ORDER
1. The validity and legality of the order passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad in RP No.54 of 1996 dated 4-12-1998 is assailed in this writ petition.
2. On an application filed by the petitioner, the second respondent resolved to regularise the issue of granting second pucca permit on the route – Kakinada Super Bazar to Sarbhavaram, through resolution dated 22-12-1995. Aggrieved by the same the second respondent-APSRTC preferred RP No.54 of 1996 on the file of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad, (for short ‘the Tribunal’) and the Tribunal allowed the revision petition by order dated 4-12-1998 setting aside the grant made by the second respondent in favour of the petitioner. It is that order which is impugned in this writ petition.
3. It is the case of the petitioner that in the process of considering the validity of the impugned permit granted by the second respondent, the Tribunal misdirected, itself, to the entire question and arrived at the conclusions ignoring the relevant material available on record. It is also the case of the petitioner that the Tribunal recorded the findings without any material and evidence on record. On both the grounds, the Tribunal has committed serious irregularity requiring interference
of this Court. It is also the case of the petitioner that the entire order passed by the Tribunal is vitiated for the reason of non-application of mind.
4. It is also the case of the petitioner that the conditions of the approved schemes in G.O. Ms. No.612 of 1978; 35 of 1979 and 56 of 1979 were modified in G.O. Ms. No.342 dated 23-8-1985 exempting the two services of the petitioner. It is the further case of the petitioner that the approved scheme Nos.767, 613 and 735 of 1975 exempts the holders of stage carriage permits in respect of routes overlapping partially in the absence of total prohibition in the scheme. There is no prohibition whatsoever prohibiting granting of permit even by the approved scheme in G.O. Ms. No.215 and 248 dated 7-4-1976. The approved schemes relating to the route -Kakinada Super Bazar to Shanthi Ashram was also modified in G.O. Ms. No.227 dated 4-7-1980 exempting the charitable institutions plying stage carriages on the route Kakinada Superbazar to Shanti Ashram.
5. It is the specific case of the third respondent, APSRTC that the route in question – Kakinada Super Bazar to Shanthi Ashram overlaps the notified routes that is to say :
(a) Visakhapatnam to Machilipatnam approved in G.O. Ms. No.782 of 1972 dated 13-6-1972 for a distance of 38 kms. from Kakinada Super Bazar to Kathipudi Junction;
(b) Kakinada-Sarabhavaram approved in G.O. Ms. No.215 of 1976 dated 7-4-1976 for a distance of 53 kms. from Kakinada Super Bazar to Sarbhavaram. This is the route in question totally over laps the notified route in G.O. Ms. No.215 of 1976.
(c) Kakinada to Koltam approved in G.O. Ms. No.248 of 1976 dated 7-4-1976 for a distance of 42 kms. from
Kakinada Super Bazar to Santhi
Ashram.
(d) Kakinada io Upparagtidem approved in G.O. Ms. No.342 of 1985, dated 12-8-1985.
All the aforesaid four schemes completely prohibit grant of permit to an operator. The approved schemes in G.O. Ms. Nos.767, 613 and 735 of 1975 do not exempt the holders of such carriage permits in respect of the routes over-lapping partially. In fact, the Government issued G.O, Ms. No.1050 dated 6-10-1986 giving an errata to modify the scheme in G.O. Ms. No.342 of 1985 removing the saving clause for future stage carriage permits held by public charitable institutions with the result the existing slage carriage permits held by the public charitable institutions only were saved on the route, Kakinada to Sarbhavaram. The petitioner cannot be considered to be a public charitable institution.
6. It is the case of the APSRTC that it has monopoly to operate bus services on the notified routes to the exclusion of all others except those who are exempted under the various approved schemes and no permit could be granted to any other person on any of the notified routes or portion thereof contrary to the approved scheme. It is under those circumstances, the APSRTC preferred RP No.54 of 1996 assailing the grant of permit to the petitioner by the second respondent.
7. Before adverting to the arguments advanced in the writ petition by the learned senior Counsel, Sri M. V. Ramcma Reddy, I would like to observe that this Court does not exercise any appellate jurisdiction over the orders passed by the first respondent-Tribunal. The first respondent-Tribunal is a quasi-judicial body presided over by a learned District Judge. This Court cannot substitute the findings arrived at by the first respondent-Tribunal by re-appreciating the evidence on record. The Court has to consider the validity of the
order passed by the Tribunal within the Certiorari parameters.
