ORDER
1. Common questions of law arise in these two writ petitions arising out of similar fact situation and therefore, I am passing a common order. The petitioner in W.P. No. 11661 of 1984 was incorporated on 22-12-1974 as a private company and made public on 29-9-1975. They are engaged in the manufacture of Industrial gases. Their factory is at Mathur, Kulathur Taluk, Pudukot-tai District which is an industrially backward area. They were attracted by the tariff concessions given under the Tamil Nadu Revision of Tariff Rates on supply of Electrical Energy Act 1978 (hereinafter called “the
Act”). The petitioner has been sanctioned a power supply of 500KVA per month by the respondents. Production was started from 15-8-1980.
2. The petitioner in W.P. No. 12017 of 1988 was brought into existence in the year 1970 and their main business is to manufacture textiles, fertilisers and chemicals. They have a factory at Manali near Madras where they manufacture caustic soda. Electricity supply was given to the factory at Manali and production commenced in January, 1979. The sanctioned load is 55000 KVA. They also claim that the concessional tarriff rates under the Act, attracted them to set up the factory at Manali.
3. The schedule to the Act prescribed the tariff rates levilable on electrical energy supplied by the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board. Section 4 to the Act says that the Government, after taking into account the cost of production of energy and such other matters, may amend the provisions of the. Schedule to the Act. The Act which came into force on 1-3-1978, contained the following tariff rates applicable to the petitioners.
“(i)(a) In the case of new industries, the following concessional tariffs shall be charged for the first five years after the commencement of production :–
For the first three years.
…
66-2/3 Per cent of High Tension rates under l(A)(b) as the case may be.
For the fourthyear.
…
80 Per cent of the High Tension rates under 1(A) 1(B) as the case may be.
For the fifth year.
…
90 Pet cent of the High Tension rates under 1(A) 1(B) as the case may be.
For the sixth year Full Tariff.
The above concession shall apply to both
unit rates and maximum demand charges. This concession shall not, however, be applicable to a consumer who utilises power from his own generating units or makes other arrangements for production purposes and utilises the power supplied by the Board for auxiliary purposes only.
Note :– (1) This tariff concession is applicable only to a consumer for new industrial undertaking and will not be available for subsequent expansion or diversification of production.
(2) If a consumer starts a branch mill for the manufacture of the same products the branch mill is not eligible for the concession.”
4. In exercise of the power under Section 4 of the Act the Governor of Tamil Nadu made amendments to the Schedule in G.O.Ms. No. 861 P. W. (Electricity), dated 30-4-1982. So far as new High Tension, industries are concerned, it was a repetition of the earlier concession with a new sentence added. It wilt be worthwhile to quote the same with the now clause underlined.
“(i)(a) In the case of new High Tension Industries, the following concessional Tariffs shall be charged for the first five years after the commencement of productions :–
For three year.
…
66-2/3 percent of the High Tension Rates.
For the IV year.
…
80 per cent of the High Tension Rates.
For the V year.
…
90 percent of the High Tension Rates.
For the VI year.
…
Full Tariff.
The above concession shall apply to both unit rates and maximum demand charges. This concession shall not, however, be applicable to a consumer who utilises power from his own generating units or makes other arrangements for production purposes and utilises the power supplied by the Board for auxiliary purposes only. The above concessions shall not apply from the year when the Industry starts earning profits.
Explanation 1 — This tariff concession is applicable only once to a consumer for a new industrial undertaking and will not be available for any subsequent expansion or diversifications of production.
Explanation 2 — If a consumer starts a
branch mill for manufacture of the same
products, the branch mill is not eligible for the
concession,” Finally by G.O.Ms. No. 20-3
dated 16-12-1988 the Schedule was once
again amended by deleting clause relating to
making of profits. As amended the schedule
was as follows :–
“(a) In the case of new High Tension Industries to be set up in the areas other than the Madras Metropolitan areas, the following concessional tariffs shall be charged for the first five years from the date the consumer is given service connection under High Tension Tariff-I :–
For three year.
