High Court Punjab-Haryana High Court

Ambuja Cements Ltd vs Union Of India And Others on 10 February, 2009

Punjab-Haryana High Court
Ambuja Cements Ltd vs Union Of India And Others on 10 February, 2009
      IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT

                            CHANDIGARH.

                       C.E.A. No. 87 of 2007

                    Date of Decision: 10.2.2009

Ambuja Cements Ltd.

                                                        ...Appellant

                               Versus

Union of India and others

                                                     ...Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.M. KUMAR

            HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.S. BHALLA

Present:    Mr. Ravinder Narain, Advocate with
            Mr. Ashim Aggarwal, Advocate
            Ms. Sushma Sharma, Advocate and
            Mr. Ajay Aggarwal, Advocate,
            for the appellant

            Mr. Rajiv Malhotra, Advocate,
            for the respondents.

 1.    Whether Reporters of local papers may be               Yes
       allowed to see the judgment?
 2.    To be referred to the Reporters or not?                Yes
 3.    Whether the judgment should be reported in             Yes
       the Digest?


M.M. KUMAR, J.

The assessee has approached this Court by filing the

instant appeal under Section 35-G of the Central Excise Act, 1944

(for brevity, ‘the 1944 Act’) by challenging order dated 14.3.2007

passed by the Custom, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal,

Principal Bench, New Delhi (for brevity, ‘the Tribunal’). The appeal

was admitted on the following substantive questions of law:

“1. Whether the service of transportation up to the
C.E.A. No. 87 of 2007 2

customer’s doorstep, in the case of “FOR

destination” sales where the entire cost of freight is

paid and borne by the manufacturer, would be

“input service” within the meaning of Rule 2(l) of

the CC Rules?

2. Whether interest ought to have been demanded in

the present case?”

2. Brief facts of the case necessary for deciding the

questions of law raised before us are that the assessee M/s Ambuja

Cements Ltd. is a private limited company incorporated under the

Companies Act, 1956. It is engaged in the business of manufacturing

and selling of cement which is a excisable commodity classified in

Chapter 25 of the Ist Schedule appended to the Central Excise Tariff

Act, 1985. One of its factory is located in District Ropar within the

jurisdiction of this Court. The appellant has claimed that it has been

paying central excise duty at the appropriate rate in respect of cement

produced by it and there is no dispute in that regard. The assessee

also claimed that when it supplies cement to its customers “FOR

destination” it bears the freight in respect thereof up to the door steps

of the customer that is the destination point. On the afore-mentioned

freight the assessee also bears the service tax which has remained

undisputed. On that basis the assessee has asserted that once service

tax is paid by it then it becomes entitled to take Cenvat credit of such

service tax in accordance with the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 (for

brevity, ‘the CC Rules’). The assessee had taken the Cenvat credit on

such service tax paid by it. On 30.3.2006 the Commissioner, Central

Excise, Ludhiana, issued a show cause notice to the assessee asking it
C.E.A. No. 87 of 2007 3

to show cause as to why the Cenvat credit taken by it from March,

2005 to January, 2006 on payment of service tax be not recovered.

The show cause notice also proposed to recover interest and penalty

(“B”). The appellant filed reply and written statement (“C”). In his

order-in-original dated 21.11.2006 (“D”), the demand raised in the

show cause notice was confirmed by raising duty demanded along

with interest. The assesssee filed an appeal before the Tribunal which

was dismissed on 14.3.2006 (“F”). The Tribunal was persuaded to

accept the argument of the revenue that the payment of service tax on

the freight incurred by the assessee was not input service as per Rule

2(l) of the CC Rules. The view of the Tribunal is discernible from

paras 12 and 13 of the order which reads thus:

“12. Having considered the submissions made by both

sides, we find in favour of the revenue. We may now

state our reasons. Crucial point to be noted in regard to

Cenvat Credit is that credit availability is in-regard to

‘inputs’. The credit covers duly paid on input materials as

well as tax paid on services, used in or in relation to the

manufacture of the ‘final product’. Therefore, extending

the credit beyond the point of duty paid removal of the

final product would be contrary to the Scheme of Cenvat

Credit Rules.

13. The interpretation sought to be placed by the

appellant does not flow from the definition of input

service (reproduced in para 5). The main clause in the

definition states that the service in regard to which credit

of tax is sought, should be used’ in or in relation to
C.E.A. No. 87 of 2007 4

clearance of the final products from the place of removal.

The learned SDR has brought to our notice the decisions

of this Tribunal to the effect that transport does not

come, the scope of clearance or forwarding. Further, that

transportation (freight) is an entirely different activity

from manufacture remains settled by the judgements of

Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Bombay Tyre

International (1983 (14) ELT), Indian Oxygen Ltd. 1988

(36) ELT 723 Supreme Court and Baroda Electric meters

1997(94) ELT 13 SC.”

