ORDER
1. A very important question has been raised as to whether the respondent, Harbans Lal Khullar, who retired as male (mail) driver from Western Railway, Jaipur Division, is an employee of the Central Government?
2. The facts are short and simple. The respondent retired from Western Railway on 31st August, 1992 as male (mail) driver. He had let out his premises known as MIG residential flat bearing No. B1A/23C, Pankha Road Residential Scheme, Janak Puri to the petitioners Sh. S.C. Chawla. The flat was let out in 1974 at a monthly rent of Rs. 250/-. While the respondent was in service, he was allotted a staff quarter at railway colony, Bandikui, which he vacated on 30th June, 1992. He wanted to shift and settle at Delhi in his own house. He has in fact already shifted to Delhi along with his wife and is presently residing in a tenanted premises at Pitam Pura, where he is paying a monthly rent @ Rs. 1500/-. This house he took on rent on 1st November, 1992. He has no other suitable residential accommodation available at Delhi except the suit property. The petitioner’s sons, who are also working and residing outside Delhi visit him off and on along with their families. Most of his relatives are in Delhi and in old age he wants to live in his own house.
3. The tenant, petitioner herein, filed a leave to defend affidavit, raising the plea that respondent owns sufficient accommodation at Rajinder Nagar. He has already filed two eviction petitions one u/S. 14(1)(e) and other u/S. 14(1)(b)(d) of the Act which are still pending. That the respondent, in fact, wants the petitioner to vacate the house so that he could get higher rent. In replication, the respondent denied that he has any accommodation at Rajinder Nagar. The property at Rajinder Nagar measuring 128 sq. yds. belonged to his father and after the death of his father, he along with his four brothers, inherited that property. But the said property was sold by them on 2nd April, 1987. He denied that he wanted to re-let the house in question. The learned Rent Controller after considering the case on merits declined to grant the leave. He found that the tenant had not raised any friable issue.
4. The present revision petition has been filed against the said order. Mr. Baira in this revision petition for the first lime raised the objection about the maintainability of the eviction petition on the ground that the
respondent, being a railway employee, does not fall under the definition of the Central Govt. employee, which is the basic requirement for filing the petition under S. 14C of the Act. On merits it has been alleged that the court below ignored the factum of joint tenancy. Since the tenancy was joint, eviction against petitioner alone is against law. Moreover respondent is not owner of the property. Premises was acquired from DDA under Hire Purchase agreement. It is, in fact, the DDA who is the owner. Respondent owns house at Rajinder Nagar.
5. Raising the legal objection, Mr. Batra contended that the classification as given in S. 14C, cannot be extended so as to cover a railway employee. As per railway manual, the employees of railway are appointed by their General Manager or by the Railway Board and not by the Central Govt. Railway employees are a class apart from that of the Central Government employees. Moreover, in his petition under S. 14(1)(e) the respondent himself has admitted that he is a railway employee. He never mentioned himself to be Central Govt. employee because he knew the difference between railway employee and Central Govt. Employee. The Supreme Court in the case of K.N. Shukla v. Navnit Lal Manilal Bhatt , while discussing the provisions of S. 197 and S. 195(1)(a) of the Cr. P.C. held that the railway officer officiating in the transportation department is not an officer under the Central Government but is under Railway Board. Therefore relying on these observations, Mr. Batra contended that the railway employee is not an employee of the Central Govt.
6. Mr. Arun Jaitley, Sr. Advocate, took the first and foremost objection that the preliminary objection cannot be allowed to be taken up for the first time in this revision petition. The petitioner in his leave to defend affidavit had not taken this as ground i.e. at the first available opportunity nor this objection was even orally taken before the Rent Controller, hence the petitioner cannot be allowed to urge it in the revision petition. Mr. Jaitley refuting the allegation on merits
contended that there was sufficient material before the court below to come to the conclusion that it was not a joint tenancy but only the petitioner was a tenant and that the house at Rajinder Nagar which was inherited by the respondent along with his four brothers has since been sold in April, 1987, and therefore, he has no alternative suitable accommodation with him. Regarding respondent’s ownership also the court has rightly come to the conclusion that the DDA cannot be the owner because respondent had purchased this property from the DDA. Even the hire purchaser of a property from the DDA is the owner as held by this court. Moreover, the scope of this court in revision petition is very limited. It cannot re-assess the facts and evidence which has already been assessed by the court below.