…
66-2/3 percent of the High Tension Rates.
For the IV year.
…
80 per cent of the High Tension Rates.
For the V year.
…
90 percent of the High Tension Rates.
For the VI year.
…
Full Tariff.
The above concession shall apply to both unit rates and maximum demand charges. This concession shall not however, be applicable to a consumer, who utilises power from his own generating units or makes other arrangements for production purposes and utilises the power supplied by the Board for auxiliary purposes only.
Explanation 1 :– For the purposes of Electricity tariff concessions for new industries, the term “new industries” shall mean a new investment by entrepreneur including by an existing industry in any area, provided the assets of the existing industry are not transferred and shown as assets of the new industry.
Explanation 2 :– This tariff concession is
applicable only once to a consumer for a new industrial undertaking and will not be available for any subsequent expansion or diversification of production.”
5. I have taken care to extract the tariff rates as applicable to the new High Tension industries as and from the respective dates namely on 1-3-1978, 30-4-1982 and 16-12-1988. These are the statutory tariff rates applicable to the High Tension industries and none of the Government Orders amending the Schedule given any retrospective operation. In other wards, whether the industries are commenced before or after the said dates, they will enjoy the concession subject to the conditions contained therein., Any other interpretation will given room for discrimination between industries depending on the date of their commencement. This is a statutory levy of tariff on electrical energy supplied by the Electricity Board. This aspect has to be kept in mind while appreciating the grievance of the petitioners.
6. Now we can move on to the cause of action for the writ petitions. The petitioner in W.P. No. 11661 of the 1984 received a notice dated 25-9-1984 stating that for the year ending 31-3-1983, the petitioner had earned profits and that the tariff concession had been wrongly extended for the period from 1-5-1982 to 30-4-1984 and that the petitioner has to pay a sum of Rs. 2,09,433.30 as balance of energy charges. After a brief correspondence the final notice was given on 20-11-1984 demanding the said amount. The writ petition is to direct the respondents to give tariff concession for the full period of five years from the date of commencement of business.
7. Similarly, in the case of W. P. No. 12017 of 1988 a notice was received in October 1988, to the effect that the petitioner had earned profits for the year ending 30-6-1982, that tariff concession had been wrongly extended after 1-5-1982 (Date of G.O.Ms. No. 861). A sum of Rs. 82,77,622.88 was therefore, demanded as energy charges from May, 1982, to November, 1983. The writ petition is to declare the bill dated 6-10-1988 is void and unenforceable to the extent of the demand for payment of Rs. 82,77,622.88.
8. In the counter affidavit filed by the respondents in W.P. No. 11661 of 1984 it is stated that electricity supply was given on 18-7-1980 and production commenced on 15-8-1980. The tariff rates applicable on the date of commencement of production and the subsequent change in G.O.Ms. No. 861 dated 30-4-1982 is then referred to. As per the amended provisions the petitioner was asked to produce documentary evidence regarding the profits made by the Company. While taking six months time to furnish documentary evidence the petitioner available of the concession after giving the following written underlakihg on 28-4-1983 and 27-4-1984.
(i) We M/s. National Oxygen Limited, represented by Mr. G. M. Saraf, Managing Director note that as per the orders of the Government in G.O.Ms. No. 861, P.W., dt. 30-4-1982 Tariff Concessions specified under the H.T. Tariff-I(i)
(i) (a) admissible to new industrial undertaking will not be available from the year when the industry starts earning profit.
(ii) We hereby declared that our financial years ending with 31-3-1983 has disclosed loss as per our books of accounts. The required certificate from our Auditors M/s. Singhi & Company, Madras, will be submitted in due course.
(iii) We undertake to purchase audited balance-sheet and profit and loss account in proof of our unit not earning profit for the year ended 31-3-1983.
(iv) On the basis of the above undertaking we request you to extend the concessions referred to in para 1 supra.