This Court can interfere only if it comes to the conclusion :
(a) that the order passed by it suffers from incurable jurisdictional errors; and
(b) the findings of the Tribunal are based on no evidence or the Tribunal failed to take into consideration the relevant material available on record.
in, nut shell, the order could be quashed by this Court only when it suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record.
8. No doubt, the learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner strenuously contends that the Corporation did not produce any scheme as such before the Tribunal and the findings recorded by the Tribunal that the permit granted to the petitioner is contrary to the approved scheme, is based on imaginary grounds. The learned senior Counsel placed reliance upon Rule 15 of the A.P. State Transport Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1989 (for short ‘the Rules’), which prescribes the procedure for filing additional evidence before the Tribunal and contend that no such procedure was followed by the Tribunal in receiving the additional evidence, if any, filed by the Corporation. It is under those circumstances, the learned senior Counsel contends that the findings of the Tribunal are not based on any evidence.
9. Learned standing Counsel for the APSRTC contends that all the schemes which prohibit grant of permit in question were before the Tribunal and the Tribunal has adverted to each and every aspect of the issue with reference to the material and accordingly recorded its findings. It is urged that such a finding of fact cannot be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction. It is strenuously contended by the learned standing Counsel
that no permit can be granted, except in accordance with the conditions of the scheme itself. It is further urged that every scheme is a law.
10. The Tribunal, in my considered opinion, after referring to the scheme in G.O. Ms” No.248 dated 7-4-1976 relating to the notified route-Kakinada to Kottam, via, Pithapuram, Gollaprolu, Kathipudi junction, Nellipudi, Sankavaram, Rowtalapudi and Chinnaiahpalem held that the same does not permit grant of any moffusil permit to any body much less the petitioner. The Tribunal accordingly held that G.O. Ms. No.215 of 1976 dated 7-4-1976 is on notified route – Kakinada to Sarbhavaram, via Pithapuram, Gollaprolu, Kathipudi junction, Nellapudi, Santhi Ashram and Chintalur, which is the same as the-proposed route of the petitioner. The Tribunal accordingly concluded that the proposed route is overlapping on the notified route and the scheme does not provide any exemption to any moffusil route permit much less to the petitioner. G.O.Ms. No.739 of 1975 relates to the notified route -Visakhapatnam to Kakinada, via among other places, Kathipudi and Pithapuram. Even this G.O., does not provide for any exemption for granting of any moffusil route permit.
11. The Tribunal has adverted to the scope of each and every existing scheme and its effect on the permit granted to the petitioner and came to the conclusion that there is nothing to show about the modification of any scheme which may give protection to any person even for an inch of overlapping.
12. While dealing with the condition that G.O. Ms. No.28 of 1992 which is later in point of time wipes out whatsoever prohibition that might have been there in the earlier governmental orders and permit could be granted. The Tribunal rightly observed that the notified routes in G.O. Ms. No.342 of 1985; 782 of 1972; 739 of
1975 and other schemes are totally different schemes for different routes, though most of the vehicles in the above schemes may run to some extent on common sector i.e., Kakinada to Kathipudi junction via Pithapuram and Gollaprolu. The Tribunal rightly concluded that each scheme has to be taken separately and so also the conditions in each scheme. The Tribunal accordingly came to the conclusion that the notified route in G.O. Ms. No.28 of 1992 upon which strong reliance is placed by the petitioner, is not the same as other notified routes like G.O. Ms. No.782 of 1972. The Tribunal rightly held that G.O. Ms. No.28 of 1992 does not prevail over the earlier schemes having common sector.
