JUDGMENT
Anil Dev Singh, J.
(1) This order shall dispose of above noted bunch of similar applications under Order 39 rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 Civil Procedure Code for temporary injunction restraining the defendants from taking any action deterimental to the interests of the plaintiffs in regard to industrial sheds which are in their possession and to stay the eviction proceedings initiated against them by defendant No.3 before the Estate Officer under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act,1971. Facts of all the cases being similar it would suffice if the facts of one of the cases namely, Suit No.2369 of 1988 are stated.
(2) In the year 1973-74 the Government of India came out with a programme to create employment opportunities for educated unemployed. The Union of India called upon the State Governments and the Administration of Union Territories to formulate and send their proposals. Accordingly, the State Governments and the Union Territories formulated their proposals which were approved by the Government after consulting the Planning Commission and the Union Finance Ministry. In the Union Territory of Delhi the task of implementing the scheme was entrusted to defendant No.2 and defendant No.3-Delhi Administration and Delhi State Industrial Development Corporation Limited (for short ‘Discs’) respectively. Sometime in July 1973 a scheme was advertised by defendant No-3 which was captioned as follows: “DELHIADMINISTRATION Offers A Unique Opportunity For Self Employment To Unemployed ENGINEERS”.
(3) The salient features of the scheme were that the unemployed Engineering Degree holders or diploma holder technicians were to be given training for three months in Entrepreneurial Development by DSDIC. On successful completion of the training they were to be considered for allotment of industrial sheds and all possible assistance was to be rendered to them for securing loans from the Delhi Administration, Delhi Financial Corporation and nationalised banks. Machinery and plant were also to be provided to them under the hire purchase scheme of defendant No.3 and assistance for promoting sale in internal and export markets was also to be given by the said defendant. That apart during the training period the degree holder Engineering Graduates and Diploma holder Technicians were to be paid stipends of Rs.400.00 and Rs.250.00 per mensum respectively.
(4) By letter dated September 4,1976 defendant No.3 informed the plaintiff that he had been "selected as an entrepreneur for Development Training & Package Assistance including allotment of a factory shed under entrepreneurial Development Programme of Discs. The plaintiff was asked to deposit the following amounts: 1)Security amounting to Rs.6000.00 (adjustable finally). 2) Reservation Charges Rs.3000.00 (non refundable/non adjustable). 3) Advance rent for one month @ Rs. 3000.00 4) Advance for power connection Rs. 1000.00 Total Rs. 13,000.00 . (5) The plaintiff vide his letter dated September 11,1976 informed defendant No.3 that a sum of Rs. 13,000.00 stood deposited by him on September 8,1976 vide receipt No.5857 and requested that since all the necessary formalities had been complied by him, he should be given possession of shed measuring 2700 sq.ft. Thereupon on September 20,1976 the plaintiff executed an agreement (for short "Agreement') in favor of the defendant in which it was, inter alia, agreed that he would pay an amount of Rs.2970.00 as monthly rental of the shed No. G-8,Robtak Road Industrial Complex subject to the condition that he shall also pay such enhanced further sum or sums of money towards the monthly rental on account of the decision of the Land Acquisition Collector or Court on reference or appeal or both and on any enhancement of expenditure incurred on account of development, specially for providing facilities like electricity, water etc. besides interest thereon @ 6% per annum or such enhanced interest as determined by defendant No.3 whose decision in this behalf was declared to be final and binding on the plaintiff. The lease was for a period of three years renewable at the option of defendant No.3. The agreement further provided that in case the rent remained unpaid for two consecutive calender months, the defendant No.3 would be entitled to discontinue electricity and water supply and would also be entitled to terminate the lease and re-enter and resume possession of the premises. It is not disputed that the plaintiff did not pay the rent in accordance with the agreement in question and till date has merely paid a sum of Rs.11,750.00 in this behalf, which fact is evident from his letter dated June 1,1987. The reasons for not making the payment in accordance with the agreement as advanced by the plaintiff is that the ownership of the sheds were required to be given to the entrepreneurs on hire purchase by defendant No.3. In this regard the plaintiff has relied