(v) We hereby undertake to reimburse to the Board in lump sum the concession allowed with belated payment surcharge thereon as per the terms and conditions of supply immediately after expiry of the period of 6 months from the accounting year ended or the date of finalisation of the accounts whichever is earlier in case our industry is found to have earned profit.
(vi) We note that the concession allowed to us from 1-4-1983 will be provisional and
subject to production of documentary proof referred to in clause (3) supra and the same will be withdrawn at any time without notice.
(vii) We agree the amount allowed as concession shall be considered as an arrears of current consumption charges and the Board will be at liberty to disconnect the supply for non-payment of the said amount found due from us.”
9. Later it was found that the petitioner had made profits and therefore, the letter dated 25-9-1984 was sent. The petitioner had also agreed to abide by all the statutory amendments.
10. So far as W.P. No. 12017 of 1988, the counter affidavit says that the petitioner was not in a position to send any separate balance-sheet for the chemical unit at Manali and only a consolidated balance-sheet was furnished which showed profit for the year ending 30-6-1982. The petitioner had also given an undertaking more or less similar to the case of W.P. 11661/84 which I have extracted earlier.
The petitioner is aware that the concession availed of, with effect from 1-5-1982 was provisional subject to revision on the production of evidence regarding profits.
11. The petitioner in W.P. No. 11661 of 1984 has filed a reply affidavit in November, 1993 and the petitioner in W.P. 12017 of 1988 has filed a supplementary affidavit in March, 1995 seeking to meet the averments in the counter affidavit and also raising certain additional grounds. The petitioner in W.P. 11661 of 1984 says that they are not disputing the power of the government to revise the tariff but only object to the retrospective application of the policy decision. In other words, the petitioners were assured of the concessional tariff for a period of five years before their commencement of the industry. Had the condition regarding making of profits was inforces at the time of the commencement of the factory, they would not have located the factory in Tamil Nadu. Regarding the undertaking given by them it is stated that whatever is not permissible in law, should not have been incorporated in the undertaking. The petitioner in W.P. 12017 of
1988 is raising certain additional grounds to which I will make a reference at the time of summarising arguments of the counsel for the petitioners.
12. I had decided two batch of writ petitions earlier, where related questions arising out of the very same Government Order, G.O.Ms. No. 861, P.W. (Electricity) dt. 30-4-1982 were agitated and I had rejected all the points. The first batch of case in W.P. Nos. 5588 of 1986 etc., cases, is dated 31-8-1994 and the second batch of case W.P. 12095 of 1985 and another, is dated 14-3-1995. I therefore, requested the learned counsel for the petitioners to go through the said judgments before addressing arguments. Learned counsel for the petitioners, after going through the judgments says that the following questions still arise for consideration in these two writ petitions :
(i) G.O.Ms. No. 861 P. W. (Electricity) dated 30-4-1982 has no application to the petitioners, who had acquired a vested right for the concessional tariff for a full period of five years;
(ii) The said Government Order cannot give a retrospective effect;
(iii) The G.O. if at all, will apply only to industries which commenced production after 30-4-1982;
(iv) The power to amend the tariff rates is subject to the power under Section 49 of the Electricity Supply Act;
(v) The G.O. is vague and arbitrary on the question of finding out the year in which a Company makes profits;
(vi) G.O.Ms. No. 2043 P.W. (Electricity) dated 16-12-1988 has deleted the clause and therefore it should be presumed that the said clause never existed;
(vii) The respondent are barred by the principles of promissory estopal and legitimate expectation, from denying the conces-sion for the full period of five years.
13. Elaborate the above point Mrs. Malini Ganesh, learned counsel for the petitioners relies on Principles of Statutory
Interpretation by G.P. Singh for the proposition that vested rights cannot be taken away. Reliance is also placed on Shri Bakul Oil Industries v. State of Gujarat, . The following passage is relied upon (at p. 147 of AIR) :
“If the Government Grants exemption to a new industry and if on the basis of the representation made by the Government and industry is established in order to avail the benefit of exemption, it may then follow that the new industry can legitimately raise a grievance that the exemption could not be withdrawn except by means of legislation having regard to the fact that Promissory Estoppel cannot be claimed against a statute.”
