JUDGMENT
R.P. Sethi, C.J.
1. With the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties the appeals were heard at length on merits at the initial stage of admission and being disposed of by this common judgment.
2. Under the cloak of technicalities and procedural wrangles the respondents-workmen are intended to be deprived of their two times bread and thereby forced to starvation. The appellants with hands in gloves with their sister-concern have left no stone unturned in unnecessarily dragging the workmen to litigation with apparently oblique motive of tiring them in their genuine struggle of remaining alive. The appellants are shown to have succeeded in depriving the respondents-workmen from getting any job w.e.f.26.9.94, the day when they ventured to go on strike. Not deterred by the order of the Labour Court passed under Section.33C of the Industrial Disputes Act and of the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 38720-38744/95, the appellants have ventured to file the present appeal with the same object as noted herein above.
3. Some of the facts necessary to appreciate the conduct of the appellants and the issue involved in the present case are that the appellants, along with their sister-concerns viz., M/s. CUMET PVT. LTD., and M/s. INSUCON LTD., executed a memorandum of settlement Annexure-A with the respondents- workmen who were on strike w.e.f.26.9.94 persuant to their Charter of demands dated 1.8.93. The strike was prolonged and continued for more than 10 months. The respondents-workmen who were employed by M/s. CUMET PVT. LTD. were threatened with the closure of the factory and induced to enter into the settlement on the terms and conditions as specified in Annexure-A. All the three Companies and the respondents-workmen herein were parties to the said memorandum of settlement which inter alia provided amongst other things:
“The workmen of M/s Cumet Pvt. Ltd., as per Annexure-A shall be provided employment in Mysore Wire and Metal Industries and M/s Insucon Pvt Ltd., as and when vacancies arise in these two factories and as and when the necessity to take more workmen arises. The workmen of M/s Cumet Pvt. Ltd., as shown in Annexure-A will be listed in seniority basis and shall be provided employment as per this settlement. All vacancies arising out of death, resignation, voluntary retirement, abandonment of service or any other cause will be filled in immediately as per seniority list. Pending absorption of all Cumet workmen into Mysore Wire & Metal Industries Insucon as the case may be, no contract, casuals workmen apprentice or staff of whatsoever description belonging to workmen category will be employed.”
“The workmen of M/s.Cumet Pvt Ltd., listed in Annexure-A shall be provided with employment on or before the expiry of 12 months from the date of this settlement, However, for the first twelve months those workmen to whom work in Mysore Wire & Metal industries and/or Insucon is not provided shall not be entitled to any compensation or wages. After 12 months and upto completion of the 18 month from the date of this settlement, those workmen in Annexure-A to whom work is still not provided in Mysore Wire & Metal Industries or Insucon shall be paid 50% of the wages, beyond 18 months. If work is still not provided in any of the workmen shown in Annexure-A full wages shall be paid till the date they are provided work or till the date they are offered employment in Mysore Wire & Metal Industries or Insucon Pvt. Ltd.”
4. As despite lapse of the period promised, no work was provided to the workmen, they approached the appropriate Government and got the dispute referred to the Labour Court. The dispute referred to the Labour Court was to the effect, whether the managements of M/s. Mysore Wire and Metal Industries, Insucon Pvt. Ltd, Cumet Pvt Ltd. Tumkur Road, Bangalore are justified in refusing work with effect from 6.9.90 to 24 workmen (Annexure-A).
5. As no work was provided to the workmen despite settlement, they filed applications under Section.33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act before the Labour Court with was disposed of vide order dated 31.5.95 directing the Management to pay wages mentioned in the applications filed by the workmen along with the interest at the rate of 18% p.a. The Writ Petition of the Employer/Appellant was dismissed with the observations that:
“Taking the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the interest on the amount ordered by the Labour Court in application Nos. 25/94 and 29/95 on the file of the Addl.Labour Court, Bangalore, in its order dated 31st May 1995 is waived.”
Despite the fact that interest was waived the workmen were not aggrieved of the said direction.
6. The learned Counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the order passed by the Labour Court was without jurisdiction in as much as the application filed by the respondents-workmen under Section 33C(2) was misconceived. Referring to condition No. 2 of the settlement as noted herein above the learned Counsel submitted that as there did not exist any agreement, settlement or award, the Labour Court was not justified in passing the orders in proceedings under the Section aforesaid which was in effect and essence a provision made for execution of the orders. It is submitted that even though the appellants had undertaken to provide job to the respondents-workmen yet they were not obliged to pay them wages in case they failed to provide them job. The argument is apparently self-contradictory and contrary to the provisions of law. The learned Counsel wanted us to read Condition No. 2 in isolation to Condition No. 5 of memorandum of settlement. The learned Single Judge rightly came to the conclusion:
“According to Clause(5) if work is not provided for the workmen shown in Annexure-A, full wages shall be paid till they are offered employment with the petitioners. There was no need for the petitioners to pay wages to the workmen if did not consider them to be their workmen. The contention that the wages will have to be paid by Cumet if no work is given by the petitioners has to be rejected outright. If such a submission is to be accepted that wages will be paid by Cumet if the workmen are not employed by the petitioners then it would lead to a curious situation.