upon alleged policy statements and circulars of the Lt. Governor of Delhi and defendant No.3. The first in point of time is the circular of the Lt.Governor dated March 9,1977 in which it was stated that the Delhi State Industries Development Corporation would sell the sheds to the entrepreneurs on hire purchase basis. According to the circular,the price was to be determined by a body, which was to comprise of Government representatives and the representatives of the entrepreneurs. Besides it was stated that the mode of payment will be over a long period to help the entrepreneurs. Then came the circular of defendant No.3 dated March 15,1977 which expressed that a decision had been taken to make available industrial sheds constructed by the Discs on hire purchase basis to the entreprenures. The circular also recorded that defend p73 ant No.3 held two meetings with various bankers which had financed the sheds for deciding the modalities of the hire .purchase. It-was also, inter alia, stated that the entrepreneurs would be required to clear the arrears of rent due to the defendant No.3 before any hire purchase agreement is entered into. The circular clarified that the detailed working of the cost and other terms and conditions were still under negotiations and required further discussion with the bankers and other concerned authorities. The position stated in the circular was termed as "provisional and subject to change". On January 23,1979 Chief Project Manager of defendant No.3 informed the entrepreneurs that a meeting was held under the Chairmanship of the Executive Councillor (Medical) in which it was decided that the arrears be paid by the entrepreneurs from June,1978 in Installments. The rate on which the arrears were to be paid were indicated as under: 1)Rs.500.00 2) Rs.525.00 3) Rs.575.00 4) Rs.625.00 5) Rs.750.00 6) RS. 1000.00 7) Rs.1,250.00 8) RS.1500.00 P.M. for 1000 sq. ft. shed. P.M. .for 1200 sq. ft. shed. P.M. for 1350 sq. ft. shed. P.M. for 1500 sq. ft. shed. P.M. for 1850 sq. ft. shed. P.M. for 2400 sq. ft. shed. P.M. for 2700 sq. ft. shed. P.M. for 3000 sq. ft. shed. (6) It was also provided therein that arrears and current payments were to be cleared by the end of May,1979. The said amounts were to be adjusted against hire purchase Installments if and when a decision with regard to hire purchase would be taken. (7) It is not disputed that no payment was made by the entrepreneurs in accordance with the aforesaid decision. Again by letter dated May 1,1982 defendant No.3 gave a second chance to the entrepreneurs to pay the rent at reduced rates. According to this letter the entrepreneurs in the first instance were required to pay 25% of the amount calculated at the same rates as were mentioned in the aforesaid letter dated January 23,1979 for the period beginning from June,1978 to March, 1982. (8) The said 25% payment was to be paid before May 15,1982. With regard to the balance of the total arrears of rent and the current rent the entrepreneurs were required to pay two Installments per month at the aforesaid rates. Out of the two Installments, one was to be appropriated towards the current month and the other was to be adjusted towards the arrears. This was to continue till the entire arrears were cleared by the entrepreneurs. By letter of the Federation of the Discs Entrepreneurs Association dated November 11, 1983, the entrepreneurs declined to pay the rent on the ground that the proforma of the receipt which the defendant No.3 was proposing to get executed from the allottees was contrary to its announcement dated September 6,1983 in as much as the amount received by defendant No.3 from the entrepreneurs was to be adjusted against hire purchase/rent Installments instead of hire purchase. The entrepreneurs wanted that the receipts should specify that the amount which was being paid by them was to be adjusted as hire purchase Installments only. Thus it is obvious that the payments of arrears of rent and the rentals for succeeding months were not paid by the entrepreneurs to defendant No.3. in accordance with the above decisions of the said defendant, nor the payments were made according to the agreed terms as contained in the respective agreements which the entrepreneurs had executed in favor of defendant No.3. Notwithstanding the failure of the entrepreneurs to make the desired payments to defendant No.3 the latter on October 14, 1986 decided to transfer the sheds to individual entrepreneurs on hire purchase basis subject to certain conditions. The sheds were decided to be transferred on no profit no loss basis and the actual cost was to be worked out keeping in view the following components: I)interest on loans raised for various complexes. ii) Ground rent demanded by D.D.A. iii) Expenditure incurred on maintenance of sheds. iv) Insurance charges of complexes. v) Interest on own funds. vi) Property Tax. (9) Pursuant to the said decision defendant No.3 by