3. Mr. Ravinder Narain, learned counsel for the assessee

has drawn our attention to Rule 2(l)(ii) of the CC Rules which defines

input service. Learned counsel has emphaissed that the inclusive

definition of ‘input service’ given in Rule 2(l)(ii) of the CC Rules

shows that it would include inward transportation of goods or capital

goods for onward transportation up to the place of removal.

4. He has further argued that the words and expression used

in CC Rules and not defined but are defined in the 1944 Act or the

Finance Act, 1994 (for brevity, ‘the 1994 Act’) are to have the

meaning respectively assigned to them in those enactments. In that

regard reliance has been placed on Rule 2(t) of the CC Rules. On that

basis it has been submitted that the expression “place of removal”

used in Rule 2(l)(ii) of the CC Rules has to be assigned the meaning

given to that expression by Section 4(3)(c) of the 1944 Act. Learned

counsel has emphasised that ‘place of removal’ means as per the

provisions of Section 4(3)(c)(iii) a depot, a premises of consignment

agent or any other place or premises from where excisable goods are
C.E.A. No. 87 of 2007 5

to be sold after their clearance from the factory.

5. He has then argued that Board’s Circular No. 97/6/2007-

ST, dated 23.8.2007, which has been issued in pursuance to the order

passed by the Tribunal has clarified the issue as to up to which stage a

manufacturer or consigner take benefit of tax on goods sent by

transport (“A”). He has drawn our attention to para 8.2 of the Board’s

circular which lay down the requirement of fulfilling three conditions,

namely, (a) the ownership of goods and the property of the goods

remained with the seller of the goods till the delivery of goods in

acceptable condition to the purchaser at his door step; (b) the seller

bore the risk of loss of or damage to the goods during transit to the

destination; and (c) the freight charges were an integral part of the

price of goods. According to the learned counsel the property in the

goods was never transferred to the purchaser and remained with the

seller i.e. assessee till the delivery of goods to the purchaser at his

door steps. He has also emphasized that the assessee had taken an

insurance cover bearing the risk of loss or damage to the goods

during transit to the destination and that the freight charges were an

integral part of the price of the goods. Learned counsel has

maintained that once all these conditions are fulfilled then it is well

settled that the revenue is bound by the circular issued by it. He has

placed reliance on a judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court

rendered in the case of Paper Products Ltd. v. Commissioner of

Central Excise, (1999) 7 SCC 84. While concluding his submissions

learned counsel has prayed that both the questions which have

emerged from the order of the Tribunal deserved to be answered in

favour of the assessee and against the revenue.

C.E.A. No. 87 of 2007 6

6. Mr. Rajiv Malhotra, learned counsel for the revenue,

however, has argued that the third condition of merging freight with

the price of the goods is not complied with. He has also submitted

that merely because the assessee has paid the service tax on the

freight charges would not constitute a basis for allowing Cenvat

credit to the extent of tax paid by them.

7. Having heard learned counsel at a considerable length

and perusing the paper book and statutes with their able assistance,

we are of the view that the questions of law deserve to be answered in

favour of the assessee-appellant and against the revenue. It is

undisputed that the appellant being a manufacturer and consigner has

paid service tax on the value of goods transported by it by road. The

Central Board of Excise and Customs (CBEC) has issued a circular

dated 23.8.2007 dealing with the issue concerning ‘up to what stage

manufacturer/consigner could take credit on the service tax paid on

goods transported by it by road’. The issue, in fact, has emerged out

of the order of the Tribunal passed in the case of the appellant itself.

The Board has opined that the phrase ‘place of removal’ has to be

determined by taking into account the facts of each case. According

to the circular, the expression ‘place of removal’ has been defined by

Section 4 of the 1944 Act and according to sub-rule (t) of Rule 2 of

the CC Rules, if any words or expression used in those rules are not

defined but are defined in the 1944 Act or the 1994 Act then they are

to be given the same meaning for the CC Rules as assigned to them in

those Acts. Accordingly, reliance on Section 4 of the 1944 Act has

been made where place of removal has been defined as under:-

“place of removal” means-

C.E.A. No. 87 of 2007 7

(i) a factory or any other place or premises of

production or manufacture of the excisable goods;

(ii) a warehouse or any other place or premises

wherein the excisable goods have been permitted to be

stored without payment of duty;

 A depot, premises of a consignment agent or any

other place or premises from where the excisable

goods are to be sold after their clearance from the

factory; from where such goods are removed.”

8. It is clear from the definition that for a

manufacturer/consignor the eligibility to avail credit of the service tax

paid on the transportation during removal of excisable goods would

depend upon the place of removal. The circular further contemplates

compliance of certain conditions where the sale has taken place at the

destination point. The aforementioned part of the circular reads as

under:-

“……However, there may be situations where the

manufacturer/consignor may claim that the sale has taken

place at the destination point because in terms of the sale

contract/agreement (i) the ownership of goods and the

property in the goods remained with the seller of the

goods till the delivery of the goods in acceptable

condition to the purchaser at his door step; (ii) the seller

bore the risk of loss of or damage to the goods during

transit to the destination; and (iii) the freight charges

were an integral part of the price of goods. In such cases,

the credit of the service tax paid on the transportation up
C.E.A. No. 87 of 2007 8

to such place of sale would be admissible if it can be

established by the claimant of such credit that the sale

and the transfer of property in goods (in terms of the

definition as under section 2 of the Central Excise Act,

1944 as also in terms of the provisions under the Sale of

Goods Act, 1930) occurred at the said place.”

