ORDER
K.S. Bakthavatsalam, J.
1. The writ petitioner was all along claiming that it was entitled to benefits under Article 30 of the Constitution of India, in the sense that the institution is having minority character. When it was denied, claiming that right in view of the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Young Men’s Christian Association represented by its General Secretary Nelson M. Issacs v. The State of Tamil Nadu represented by the Secretary to Government, Education Department, Madras, W.P. Nos. 1757 of 1975 etc., dated 24.9.1976, later on, preferred W.P. Nos. 2406 of 1980 etc. Herein the petitioner seems to be the Christian Association represented by its President and General Secretary. The writ petition was allowed by Nainar Sundaram, J. (as he than was). But, on appeal a Division Bench consisting of the Chief Justice and Raju, J. in W.A. Nos. 277 to 279 of 1989 affirmed the order of the learned single Judge and certain directions were given by the Division Bench. The said Division Bench made it clear that till the decision is rendered by the concerned District Educational Officer, the present status of the schools shall not be altered. The directions given by the Division Bench are to the following effect:
…That the schools in all the three writ petitions shall file representations and produce all relevant records before the concerned District Educational Officer in each of these cases to establish that the school in question had been established and
“…were being administered/managed by Young Men’s Christian Association. The concerned District Educational Officer shall thereupon decide the question as to whether or not the petitioner-school is entitled to the benefit of being accorded the status of a minority institution. That in the event the District Educational Officer is not satisfied on facts about any School having been established and administered/managed by the Y.M.C.A. the said school may be required to obtain a declaration from the civil court. This eventually will however, only arise after the District Educational Officer concerned passes reasoned and speaking order refusing the status as claimed by the concerned school.
Consequent to the directions, mentioned above, the petitioner seems to have made representation to the District Educational Officer, with certain evidence to show that the school is a minority institution. By the impugned order, the District Educational Officer has held that the request of the petitioner school viz, Y.M.C.A. Sports Higher Secondary School, Nandanam, Madras-35 to accord the status of a minority institution cannot be acceded to and the said school may obtain a declaration from the civil court based on documentary evidence.
2. Learned Counsel for the writ petitioner contends that the question of minority character cannot be re-opened in view of the judgment of the Division Bench in Young Men’s Christian Association represented by its General Secretary v. The State of Tamil Nadu, W.P. No. 1757 of 1975 etc., dated 24.9.1976, wherein an agreed list was filed by the State and the petitioner. Learned Counsel contends that in view of the said decision, it is not open to the respondents to go into the question now. Learned Counsel also points out that the order of Nainar Sundaram, J, (as he then was) has not been set aside fully by the Division Bench and that the Division Bench has given only certain directions, as mentioned above, giving liberty to the petitioner to produce records to the satisfaction of the District Educational Officer to show that the school in question had been established and were being administered/managed by Young men’s Christian Association. Learned Counsel for the petitioner also contends that the authority exercised the power which was not given by the Court and that the order is vitiated on the ground that the District Educational Officer has taken into account totally irrelevant considerations. Learned Counsel also stated that as it seen from the affidavit that the procedure conducted by the authority is violation of principles of natural justice and as such the proceedings of the District Educational Officer has got to be set aside.
3. When the writ petition came up for disposal, W.M.P. No. 3484 of 1993 was filed to implead the petitioners therein as party respondents in the main writ petition. Mr. K. Chandru, the learned Counsel appearing for the impleading parties states that teachers of the said school, the impleading parties, want to get them impleaded in the main writ petition to support the stand of the State.
4. The petition for impleading was stoutly opposed by the learned Counsel for the writ petitioner stating that they are not interested parties and that they cannot be impleaded as party respondents in the main writ petition.
5. I have heard the arguments of the learned Counsel on all parties. I am not convinced with the argument of the learned Counsel for the writ petitioner that the petitioners in W.M.P. No. 3484 of 1993 are not necessary parties in such proceedings. That apart, in Seethalakshmi Ammal v. State (F.B.), a Full Bench of this Court, to which I am a party, while considering the term who is ‘person aggrieved’ has held that meaning may vary according to context and that even a stranger may be found to have locus standi, provided he moves court for a right in common with general public. The only exception, the Full Bench in the abovementioned case has noted is that he is not a busybody or meddlesome interloper. This principles will equally apply to the impleading petitioners, who want to implead themselves in the writ petition, as their names appear in the order. Accordingly, W.M.P. No. 3484 of 1993 shall stand allowed.
6. Learned Government Advocate appearing for the State, relying upon the averment in the counter affidavit states that the petitioner has not submitted the application so far, that the directions given by the Division Bench of this Court in WA Nos. 277 to 279 of 1989 dated 31.10.1990 have been fully adhered to by the third respondent and that there is no necessity for giving personal hearing, to the petitioner. According to the learned Government Advocate the third respondent has considered the materials placed before it in pursuance of the directions given by the Division Bench of this Court in W.A. Nos. 277 to 279 of 1989, dated 31.10.1990, and once it has been considered nothing more to be done and the only course open to the petitioner is to move the civil court to get declaration.
7. Though the learned Counsel for the petitioner raised certain points and contends that the earlier judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in W.P. No. 1757 of 1975, dated 24.9.1976, concludes the issue, I do not think it is necessary for the purpose of deciding the issue in this writ petition, to go into such question at this stage, since I am satisfied on the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the legal battle the petitioner is asked to meet by the respondent State right from 1975, it is incumbent on the part of the third respondent to give a personal hearing to the petitioner before deciding the issue. It is true that the Division Bench of this Court in W.A. Nos. 277 to 279 of 1989, dated 31.10.1990 had stated that the petitioner should make a representation. But if the two directions given by the said Division Bench, mentioned above, are read together it can be seen that only if the District Educational Officer is not satisfied that it had not been established that the petitioner is a minority institution, it can move for declaration before the civil court. So in my view, to arrive at a finding as to whether the petitioner is a minority institution or not on the basis of materials produced before it, the concerned authority, the District Educational Officer herein, should have given a personal hearing to the petitioner institution. That is the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Km. Neelima Misra v. Dr. Harinder Kaur Paintal , In that case, the Supreme Court has held that even in administrative orders which involve civil consequences must be made consistently with the rule expressed in the Latin Maxim audi alteram partem. The Supreme Court, in that case has held that the shift now is to a broader notion of ‘fairness’ or ‘fair procedure’, in the administrative action. If the principle laid down in the abovementioned case is applied to the facts of this case, I am of the view that the impugned order has got to be set aside and that the third respondent has to be directed to hear the petitioner before passing an order afresh. As such, the writ petition stands allowed, the impugned order is set aside and the third respondent is directed to take up the matter and issue to the petitioner and pass orders, after giving it a personal hearing. The first respondent is to complete the proceedings within a period of sight weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. Till then the directions given by the Division Bench in W.A Nos. 277 to 279 of 1989, dated 31.10.1990 holds good that is till the decision is rendered by the concerned District Educational Officer, the present status of the schools shall not be altered.