its letter dated November 21,1986 offered the plaintiff the shed on cash down/hire purchase basis and demanded a sum of Rs.8,36,000.00. For this purpose the plaintiff was given the following options: 1)To acquire shed on cash down basis: Under this option the plaintiff was required to deposit 100% cash down payment of the total cost within one month from the date of issue of the offer with a discount entitlement of 2% on the total cost. 2) On hire purchase basis : a)75% cash down payment within one month from the date of the issue of the offer and remaining 25% in equated 72 monthly Installments with discount of one and a half percent on the total cost or, (b) 50% cash down payment within one month from the date of issue of offer and the remaining 50% in equated 72 Installments with a discount of 1% on total cost. Similar offers were given to other entrepreneurs as well. It appears that the plaintiff and the other entrepreneurs had reservations about the offer and agitated the matter with the authorities as a result of which fresh offers at reduced rates were made by defendant No.3 on May 8,1987 to the individual entrepreneurs including the plaintiff. This offer noted that the defendant had constructed the sheds mainly by securing loans from the financial institutions and from the government besides investing its own funds. It further stated that due to non-payment of lease money by the entrepreneurs the said defendant failed to pay back the loan and interest to the banks and the financial institutions which resulted in increased liability of the defendant. The plaintiff according to the fresh offer was required to pay in the following manner: Option NO.1 100% Cash Down Total cost P 7,58,764.26 Option N0.2 75% Cash Down 4 7,62,669.94 and remaining 25% in equated 72 Installments. Option NO.3 50% cash down 4 7,66,575.63 and remaining 50% in equated 72 Installments. Option N0.4 25% cash down 4 7,74,387.00 and remaining 75% in 72 equated Installments. (10) Similar offers were also sent to the other entrepreneurs. This time again offers did not satisfy the expectations of the plaintiff and the other allottees. The plaintiff by its letter dated June 1,1987 disputed the price of the shed and the interest' which was required to be paid by him. (11) Again another offer of hire purchase was made by the defendant to all the plaintiffs by its letters dated May 2,1989 which also did not evoke favorable response from them. According to Mr. Kimti Lal the plaintiff, the defendant ought to have worked out the cost of the shed at the Cpwd rates which were prevalent in the year 1975-76. According to his calculations the price of shed would not be more than Rs-33.25 sq. ft inclusive of cost of land. The said plaintiff gave a counter offer by staling that he was willing to pay a sum of Rs.89,725.00 less Rs.ll,750.00 already paid by him along with simple interest @ 6% per annum from the date of delivery of the shed to him.
(12) The sum and substance of the case of the plaintiff is that he is not liable to make payment of arrears of rent as the shed is to be transferred to him on hire purchase basis. In the plaint it is, inter alia, prayed that the plaintiff should be declared as a “hire purchaser” of the shed in question and the price of the shed be calculated on the basis of actual cost of construction including ” proportionate actual cost of land” in accordance with the programme under which he was allotted the shed in 1976 and he should not be burdened with post capitalisationexpenses, including interest, municipal taxes, expenditure for maintenance, insurance etc. It is further prayed that defendant No.4 (Municipal Corporation of Delhi) be restrained from taking any action to the detriment of the plaintiff in respect of the shed in question. In his application for interim relief filed Along with the suit it is reiterated that the defendants be restrained from taking any action to the detriment of the plaintiff in respect of the shed. Similar applications were also moved in other suits as well.
(13) During the pendency of the suits,due to non-payment of arrears of rent, defendant No.3 referred the matters to the Estate Officer for evicting the plaintiffs by initiating proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act,1971( for short ‘the Act’). This led to fresh prayer of the plaintiffs for grant of interim relief.
(14) My learned predecessor by his order dated December 17,1990 in Suit No.2369 of 1988 directed the Estate officer “not to pass any final order of eviction”. February 13,1992 somewhat” similar orders were passed by me in Suit Nos.2408/88, 2468/ 88, 2465/88, 2391/88, 2382/88, 2464/88, 2337/88, 1365/89, 1630/89 and 1432/89 by virtue of which the Estate Officer, though free to proceed with the matter, was restrained from dispossessing the plaintiffs without prior permission of the court.
(15) The applications have now come up for vacation/confirmation of these orders.