It was specifically agreed by the workmen that they will not question the closure of Cumet before any Court of law at any time either now or in future. It was also further agreed by the workmen that they shall have no claim whatsoever against Cumet and they shall not be entitled to any notice nor any closure compensation. It was further agreed by the workmen that they shall not be entitled to any compensation separately for the service rendered in Cumet at any time. It was further agreed that the workmen shall call off the strike and report for duty within 30 days of the set lament. In the light of the above recitals in the settlement it is not known under what circumstances under the settlement can Cumet be asked to pay wages for those workmen who were to be provided employment under the petitioners. By this settlement it is clear that the workmen become employees, of the petitioners and the petitioners alone and they have given-up all rights as against Cumet. There can be no doubt in the mind of this Court that under the settlement the workmen have ceased to be the employees of Cumet and have become the employees of the petitioners. The petitioners cannot be permitted to interpret the settlement in any other way and the Labour Court was right in holding that there was a legal obligation on the part of the petitioners to pay wages to the former employees of Cumet pursuant to the agreement.”
7. The Sub-section 2 of Section 33C of the Industrial Dispute Act provides:
“Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government within a period of not exceeding three months.
Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing extend such period by such further period as he may think fit.”
8. Section 33C(2) is applicable even in cases where the right to benefit is disputed by the employer. The Labour Court has jurisdiction to determine whether the workmen has right to receive the benefit and for that the Labour Court can interpret the award or settlement on which the workmen’s right is based. The Supreme Court in THE CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA Ltd., v. P.S. RAJAGOPALAN etc., dealing with such a case has held:
“When Sub-section (2) of Section 33C refers to any workman entitled to receive from the employer any benefit there specified, it does not mean that he must be a workman whose right to receive the said benefit is not disputed by the employer. Section 33C(2) takes within its purview cases of workmen who claimed that the benefit to which they are entitled should be computed in terms of money, even though the right to the benefit on which their claim is based is disputed by their employers. The claim under Section 33C(2) clearly postulates that the determination of the question about computing the benefit in terms of money may, in some cases, have to be preceded by an enquiry into the existence of the right and such an enquiry must be held to be incidental to the main determination which has been assigned to the Labour Court by Sub-section (2).”
9. In CENTRAL BANK v. S.K.SHAW, it was held that dispute as to special allowance under the terms of the bipartite agreement between the parties could be interpreted by the Labour Court in an application filed under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
10. In WORKMEN OF DODSAL PVT. LTD. v. DODSAL PVT. LTD. and Anr., it was held, where on reference to the Industrial dispute the Labour Court interpreted its earlier award and settlement arrived at, the High Court would not be justified in reappraising the material with the object to give its own interpretation of the award as if the High Court was exercising the appellate jurisdiction. The interpretation of the award or the settlement is within the competence of the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court.
11. The reliance of the learned Counsel for the appellant on C.I.W.T. Corporation V. Workmen is misplaced. It is true that the APEX Court held that the proceedings under Section 33C(2) were proceedings, generally, in the nature of the execution proceedings wherein the Labour Court was required to calculate the required amount of money due to the workmen from his employer. The calculation or computation was to be made on the basis of existing right to the money or benefit in view of its being previously adjust or otherwise duly provided for. However it was never held that if a dispute is raised with respect to the legality or interpretation of a settlement arrived at between the parties, the Labour Court was to be deprived of the jurisdiction to grant the relief on the basis of the existing rights agreed by the parties and duly provided for in the agreement executed by them. In fact the Supreme Court in this case also approved its earlier decision in P.S. RAJAGOPALAN’s case.(supra).
12. In the end the learned counsel vainly attempted to pursuade us to hold that the subject matter of the dispute referred under Section 10 of the Act and the one raised in the application filed under Section 33C(2) of the Act was the same. The submission is without any substance. The dispute referred to the Labour Court, as noted earlier is to the effect as to whether the appellants were justified in refusing to provide work to the workmen with effect from 6.9.90. The reference of dispute impliedly acknowledges the right of the workmen to work. Once the workmen are held entitled to work, they cannot be denied the claim for the payment of wages in lieu thereof. The subject matter of both the proceedings are different and distinct. The confusion created by artificialities cannot come in the way of Courts to grant the appropriate relief to the deserving respondents.
13. There is no merit in these appeals which are accordingly dismissed.