7. The admitted facts are that the respondent had mentioned himself to be a retired railway employee. In the leave to defend application the objection that he is not a Central Government employee was not taken nor this point was urged before the Addl. Rent Controller. This objection therefore, according to Mr. Jaitley, cannot be allowed to be taken for the first time in the revision petition. He relied on the decision of this court in the case of Parvin Sarin v. Sh. Manbir Singh reported in (1981) 1 Ren CR 697, where the court held that the objection not taken by the tenant before the Controller and the Tribunal, cannot be allowed to be taken in second appeal. He also placed reliance on the decision of this court in the case of Mrs. Kundan Lal Mehta v. Smt. Parkashwati reported in (1980) 2 Rent CJ 551. In fact this is a new point taken in this revision petition, which ordinarily should not be allowed to be argued at this stage, but keeping in view the far- reaching consequences of the legal objection raised, I am dealing this on merits also.
8. The word “Central Government Employee” has not been defined under the Act. As per the General Clauses Act, 1897, “Central Government” shall,
“(b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution mean the President; and shall include,
(i) in relation to functions entrusted under clause (1) of Article 258 of the Constitution to the Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause;
(ii) in relation to the administration of a part C State the commencement of the Constitution, the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under Article 239 or Article 243 of the Constitution as the case may be;
(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution.”
Even according to this provision, the authority given to the Central Government is to be exercised by the President, and when this authority is so exercised by him or by any other authority permitted to do so under the rule of business, the action in any such case must purport to have been taken in the name of the President. The Central Government is not an individual but an organisation, whether a function is exercised by the President as the head of the Union of India or whether a power is vested by the Constitution on the President as such as a persona designate, the procedure for the exercise of power would be the same, namely, either the one prescribed by the rule of business or under the law and the rules made there under. The Indian Railway, as such, is nothing but a part of the Central Government and is covered under the definition of organisation. If the Central Government is an organisation then railway is a part of the same. As per the rule of business, powers have been delegated to the Railway Board but ultimate powers of the Railway Board vests with the Railway Ministry which is a part of the Central Government. Therefore we cannot think railway to be something different or dehors of the Railway Ministry or dehors the Central Government.
9. The analogy that the railway administration is a part of the Central Government can also be drawn from the provision of Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure which prescribes that;
“no suit can be instituted against the Government unless the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been delivered to, or left at the office of-
(a) in the case of a suit against the Central Government (except where it relates to a railway), a Secretary to that Government;
(b) in the case of a suit against the Central Government where it relates to a railway, the General Manager of that railway;.”
Therefore this makes it clear that the railway is a part of the Central Government but for the purposes of rule of business, the President has delegated the power to the Railway Board to administer its own functions.
10. Mr. Batra’s contention that the railway employees are governed by railway manual and railway rules will not make any difference nor anything turns on the fact that the railway quarters are to be allotted by the railway administration. While bringing on the statute book, the amended Act 57 of 1988 in the Delhi Rent Control Act and incorporating Sections 14B and 14C, the legislature had in mind to rationalise the present Rent Control laws by bringing about a balance between the interest of landlords and tenants, to reduce litigation between them and to ensure expeditious disposal of disputes between them. So far as I could read, while incorporating Sections 14B and 14C, the legislature had in mind that the retired employees, be that of Central Government or the armed forces, who have to vacate the accommodation with them allotted by the Government must not be necessarily dragged into prolonged Litigation. They should be facilitated to occupy their own house immediately. The argument can be raised, as to why the armed forces have not been covered under the definition of employee of the Central Government? Why separate classification has been made for them? So far as my reading goes of Section 14B of the Act, the landlord belonging to the armed forces have been kept a class apart, the reason is obvious because so far as members of armed forces are concerned, legislature wanted to
give them extra benefit than other Central Government employees, for example under section 14B where the landlord is a released or retired official can file a petition whereas under Section 14C no released government employee can file the petition. Again u/S. 14B a dependent of a member of any armed forces who had been killed in action can file a petition. But no such provision is available u/S. 14C. Hence the legislature in order to cover the dependent members of the official, who was killed in action had to have a separate provision, otherwise the armed officers being government servant would also have been covered u/S. 14C. The officers of the Delhi Police are employees of the Delhi . Administration or of the Central Government as the case may be. They have also not been covered under Section 14C of the Act but have been kept at par with the officers of the armed forces. Explanation to Section 14B makes it clear which reads as under :
Explanation.– For the purposes of this Section, “armed forces” means an armed force of the Union constituted under an Act of Parliament and includes a member of the police force constituted under Section 3 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978.”
