JUDGMENT
R.B. Misra, J.
1. In this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.12.1997 (Annexure-II to the writ petition) passed by S.S.P., Meerut.
Heard Sri H. N. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Sri S. K. Sharma, learned standing counsel for the respondents.
2. Brief facts necessary for adjudication of the writ petition are
that the petitioner was appointed as constable in November, 1978 and after completing the training, he was promoted to the post of Head Constable on 25.1.1985 while posted under the Police Administration Etah. This transfer to Meerut by order dated 6.6.1997 (Annexure-1) was challenged by way of writ petition in 1977 is pending consideration before this Court. Whereas by an order dated 27.12.1997, the S.S.P., Meerut (respondent No. 2) dismissed the service of the petitioner.
3. It appears in view of the transfer dated 27.12.1997 the petitioner was supposed to join at Meerut but he absented and has got the telephonic pressure of Ministers for cancellation of said transfer order which was subsequently found that there was no such telephonic call ever have been made by the concerned Ministers. The concerned authority in its order dated 27.12.1997, has observed that if the petitioner was aggrieved by the transfer order, he should have given the representation to the senior officer rather to involve in such activities.
4. According to para 5 of the impugned order dated 27.12.1997, it has been indicated that the concerned authority, i.e., S.S.P., Meerut, was satisfied that the conduct of the petitioner was immoral and conducting of disciplinary enquiry was not appropriate and practicable, therefore, in exercise to its power under Rule 8 (2) (b) of U.P. Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (in short called ‘Rule 1991’ hereinafter) the S.S.P., Meerut dismissed the service of the petitioner.
5. It has been contended on behalf of learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has not been afforded proper opportunity of hearing and without proper enquiry, and assigning any cogent reason, the S.S.P., Meerut, has awarded major punishment behind the back of the petitioner which cannot be legally sustained.
6. The counter-affidavit and rejoinder-affidavit have been exchanged. No material has been highlighted in the counter-affidavit. Neither any cogent reason nor categorical satisfaction of the S.S.P., Meerut, has been forthcoming from the impugned order whereas in rejoinder-affidavit, the averment of similar nature as averred in the writ petition have been reiterated.
7. The extract of relevant ‘Rule, 1991’ as indicated above are being provided here for reference.
“8. Dismissal and removal.–(1) No police officer shall be dismissed or removed from service , by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority.
(2) No police officer shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank except after proper inquiry and disciplinary proceedings as contemplated by these rules :
Provided that this rule shall not apply :
(a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge ; or
(b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such enquiry ; or
(c) where the Government is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such enquiry.”
8. It appears from the aforesaid para 8 (2) (b) of the ‘Rule, 1991’ that the authority has power to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank if he is satisfied that for some reason to be recorded by the said
authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such enquiry.
9. The above provision is para materia to the provisions of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution whereby such dispensation of enquiry was provided when it is not practicable to hold enquiry and Governor or the President of India is of the opinion to that effect. In the case of B. K. Sardari Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1971 SC 1547, it was, inter alia held that such an enquiry may be held by the President or the Governor of the State, as the case may be but in the case of Shamsher v. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 2192, it has been held that the satisfaction could be arrived at by the Minister and Governor should be entitled to pass the order of ex parte. the order for satisfaction is not transferred and earlier view expressed in B. K Sardari Lal (supra), has been reversed to that extent. It will be relevant to point out at this stage that the later judgment of the Supreme Court in Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1991 SC 385 : (1991) 2 UPLBEC 959 (SC), Wherein the Bench consisting of Hon’ble K. Jagannatha Shetty and Hon’ble A. M. Ahmadi, JJ, inter alia interpreted that in case of dispensation with departmental enquiry the subjective satisfaction of concerned authority must be fortified by independent material and the Supreme Court observed in Jaswant Singh (supra) as follows :
“It was incumbent on the respondents to disclose to the Court the material in existence at the date of the passing of the impugned order in support of the subjective satisfaction recorded by respondent No. 3 in the impugned order. Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) can be invoked only when the authority is satisfied from the material placed before him that it is not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental enquiry.”
Their Lordships in the said judgment of Jaswant Singh (supra), have also placed reliance on the judgment of Union of India v. Tulsi
Ram Patel AIR 1985 SC 1416, where it was observed as follows :
“A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary authority lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Department’s case against the Government servant is weak and must fail.”
10. In the case of Jaswant Singh (supra), thereafter the Supreme Court held that since no particular subjective satisfaction of the concerned authority, having been disclosed, the impugned order of dismissal dated 7.4.1981 was set aside and appellant was reinstated in the service forthwith.
11. In support of the contention that the concerned authority had to record the circumstances that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the enquiry as such the impugned order in writ petition was illegal. The petitioner placed reliance on Bhupendra Singh Yadav v. State of U.P. and Ors., 1998 (1) UPLBEC 638, Balbeer Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors., 1996 (1) AWC 2.47 (NOC) : 1996 (1) UPLBEC 316. On behalf of the respondents, no material has been produced for the purpose of justifying the impugned order or for showing compliance of requirement of law.
12. This Court in its order dated 30.9.1999 passed in Writ Petition No. 48469 of 1998, Chandrtka Prasad v. State of U.P., has taken similar view dismissal of the writ petitioner made under Rule 8 (2) (b) of ‘Rule 1991’ was quashed.
13. I have gone through the contents of writ petition, counter-affidavit and rejoinder-affidavit as well as examined the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties. The petitioner being a member of police force is expected to observe the norms with more strict discipline in comparison to employees of other department. However, before passing any major punishment under Rule 8 (2) (b) of ‘Rule 1991’, the S.S.P. was under obligation to elaborate explanation of the circumstances and
give cogent reason showing his inability for not proceeding for disciplinary inquiry rather to take course of passing the order of dismissal outrightly. Apparently, nothing has been recorded showing the satisfaction of the authority concerned for not holding the inquiry and no circumstance has been shown for the purpose of contending that it was not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry. I find the S.S.P., Meerut, has miserably failed to exercise due care and caution to observe norms of law and has passed an arbitrary order based on whim and in haste.
14. In view of the above observations made by different judgments, the dismissal in question cannot sustain in the eyes of law. Therefore, the writ petition is allowed and the order dated 27.12.1997 Annexure-2 to the writ petition is set aside and the petitioner is entitled to get all consequential benefits.