(16) At the outset it is important to note that plaintiffs have paid small sums towards rentals of the sheds like the plaintiff in suit No.2369 of 1988 who has merely paid a paltry sum of Rs.ll,750.00 towards the rent of the shed. Calculating the rent from the year 1976 to the date of filing of the suit, a few lakhs would be due from each of the plaintiffs to the defendant as per the terms of the agreements. The plaintiffs also failed to act as required by letter of the Chief Project Manager dated January 23,1979 whereby he had asked the entrepreneurs to pay the arrears in accordance with rates indicated therein. The letter also clarified that the amounts so deposited by the entrepreneurs would be adjusted against hire purchase Installments if and when a decision would be taken with regard to the same. It is not denied that the plaintiffs were in possession of the sheds from the year 1976 or so but when it came to payment of rent they dithered. The same treatment was meted out by the entrepreneurs to another letter of the defendant dated May 1,1982 demanding payment of arrears from them. The excuse or justification for not making the payments is totally filmsy and untenable. According to the Federation of Discs Entrepreneurs Association letter dated November 11,1983, the entrepreneurs did not make the payment as the amount was to be adjusted against hire purchase/rent Installments instead of hire purchase only.
(17) The argument of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs was that the agreements were of adhoc nature and meant to serve as a stop gap arrangement till the defendant formulated a policy for disposal of the sheds on hire-purchase basis. According to the learned counsel the agreements have ceased to be operative and no longer govern the relationship between the parties as in the year 1977 itself the defendant had made a categorical representation followed by similar declarations from time to time that the sheds would be transferred to the allotted on hire purchase basis at a price to be determined subsequently. Learned counsel further contended that acting upon the representation the plaintiffs accepted the offer of the defendant to transfer ownership of the sheds on hire purchase basis to them and now the defendant can not be allowed to go back and claim that the offers given to entrepreneurs to buy the sheds on hire purchase were time bound or since they did not accept the offers within the stipulated time the same lapsed.
(18) The plaintiffs used all the arrows in their quiver to withhold the payment of rent/hire purchase charges. The conduct of the plaintiffs show that it was not based on equity, fairplay and justice. It is queer logic that on the one hand the plaintiffs failed to discharge their obligations under the agreements or the letters of defendant No.3 dated January 23, 1979 and May 1, 1982 by not making the requisite payments and on the other hand they are pressing into service the application of doctrine of equitable estoppel. It is well settled that one who claims equity must do equity. Estoppel springs from equity doctrine. If the application of the principal leads to results which are unjust and opposed to fair play and justice the doctrine will have no application in a given case.
(19) As is seen from the above, the conduct and action of the plaintiffs is far from being based on equity. Plaintiffs are in possession of the sheds for a long time without making the requisite payments. Such like parties to the litigation are disentitled from invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Promissory estoppel proceeds on the footing that when on the representation of a promisor, a promisealters his position, then the former must keep his word and is not allowed to recede from his promise as otherwise it will work injustice on the latter. In the present case it has not been shown that the plaintiffs who were already in possession of the sheds as lessees were induced by defendant No.3 to alter their position on the basis of the alleged policy decision to make over the ownership of the sheds to them on hire purchase basis. The advertisement of July 1973 is silent as to how and on what basis the sheds would be given to the entrepreneurs.