13. Even according to the petitioner,
the petitioner filed a representation before the Government seeking modification of the scheme, which is stated to be pending and under consideration of the Government. That, itself, would show that there is no exemption granted in favour of the petitioner, as urged by the learned senior Counsel. A perusal of the order passed by the Tribunal would show the intense application of mind to each and ‘every aspect that was urged before it. The Tribunal has referred to each of the schemes and impact of each of the scheme on the issue relating to grant of permit to the petiiioner. The Tribunal has adverted to every aspect and material available on record. It is so obvious and evident that all the approved schemes contained in various governmental orders were before the Tribunal, It is, therefore, not possible to accept the submissions made by the learned senior Counsel that the above schemes contained in various Governmental Orders are not before the Tribunal. Since the material was available on record, the question as to whether the said material was made available by the Corporation by following the procedure prescribed under Rule 15 of the Rules
would not be of any significance. Even if the Tribunal failed to follow the said procedure, the order, itself, cannot be held to be vitiated. After all Rule 15 of the Rules provides procedure for making or filing additional evidence before the Tribunal. At any rate, as rightly pointed out by the learned standing Counsel for the Corporation, there is no whisper in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition about the Tribunal not following the procedure prescribed by the Rules in the matter of receiving additional evidence. It is nowhere stated in the affidavit that the scheme were not made available on record. It is also not stated that the findings and the conclusions reached by the Tribunal are not based on any evidence. On the other hand, the sheet anchor of the case of the petitioner is that its application for exemption is pending before the Government. Mere pendency of the application for granting exemption would not enable the authority concerned to grant permit contrary to the scheme.
14. A Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No.551 of 1977 dated 15-3-1978 held that if there were other schemes covering portions of the route imposing a complete ban on the grant of permit to private operators overlapping the route except on specified portions, the Authority had no jurisdiction to grant permits in contravention of such terms. The said judgment was approvingly referred to by another Division Bench of this Court in WP No.16562 of 1992 and WA No.l of 1993 dated 18-2-1993.
15. As rightly urged by the learned Standing Counsel the decision of the Division Bench in WA No. 1022 of 1998 dated 8-7-1998 is required to be understood in the background of its own facts. The observations made by the Division Bench that a Circular issued at a later point of time should always be adopted and if such Circular issued at a later point of time covers the subject of the earlier circular,
the same shall be deemed that the earlier Circular stands overruled and no effect need be given thereto, is to be understood in the contextual facts as in that case as observed by the Court, itself, in the said judgment. Therefore, the findings recorded by the Tribunal that G.O. Ms. No.28 of 1992, which is subsequent to the earlier schemes, but the same relates to the routes – Paderu to Araku and Araku to Kakinada, and, therefore, does not deal with the same route is absolutely correct and is not contrary to the law laid down by this Court in WA No.1022 of 1998. The Tribunal accordingly, rightly, concluded that the schemes like G.O. Ms. No.782 of 1972 and 215 of 1976 etc., in categorical terms prohibit grant of permit or overlapping. The Scheme in G.O. Ms. No.215 of 1976 from Kakinada to Sarbhavaram covering the entire proposed route of the applicant with a length of 54 kms., completely prohibits any overlapping and grant of permit for muffasil route. The Tribunal rightly held that the later schemes in G.O. Ms. No.28 of 1992 is not for the very same route as of the earlier schemes in G.O. Ms. No.782 of 1972 etc.
16. The issues raised for consideration in this writ petition are not res Integra. In Adarsh Travel Bus Service v. State of U.P., , the Apex Court held that :
“A careful and diligent perusal of Section 68-C, Section 68-D(3) and Section 68-FF in the light of the definition of the expression ‘route’ in Section 2(28-A) appears to make it manifestly clear that once a scheme is published under Section 68-D in relation to any area or route or portion thereof, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial of other persons or otherwise, no person other than the State Transport Undertaking may operate on the notified area or notified route except as provided in the scheme itself. A necessary consequence of these provisions is that no private operator can operate his vehicle
on any part or portion of a notified area or notified unless authorised so to do by the terms of the scheme itself.”
The aforesaid decision has been approvingly referred to by the Supreme Court in subsequent decisions. The law is clearly laid down that no person other than the State Transport undertaking may operate on the area or notified route except as provided in the scheme itself. The schemes in the instant case do not authorise grant of any permit in favour of any private operator.
17. For the aforesaid reasons, it is not possible to agree with the contentions of the learned senior Counsel that the findings recorded by the Tribunal are not based on evidence. It is also not possible to upheld the submission made by the learned senior Counsel that the schemes were not at all on record to enable the Tribunal to record findings. A perusal of the order, itself, would show that the entire record was made available before the Tribunal and it had adverted to every conceivable aspect of the matter and rightly came to the conclusion that no permit could be granted in favour of the petitioner contrary to the approved schemes. I do not find any reason whatsoever for remitting the matter for fresh consideration by the Tribunal as prayed for by the petitioner.
18. Accordingly the writ petition fails and shall stand dismissed. No order as to costs.