In my opinion, the said judgment actually supports the case of the respondents and the petitioners are relying upon only a stray sentence. Actually the ratio of the said judgment is that the State Government is under no obligation to grant exemption from Sales Tax. The State Government was fully within its powers to revoke exemption by means of subsequent notification without offending the rule of promissory estoppel. What is more it was held in that case that the parties had not made out any case of promissory estoppel and laid down the following conditions for invoking the principles of promissory estoppel;
(i) that a representation was made to grant the exemption for a particular period to a new industry established in view of the representation held out by the State Government; and
(ii) that the appellants had established the new industry acting upon the representation made by the State Government”.
Learned counsel also relies on Mithra’s Legal Dictionary and the Concise Dictionary of law released by Oxford University Press for understanding the words “vested rights”. The following is the definition in the Concise Dictionary of Law for the words “vested rights”.
“Vested Rights: Rights that have accrued to a person, as opposed to rights that he may or may not acquire. There is a presumption that
Acts of Parliament are not intended to interfere with vested rights, particularly without payment of compensation.”
In my opinion, these arguments miss the basic concept of vested rights to which has been brought out in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shri Bakul Oil Industries v. Stale of Gujarat, (cited supra). The apex Court said that there was no necessity to go into the question of the “existing rights” because the State Government was under no obligation to grant exemption or give a concession.
14. It is next contended that the power to amend the tariff rates as contained in Section 4 of the Act cannot be understood as enabling the State Government to change the basic structure of concession originally contained. It is one thing to say that the power of amendment should be within the prescribed limits of subordinate legislation but totally another to say that the power of amendment cannot alter the basic structure. Apparently, the petitioners are seeking to invoke the principle that the Constitution of India cannot be amended so as to affect the basic structure of the Constitution. In my opinion, this principle has no application to the case of a subordinate legislation where the limits are well established by a series of decisions. One important judgment among the catena of decisions is the case relating to I. E. Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, . Apart from the parameters mentioned in the said judgment, as pointed out in the judgment above referred to viz., the amendment should not also violate the principles of promissory estoppel. The only question is whether on the facts of the case, the petitioners had established a case of promissory estoppel and I will deal with that question a little later. I will first refer to the arguments based on G. O. Ms. 2043 of 1988. I have already quoted this Government Order and the changes brought out by the Government order by way of amendment of the Schedule to the Act. However, reliance is placed on the preamble to the Government order, which takes note of the representation made to Government that it is
not proper to deny concessions announced for a fixed period midway on the ground that the unit has started earning profits. It is only on such representation that the offending clause was deleted from the Schedule to the Act. The argument is that the deletion has the effect of removing the offending clause from the beginning and it was no longer open to the respondents to apply the said clause even during the period from 30-4-1982 till 16-12-1988. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners the deletion must be read into in G.O. Ms. No. 861 dated 30-4-1982. This argument has to be rejected for the simple reason that neither the preamble to the Government order nor the amendments incorporated in the Schedule to the Act says that the deletion will have restrospective effect. In the absence of such a clause giving a retrospective effect, the Court will not be justified in holding that the deletion takes effect from 30-4-1982 even though the Government order itself was issued only on 16-12-1988.
15. The main and substative argument of the learned counsel is based on the principles of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation. For this purpose learned counsel for the petitioners relies on a letter dated 29-6-1976 written by the Secretary to the Government to the petitioners. The following sentence in the said letter is relied upon as the main reason for the petitioner to locate the factory at Manali:–
(i) The new industries concession in respect of H. T. Consumers under the standard HT-I Tariff will be made applicable on the special rate for caustic soda industry during the first five years after commencement of production.”
