JUDGMENT
Manju Goel, J.
1. These are five petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashment of the orders summoning the petitioner for offences under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act(hereinafter referred to as the `Act’) for which five complaints have been filed by the respondent No. 2 M/s International Print-O-Pac Ltd. The impugned orders in all the five complaints are similar and have been passed on 16-2-2004. The complaints are similar. The complainant M/s International Print-O-Pac Ltd. alleges that the accused No. 1 M/s National Food Products(India) Pvt. Ltd. issued several cheques towards repayment of its dues towards the complainant and these cheques when presented were returned unpaid on account of insufficiency of funds. The Crl.M.C.188/2005 relates to the complaint in respect of three cheques bearing No. 889715, 889716 and 889717 for Rs. 1,00,000/- each. The Crl.M.C.185/2005 relates to the complaint in respect of three cheques bearing No. 889712, 889713 and 889714 for Rs. 1,00,000/- each. The Crl.M.C. 192/2005 relates to the complaint in respect of cheque No. 387698 dated 10-6-2003 for Rs. 2,00,000/-. The Crl.M.C.254/2005 relates to the complaint in respect of three cheques bearing No. 889721 for Rs. 1,64,671/- and cheque No. 889722 for Rs. 1,64,671/- and cheque No. 889723 for Rs. 1,00,000/-. The petitioner is arrayed as accused No. 3 and is described as “Smt.Rachna Kapoor, Director”. The allegation about her is available in para 13 in each of the complaints in the following language;
“the second and third accused being the Directors and second accused being signatory of cheques and accused No. 2 & 3 being in charge of the companies affairs and responsible to the company for the conduct of the company as well as the company are also guilty of offences and liable to be punished in accordance to law.”
2. The Metropolitan Magistrate has summoned the petitioner along with the accused No. 1 which is the company and accused No. 2 who is also a Director of the company as well as the present petitioner on the basis of the allegation in the complaint and the affidavit filed by the complainant.
3. The petitioner in these petitions alleges that she has never dealt with the complainant in any manner whatsoever, that all the transactions of the accused company used to be handled by her husband who is the accused No. 2 in the complaints, that in the complaint not even a single act relating to the transaction in question has been attributed to the petitioner except making the bald allegation as quoted above and that therefore the orders summoning her for the offence is bad.
4. To what extent the petitioner is involved in the conduct of the business of the accused company is a matter of trial. However, at the time of summoning, the Metropolitan Magistrate has to satisfy himself that the complainant has made out a case for summoning each accused. This Court in its judgment in the case of Raminder Kaur Narula vs. Prem Colour Chemicals(P) Ltd. in Crl.M.C. 2690/2004 delivered on 6th July, 2005 has held that unless the complainant says that a particular Director who is prosecuted by him is responsible for the offence being a Director responsible for the aspect of the business relating to the offence in question by specifying how he is so responsible and on what basis such allegation is made, the Court cannot summon him for the offence under Section 138 of the Act. For coming to this conclusion, the Court relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Katta Sujatha(Smt.) vs. Fertilizers & Chemicals Travancore Ltd. & Anr. reported in (2002) 7 SCC 655 as also the judgment of this Court in the case of Cdr. Shekhar Singh Vs. N.K. Wahi 2003 [1] JCC [NI] 52.
5. In the present case, it is clear that the complainant has alleged nothing against the petitioner except saying that she is the Director of the accused company. The allegation that she is responsible for the conduct of the business of the company is merely a bald allegation without any consequence because he does not specify how the petitioner is so responsible and on what basis such allegation is made in the complaint. The Metropolitan Magistrate was, therefore, not justified in summoning the petitioner in the five complaints mentioned above. I am, therefore, constrained to allow the five petitions and quash the impugned orders and discharge the petitioner in all these complaints.