(20) At this stage it will be worthwhile to once again draw upon the facts of Suit No-2369/88 which would serve as an illustration to demonstrate that the doctrine of promissory estoppel would not be attracted to the cases in hand. It is not denied that the plaintiff in the said suit executed an agreement on September 29,1976 in favor of defendant No.3 in which he undertook to pay the amount of Rs.2970.00 as monthly charges for Shed No.G-8, Rohtak Road Industrial Complex. As is evident the policy statements of the Lt.Governor dated March 9,1977 and defendant No.3 dated March 15,1977 pertaining to sale of sheds to entrepreneurs on hire purchase basis came subsequent to the agreement which the plaintiff executed in favor of defendant No.3. Plaintiff and defendant No.3 had acted upon that agreement in as much as the plaintiff had deposited the advance rent for one month, security amounting to Rs.6000.00 and reservation charges to the tune of Rs.3000.00 besides paying advance for power connection and the defendant No.3 had put the plaintiff in possession of the shed and accepted the advance rent and other charges though the agreement had not been signed on behalf of defendant No.3. The plaintiff was put in possession of the shed not because of any policy of the hire purchase but pursuant to the agreement executed by him on September 29,1976. Therefore the plaintiff did not change his position in any manner after the policy statement of the Lt. Governor dated March 9,1977 and defendant No.3 dated March 15,1977. It is not pleaded that the cases of the other plaintiffs are in any way different or dissimilar. The plaints also do not disclose as to how defendant No.3 led the plaintiffs to change/alter their position while relying up its policy decision dated March 15,1977. In Delhi Cloth & General Mills L Vs. Union of India the Supreme Court while taking stock the number of judgments, namely, Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co.Ltd. Vs. State of U.P., , Union of India Vs. Godfrey Philips India Ltd., , Central London Property Trust Vs. High Trees House Ltd. 1947 Kb 130 and Central Newbury Car Auctions Ltd. Vs. Unity Finance Ltd. (1956) 3 All Er 905 held that the party asserting promissory estoppel must have been induced to alter its position on the representation made to him by another. It was observed by the Supreme Court that the alteration of position by the party is the indispensable requirement of the doctrine. Decisions cited by Mr. Lekhi, namely, Bareilly Development Authority & another Vs. Ajai Pal Singh and others and Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co.Ltd. Vs. State of U.P also do not hold anything to the contrary. They do not in any manner advance the case of the plaintiffs.
(21) Since the basic ingredient for application of the principle of promissory estoppel that one party must make a representation and the other party must act on the basis of that representation is missing the same will not apply.
(22) It is also manifest from aforesaid policy decision that no representation was made by defendant No.3 with regard to the price at which the sheds were to be sold on hire purchase basis to the plaintiffs. The policy was not definite and immutable and was liable to change as is evident from the categorical statement.. appearing in the circular dated March 15,1977 to the effect that the position stated therein was to be taken as “provisional and was subject to change in the light of the further discussion with the bankers and other authorities”.
(23) An inchoate policy like the present one can neither attract the doctrine of promissory estoppel nor confer any rights and impose any duties on the parties. In these circumstances, defendant No.3 cannot be asked to abide by the alleged policy of sale of the sheds on hire purchase basis if it chooses not to pursue the same. Letters of defendant No.3 dated November 21, 1986, May 28, 1987 and May 2, 1989 are mere proposals for transfer of industrial sheds in question on hire purchase basis. The plaintiffs are at liberty to reject the offers but then they cannot claim to be the owners of the sheds on hire purchase basis. Having regard to the above discussion, I am prima facie of the view that the principle of equitable estoppel cannot come to the aid of the plaintiffs. Since this is a prima facie view it will be necessary to examine the other submission of Mr.Lekhi, learned counsel for the petitioner.
(24) Mr. Lekhi next contended that the defendant No.3 decided to transfer the sheds on no profit no loss basis to the allottees but is now demanding exorbitant amounts which are not based on any relevant criteria but merely on its whim and caprice. On the other hand Mr.Swatanter Kumar, learned counsel for defendant No.3 submitted that the price evaluation has been made on the basis of various relevant factors. It was contended that the plaintiffs who have filed suits did not make the requisite payments which resulted in heavy financial involvement of the defendant. He pointed out that the defendant . No.3 had acquired the land and constructed the sheds mainly by taking loans from the banks and other financial institutions and the Government besides the said defendant had invested its own funds. It was also submitted that due to non-remittance of payments by the allottees the defendant failed to pay back the loan and interest thereon to the banks and other financial institutions resulting in ever mounting liability of the defendant. Learned counsel stated that the offered hire purchase rate includes interest component also. His contention is that if the payments were made in time by the plaintiffs the liability of the defendant towards the banks and other financial institutions would have been much less and consequently the plaintiffs would not have been saddled with the increased interest component.