So far as W.P. No. 11661 of 1984 is concerned, there is no such letter. Except to say that the factory was located at Mathur Village in Pudukkottai, being attracted by the tariff concession contained in the Schedule to the Act, there is no other pleading. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners the very schedule to the Act containing the tariff concession is an incentive given to the new
industry to locate them in Tamil Nadu especially in the backward areas. In other words, the Schedule itself constituted the promise to the petitioners, by locating the industry. The petitioners had changed their position oh the ba.sis of the Schedule, and therefore, it was no longer open to the respondents to resile from the promise. This argument is, in my opinion, misleading because I have already pointed out that the Act enables the State Government to revise the tariff rates on electrical energy supplied by the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board. While Section 3 says that the tariff rates wilt be prescribed in the Schedule to the Act, Section 4 makes it very clear that the State Government can amend the provisions of the Schedule from time to time. Therefore, if the Schedule to the Act was a promise to the petitioner, equally the petitioners should have known about the power to amend the Schedule from time to time. It is therefore, idle to contend that the petitioners believed that the concessional rates of supply were available for the full period of five years. The concessional rates of supply were circumscribed by conditions which are relevant and reasonable. They have a nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the grant of concession. While on this aspect the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner based on Section 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 can be noticed. Section 49(3) of the Act is as follows :–
“(3) Nothing in foregoing provisions of this section shall derogate from the power of the Board, if considers it necessary or expedient to fix different tariffs for the supply of electricity to any person not being a licensee having regard to the geographical portion of any area, the nature of the supply and purpose for which supply is required and any other relevant factors.”
The argument is that different tariff rates can be fixed only if the geographical portion of any area or the nature of the supply and purpose for which supply is required warrants such different tariffs. In my opinion, this Section has no application at all to the facts of the present case. Section 49(3) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 was with reference to fixation of different tariffs contrary to Sec-
tion 49(2) of the Electricity (Supply) Act which calls for uniform tariffs. By the impugned Government order or in other words the amendment of the Schedule to the Act, it is nobody’s case, the different tariff rates are fixed for different companies. That apart, Section 4 of the Act, which enables the State Government to amend the Schedule from time to time, says that they must take into account the “cost of production of energy and such other matters as may be prescribed.” Therefore, so long as the amendment is within the scope of Section 4, the amendment of the Schedule cannot be challenged. In fact, in this case, the petitioners have not challenged the exercise of the power under Section 4 and whether such exercise is contary to Section 4 of the Act. In my judgment dated 14-3-1995 rendered in W.P. Nos. 12095 and 12141 of 1985 I have considered some of these aspects and I had observed as follows :–
“According to them, the words “New High Tension Industries” in G.O.M.S. No. 861, clearly indicate that the Government order will apply only for industries which commenced its operation after 30-4-1982. In other words, industries which had commenced operation prior to 30-4-1982 will not be governed by the new clause relating to an industry earning profits. This argument cannot be accepted because the Schedule to the Act itself is amended and after the amendment it is only the amended schedule which will be applicable. This is a statutory amendment which does not retain the earlier Government order. In other words, a consumer cannot seek to have the benefit of one part of the Government order and avoid the other part.”