Ordinarily the officials of the Delhi Police would have been covered u/S. 14B being the employees of Delhi Administration but still they have not been brought under Section 14 but under Section 14B because this has been done in order to enable the dependent of the police official who had been killed in action should also be entitled to get immediate possession of his house. Therefore, it is keeping in view of the exigencies of the services of the armed forces and Delhi Police that provisions have been made even though they are the employees of the Central Government or the Delhi Administration.
11. So far as the decision of Supreme Court in K. N. Shukla’s case (supra) is concerned, that is of no help to the petitioner because in that case the question was regarding the obtaining of the Sanction u/Ss. 195 and 197, For prosecution of the Govt. servant, sanction of Central Govt. is a pre-condition. The petitioner in
that case was the railway employee. For his prosecution, sanction was given by the Rail way Board. His objection was that the Rail way Board could not have given the sanction but in fact it ought to have been given by the
Central Government. It was in this back
ground, the Supreme Court held that once the
Central Government delegated its power to
another authority with regard to appointment
and removal of a public servant, then for the
purposes of Section 197, Cr.P.C. the public servant concerned will not he treated to be a
public servant for the purposes of interpreting
the word, “not removable from his office
except by or with the sanction of the Central
Government” within the meaning of that
section. Relying on the decision of the Federal
Court, where it was held that a police officer
who could be dismissed by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police under the statutory
rules and regulations was not a person not
removable from office except by or with the
sanction of the Provincial Government within
the meaning of Section 197 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure and that sanction under
that section was not, therefore, necessary for
prosecuting such an officer for an offence
alleged to have been committed by him.
Varadhachariar, J. speaking for the Federal Court observed that in the light of the practice prevailing in India under which the power to
appoint and dismiss particular classes of
officers is vested in particular authorities.
Otherwise there is the danger of our ignoring
the policy of the legislature in limiting the
class of officers entitled to this protection and
of making S. 197, Cr.P.C. available to all
public officers. The reading of the observation of the Supreme Court makes it clear that
the Central Government had delegated the
power for the purposes of Section 197,
Cr.P.C. to the Railway Administration or to the Railway Board, as the case may be, and
therefore, once the Railway Board gave the
sanction for prosecution of its employee,
there was no necessity of obtaining a sanction
from the Central Government. But that is not
the case in hand. Here we have to see with
what intention the legislature brought the
special summary provisions on the statute
book of the Delhi Rent Control Act by its
amendment of 1988?
12. The reliance by Mr. Batra on the decision of S. C. Bansal v. Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap reported in (1990) 42 DLT 463 is misplaced. There the court was dealing with the case of Secretary General, Lok Sabha, who is not a government servant. In that case the court observed that the Lok Sabha Secretariat enjoys an independent and autonomous status under the Constitution of India and is independent of the Central Government both administratively and financially. Under Article 98 of the Constitution of India, the appointment of the Secretary of the Lok Sabha is made by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, and therefore, it was in this background the Court came to the conclusion that leave to defend ought to have been given because the legislature has deliberately kept out persons who are not in employment of the Central Government like Secretary Lok Sabha, persons holding constitutional posts like Judges of the High Court and Supreme Court, employees of public sector undertakings etc. whereas the respondent herein is not such an employee nor an employee of public sector undertaking. His status is that of a Government servant and being a government servant is covered under a definition of a Central Government therefore the decision of S. C. Bansal (supra) is of no help to the petitioner.