(25) The plaintiffs in their respective plaints have failed to advance any cogent reasons as to why they did not pay in accordance with the agreements executed by them. No worthwhile answer is also forthcoming from the plaintiffs as to why payments were not .made at the rates indicated in the letters of the defendant dated January 23,1979 and May 1,1982 even when the rates were much below what was stipulated to be paid by them in accordance with their respective agreements. For example, according to these letters the plaintiffs, who were in possession of 2700 sq. yards, were required to pay Rs.l250.00 per month instead of Rs.2970/ There is no justification whatsoever for not making the payment in accordance with the said letters. It is not difficult to imagine the plight of the defendant No.3 who has been placed in a difficult situation because of the plaintiffs failure to make the payments. At this interlocutory stage it will neither be desirable nor appropriate to decide whether the rate at which defendant No.3 has offered to transfer the sheds to the entrepreneurs is exorbitant or is not based on the declaration of the defendant that it will transfer the sheds on no profit, no loss basis. It is not denied by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that the land was acquired by defendant No.3 and sheds were constructed thereon by taking loans from the banks and the Government of India. This money was required to be returned to the banks with interest and in case of default in payment the interest liability would keep on mounting. Since the plaintiff and other allottees failed to make the payments in time,it Joes seem to me that this may have contributed to the mounting interest which the banks are charging defendant No.3 for the monies advanced to it for the acquisition of the land and construction of the sheds thereon. However, this is one part of the story. The other part of the story is also disquieting. It speaks of the inaction of defendant No.3 in not deciding the price at which the sheds were 809 to be made over to the plaintiffs on hire purchase basis even though the inchoate policy to transfer the ownership to the entrepreneurs was announced in the year 1977. It is noteworthy that a definite offer to transfer the sheds on hire basis for the first time came only in the year 1986. It took nine years for the defendant to calculate the price of the sheds. This inaction and inertia is symbolic of our present day system. When the defendant on January 23,1979 and May 1,1982 asked the plaintiffs to pay the arrears of rent at the reduced rates as indicated in the said letters one would have thought that the price at which the sheds would be sold to the entrepreneurs would be declared shortly. Learned counsel for the defendant was unable to give any worthwhile reasons for talking such a long time in coming out with the price at which these sheds were to be sold.
(26) Learned counsel for the plaintiff invited my attention to the audit report of the auditors and submitted that they have commented unfavorably with regard to the state of accounts of the defendant No.3. That may be so. But the fact remains that the plaintiffs failed to pay the rent in accordance with respective agreements and in any case opportunity to pay at reduced rate provided by letters dated January 23,1979 and May 1,1982 of defendant No.3 was not availed by them.
(27) Having regard to the facts and circumstances of 804 the case I am of the opinion that at this stage it will be appropriate to ask the plaintiffs to pay at the rates mentioned in the aforesaid letters dated January 23,1979 and May 1,1982 of defendant No.3. Since the plaintiffs did not make the payments for the last 16 years it will be in consonance with principles of fair play that they are asked to pay interest as well. In the circumstances it is directed that the plaintiffs will pay the arrears and future rent in accordance with the rates mentioned in the letters dated January 23, 1979 and May 1,1982 with interest @10% per annum from the date the plaintiffs were put in possession of the sheds till payment. The plaintiffs, however, will be at liberty to deduct the amounts already paid. In the event of the plaintiffs paying the directed amount within ten days from today the order dated December 17, 1990 and February 13,1992 will remain in force till further orders. However in case any plaintiff fails to deposit the said amount within the aforesaid time, the interim orders dated December 17,1990 and February 13,1992 will stand vacated qua him without further reference to the court. Future rent/damages for use and occupation will be paid by the plaintiffs’ the rates indicated in the aforesaid letters dated January 23, 1979 and May 1,1982 month by month by 7th of each calender month. The orders dated December 17,1990 and ‘February 13,1992 are accordingly modified to the extent 804 indicated above.
(28) Before parting with the judgment I may notice another submission of the learned counsel for the defendant No.3 to the effect that no relief can be granted in the applications filed by the plaintiffs for interim reliefs as the suits are not maintainable. He contended that the premises in question are public premises covered under the provisions of the Act. It was urged that the Act being a self contained code the jurisdiction of this court is barred from entertaining the suit. On the other hand learned counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that the question of evaluation of the shed cannot be decided by the Estate officer and is beyond the scope of the Act. Upon consideration of the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, I am prima facie of the opinion that the jurisdiction of the civil court is not barred in so far as the question relating to the price of sheds is concerned.
(29) Any observations made hereinabove will not be taken as an expression of opinion affecting the final decision of the case.
(30) The applications are disposed of.