9. It is well settled that the circulars issued by the Board are

binding and aims at adoption of uniform products. In that regard

reliance has been rightly placed on the judgment of Hon’ble the

Supreme Court in the case of Paper Products Ltd. (supra) and such

circulars are binding on the department. Placing reliance on earlier

judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of CCE v. Usha Martin

Industries, (1997) 7 SCC 47; Ranadey Micronutrients v. CCE,

(1996) 10 SCC 387; CCE v. Jayant Dalal (P) Ltd., (1997)10 SCC

402; and CCE v. Kores (India) Ltd., (1997) 10 SCC 338, Hon’ble

the Supreme Court concluded in para 5 as under:-

“5. It is clear from the abovesaid pronouncements of

this Court that, apart from the fact that the Circulars

issued by the Board are binding on the Department, the

Department is precluded from challenging the

correctness of the said Circulars even on the ground of

the same being inconsistent with the statutory provision.

The ratio of the judgment of this Court further precludes

the right of the Department to file an appeal against the

correctness of the binding nature of the Circulars.

Therefore, it is clear that so far as the Department is

concerned, whatever action it has to take, the same will
C.E.A. No. 87 of 2007 9

have to be consistent with the Circular which is in force

at the relevant point of time.”

10. It is, thus, evident that the revenue is precluded from

challenging the correctness of the circular even on the ground of the

same being inconsistent with statutory provisions. It goes further to

limit the right of the revenue to file an appeal against the correctness

of the binding nature of the circular. Therefore, there is no escape

from the conclusion that the circular is binding on the revenue.

11. The only question then is whether the appellant fulfills

the requirement of circular. The first requirement is that the

ownership of the goods and the property therein is to remain with the

seller of the goods till the delivery of the goods in acceptable

condition to the purchaser at his door step. The aforesaid condition

has to be considered to be fulfilled because the supply of cement by

the appellant to its customer is ‘FOR destination’. The appellant also

bears the freight in respect thereof up to the door step of the

customer. The freight charges incurred by it for such sale and supply

at the door step of the customer are subjected to service tax which is

also duly paid by the appellant. Moreover, the definition of

expression ‘input service’ is available in Rule 2(l) of the CC Rules,

which reads thus:-

“2(l) “input service” means any service, –

(i) used by a provider of taxable service for

providing an output service, or

(ii) used by the manufacturer, whether directly

or indirectly, in or in relation to the

manufacture of and includes services used in
C.E.A. No. 87 of 2007 10

relation to setting up, modernization,

renovation or repairs of a factory, premises

of provider of output service or an office

relating to such factory or premises,

advertisement or sales promotion, market

research, storage upto the place of removal,

procurement of inputs, activities relating to

business, such as accounting, auditing,

financing, recruitment and quality control,

coaching and training, computer networking,

credit rating, share registry, and security,

inward transportation of inputs or capital

goods and outward transportation upto the

place of removal;”

12. The ‘input service’ has been defined to mean any service

used by the manufacturer whether directly or indirectly and also

includes, inter alia, services used in relation to inward transportation

of inputs or export goods and outward transportation up to the place

of removal. It has also remain un-controverted that for transportation

purposes insurance cover has also been taken by the appellant which

further shows that the ownership of the goods and the property in the

goods has not been transferred to the seller till the delivery of the

goods in acceptable condition to the purchaser at his door step.

Accordingly, even the second condition that the seller has to bear the

risk of loss or damage to the goods during transit to the destination

stand fulfilled.

13. The third condition that the freight charges were integral
C.E.A. No. 87 of 2007 11

part of the excisable goods also stand fulfilled as the delivery of the

goods is “FOR destination’ price. This aspect has been specifically

pointed out in para 2.2 of the reply dated 12.4.2006 given to the show

cause notice. Therefore, we are of the view that the first question is

liable to be answered in favour of the assessee and against the

revenue.

14. Once the first question has been answered in favour of

the assessee and against the revenue then it is evident that there is no

contravention and violation of any of the provisions of law and the

credit has been lawfully availed. Therefore, the allegation concerning

not availing the service within the meaning of ‘input service’ and

irregular availment of credit could not be sustained. Then the

question of payment of interest does not arise and the answer to the

second question consequently would be against the revenue and in

favour of the assessee.

15. As a sequel to the above, both the questions of law are

answered against the revenue and in favour of the assessee.





                                              (M.M. KUMAR)
                                                 JUDGE




                                              (H.S. BHALLA)
February 10, 2009                                JUDGE

okg/Pkapoor