JUDGMENT
Bharati Sapru, J.
1. Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner Shri Amit Singh and Shri Sheshadri Trivedi, holding brief of Shri Sameer Sharma for respondent No. 2 and 3. This is a workman’s petition challenging the award of the Labour Court dated 13.12.1996 passed in Adjudication Case No. 62 of 1995 and also an order dated 27.3.98 passed by the respondent No. 1 on an application named by the petitioner to rectify the award under the provisions of Section 66 of the U.P.I.D. Act. The order of reference reads this:
KYA SEWAYOJAKON DWARA SRAMIK SHIVANATH PUTRA SRI CHABBA PASSI, BHOOTHPOORV PARICHALAK, JHANSI DEPO KO ADESH DINAK 15.11.74 DWARA KARYA SE RRATHIK/KIYA JANA UCHITH EVAM VADHANIK HAI? YADI NAHIN TO SAMBANDHIT SRAMIK KYA HITLABH/KSHATHIPOORTHI PANE KA ADHIKARI HAI? KIS TITHI EVAM ANYA KIS VIVARAN KE SATH?
2. The facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed as a conductor in the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation on 28.4.1970 and he worked there till 14.11.74. It is admitted to the petitioner workman that he was working as temporary conductor and seniority list of such conductors had been prepared on 15.11.1974. The services of the workman were dispensed with and he was told that as and when need arises, he will be engaged and he will be given employment. It is stated by the petitioner workman that seniority list was published on 25.1.92 by which, he came to know that persons junior to him have been engaged and given regular appointment as conductor in the respondent Corporation.
3. The petitioner, then sought a reference in the year 1995 in which, he claimed that he had been retrenched without following the procedure prescribed under Section 6N of the U.P. Industrial Dispute Act as persons junior to him had been given employment. The workman also claimed that the provisions of Sections 6F and 6Q of the U.P.I.D. Act had been violated and he was entitled to be reinstated with consequential benefits.
4. The respondent Corporation filed its written statement before the Labour Court and rebutted the claim of the petitioner. The respondent Corporation also took-up the plea that the claim had been raised by the petitioner workman belatedly. The petitioner had sought to raise his claim after a period of 21 years and, therefore, even though no limitation was prescribed under the Act, the claim itself should have been made within a reasonable time.
5. The Labour Court made an award on 13.12.96 whereby it came to the conclusion that although it was correct that the petitioner had worked for more than 240 days and had been dismissed without its compliance of Section 6N of the U.P.I.D. Act, he could not be reinstated. In view of the fact that the claim made by the petitioner in approaching the Labour Court for relief was highly belated and could not be said to be within reasonable time. Against this award of the Labour Court, the petitioner filed an application under Section 6(6) of the U.P.I.D. Act by which, the workman sought to have the award rectified. The Labour Court rejected the application made by the workman by an order dated 27.3.98 by holding that the powers of the Labour Court under Section 6(6) of the Act were confined to making corrections of mistakes which were of clerical or of arithmetical nature, and since there were no such slips or omission in the award, it required no rectification.
6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner Shri Amit Singh has argued that once the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the removal of the petitioner workman was bad and in violation of the provisions of Section 6N, it should have reinstated the petitioner with all relief. Learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention, has relied on the decision of the Hon Apex Court 1999 (82) FLR 137 in the case of Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing Cum Processing Service Society Ltd. and Anr. in which case, there was a delay of 7 years for raising such dispute. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the relief couldn’t be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay. The Supreme Court considered the facts and circumstances of that case and in that case, there was a delay of 7 years. The Supreme Court, however, while considering the purpose and scheme of the Industrial Dispute Act also stated in that case that the Act contemplates realistic and effective negotiations, conciliation and adjudication as per the need of the society keeping in view of the fast changing social norms of the developing country like India.
7. The Supreme Court also held in this case that the plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not a merely hypothetical defence and even in cases where delay was shown to be existed, the Tribunal/Labour Court or Board while dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/termination or dismissal.
8. In response to the contentions as made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner on delay, learned Counsel for the respondent has argued that in this particular case, the respondent Corporation had correctly taken the plea of delay.
9. The undeniable facts are that there was a delay of 21 years in raising of the reference. A period of 21 years cannot be said to be a reasonable time for any workman to approach the Labour Court for relief. The learned Counsel for the respondent in support of his argument has cited the case of Haryana State Co-operative Land Development Bank v. Neelam as reported in 2005 (105) FLR 114. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that:
the Industrial Courts like any other Court, must be held to have some discretion in the matter of grant of relief. There is no proposition of law that once an order of termination is held to be bad in law irrespective of any other consideration, the Labour Court would be bound to grant relief to the workman. The Industrial Disputes Act does not contain any provision, which mandates the industrial Court to grant relief in every case to the workman. The extent to which relief can be moulded will inevitably depend upon the facts and circumstances in a particular case.
10. On the question of delay, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering Ajai Singh’s case, held that the decision in Ajai Singh as relied upon by the petitioner, had been rendered in the circumstances of that case and, therefore, it was a decision confined to what it decided and not what could be logically deduced from it. The Supreme Court has also relied on earlier decision of Supreme Court in the case of Assistant Executive Engineer v. Sri Shivalinga as reported in 2002 (92) 601 and on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Nedumkadi Bank Ltd. wherein the Supreme Court held that though the law did not prescribe any time limit to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act, it is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and revive a matter which has since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. The Supreme Court further held that a person in a certain situation might even be held to be bound by the doctrine of acceptance i.e. sub-silentio. The petitioner in the preset case did not raise any industrial dispute questioning his termination/dismissal within a reasonable time. In fact, he allowed 21 years to slip by.
11. It has been stated by the petitioner workman that he came to know of the seniority list in the year 1992 and even after that he kept silent for another three years before raising the reference in the year 1995.
12. 21 years cannot be said to be a reasonable time to approach any Court for relief. The submissions made by learned Counsel for the respondent Corporation that the petitioner moved his claim highly belatedly has substance and is accepted by this Court to be correct. The submissions made by learned Counsel for the respondent Corporation that the award of the Labour Court while deciding the issue of delay is correct and warrant no interference from this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on account of the fact that the decision of the Labour Court is well considered on the question of delay. The Labour Court could not have put the clock back for 21 years, as it is too long a period and, therefore, the Labour Court rightly refused to grant any relief to the petitioner workman of reinstatement.
13. Having heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and the respondent, I am of the firm opinion that the Labour Court has committed no mistake in refusing to grant relief of reinstatement to the petitioner workman. Indeed, the petitioner workman slept for many years. It could not be said that a delay of 21 years is to be condoned because it would be reasonable for any person to approach any Court for relief after a period of 21 years. The petitioner workman in my opinion did not approach the Labour Court for relief within a reasonable time and, therefore, was not entitled to the relief of reinstatement. In my opinion, the award of the Labour Court is well considered and contains no error of law.
14. The award of the Labour Court is confirmed. The writ petition is devoid of merits. It is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.