court set-aside the order. In the circumstances, the interference by the learned Single Judge with the impugned part of the order cannot be said to be erroneous or unjustified.
9. In the result, we find no merit in this appeal which is accordingly, dismissed.