16. Most of the judgment relied upon by the counsel for the petitioners had already been discussed by me in my two earlier judgments referred to already. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent the letter dated 29-6-1976 does not in any way advance the case of the petitioners because the tariff concessions were available right from 1-3-1978 when the Act came into force. Even prior to the said Act, similar concession had been given by exer-
cising power under the Tamil Nadu Essential Articles Control and Requisitioning (Temporary Powers) Act, 1940. It is therefore, idle to contend that only in the letter dated 29-6-1976 a promise was given to extend concessional rates of supply. At the risk of repetition I have to say that the grant of concessional rates of supply are governed by statutory orders issued under this Act. Therefore, the industry knows very well that such statutory orders are being changed from time to time and new conditions are either imposed or deleted from the Schedule to the Act. It is only subject to such vagaries of Government policy that the electricity supply was extended No industries right from the year 1974 onwards. On facts I am not convinced that it is only because of the concessional tariff rates that the petitioners established their factory in Tamil Nadu. In fact, concessional tariff rates for new industries is almost common in most of the States of India. Very often parties invoke the principle of promissory estoppel in a light hearted manner. It is a rule of evidence and ample proof is necessary to show that the parties would not have located the factory in Tamil Nadu but for the tariff rate concession. Merely because the Act as it stood on 1-3-1978 contained a schedule which prescribed the tariff rates for High Tension industries in a concessional method subject to certain conditions, does not mean that the Government cannot change the conditions based on experience and the necessity to extend concession to industries in a uniform manner. The change brought out in G.O.Ms. No. 861 dated 30-4-1982 was primarily to extend the concession only to industries which were unable to stabilise themselves and which were incurring loss. Why should industries which are flourishing be given concessional rates of tariff at the cost of the Electricity Board? I have given vent to my feelings about the need for the Electricity Board to be in a financially sound position to supply electricity to various consumers according to their needs. For instance, the Electricity Board is supplying electricity free to agriculturists. These and other matters had apparently impelled the Government to withdraw, the concession to those industries which were making profits.
In my opinion, the decision was absolutely reasonable and in public interest. The reference to various decisions to which I will now advert, will make it clear that where public interest warrants the principles of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked.
17. Delhi C. and G. Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, is one of the decisions cited by the petitioners. In my opinion this judgment is clearly against the contention of the petitioners. Certain rate of freight for carriages of the goods Naptha was claimed by fertiliser company on the basis of certain assurance as to the rate of freight given by the Railway Board before the Company set up the factory. Reliance was placed on a letter containing the assurance. But the very same letter stated that the rate of freight was subject to review by the Railways. It was therefore, held that the assurance was not clear and unqualified, and that therefore, no question of estoppel would arise in the matter. The fact situation in this case is almost identical. But the learned counsel has relied on this judgment only for the proposition that the doctrine of promissory estoppel can be invoked even without the party suffering any detriment or prejudice. It is pointed out that all that is necessary is to prove that the party asserting the estoppel must have acted upon the assurance and changed or altered its position by relying on the assurance. Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd., is another judgment which is strongly relied upon by the petitioners. Confirming the earlier judgment in Motilal P. Sugar Mills v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the apex Court only laid down the proposition that public bodies are as much bound as private individuals to carry out representations of facts and promise made by them, relying on which other persons have altered their position to their prejudice I have already noticed the fact that the question of prejudice or detriment need not any longer be proved in view of the subsequent judgments of the Supreme Court. The apex Court has also held that Jeet Ram’s case, was wrongly decided to the extent that it goes against Motilal Sugar Mills’ case. But the important observation of the apex Court in
this case cannot be ignored. They are as follows :–
“Of course we must make it clear, and that is also laid down in Motilal Sugar Mills Case, (supra), that there can be no promissory estoppel against the legislature in the exercise of its legislative functions nor can the Government or Public authority be de-barred by promissory estoppel from enforcing a statutory prohibition. It is equally true that promissory estoppel cannot be used compel the Government or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is contrary to law or which was outside the authority or power of the officer of the Government or of the public authority to make. We may also point out that the doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires, if it can be shown by the Government or Public Authority that having regard to the facts as they have transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government or public authority to the promise or representation made by it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the person whom the promise or representation is made and enforce the promise or representation against the Government or public authority. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case, because on the facts, equity would not require that the Government or public authority should be held bound by the promise or representation made by it. This aspect has been dealt with fully in Motilal Sugar Mills Case (supra) and we find ourselves wholly in agreement with what has been said in that decision on this point.”