13. In the case of B. M. Chanana v. UOI this Court treated the respondent No. 3 an employee of the Northen Railway, a government servant. This judgment of the Division Bench of this court has been upheld by the Supreme Court. Therefore inference can be drawn from the observation of the Division Bench of this Court in B. M. Chanana’s case (supra) that for the purposes of the provision of Section 14-C the employee of the railway will be treated for all intents and purposes a government servant, and therefore, an employee of the Central Government.
14. By bringing on the statute these special provisions, for special category of landlord’s, a right has been given to them to recover immediate possession under Sections 14B, 14C and 14D. Such landlords fall under a separate identifiable class. This beneficiary
legislation, to my mind, should be made applicable to all government servants and it should be given a wider interpretation. The interpretation should be harmonious in order to validate the constitutional provision of the statute. The objective of the provision of Sections 14B and 14C is the same which the legislature intended when it brought on the statute book Section 14A i.e. to vacate the government accommodation and to cut down the litigation. In fact the interpretation to Section 14C must be made in such a fashion as to achieve the object of the legislation and also to save its validity. It must be liberally construed. The object of the legislature in using the word “Central Government” was to include the government servant. Railway employees are government servants even though the Central Government has delegated its power to the Railway Board. But that will not take them out from the purview of the word employee of the Central Government. Admittedly, the allotment of railway accommodation is exclusively the purview of the General Manager of the Railway Board, as the case may be, but by delegating these powers the employees of the railway do not become employees of some statutory body or a local authority. They still remain government servants.
15. The other point raised by Mr. Batra in this case is that the respondent is not the owner of the property in question because he has purchased the property from the DDA on hire-purchase basis. Since he is only a hirer no right or title of this immovable property vests in the respondent. He placed reliance on the decision of Karnataka High Court in the case of S.D. Patel v. H. R. Thippaiah reported in (1979) 2 Rent LR 561, where it was held that the civil court functioning under Rent Act not competent to entrain an eviction petition against sub-lessee. Relying on this decision, Mr. Batra contended that the status of the respondent at best can be of a sub lessee. The right in the property still vests with the DD A. I am afraid this objection merits rejection because this court in umpteen number of cases has already held that the persons who
have purchased the flats on hire purchase basis from DDA will be the owner and landlord so far as tenant is concerned. Therefore this objection has no force.
16. Mr. Batra took up another objection that in the notice dated 7th December, 1978 the landlord/respondent admitted that it was a joint tenancy in the name of the petitioner and his mother. But in the eviction petition, Smt. Satyawati Chawla has not been imp leaded as a party. The respondent, therefore, cannot be allowed to resile from his admission made in his notice dated 7th December, 1978. This objection also merits rejection because in the judgment inter se the parties, by a court of competent jurisdiction, it has been held that the present petitioner, Sh. S. C. Chawla, alone is the tenant. That judgment was not challenged. Hence, to my mind, Mr. Arun Jaitley rightly contended that the petitioner is estopped from raising this new ground. The rent has been deposited by the petitioner alone and now he cannot be allowed to raise this new ground. As regard the requirement of the landlord the trial court has gone in detail and found that he bonafide requires the same as he already given up the government accommodation allotted in his favor by the Western Railway and has shifted to Delhi. He is residing in a tenanted premises. He has no other suitable accommodation with him. The house of his father at J-400, Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi has already been sold out in 1987 by him and his four brothers who had inherited the same whereas he retired from service on 31st August, 1992. The house in Rajinder Nagar was sold in 1987 therefore it cannot be said that that house was sold in order to give a cover up for this eviction petition.
17. For the reasons stated above, I find no infirmity in the order of the trial court and find no merit in this petition. The same is accordingly dismissed.
18. Petition dismissed.