JUDGMENT
1. CWJC 3359 of 1992(R) was filed by the Management challenging the award of the Labour Court, Jamshedpur in Reference Case No. 9 of 1985. By that award, the Labour Court set aside the punishment of dismissal awarded to two workmen, K.K. Yadav and R.P. Singh and directed their reinstatement with full back wages from the date of their dismissal to the date of their reinstatement. According to the Management, the Labour Court had acted without jurisdiction in passing such an award since by an order dated 16:8.1990, it was found that the Domestic Enquiry conducted by the Management against the workmen was valid and proper and what remained to be decided in terms of Section 11(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act was the question whether the punishment was disproportionate to the charges proved. But, what the Labour Court did was to reconsider the evidence taken at the Domestic Enquiry and to record a finding that the charges against the workmen were not proved by the Management, in disagreement with the findings of the Enquiry Officer as if it were sitting in appeal over the decision of the Enquiry Officer. According to the Management, the Labour Court had only jurisdiction to consider whether the punishment awarded was proper, once it had found that the Domestic Enquiry was valid and proper.
2. The learned Single Judge held that there was no reason to interfere with the award passed by the Labour Court, but he felt that the conduct of the workmen was such that they did not deserve the back wages as ordered by the Labour Court. The learned Single Judge, while upholding the directions for reinstatement, held that the workmen are entitled only to 50% of the backwages and not to the whole as held by the Labour Court. Feeling aggrieved by its substantial failure in its writ petition, the Management has filed LPA No. 348 of 2000 and feeling aggrieved by the interference with the backwages, the Union has filed LPA No. 9 of 2000.
3. The learned counsel for the Management has submitted that the Labour Court having held on 16.8.1990, that the Domestic Enquiry was valid and proper, had acted beyond its jurisdiction in posing point No. 1 in the award for decision and purporting to enter a finding that the Management had not proved the charges against the workmen. The counsel submitted that once the validity of the Domestic Enquiry was upheld, the Labour Court was concerned only with the quantum of punishment awarded in the light of what has been found at the Enquiry. That part of the award in which the Labour Court purported to disagree with the Enquiry Officer and to record a finding that the charge has not been found to be proved was one without jurisdiction. The finding that the punishment was ‘disproportionate was based on the finding that the charges were not proved and this was also illegal. Thus, it was submitted that the award should have been struck down and the learned Single Judge was not justified in upholding the award. The learned counsel for the Union on the other hand submitted that under Section 11(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, there was ample jurisdiction in the Labour Court to consider the question of the propriety of the punishment awarded and in that process to come to a conclusion of its own regarding the charge. The counsel did not dispute that on 16.8.1990 there was a finding that the Domestic Enquiry was valid and proper. But, he submitted that the Labour Court could not be said to have travelled beyond its power under Section 11(A) of the Act since it had the jurisdiction to reconsider the matter as far as punishment was concerned.
4. We find that in its order dated 16.8.1990, the Labour Court held that the Domestic Enquiry had been conducted by the Management in accordance with the principles of natural justice and the findings of the Enquiry Officer was on the basis of the evidence taken during the Domestic Enquiry. It was thus, that the Domestic Enquiry was found to be legal and valid. Once the Domestic Enquiry was so found to be legal and valid, it appears to us that it was not open to the Labour Court to canvass the question whether the findings at the Domestic Enquiry were correct or sustainable or not. In fact, the first question posed by the Labour Court to itself, in our view, is based on misconception of its jurisdiction in the context of its finding dated 16.8.1990. The question posed is “Whether the management had been able to prove the charges levelled against the workmen on the basis of the evidence available on record?” The Labour Court did not take any evidence or did not direct the management to adduce evidence before it, to sustain the charges framed against the workmen. Obviously, it was because of its own conclusion that the Domestic Enquiry was valid and proper. So, no occasion arose for the Labour Court to ask itself the question whether on the evidence, the charges have been proved. In fact, as we have earlier noted, the very finding on 16.8.1990 was to the effect that the findings of the Domestic Enquiry was supported by the evidence taken at that Enquiry. Thus, in our view, the Labour Court had asked itself a wrong question when it posed the first question for decision. Thereafter it has proceeded to record a finding that the Management has not proved the charges levelled against the workmen. When a Tribunal has asked itself a wrong question and even if it has answered that question correctly, it acts outside its jurisdiction attracting the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court (See Anisiminic). Here, the Labour Court has committed such an error of jurisdiction.
5. Even while considering the quantum of punishment, the Labour Court has proceeded on the basis that the Management has failed to prove the charges levelled against the workmen. This again, in our view, is not the correct approach to the question, the Labour Court had to consider, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 11(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The jurisdiction under Section 11(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act was to consider whether on the charges proved and the punishment awarded was not reasonable or was too harsh. In that process, the Labour Court could have taken note of all the relevant materials on record. But, that would not mean that it could sit in appeal over the findings of the Enquiry Officer disagreeing to that finding and find the punishment to be disproportionate to the charges proved. Here, what has happened is that the Labour Court has actually found that no punishment was liable to be awarded since the charges against the workmen were not proved. The conclusion is directly against what has been found by the Enquiry Officer, at the enquiry, the validity of which had already been upheld by the Labour Court.
6. In this situation, we are constrained to interfere with the award passed by the Labour Court. In our view, the learned Single Judge was not justified in refusing to interfere with the award. We may notice that the learned Single Judge had not adverted to this aspect. We are, therefore, satisfied that LPA No. 348 of 2000(R) deserves to be allowed and the award of the Labour Court deserves to be quashed and the matter remitted to the Labour Court for a fresh decision in accordance with law consistent with the finding dated 16.8.1990 that the Domestic Enquiry was valid and proper and consistent with the powers conferred on it under Section 11(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In this view, we are satisfied that the appeal filed by the Union has only to be dismissed. In the result, we allow LPA No. 348 of 2000(R) and setting aside the decision of the learned Single Judge in CWJC No. 3359 of 1992(R), quash the award of the Labour Court in Reference No. 9 of 1985 and remit the reference to the Labour Court for a fresh decision in accordance with law, its finding on 16.8.1990 and in the light of the observations made above. We dismiss LPA No. 9 of 2001(R).