This is the proposition, which I was referring to earlier that where equity warrants the rights of a private individual to enforce a promise cannot be upheld. Reference is then made to Asst. Commr. Commercial Taxes (Asst.) v. Dharmendra Trading Co., . I have already considered this case in my earlier judgments referred to above. This case turned on the fact that Government was unable to establish a case of misuse of an earlier concession, before withdrawing the same. Similarly, Purnami Oii
Mills v. State of Kerala, has also been considered by me in my earlier judgments. The principal reason for holding that the said judgment will not apply to the facts of the present case is that the said judgment related to the grant of exemption from payment of sales tax under Section 10 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act whereas we are concerned in this case with the tariff rates for supply of electricity which were liable to be changed from time to time, statutorily, under Section 4 of the Act. K.M.L. Nara-simhan, Larsen and Toubro Ltd. v. Union of India, is based purely on the facts of the case and does riot in any way advance the case of the petitioners. Learned counsel for the petitioners also relies on a decision in Gujarat State Financial Corpn. v. M/s. Lotus Hotels Pvt. Ltd., . That case also turned on the facts of the case and it was a case of a totally arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the Gujarat State Financial Corporation which was faulted by the Supreme Court. There was an agreement between the Corporation and a private company. On the basis of the agreement the Company proceeded to undertake and execute a project of setting up a Four-Star Hotel. The company had incurred huge expenses and suffered liabilities. It is at that stage that the State Corporation delayed the process in extending the promised loan. Certain Police enquiries were cited as the cause for the decisions of the Corporation. In my opinion, that case has absolutely no application to the facts of the present case.
18. On the other hand, Mr. R. Thyaga-rajan, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents has strongly relied on my earlier judgments and the judgment of the Division Bench in a batch of cases in W.P. Nos. 14812/89 etc. cases dated (sic)-12-1993. In the Division Bench judgment, reference was made to Section 4 of the Act and it was held:
“While holding that the petitioners would be entitled to the concessional rate of tariff for the period prior to 1-3-1993, we further hold that the petitioners would be entitled to only such concessional rate that was in force from time to time by virtue of the various Govern-
ment orders to which a detailed reference has been made supra in the statement and not to a flat rate of 55 paise per unit as claimed by them.”
They proceeded to observe :
“The grant of exemption or a concession is the exclusive discretion of the legislature or the Government and merely because those authorities have chosen to extend the benefit of concession or exemption to only the category of cottage industries whose consumption of energy does not exceed a particular limit for a particular purpose, does not involve per se any discrimination or arbitrariness whatsoever. The petitioners have no inherent or vested right for any concessional rate. The benefit of concessional rate itself is a privilege granted by the legislature or the State Government and that being the position it is always open to those authorities to also fix their own guidelines or criteria for purpose of according or denying the concessions. Such intricate questions as to the prescription of conditions and terms or guidelines for availing of a concessions are purely matters of policy and the wisdom of which is wholly alien to the consideration by Courts.”
He also relies on a decision in Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn., to answer the contention based on legitimate expectation. The following passage is apposite (at p. 1021 of AIR) :–
“Is cautioned in Attorney General for New South Wales’ case (1990 (64) Australian LJR 327) the Courts should restrain themselves and restrict such claims duly to the legal limitations. It is a well meant caution. Otherwise a resourceful litigant having vested interests in contracts, licences etc. can successfully indulge in getting welfare activities mandated by a directive principles thwarted to further his own interests. The caution, particularly in the changing scenario, becomes all the more important.”
19. There was one last argument to overcome the undertakings given by the petitioners. The argument is that where the contract is one sided and the weaker party has
no option but to sign on dotted lines which serves as a trap for an unwary weaker party, the same should not be enforced. I am unable to accept this contention because the petitioners are big companies which are advised by leading legal experts and for them to contend that they were not aware of the meaning of the understandings and had to sign the same under force of circumstances is neither believable nor acceptable.
20. In fine, I reject all the contentions raised by the petitioners and uphold the validity of the demand made by the respondents. The writ petitions are therefore, dismissed. There will however, be no order as to costs.
21. Petitions dismissed.